The Jakarta Post, April 29, 2006
Political elites 'prolonging' Poso sectarian conflict
Ridwan Max Sijabat, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta
For those people who wonder why the sectarian conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi
remains smoldering, local Muslim and Christian peace activists have a theory.
They say it is a public knowledge in Poso that the conflict, which claimed more than
1,000 lives during the past six years, has been intentionally prolonged by elites in
Poso and Jakarta for political and economic gain. In an interview with The Jakarta
Post on Thursday, the activists declined to identify the masterminds behind the recent
attacks but said they were "easily found in central and local governments, the military
and the police." The four activists are former Muslim and Christian militiamen fighting
in the sectarian violence that peaked between 2000 and 2001 -- Andi Basatahir,
Agustanti Ekarini Saptati, Alex Patambo and Syamsul Alam Agus. They are all either
from predominantly Muslim Poso or the Christian enclave of Tentena.
The activists said most people from the two religious communities there were tired of
the conflict and wanted peace. However, operatives working for the elites were
provoking incidents to keep the animosity between the religions burning. The activists
were attending an international workshop, "Promoting Peace: The Roles of Peace
Cultures and Local Wisdom", here on Thursday. They said many people in Poso
knew the identities of the people behind the conflict. "The group actually consists of
people trying to take economic advantage of the conflict," said Andi, a former Muslim
militiaman.
He said the Jakarta and Poso administrations had never decided to send combat
battalions to Poso, however, regular soldiers and those from the Army's Special
Forces (Kopassus), were operating there. Many standard weapons used by the
military and the police had also been distributed to civilians, they said.
In its October 2005 report on the violence in Poso, the International Crisis Group said
a study of recent incidents in Poso and Tentena suggested "the conflict areas
continue to be home to 'leftover (Muslim) mujahidin' who went there to fight from other
parts of the country and never left ... or who were locally recruited and continued to be
active in jihadist circles long after the conflicts waned."
However, the report also said the May 5, 2005, bomb attack in the marketplace of the
Christian town of Tentena, Poso, which killed 21 people, was more complicated. The
culprits likely came from "beyond mujahidin circles to include local officials and gang
leaders," it says. Agustanti said while there were still a few people left in the area
from hardline militia groups, most had gone. "But strangely, more bombs have
exploded, people are being mysteriously shot dead and many others living in remote
areas have been intimidated." Alex, an activist from the Central Sulawesi Churches
Crisis Center said Poso would have returned to normal if the government had the
political will to remove the instigators of the violence. Syamsul said security and order
in Poso could be restored only if the police and the military took strict actions against
rogue officers and enforced the law.
"So far, none of the cases of violence that occurred during and after the conflict,
except the one involving (Christian) Fabianus Tibo and his two friends (Marinus Riwu
and Dominggus da Silva) who have been sentenced to death, have been investigated
as recommended by the 2001 Malino Peace Agreement," Syamsul said. The situation
in Poso had remained tense because the central government was not fully committed
to implementing the peace accord, and its officials had become part of the conflict, he
said.
Bombings, killings, abductions and rapes that happened around the conflict were yet
to be investigated because local government officials and security personnel were
involved, the activists said. Neither had the police ever announced the results of
ballistic tests on bullets and guns used in many murder investigations.
The activists believed the conflict was initially triggered by political friction among local
elites in 1998.
It had not been settled because the government had adopted a top-down approach,
with venal public institutions treating the conflict like a money-making scheme, they
said. "Like in conflict-riddled Ambon, Papua and Aceh, Poso has been treated like a
battlefield. After employing a repressive (military) approach, the government then
carries out a rehabilitation project involving a huge amount of funds, a major part of
which have gone into officials' pockets," Alex said.
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