Asia Times, March 6, 2003
Why thugs can hijack 'jihad'
By Phar Kim Beng
HONG KONG - The bombings on Tuesday at the airport in Davao City, Philippines,
have resurrected the fear of Islamic militancy in Southeast Asia, a problem that began
to take on a greater urgency with the October 12 bombings in Kuta, a prime tourist
haunt in Bali, Indonesia. The bloodshed in Kuta compelled the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to look at the problem as a regional threat, rather
than a national one. But there were signs of trouble long before last October.
As early as September 2000, a year before the September 11 attacks in the United
States, decision-makers from ASEAN had already identified the ramifications of
Islamic militancy.
Speaking at a June 2000 conference in Hong Kong organized by the Asian Wall
Street Journal, former Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan, himself a Muslim, raised
the alarm of the possible rise of Islamic militancy. He linked the problem to the onset
of globalization.
During a working visit to Malaysia that same month, Singaporean Senior Minister Lee
Kuan Yew spoke of the possible rise of Islamic militancy in Indonesia and the rural
heartland of Malaysia: "You have to watch Islamic militancy carefully, because if it
takes root in Indonesia and they go up to the islands south of Singapore, or if they
take root in Malaysia and come down to Johor, then we are vulnerable," Lee warned.
Lee further affirmed that the recent rise of political Islam in Indonesia started when
then president B J Habibie canceled a decree imposed by former president Suharto
that outlawed the use of Islam or Islamic symbols for political parties. As a result,
more than 20 political parties eventually used Islamic symbols, and several splinter
groups won in Indonesian elections, making them a faction that could be courted by
whoever was in power to maximize their gains. Thus, in one stroke of the pen,
Habibie, considered by many as an eccentric though devout Muslim, re-legitimized
the presence of "Islamic politics" in Indonesia after a break of some 50 years.
However, only preemptive arrests were made in Malaysia. In September 2000,
Malaysian authorities took 10 members of the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia
(KMM), a militant group accused of a spate of robberies and at least one murder, into
custody under the draconian Internal Security Act (ISA) that allowed indefinite
detention.
But the KMM arrests were deemed political, as the group was led by the son of Nik
Aziz, currently the chief minister of Kelantan, an Islamic stronghold in northern
Malaysia. When the arrests were made, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad was
accused of using ISA to silence dissidents. Be that as it may, Mahathir spoke of the
threat posed by members of KMM who fought in Pakistan and then trained in
Afghanistan.
Malaysian authorities charged that the group had attempted to form a regional
network of militants bent on creating a union of Islamic states in Indonesia, Malaysia
and the Philippines; a charge now used by the Singaporean government to crack
down on Islamic militants in the republic too.
As can be seen, while the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States made
global headlines, the issue of Islamic militancy in Southeast Asia had at least
received some prior attention at the highest levels. Nor were the policymakers merely
standing watch. A month before the September 11 attacks, decision makers from the
security agencies in ASEAN had met in Kuala Lumpur to discuss the nature of the
threat.
However, occasional bombings in Southeast Asia have shown that mere coordination
of the intelligence apparatus is simply not enough. Islamic militancy is very much a
hermeneutic problem the world over, increasingly with serious impact on Southeast
Asia.
An apt example of how the term "jihad" is vulnerable to contradictory interpretation is
clearly brought home by events prior to the start of Operation Desert Storm in Kuwait,
for example. In the midst of the early phase of the operation, both Saudi Arabia and
Iraq sought international Islamic sanction for their policies. The International Congress
of Ulama (religious scholars), convened by Iraq in December 1990, issued a
declaration supporting the Iraqi position, urging Muslims to undertake jihad and
revolution against those Arab Muslim leaders who had joined coalition forces under
US leadership.
On the other hand, a counter-congress of ulama met in Saudi Arabia during the same
month, calling for war against Saddam Hussein as the highest form of jihad. In the
end, the groups issued two different fatwas, each declaring their side's cause to be a
"just" war.
Indeed, fatwas, declarations and proclamations originated not in Islamic countries
alone but also in several Islamic communities in the Muslim diaspora, including
Europe and the United States. The Islamic Council of Europe, for example, called for
an independent Islamic vision, absolutely rejecting the presence of foreign troops on
Saudi soil - a position that echoed the views of al-Qaeda. It supported the conclusion
that "those who provide a fatwa that legitimizes the seeking of aid from the
non-Muslims under current circumstances have not an iota of support in either the
Koran or the Sunnah" (recorded deeds of the Prophet Mohammed).
The above controversies amply showed the internal confusion of Muslims over the
meaning of "jihad". Indeed, other than the consensus that jihad should be defensive,
to this day Muslims continue to disagree on the terms in which jihad may be initiated
or conducted. The result is a free-for-all where any aggrieved Muslim group can seize
on its own version of jihad in the name of God. So, depending on one's political
perspective, jihad can be flexibly used and abused.
Thus if regional security organizations in Asia wish to curtail the rise of Islamic
militancy in Ambon, Aceh or even Mindanao, there has to be a common charter
agreed by every member states' religious authorities on what jihad means. The goal is
to benchmark "jihad" lest the term is hijacked by illegitimate sub-state actors for their
pet political causes.
Barring this collective endeavor, Islamic militancy will be akin to a hydra-headed
monster where all religiously inspired individuals or groups can launch their own jihad
against the authorities. This is what Asian authorities should deter as they become
increasingly aware of the importance of containing Islamic militancy.
© 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved.
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