Paras Indonesia, January, 31 2007 @ 05:27 pm
Terror Project In Poso -Part 1
By: Lian Gogali
"The current score is 1:9," said one man. "No way, it is 2:11," said his friend. But in a
matter of hours, the score would change again. Such statements were made as if
they were watching a soccer match. Ironically, it was far from the idea of a sports
match. These men were counting the civilian fatalities in the clash between police
officers and Poso's Most Wanted men (or "DPO" as they are referred to) in Tanah
Runtuh, Poso, Central Sulawesi. The numbers suggest that there were more civilians
killed compared to the officers. But in Poso, this scoring system has become such a
concerning phenomenon. It is a place where an effort to bring peace and trauma
healing was supposed to be under way.
This particular phenomenon emerged since the appointment of the new Central
Sulawesi Police Chief Badrodin Haiti who replaced the ousted Oegroseno. One of his
first tasks had been to lead the execution of Fabianus Tibo, Marinus Riwu and
Dominggus Da Silva on September 22 last year. The police have apparently failed, or
ignored, to note the lessons from the past that a law enforcement approach without
considering the social implications would not succeed in Poso. The police seem to
also have forgotten that a militaristic approach would only create a new string of
violence in the conflict-torn area. For those reasons, many activists in Palu and Poso
feel that Badrodin Haiti deservingly bear the name "the executioner".
Upholding the law is now being seen as the bases of resolving the conflict in Poso. It
was first advocated by the mass media which have been quoting government officials
in referring to the perpetrators of violence in Poso as "terrorists". They have also
insisted that the Anti Terrorism Law should to be applied there. The central
government (in this case represented by Vice President Jusuf Kalla) is now sticking to
the belief that there is no more conflict in Poso. Kalla said the acts of violence are
being caused by irresponsible parties, "the terrorists". So, in other words, Poso is no
longer a conflict zone but a zone for the war on terror. This anti terror warfare
approach was showcased by security approach applied by the current authority in
power (in this case the 88 Special Detachment – Densus 88) in Poso. It started with
the execution drama of Tibo and co, followed by the release of the most-wanted list
(29 men, all Muslims), then ended with 'the bang': SWAT-style raid in Tanah Runtuh
neighborhood on January 22, 2007. The targets of the raid were 24 men who had been
on the Most Wanted list since May last year. These series of events is being seen by
many in Poso and Palu as part of the police's pattern in operating its terror project.
One of those killed in the 22 January operation was Muhamad Safri Dekuna alias
Andreas, who voluntarily turned himself in to police in June 2005 when he learned he
was being accused of a crime he did not commit, only to be beaten and tortured so
badly that he required hospitalization.
(ICG Report: Jihadism In Indonesia: Poso On The Edge, January 24, 2007)
Not learning from past mistakes is one thing. But perhaps it was not a mistake, as
the militaristic approach was again chosen by the police in pursuit of what they call
"justice" in Poso. It is more likely that the police have indeed considered the social
implications and decided to side with certain groups in the society in legitimating its
operations. To the benefit of the police, many in the general public, nationally, thanks
to their opinion-makers, have agreed that fighting against terror is the best method to
bring peace in Poso.
In reality, open warfare between police and civilians is one of the results of such
approach. Firstly, instead of cowering these civilians, the attacks have instead sprung
out solidarity among militant groups which have started to arm themselves in the fight
against the authority. This tendency in itself is another aspect the police could claim
to legitimate their anti-terror strategy. On the other hand, peace activists in Poso and
Palu have found that it is impossible for these civilians to be able to obtain illegal
firearms without information and political access to the military. In reality,
religion-based solidarity groups have been around since the beginning of the Poso
conflict. What triggered this sense of solidarity is the feeling shared by the groups
that their existence is being threatened by the security approach that disregards the
mass psychology. In the beginning of the Poso conflict, the rumors of village attacks
forced groups to align themselves according to their religions. This time, however, the
solidarity is built around those listed in the most-wanted list. Groups which are
concerned with these men have stepped up their militancy and, so far, directed their
anger and hatred towards the police. One vulgar description of this rage was portrayed
in several writings on the wall of one traditional café in Poso: "Jihad vs. Police", and
"Die One, Born 10 Jihad".
Secondly, besides the obvious implication on the rise of solidarity among the
supporters of these Most Wanted men, the Poso people are starting to tally who is
being sacrificed more. Aside from counting the loss between police and civilians,
people are counting which religious groups are being blamed more for the conflict.
When Tibo made his plea, he gave the court 16 names (later called Group 16) whom
he considered masterminded the attacks on Muslim villages in 1998. All in that list
were Christians. The court and the police ignored Tibo's Group 16 and later came up
with their own list of 29 names. All of them were Muslims. So the current tally is
29:16. The feeling of who is being sacrificed more is certainly a bad indication in the
process of reintegration and reconciliation in Poso. More and more people are starting
to talk about the mathematical demand on who should be sacrificed next in Poso. It is
imminent that the counting phenomenon would create religious suspicions that
distract the communities in its social and economic interactions. Sorry and peace is
still a distant away since the mathematical challenge has not equalled the numbers.
Thirdly, the re-deployment of two Mobile Brigade (Brimob) units to Poso, even
involving the strong participation of the Armed Forces (TNI), would again slowly but
surely send Poso back into a war zone. Indirectly, the government is saying that the
law enforcement suggested earlier was actually in the form of militaristic approach. If
that is the case, Poso is no longer being seen as a conflict zone but instead as a
training ground to practice anti-terror operations. The government is trying to enforce
the law for the law itself and to serve a military agenda. It is surely not going to help
bring peace in the conflict torn area which has seen blood spilled since the reformasi
year of 1998.
It can almost be assured that the law enforcement that ignores the social implications
of the concerning community would boomerang to the victims themselves. If that is
the case, why does Vice President Jusuf Kalla support such an approach which has
been proven unsuccessful repeatedly in Poso?
A coalition of 32 NGOs in Central Sulawesi has released a statement demanding the
government to replace the current Central Sulawesi Police Chief Badrodin Haiti and
along revoke his policies law enforcement in Poso. The other task the government
must do is to investigate and bring to justice those responsible in the illegal firearms
trade in Poso and the surrounding area.
It is true that Poso has layers of problems. That is why an approach to enforce the
law in Poso must coherent with the social-economic reintegration of its people. Some
groups, like the Poso Center is trying to do just that through its programs. But again,
the government is ignoring (even worsening) the core problem. Poso conflict is more
than just a communal dispute. It clearly involves various interests – politics, military,
and money. In the end, it does not matter which religion is being sacrificed more. If it
continues on this rate, they both are the losers.
Copyright (c) 2005 - PT Laksamana Global International. All rights reserved
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