The Jakarta Post, May 02, 2006
What draws recruits to join Noordin's squad?
Noor Huda Ismail, St Andrews, Scotland
The National Police raided Noordin Top's Central Java safe-house on Saturday April
29, 2006. The Malaysian terror suspect, in his 40s, eluded capture escaping only
hours before police arrived at his hideout.
But two of his trusted man, Gempur Angkoro alias Jabir and Abdul Hadi were killed.
While another two, Solahudin alias Supri and Mustaghfirin were arrested.
The report sheds light on the nature of the group's network.
First, as widely reported by the press Noordin has broken away from Jamaah
Islamiyah (JI) and formed his own jihadi organization, called Tanzim Qaidatul Jihad.
Security analysts have come to the conclusion that there is a deep factional rift within
JI.
However, the raid shows that Noordin still has the ability to attract hard-core followers.
It is important also to note that they do not gravitate toward Top's squad because of
some individual pathology.
I have been talking to some jihadists inside and outside prison and I also believe
journalists who cover terrorism stories would agree with me that, in the main, friends,
families and neighbors of terrorists are shocked and surprised to find out that they had
been mingling with "terrorists".
"I talked to one of them before the arrest. He went to Friday prayers twice at our
mosque," said Sugiono, who lives next door to Noordin's safe-house (detik.com, April
29).
Sugiono's comment confirms that most recruits look, dress and behave like normal
people, at least until they are given a deadly mission.
Second, the arrest of more than 200 members of the group since the first Bali blast
has transformed the group's modus operandi. The group is now working more loosely
around increasingly autonomous cells without central coordination.
Leadership figures provide inspiration to members and affiliated organizations.
However, jihadis engage in terrorist activity without consulting the leadership.
This is particularly true in the case of the Seram attack on a paramilitary police post
on May 16, 2005, that shows how a disparate group of men linked through various
networks can come together and form a team of operatives.
Asep Djaja alias Dahlan who was involved in that attack told me in Ambon Police
detention last year, that he was sent by Mujahidin's Kompak's Aris Mundandar to
Ambon. Munandar also sent him to participate in a guerrilla training program at an
MILF camp in the Southern Philippines, before coming to Ambon.
But he said the Seram attack was his own initiative. "Munandar didn't know of this
plan," he said.
Some of the cells of the group operate in conflict areas. The group believes that
Maluku and Poso are important.
In interviews, Nasir Abas, the former head of Mantiqi 3 which covers Poso said that
Poso had the potential to develop into a qoidah aminah, a secure area where
residents can live by Islamic principles and law: In their view, such a base could then
serve as the building block of an Islamic state, and Maluku and Poso thus remains a
focus for religious outreach and recruitment efforts.
In terms of recruitment, the favored cell in the group has a tendency to develop within
previous operations even dating back in 2000, school ties and a reputation for
involvement in conflict.
The recent arrest shows that Sholahuddin who is now still under police interrogation
was involved in the Atrium bombing in 2000 and studied in the Islamic boarding school
Ngruki for a couple of years.
Gempur Angkoro alias Jabir assembled the bombs used in deadly attacks in Jakarta
at the Australian Embassy in 2004 and the J.W. Marriott hotel in 2003. Abdul Hadi
was a recruiter of suicide bombing candidates. Both acquired skills in a one-month
bombing-making course from the late Azhari.
Jabir studied in Ngruki then moved to Darusyahada in 1995 and graduated in 1998 and
taught there briefly.
Interestingly, both Salahudin and Jabbir have a strong jihadi family background.
Sholahuddin's father belonged to the hard-core Darul Islam movement in the 1950s,
which tried to assassinate Sukarno in 1957. Two of his brothers Farihin bin Ahmad
and Abdul Jabar participated in the attack on the Philippine ambassador's Jakarta
residence in 2000.
Gempur is a cousin of Faturrahman al Ghozi, who was shot and killed by the
Philippine police in 2003. Al Ghozi's father was a Darul Islam member who was jailed
during the Soeharto era.
Al Ghozi's younger brother, Ahmad Rofiq Ridho, is now standing trial on several
charges including sheltering Top. "I helped Noordin because Jabir asked me to do
so," Ridho said in jail interview last year.
Third, the report also says that police found some bombs being assembled. The
bombs were to be carried in a backpack or vest in an operation.
It suggests that there is change in strategy from using car bombs that were used in
annual attacks -- Bali in October 2002, the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August
2003, and the Australian Embassy in September 2004 -- to smaller bombings at a
faster tempo. Last year's blasts in Bali confirmed this switch.
Lastly, terrorism is indeed a marginal symptom that tells a lot, as does as any
symptom, and obliges everybody (above all Muslims) to go beyond wishful thinking,
misgivings and passivity to realize that the real challenge here is the prevention of the
spread of their ideology.
However, if the challenge posed by the ideological radicalism underlying the belief
systems of these individuals is not dealt with effectively, there will be no guarantee
that the possibility of another generation of JI recruits can be prevented.
There is no choice. The Indonesian government and Muslim leaders must refute the
notion that terrorism is a legitimate means in pursuit of the larger cause of defending
Muslims and Islam.
Failure to do so will simply ensure that Indonesia remains a legitimate terrorist target.
The writer earned a British Chevening scholarship and is now in the postgraduate
program in International Security Studies at St. Andrews University. He can be
reached at noorhudaismail@yahoo.com.
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