LAKSAMANA.Net, April 13, 2003 01:17
Aceh: Chess Game with Military Hardliners
Laksamana.Net - In the weeks to come, President Megawati Sukarnoputri will face a
crucial decision whether she will surrender to pressure from the military hardliners
trying to force her to take military action in putting down the separatism group the
Free Aceh Movement (GAM).
Growing public and international pressure is also mounting for Megawati to cancel
plans to launch a new military operation.
Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
said last Monday (7/4/03) that the President had already ordered the military and
police to be ready for operations in Aceh.
This gave the impression that the government will reverse its position on the cessation
of hostilities agreement (COHA) with GAM and undermine the peace process under
the pretext of the increasing tension in Aceh.
The pressure from the military hardliners was voiced clearly by Army Chief of Staff
Ryamizard Ryacudu. "No country would recognize rebels, let alone negotiate with
them. We're all too lenient," he said.
In an effort to show the infectiveness of the Geneva peace agreement signed on
December 9 last year, Ryacudu quoted an intelligence report that stated that during
the ceasefire, GAM had recruited new members, increasing its strength to 5,000.
It also increased its stock of weapons. While previously, they had only 1,500 rifles,
they now have 2,100.
Unlike his superior, Armed Forces Commander Endriartono Sutarto, who is more
moderate and less confrontational to the government’s attempt to negotiate peace,
the army chief appears to side with the reactionary group in the army.
This group wants to cancel the Geneva Peace Agreement and undermine the process
of demilitarization and disarmament established by COHA, a process supposed to be
completed by July.
When Ryacudu visited the Pidie military district command last month, hundreds
turned out to warmly welcome the general, calling for the military to set up more posts
and for the dissolution of the Joint Security Committee (JSC) established to oversee
the COHA process and to act as the referee between the government and GAM.
The demonstration showed that Ryacudu is generating pressure for an end to JSC.
The military hardliners in Jakarta are quite aware that should GAM finally agreed to
lay down its arms and to store all its weapons by July 9, the military would have lost
its justification to put down the rebellion through military operations.
The military hardliners are also aware that the logical consequence would be to halt
all military operations in the province, with redeployment of troops from offensive to
defensive positions.
Under such circumstances, the military hardliners in Jakarta would have lost the
chance of creating a condition in which Megawati would remain dependent on the
military.
In facing such pressure from the military, Megawati has tried to neutralize the military
moves. By ordering the military and the police to prepare for armed operations to put
down GAM, analysts believe Megawati’s aim has been to crystallize vocal
resistance to such a move from various sectors of society in Jakarta and Aceh and in
the international community.
If the statement was meant to send the message to the anti-military side to raise its
game, it achieved its effect. Growing criticism has come from party politicians,
academics, NGOs activists, public figures and ordinary people in Aceh.
Ibrahim Ambong, chairman of House Commission 1 overseeing Foreign Affairs,
signaled Friday (11/4/03) that the parliament may summon Yudhoyono and Armed
Forces Commander Sutarto to clarify the government’s plan to take military action in
Aceh.
The ineffectiveness of the military approach to Aceh was also voiced by former
President Abdurrahman Wahid on the same day. Wahid warned that if the government
insists on attacking GAM, both the moderate and the extreme wings of GAM will
unite in taking up arms against Jakarta.
Megawati witnessed during her childhood the difficulty faced by her father, founding
President Sukarno, when he was forced to depend on General Abdul Haris Nasution
to put down rebellions in Sumatera and Sulawesi in the late 1950s.
The success of Nasution and the army in undermining the position of the rebellious
colonels in the outer islands brought with the high price of a stronger bargaining
position for the generals in Jakarta. This in turn prompted Sukarno to strengthen the
role of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) as a countervailing force against the
army led by Nasution and later by Achmad Yani.
After Sukarno’s downfall in 1966, several of his ardent supporters said that by
building the triangle of Sukarno, the army and the PKI in an effort to create a balance
of power among the political elites, Sukarno in reality was trapped in his own game
and closed the door to popular support in neutralizing the military’s drive to dominate
the political scene.
Under strong pressure from Nasution, Sukarno issued the presidential decree known
as the decree of July 5, 1959. The essence of this decree was to provide an outlet for
the military to play politics independently of the president. At the same time, the
decree crippled the function of the political parties.
The situation facing Megawati is quite different, as the system of checks and
balances between the executuve and the legislature are functioning well. The
parliament is more aggressive than the government.
In a situation where pressure from the general public as well as the parliament is quite
strong, the military faces difficulty in dictating to Megawati.
The failure of National Intelligence (BIN) Chief A.M. Hendropriyono to push through the
anti-terrorism bill which gives BIN the authority to detain terrorism suspects, has
proved the effectiveness of public pressure and the parliament in blocking the hidden
agenda of the military.
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