The International Crisis Group (ICG), 10 October 2006
Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis
Asia Report N°120
10 October 2006
Executive summary and recommandations
The worst crisis in Timor-Leste's short history is far from over. The country is in
political limbo, waiting for the report of the UN-appointed Independent Special
Commission of Inquiry that is expected to name names and recommend prosecutions
for perpetrators of the April-May violence in Dili that killed more than 30 people.
Scheduled for release in mid-October, it is critical to moving forward but potentially
explosive. Elections scheduled for May 2007 could be another flashpoint. With some
creativity, focus, and political will, Timor-Leste can get back on track but the wounds
are deep, and it will require enormous political magnanimity on the part of a few key
actors.
There is, however, a growing consensus on what is needed for resolution, including
security sector reform. A new, expanded UN mission is in place with the mandate of
"consolidating stability, enhancing a culture of democratic governance, and facilitating
dialogue among Timorese stakeholders".
The crisis is widely portrayed as stemming from the sacking of a third of the country's
defence forces in March 2006, after which the disgruntled soldiers became part of a
power struggle between President Xanana Gusmao and the now deposed prime
minister, Mari Alkatiri. However, the problem is far more complex.
The roots lie partly in the battles and betrayals that occurred within the Revolutionary
Front for the Liberation of East Timor (FRETILIN), just before and during the
Indonesian occupation. Ideological and political disputes in the 1980s and 1990s,
particularly between FRETILIN central committee members and Xanana Gusmao,
then commander of the guerrilla army FALINTIL, carried over into the post-conflict
government.
They are also to be found in the poorly implemented demobilisation of FALINTIL
fighters in 2000 and the creation of a defence force for the new country in 2001 that
absorbed some of the veterans but left others unemployed and resentful while donors
and the UN devoted most of their attention to creation of a new police force. That
many of the police, vetted and retrained, had worked for the Indonesian administration,
was more salt in the wounds of the ex-fighters.
The old ideological splits and the frustrations of the ex-FALINTIL were manipulated in
particular by Rogerio Lobato, a FRETILIN central committee member who had lived in
Angola and Mozambique for the duration of the conflict. As interior minister, he
controlled the police, encouraged rivalry with the defence force, most of whom were
personally loyal to Xanana Gusmao, and created specialised police units that
effectively became a private security force. The police under him were in charge of law
and order, border patrol, riot control and immigration. It was never clear what the role
of the defence force was.
All these problems had been festering for years. When 159 soldiers in January 2006
petitioned the president as supreme commander, alleging discrimination in the
defence force by officers from the eastern part of the country (lorosae) against people
from the west (loromonu), many interested parties saw political opportunity. More
soldiers from the west joined the petitioners, while personal and institutional tensions
between a president commited to pluralism and a ruling party with distinctly
authoritarian tendencies, politicisation of the police, lack of any regulatory framework
for the security forces more generally and the in-bred nature of a tiny political elite
with 30 years' shared history allowed matters to spiral out of control.
Recommendations
To the Timor-Leste Government and the United Nations Integrated Mission in East
Timor jointly:
1. Immediately define terms of reference and allocate funds for the "comprehensive
review of the future role and needs of the security sector" as specified in Article 4(e) of
Security Council Resolution 1704/2006, and quickly appoint the necessary staff to get
the review underway.
2. Use the review to clarify the roles of the defence force (F-FDTL), police (PNTL), and
intelligence agencies; maritime, border, and internal security threats; command and
control arrangements, including in emergencies; and civilian oversight mechanisms.
3. Create a job corps for urban youth, starting in Dili, simultaneously to reduce the
propensity for gang violence and to address an unemployment rate for this group
estimated at over 40 per cent.
To the Timor-Leste Government:
4. Establish a national security council based on the above review, on which the
commanders of the police and F-FDTL, the heads of intelligence agencies, and the
ministers of defence and interior would sit.
5. Resolve as a matter of urgency the issue of the F-FDTL deserters, by prosecutions
where appropriate and absorption of the rest either back into the defence force or into
civilian jobs.
6. Develop a plan for the gradual retirement of resistance veterans within the F-FDTL
and a more comprehensive social security package for all veterans.
7. Absorb the special police units created by Rogerio Lobato into the regular police as
a temporary measure until the security review is complete and any further
restructuring can be based on identified needs.
8. Review the police re-screening plan after a month or two to see if it can be
streamlined in the interests of getting police back to work more quickly.
9. Seek agreement from leaders of all political parties on a political code of ethics for
the 2007 elections, announce it on radio and television and ensure it is conveyed to all
levels of party structures.
10. Ensure that the president and all ministers give full backing to the Simu-Malu
reconciliation project and explore other avenues of healing the east-west
(loromonu-lorosae) rift, with particular attention to the role that women in affected
communities can play.
11. Adopt the recommendations of the Truth, Reception and Reconciliation Mission's
report Chega! [Enough!], giving priority to those related to security of the person, the
security sector, protection of the rights of the vulnerable and reconciliation, and
disseminate the entire report widely.
To the UN Secretary-General and Secretariat:
12. Appoint an activist Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) who
will engage members of the political elite but not shy away from conflict, intervening
where necessary to overcome fractiousness, adjust programs that are going astray
and help clear political hurdles.
13. Institute procedures for improving recruitment of international judges, prosecutors
and lawyers to serve in Timor-Leste courts.
14. Invite a peer review periodically of judicial performance, including in the Court of
Appeal, by an independent panel.
15. Ensure that there is regular oversight of UN-funded programs in the law and legal
development area by a senior UN official with expertise in the area.
Click here to view the full report as a PDF file |
