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U.S. Department of State
International Religious Freedom Report
October 2001
-Part 3 of 4-
In July 2000, the acting governor of North Maluku started expelling militant Laskar Jihad troops from the province. However, the governor of Maluku took no similar action, claiming that it was the responsibility of Jakarta to order the expulsion of the militants. A major factor contributing to the continuation of violence in these two provinces was the failure of the Government and security forces to bring the perpetrators to justice or to prevent (and then deport) several thousand armed Laskar Jihad militants from Java who had joined forces with Muslims in various parts of the two provinces (see Section III).
On May 5, 2001, the Laskar Jihad leader in Maluku Province accused the Indonesian National Police (INP) of detaining him under false charges when he was arrested for having ordered the execution by stoning of a member of the Laskar Jihad found guilty of rape and adultery. In his defense, he asserted that he was within his rights to follow Shari'a law, not national criminal law, in this case. The police rejected his defense and, as of June 30, 2001, were investigating the case.
On Christmas Eve 2000, unknown terrorists bombed or attempted to bomb 34 Christian churches in 10 cities in 8 provinces and special districts. Nineteen citizens died from the blasts, including Muslims guarding the churches, and 84 persons were injured. The Government formed a special interagency team to investigate the bombings, and the NGO Indonesian Forum for Peace (FID) formed a joint factfinding team with the Government to investigate the Christmas Eve church bombings. On June 28, 2001, the Bandung District Court sentenced Agus Kurniawan to 9 years in prison for his role in the bombings. Another suspect also was on trial for involvement in the bombings at the end of the period covered by this report. President Wahid and various religious leaders publicly stated their belief that the coordinated bombings were politically, not religiously, motivated to destabilize the country and undermine Wahid's government and reform efforts.
Forced Religious Conversion
According to multiple sources, including direct testimony from victims and witnesses in early 2001, thousands of Christians underwent forced conversions in the Moluccas from December 1999 to January 2001. There also were several hundred Muslims forced to convert to Christianity in North Maluku and Maluku Provinces in early to mid-2000. President Wahid conceded in late December that hundreds of Christians on Keswui and Teor Islands in Maluku converted to Islam in November and December 2000 to save their lives. By February 2001, over 700 converts had been able to leave the 2 islands. There also have been credible reports of forced conversions occurring in other parts of Ambon/Maluku and North Maluku (see Section II). Estimates range from over 3,500 to 8,000 cases. Many of these conversions, especially those in North Maluku, occurred in early 2000; however, confirmation of the conversions was not available until late 2000 and early 2001. For example, on Keswui and Teor Islands inMaluku Province, hundreds of Christians converted to Islam in November and December 2000 under threat of execution. While most documented cases involve Christians who converted to Islam, there have been reports of Muslims who were forced to convert to Christianity in Halmahera, North/Maluku (Lata Lata, Bacan). There is credible evidence that 200 to 800 Muslims were forced to convert to Christianity in the Moluccas. Many of these conversions occurred during the period covered by this report.
There were allegations that local government officials, largely village heads, were complicit in some of the mass conversions. The governor of Maluku Province argued that most persons only were "pressed" and not coerced to convert.
Christian IDP's from Keswui and Teor who had undergone conversion said in media interviews that Muslim militants ordered Christians to convert to Islam or face probable death at the hands of Muslim militias. According to these sources, Christians were forced into mosques and converted to Islam en masse. Both male and female converts later were forced to undergo circumcision to prove that they were genuine Muslims, despite the fact that Muslim women in the Moluccas were not customarily circumcised. The victims suffered considerable pain and some developed infections as a result of the forced circumcisions.
There were no reports of the forced religious conversion of minor U.S. citizens who had been abducted or illegally removed from the United States, or of the Government's refusal to allow such citizens to be returned to the United States.
Improvements in Respect for Religious Freedom
On June 1, 2001, the Government lifted the 24-year-old ban on Jehovah's Witnesses; this step toward greater respect for religious freedom and diversity continued an earlier trend when, in the previous reporting period, the Government lifted the ban on Confucianism and the Baha'i Faith (see Section II).
In late 2000, the Falun Gong obtained a license to operate as a social organization in the country, and Falun Gong members practiced freely without government interference.
During the period covered by this report, Gadja Mada University in Yogyakarta, with the assistance of other local universities and institutes, opened a graduate level program on comparative religion. Courses on Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism are taught. State-run institutes of Islamic religion offer undergraduate comparative religion programs, but most of the lecturers are Muslims.
Government officials took steps to address the deterioration of religious tolerance in the country and the rise in sectarian violence along religious lines. During the period covered by this report, Government officials and domestic NGO's assisted the U.S. Embassy in bringing Moluccan Christian and Muslim victims of forced conversion to Jakarta to testify (see Section IV). Indonesian government officials also participated in a U.S. Embassy-sponsored digital videoconference on Religious Freedom in a Democracy.
Section III: Societal Attitudes
Religious intolerance, especially on the part of extreme Muslims towards religious minorities, including Christians, increasingly was evident and became a matter of growing concern to many religious minority members and Muslim moderates. There was continued interreligious violence in the Moluccas, and religious intolerance also manifested itself in numerous attacks on churches in various locations throughout the country.
Citizens generally tend to identify themselves and to interact with others on the basis of ethnicity, religion, race, or social class, and civil society is in a very nascent stage. The country is a multiethnic, multireligious society that, historically, has experienced outbursts of religious intolerance and violence.
The economic crisis that began in mid-1997 and continued through the period covered by this report, severely affected millions of citizens, pushing many below the poverty line and reversing the gains of the newly emerging middle class. With the weakening of central leadership and control--Soeharto stepped down in May 1998--ethnically and religiously based communal conflict reemerged in the late 1990's. In 1997 ethnic/religious conflict broke out in West Kalimantan, and the tempo of violence increased after 1998, breaking out and continuing in pockets all over the archipelago (e.g., the Moluccas, Java, Kalimantan, Sumatra, Lombok, Irian Jaya/Papua, and Sulawesi); this violence continued during the period covered by this report. Most of the violence was attributable to unaddressed grievances and frustration with arbitrary central government development and migration policies that had, in many areas, upset delicate ethnic and religious balances. In the absence of a healthy civil society and democratic culture to arbitrate differences peacefully, this frustration was provoked easily and often took the form of extrajudicial violence under the banner of an ethnic/religious crusade. Despite the Government's general religious tolerance, it was unable to stop the sectarian violence or rein in religious extremism, particularly for the Muslim majority.
In the Moluccas, over 1,500 persons were killed, half a million internally displaced, and thousands forced to convert to another faith, largely because of their religious affiliation. While the underlying causes of the conflict were attributable largely to unresolved grievances and resentment over the distribution of economic and political power between local residents and more recently arrived migrants, the competition quickly took on religious overtones and resulted in the segregation and displacement along religious lines of the population in both provinces. A major factor contributing to the continuation of violence in these two provinces was the failure of the Government and security forces to bring the perpetrators to justice, and to prevent the influx of or deport several thousand armed Muslim militants (Laskar Jihad) from Java who joined forces with Muslims in various parts of the two provinces (see Section II). The presence of these outside forces hindered local reconciliation efforts and peaceful resolution of the conflict. While in the previous reporting period, the victims were divided approximately equally between Christians and Muslims, most of the 1,500 victims during the period covered by this report were Christians.
The Government failed to halt the violence in Maluku Province. Religious violence and the lack of an effective government response to punish perpetrators and prevent further attacks led to allegations that officials were complicit in some of the incidents or, at a minimum, allowed them to occur with impunity (see Section II). In May and June 2001, there was renewed violence, particularly in the area of Poso in Central Sulawesi, which resulted in numerous deaths and widespread destruction. The violence was engendered by the continued presence and activity of armed militant Muslims from outside the province. However, the situations in North Maluku and Central Sulawesi Provinces stabilized by the end of the period covered by this report largely due to effective local government leadership (see Section II).
There were numerous attacks on churches and some attacks on mosques in various locations throughout the country, ranging from minor damage to total destruction; only a few cases, if any, were investigated thoroughly, and there were no reports of perpetrators being punished (see Section II). According to the Indonesian Christian Communication Forum, from January 1999 to April 2001, 327 churches were closed or destroyed, while the Ministry of Religion reports that 254 mosques were attacked or destroyed during the same period. Most of the attacks and destruction occurred in the Moluccas. From July 1, 2000 to May 31, 2001, there were 108 reported incidents of destruction of churches (compared to 163 incidents reported in the previous period) including 21 attacks on churches in Java; 20 in Sumatra, 10 in Lombok; 9 in South, Central, and Southeast Sulawesi; and 5 in North Sumatra (Medan).
In late May 2001, three churches in Pasuruan, East Java were attacked by mobs who allegedly were supporters of President Wahid and the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Muslim organization. NU leaders and President Wahid denied that NU members were responsible and ordered the police to investigate. Authorities charged 2 persons with attacking churches and 132 persons with rioting.
Attacks on mosques in the conflict-torn Moluccas continued. The Maluku provincial government reported that four mosques had been attacked or destroyed during the period covered by this report, while the North Maluku provincial government reported no attacks on mosques during the same time period. On May 30, 2001, a mob of allegedly pro-President Wahid supporters associated with the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) torched a mosque associated with rival Muhammadiyah followers in Pasuruan, East Java. On May 22, 2001, a mob of 400 persons vandalized the retreat of Jamaah Salamulla (an Islamic group) in Bogor, West Java (see Section II).
Attacks on places of worship reflect religious intolerance, but other contributing factors include general underlying socioeconomic and political competition and tensions. Non-Muslims in general--and Sino-Indonesians in particular--tend to be economically better off than the majority of Muslims. Similarly in the Moluccas, Central Sulawesi, Irian Jaya/Papua and Kalimantan, economic tensions between local or native peoples (predominantly non-Muslim) and more recently arrived migrants (predominantly Muslim) were a significant factor in incidents of interreligious and interethnic violence.
Islam is undergoing a renaissance in the country, as evidenced by a growing number of religious schools (pesantrens), mosques, banks and other businesses, civic groups, media outlets, and political parties associated with Islam (see Section II). According to a 1999 study released by the U.S. Department of State in Fall 2000, approximately 75 percent of the country's Muslims wanted Islam to play a very large role in society and government policy, and 54 percent wanted religious leaders to become more politically active. There are 15 Islamic political parties; Muslims continued to seek greater political empowerment and economic opportunity through these political parties as well as through religious organizations. The number of stores selling Islamic attire and religious objects increased greatly during the period covered by this report; more women donned the head covering, the "jilbab". Since the early 1990's, a growing number of Muslims have undertaken the Hajj. In 2001 approximately 205,000 persons (or 24,000 more than in 2000) made the pilgrimage, despite the continuing economic crisis in the country. The Islamic publication, Sabili, which advocates obligatory adherence of Muslims to Shari'a law, was one of the country's top five magazines in circulation during the period covered by this report.
In general Islam in the country traditionally has been moderate. According to leading Muslim scholars and leaders, the Muslim community still is predominantly (80 percent) moderate; however, with the removal of Soeharto-era restrictions on religious organization and expression, there has been a resurgence--or a greater vocalization--of advocacy for an Islamic state. An estimated 20 percent of the country's Muslims consider themselves to be fundamentalists and advocate establishment of an Islamic state, which would make it obligatory for Muslims to follow Shari'a law. The majority of these Muslims (16 to 18 percent) pursue their goal through peaceful political and educational means. A small, but vocal minority (2 to 4 percent) condones coercive measures and has resorted to violence. Fundamentalist groups advocating coercion and resorting to violence include: Laskar Jihad, Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Hizbullah Front, Laskar Mujahidan, and the Campus Association of Muslim Students (HAMMAS). Many of the country's religious minorities expressed growing concern over what they perceived to be increasing demands by certain Muslim groups to impose Shari'a law in the country; however, during the period covered by this report, a proposal to implement Islamic law failed (see Section II).
Anti-Christian sermons and publications continued during the period covered by this report. In the early part of 2000, a movement known as the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) emerged on university campuses in Java. There were sporadic reports from some Jakarta neighborhoods that student followers of the NII movement set up roadblocks, checked identification cards, and harassed passing non-Muslims, in some cases forcing them to recite passages from the Koran. Similar incidents occurred in Makassar, South Sulawesi. In October 2000, Muslim students attacked several hotels allegedly operating prostitution and gambling businesses in Riau Province.
In December 2000, over 500 armed Laskar Jihad militants attacked cafes in Solo and demanded that they close during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadhan. Also in December 2000, the Laskar Hizbullah raided a number of nightspots in an elite Jakarta neighborhood. In early May 2001, radical Muslim groups raided a number of bookshops in urban areas of Java and Sulawesi and destroyed books that they claimed had Communist content, even books whose authors criticized Communism. Protests from Islamic groups prompted a publisher to remove books by the religious philosopher Anand Krishna from bookstores. Extremist Muslim groups also targeted cultural events, including art exhibits, and homosexual gatherings.
Some radical Islamic groups established vice squads to monitor the behavior of other Muslims and to punish errant behavior. One such group, the Anti-Vice Mass Movement (GMAM) kidnaped and tortured two police officials in Makassar, South Sulawesi for the police officials' alleged involvement in gambling and prostitution activities. Non-Muslims also were the targets of violence. Roadblocks manned by Muslim morality squads who check the religious identities of passersby continued to operate in the Makassar area. There were reports of some non-Muslims being detained and beaten by these squads.
Political tensions among Muslim groups became more intense during the period covered by this report, in particular between the 2 largest Muslim social organizations, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which has 40 million members, and Muhammadiyah, which has 35 million members. NU is associated politically with President Wahid, its former chairman, while Muhammadiyah is associated politically with Amien Rais, a former chairman of the organization and now chairman of the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the speaker of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). During the first 6 months of 2001, NU supporters, enraged by Rais' calls for the impeachment of Wahid, attacked and damaged Muhammadiyah offices and other properties, including a mosque frequented by Muhammadiyah followers, in Central and East Java.
Muslim student groups also are divided along political lines. The Muslim Students' Action Front (KAMMI), the Association of Islamic Students (HMI), and the Intercampus Muslim Student Association (HAMMAS) opposed President Wahid and called for his removal or resignation. On the other hand, the Muslim Student's Movement (PMII), which is affiliated with NU, supported Wahid.
Some prominent Muslim interfaith organizations also were in part divided along political affiliations. Many of the Muslim members of the Indonesian Committee on Religion and Peace (ICRP) were affiliated with Muhammadiyah and some opposed the continuation of President Wahid's presidency, while many of the Muslim members of the Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace (also ICRP) were NU supporters and proPresident Wahid.
Many Muslim moderates worried that minority extremist groups potentially could force their will on the country's moderate Muslim majority and erode the country's religious harmony. In December 2000, more than 70 Muslim clerics and 17 NGO leaders issued a letter to the police calling the raids and sweepings of pubs, hotels, and amusement centers "intolerable acts" and giving their support to police efforts to stem the raids. A coalition of media, human rights groups, students, legal scholars and literary figures (the Alliance for Freedom of Thought and Expression) condemned the book seizures in May 2001. But only one Islamic organization, the Muhammadiyah Youth Association (IRM), joined the public condemnation. In May 2001, the Attorney General announced a government prohibition on sweeping operations, and the Minister of Religion noted that such operations conflicted with religious teachings.
Muslims are a religious minority in the easternmost province of Irian Jaya/Papua. The arrival in the province of mainly Muslim migrants from other parts of the country has in the past led to attacks on mosques; however, there were no reports of attacks on mosques in Irian Jaya/Papua during the period covered by this report.
Muslim and Christian observers expressed concern over what they believed was an increase in Christian fundamentalist groups in the country, some of which were influenced and partially funded by foreign groups from other countries. Some observers maintain that leaders of these "Charismatic" Christian groups were aggressive proselytizers, who did not respect the sensitivities of the country's Muslim majority. When radical Muslim groups alleged that there was a foreign Christian conspiracy to destabilize the country by attacking Muslims, moderate Muslim and Christian religious leaders and intellectuals claimed that they were referring to these groups.
Some extremist religious leaders--both Muslim and Christian--preached hatred against other religious groups and encouraged their followers to engage in violence against persons of other faiths. Speaking at mosques and on the radio, the Laskar Jihad leader stationed in Ambon/Maluku ordered Muslims to launch a Jihad against non-believers--Christians--and to kill them if need be. Other local Moluccan Muslim leaders threatened to kill Muslims who tried to make peace or do business with Christians. Some extreme Christian leaders reportedly encouraged their followers to use violence against Muslims. Both sides argued that they were acting out of self-defense, and that the opposing side had started the cycle of violence.
Members of the mainstream Hindu community, represented by the Pansada Hindu Dharma, reported no incidents where followers were discriminated against or harassed; however, some Hindus objected strongly to the use of sacred Hindu words and symbols in the secular world of advertising. In January 2001, the Peradah Hindu Youth Association lodged a formal complaint against a motorcycle company that had used the names Rama, Vishnu, and Krishna for their line of motorcycles.
Some mainstream Balinese Hindus opposed the presence of Hare Krishna in Bali and pressed the local public prosecutor's office to reinforce a local ban on Hare Krishna (see Section II). Hare Krishna followers strongly oppose the Balinese Hindu tradition of sacrificing meat during their ceremonies, one of a number of ritual differences between the two Hindu groups.
Members of the Baha'i Faith did not report major problems since the lifting of the ban on their religious practice (see Section II); however, in early May 2001, a crowd of Muslims reportedly ousted two Baha'i families living in a predominantly Muslim village in the Donggala District of Central Sulawesi. The local branch of the Indonesian Ulemas Council (MUI) issued a religious decree (fatwa) banning the spread of the Baha'i Faith in the district.
During the period covered by this report, there were a number of reports of killings of persons who practice traditional magic--"dukun santet"--based in part on indigenous preIslamic "Aliran Kepercayaan" and "Kebatinan" belief systems. Police acknowledged in November 2000 that at least 20 villagers in the Cianjur area of West Java had been executed for allegedly practicing traditional magic. Police arrested 20 persons suspected of involvement in the killings. However, none of the cases had come to trial by the end of the period covered by this report.
During the period covered by this report, interfaith organizations grew, and their activities enjoyed some media coverage. The Indonesian Peace Forum (FID) formed immediately following the December 24, 2000 church bombings, and brought together moderate leaders from all of the country's major religions. FID leaders, many of them prominent Muslims, deplored the attacks on the churches, called for a thorough government investigation, and formed their own investigative team. FID also sponsored a number of events to foster religious respect and end interreligious, ethnic, and separatist conflicts.
Other active interfaith groups include the Society for Interreligious Dialog (MADIA); the Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace (ICRP); the Indonesian Committee on Religion and Peace (also ICRP); the Institute for Interfaith Dialogue (Interfidei); and the Institute of Gender and Religious Studies. During the period covered by this report, these and other similar organizations hosted numerous national and regional seminars to promote interfaith dialog and religious tolerance. In November 2000, the two ICRP organizations announced plans to host an Asia-wide Conference on Religion and Peace. In December 2000, Interfidei held an interdenominational forum on Religion and National Integration in Yogyakarta, and in February 2001, the national chapter of the World Committee of Churches held an Interfaith Youth Conference in North Sulawesi. One of the Muslim panelists attributed the religious intolerance to the incorrect teaching of religion in the country.
Section IV: U.S. Government Policy
The U.S. Embassy/Consulate General Surabaya and visiting State Department officials regularly engaged Indonesian government officials (particularly in the Ministry of Religion and the State Secretariat) on religious freedom issues and also encouraged officials from other embassies to discuss the subject with the Indonesian Government. U.S. Embassy/Consulate General Surabaya officials focused many of these discussions on the deterioration of religious freedom in the Moluccas. U.S. government officials expressed serious concern over the forced conversions of Christians and Muslims in the Moluccas and encouraged Indonesian government officials and Indonesian NGO leaders to hear the testimony of victims of forced conversion and to lobby to bring action against the perpetrators of such acts (see Section III). Some of these interventions appeared in local press accounts. The Embassy also voiced support for the Government's decision to lift its ban on Jehovah's Witnesses.
The U.S. Embassy/Consulate General Surabaya, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), local NGO's, and others pressed Ambon/Maluku government officials to evacuate forced conversion victims from Teor and Keswui Islands in January 2001 (see Section II). Embassy/Consulate General Surabaya and USAID officials were partly successful in their encouragement of moderate Moluccan Muslims and Christians to seek ways--through the Baku Bae movement and other initiatives--to end the violence and to work jointly to rebuild the war-torn provinces.
U.S. Embassy/Consulate General Surabaya officials regularly met with religious leaders to discuss the importance of religious freedom and tolerance and to encourage interreligious efforts to mitigate the sectarian conflict in the Moluccas and to combat religious intolerance in many parts of the country.
U.S. Embassy and USAID officials worked with Indonesian and international NGO's to develop methods to mitigate religious conflict and to combat religious intolerance. The U.S. Embassy and USAID worked with Indonesian interfaith NGO's, such as the Society for Interreligious Dialog (MADIA), the Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace (ICRP), the Indonesian Committee on Religion and Peace (also ICRP), and the Institute for Interfaith Dialog (Interfidei). They also met with Indonesian and international human rights groups and with the National Human Rights Commission (KOMNASHAM) and its branch in Ambon in the Maluku Province.
The U.S. Embassy promoted religious tolerance through public affairs, exchange, and training programs and engagement with Indonesian officials and religious and NGO leaders. State Department and USAID funding was used to promote religious freedom, tolerance, and conflict resolution. U.S. Embassy/Consulate General Surabaya officials identified and assisted several Indonesians to testify on religious freedom before the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and advised the USCIRF of potential issues. The U.S. Embassy served as a liaison between the U.S. Government, Congress and Indonesian government officials on religious freedom issues and advocated U.S. government positions on areas of concern. In May 2001, over 170 Indonesians (government officials and NGO representatives) attended a U.S. Embassy-sponsored digital videoconference on Religious Freedom and Tolerance in a Democracy in May 2001. Religious freedom and tolerance also was one of the three themesaddressed during the annual Fulbright seminar held in May 2001 in Bali. The Embassy/U.S.-Indonesian Fulbright Foundation (AMINEF) provided expertise and equipment (a virtual library on comparative religion) to help establish the country's first graduate-level program on comparative religion at Gadja Mada University in Yogyakarta (see Section II).
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