ON LINE opinion, 21 November 2006
Australia's e-journal of social and political debate
Indonesia pre-nup won't lead us to wedded bliss
By Bruce Haigh
The latest security agreement between Australia and Indonesia represents another
attempt to patch up an unstable relationship. It resembles the sort of prenuptial
agreement that Liz Taylor and Richard Burton might have put together prior to their
second attempt at marriage.
The agreement is a grab bag of issues. There are nine separate arrangements placed
under an umbrella of what is termed, "The Framework for Security Co-operation".
As a document it sets out, with admirable brevity, the fears of both parties. It
anticipates areas of future difficulty and seeks to put in place mechanisms to protect
national interest. It reeks of mutual suspicion. Rather than build bridges it builds walls
and it is full of silly, meaningless statements such as ( Article 2:3 ),"… including by
those who seek to use its territory for encouraging or committing such activities,
including separatism, in the territory of the other Party."
Things are bad in Australia but they are not that bad. What sort of separatist activity
in Australia did those drafting the agreement have in mind?
Who drafts these agreements? Who checks them? What influenced the collective
Australian mindset to agree to the above flight from reality?
How is it possible that anyone in DFAT or in government believes that a positive
relationship could be built from such a negative document?
Article 2:6 boldly affirms that, "Nothing in this agreement shall affect in any way the
existing rights and obligations of either Party under international law," which of course
negates Article 2:3 above.
The separatist movement in West Papua exists because of the human rights abuses
of the Indonesian Military (TNI). The Australian Government is a signatory to UN
conventions on human rights, refugees and children to name but a few which relate to
the current situation prevailing in West Papua.
Before foreign aid workers and press flooded into Aceh following the tsunami at the
end of 2004, the region was under military law. There was a civil war. Human rights
were being transgressed daily. The presence of outsiders meant the TNI had to lift
their game, so much so, that they were forced to enter into meaningful negotiations
with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM ).Outside pressure, as a result of the natural
disaster, has brought positive benefit to the people of Aceh in their struggle against
the TNI.
The primary role and function of the TNI is to hold the Indonesian archipelago together.
Without the TNI fulfilling this role the archipelago would break up. To prevent this
happening the TNI has, from time to time, felt constrained to use force. This has been
accomplished with the use of weapons, beatings, detention, rape, extortion and other
forms of intimidation.
It is the accomplishment of unity by these means that many countries object to. In
the past, when it was felt necessary, Australia also made its objections to the use of
military violence and intimidation known. The TNI is supported in this role by the
Indonesian government.
Just as the territory of Indonesia cannot exist without the military neither can the
"fledgling" democracy, as it is referred to in some sections of the Australian media.
Because of the nature of the Indonesian state, outlined above, democracy in
Indonesia is forced to exist within the framework provided by the military. The strength
of the democratic process diminishes with the distance from the city state of Jakarta.
When the Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, pledges to uphold the
territorial integrity of Indonesia he is also pledging to uphold the role of the military and
unfortunately its methods.
Were the role of the military to be curtailed the archipelago would break up as there is
no strong consensus holding it together. The Indonesian archipelagic state is to all
intents and purposes a Javanese empire and as such the military enjoys a privileged
position within society including with respect to the law.
The agreement lists as an objective the enhancement of TNI capabilities. Experience
has shown that improved skills and hardware will only make the TNI more efficient at
repression.
The role of the TNI also has the effect of making the archipelago more unstable, its
methods of compliance create dissent.
The break up of the archipelago would be no bad thing for many of the people who live
there and would improve Australia's strategic outlook with the resulting removal of the
TNI from its loathed policing role.
It is hypocritical for John Howard to berate tyrants and tyrannical behavior in other
parts of the world and to ignore what is happening in our own neighborhood.
The TNI will take what they want from the agreement and ignore the rest. The TNI
does not want the ADF chasing terrorists within Indonesian territory and they will
apparently achieve that restraint with the agreement. Otherwise the agreement is an
exercise in elites engaging in diplomatic denial and is not worth the paper it is written
on. The agreement will have a shelf life for as long as the next Javanese dummy spit.
The Indonesian Ambassador has hardly had time to get back into the social whirl
since he stormed out of Canberra in March. I would have thought there was a lot to be
done before embarking on this agreement.
The Howard Government might begin by showing respect for Islam and its
practitioners particularly Australian Muslims, get out of Iraq and begin a process of
forging close ties with people throughout the archipelago.
First published in the Canberra Times on November 18, 2006.
Bruce Haigh is a retired Australian diplomat. He worked on Indonesian affairs and has
written many articles, papers and a book on issues relating to Indonesia. He
comments on international and domestic issues and farms olives and grapes at
Mudgee, New South Wales.
© The National Forum and contributors 1999-2006. All rights reserved. ISSN
1442-8458.
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