The International Crisis Group (ICG), 29 December 2006
"Priorities for a GAM-Led Government in Aceh"
Sidney Jones in The Jakarta Post
The Jakarta Post
Being spectacularly and publicly wrong, as I was on the local elections in Aceh, is
always a humbling experience. I thought the split in the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
leadership would prove more damaging; I thought the money and machinery of the old
elite would have more influence; and I underestimated the strength of GAM support.
It is therefore with some trepidation that I make any pronouncements about the future
of Aceh. But after Dec. 11, a few things seem clear:
The GAM victories at the provincial and district levels on balance strengthen the
peace process; they also put GAM in a strong position for the 2009 parliamentary
elections.
As governor, Irwandi Yusuf will give priority to generating jobs, attracting investment
and speeding up reconstruction, but he will have to struggle to avoid being pulled in all
directions.
Working out a modus vivendi with the security forces may be less difficult than might
appear at first glance.
One of the biggest challenges to newly elected GAM officials will be rising above a
political culture of corruption, patronage and bureaucratic lethargy.
It's both easy and misleading to look at the election results and say that GAM
achieved more in 18 months of peace than it did in 30 years of war. It was the longed
armed struggle that made GAM a serious negotiating partner; the Indonesian
government would have had no reason to sit down at the table in Helsinki with a minor
gadfly. In many areas of Aceh, GAM took credit for the hugely popular peace, but if
villagers heard only one side of the story, it was partly because government
spokesmen rarely ventured very far afield.
But GAM's triumph at the polls should prove to any doubters in its own ranks that
accepting the Helsinki offer -- acknowledgment of Indonesian sovereignty in exchange
for political participation and autonomy was the right move. Does it mean that all
aspirations for independence have disappeared? Of course not, any more than turning
over the agreed number of weapons meant that GAM no longer had guns. But just as
the issue of leftover guns became pointless as the peace process moved forward, the
independence dream could steadily recede if a genuinely autonomous GAM-led
government succeeds in producing concrete benefits for the Acehnese population.
GAM members in executive positions are not going to be able to do this alone: they
need sympathetic legislatures, particularly at the province level. The governor has no
veto power, and while legislators can force their own agenda on an unwilling executive,
the latter can only wheedle, cajole, make deals -- and sweeten the pot. It is therefore
all the more important for GAM to get a political party up and running to try and gain
control of the provincial legislature in the 2009 elections. If it does as well then as it
did on Dec. 11, it then will have the wherewithal not only to develop and push through
a legislative agenda but also perhaps to test the limits of autonomy. In the short term,
though, GAM will have a hard enough time trying to meet the expectations of its
members and master the tools of governing before even thinking about major
legislative initiatives.
Irwandi has made it clear in all post-election interviews that he will focus on improving
the economic welfare of Aceh's poor, particularly farmers and fishers, and on
upgrading public services. In his view the first depends in part on direct access of
Acehnese to international commodity markets, without going through Medan-based
middlemen. Improving port facilities, fixing roads, facilitating transportation links
between Aceh and Malaysia, including direct Banda Aceh-Kuala Lumpur flights,
getting abandoned palm oil plantations working again, attracting investment for joint
ventures in agribusiness -- all of this could be part of the medium to long-term picture.
But the immediate issue will be trying to speed up reconstruction work, addressing
local complaints about the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR),
improving or phasing out the Aceh Reintegration Agency (BRA). If Irwandi is allowed
any honeymoon at all, squabbles over reintegration payments to conflict victims or
unfinished housing for tsunami victims could end it.
On the cultural side, we may see a GAM-led government devote some attention to the
writing of new history textbooks for Acehnese school children and greater use of the
Acehnese language.
The governor-elect is a consummate pragmatist, and is not about to alienate any
group whose support he may need later -- for example, Aceh's ulema, the Islamic
religious scholars. It means neither Irwandi nor other GAM leaders are likely to make
any move to roll back the application of Islamic law, although they might try to slow
its further extension into the criminal justice realm. He is also not likely to make any
major push on the sensitive issue of dealing with past human rights abuses.
Members of the Indonesian Military (TNI) cautiously welcomed the elections in Aceh,
but they have to be unhappy with the results. Local commanders we interviewed
before the election made no secret of their conviction that GAM had not given up its
goal of independence. Several conservative nationalists, military and non-military,
suggested that GAM immediately dissolve itself to prove that it is loyal to the
Indonesian unitary state. Harping on such pro forma acts, like demanding loyalty
oaths from released GAM prisoners, serve no purpose. GAM members took part in an
election under Indonesian law and will be working with Indonesian institutions as they
govern; they should not be asked for proof of loyalty, as if they were all closet traitors.
The fact is that GAM is not likely to run into serious problems with the TNI unless it
challenges its economic interests. There is a history of mutual accommodation on
this front between GAM and the TNI during wartime; will it be possible during
peacetime as well? This is one area, among many, where whatever desire Irwandi
may have for clean government may run afoul of realities on the ground. A World
Bank-sponsored study showed the amount of money truckers have to pay driving from
Medan to Aceh, and much of that is collected by military and police. If GAM could
end extortion by security forces (and by its own members, though on a lesser scale),
it could probably sew up local elections for years to come.
It will be interesting to see how Irwandi will address the issue of police and how high a
priority he will make police reform. There is certainly scope under the Aceh
Government Law No. 11/2006 for expanding local recruitment and making training
more Aceh-centric. A GAM-led government could make a signal contribution to
security sector reform more generally by changing the way the police work, not just to
ensure that they are less corrupt and abusive, but that they spend more of their time
on actual policing as opposed to attending ceremonial functions.
The vote for GAM candidates represents a deep desire for change, but whatever the
intentions of Irwandi and other newly elected officials, they are likely to immediately
get bogged down by the prevailing political culture. Past GAM supporters, potential
political allies, contractors and others will be swarming around like flies to honey,
looking to benefit from the new administration. How to keep relatively clean while at
the same time building a political base for 2009? It won't be easy, and some
patronage politics is inevitable. But inviting some of Aceh's anti-corruption NGOs to
monitor allocation of government contracts might be a start.
The desire of Irwandi and his colleagues to improve public services is going to run up
against a lethargic, bloated and unproductive bureaucracy.a problem that goes well
beyond Aceh, but a GAM-led administration will need all the help it can get. Many of
Aceh's best and brightest are now working for international NGOs, often at salaries far
above what any Acehnese civil servant could make in his or her wildest dreams. If
Irwandi can appeal to their idealism and attract some of them back into government,
he would be performing a signal service. (His own work ethic is unquestioned -- after
the Helsinki accords, he was putting in 18-hour days running the GAM office trying to
respond to all the problems his members were having, with very little administrative
backup).
In a pre-election report on Aceh, we wrote, might not be a bad thing for GAM to win a
few district offices but lose the governorship. Losers in democratic elections can
escape responsibility for the mistakes and missteps of the victors. By 2009, if a
popularly elected gubernatorial team does not deliver greater security and prosperity,
the audience for an alternative GAM platform will increase." Now the tables are turned,
but the basic lesson remains the same: GAM will have to produce results. More
power to them.
The writer is Southeast Asia Project Director of the International Crisis Group. |
