In recounting the story of Convoy ON-67, I have made use of the references cited by Admiral Murdaugh in his letter to the Edison News. I have had these sources in my library since they were published, Samuel Eliot Morrison's Battle of the Atlantic volume in 1947 and Theodore Roscoe's Destroyer Operations volume in 1953. The text for the latter was researched and edited technically by Radm Thomas Wattles, from official Navy sources. I knew this officer as Commander Wattles, the Executive Officer of Bancroft Hall at the Naval Academy, during my final year as a midshipman. It was from Commander Wattles that most midshipmen first learned of Pearl Harbor.

Edison DD439, with Commander Murdaugh commanding and doing double duty as the Escort Commander, left Hvalfjordur, Iceland 16 February 1942, along with Nicholson DD442 , Lea and Bernadou, both recently re-commissioned WW II 4-pipers. This force was to rendezvous at the mid-ocean passage point of convoy ON-67, westbound from the UK, and take this group of 35 ships on into Halifax. Meeting up on 19 February, the escorts took up a 4,000 yard screen, patrolling in a semi-circle at 12 ½ knots ahead of an 8 ½ knot convoy. Extra resources were the HMCS Algoma, which was to stay on from the UK escort group as long as her fuel permitted, and in the convoy itself, the British rescue ship SS Toward, carrying special ocean-tested rescue gear and a High Frequency Radio Direction Finder, commonly called Huff-Duff. For the escort screen, only Nicholson's radar was working properly.

On the morning of the 21st, on course 204 True, with ten miles visibility, tell tale smoke from the convoy broadcast the convoy's presence over a wide span of ocean. At noon, the convoy entered fog. Edison had a sound contact, and dropped a small pattern of depth charges. At dusk, the Toward reported intercepting probable submarine radio traffic on bearing 107 True. The Lea made a short search out on the bearing but discovered nothing. The convoy was being shadowed and at 0305 on the 22nd, the shadowers struck. Two convoy ships were hit from torpedoes fired from the after quarter of the convoy, likely, from a range beyond the screen which was in its night formation ahead of the convoy. Nicholson fell back and joined Toward and Algoma in rescue of survivors. The Forward's big dip net proved especially effective.

The SS Toward and the SS Rathlin were the first two of a class of specially designed convoy rescue ships. A surgeon was embarked, the sick bay was well staffed, and accommodations had been designed for several hundred survivors. The dip net feature consisted of a large net with its own flotation which could be hoisted over the side and put into the water for "water-logged and oil-smeared survivors".

On the afternoon of the 22nd, the convoy changed course to 240 True and four hours later to 200 True. ON-67 had caught a respite. With two ships sunk, the convoy nursed its wounds into the 23rd. At 1210, on 23 February, Edison reported another sound contact. Moving forward directly ahead of column 8 of the convoy, Edison dropped a pattern of depth charges. The contact had been evaluated "very definite" so Edison stayed with it until the convoy had passed well beyond the area. Unfortunately, the screw noises of 30 or more ships mask the noise of a single silent submarine and Edison finally gave up and rejoined her convoy station at 25 knots. Later that afternoon, Bernadou picked up a sound contact on the convoy's port beam. It evaporated. Despite frequent course changes ordered by Commander Murdaugh to avoid ambush, it seemed likely that the enemy was not through with ON-67. While the first attack on the early hours of the 22nd probably came from one submarine, by the 24th a pack had been called in. At 0030 on the 24th, the second attack came and was pressed home in waves until 0645. Four merchantmen were torpedoed, two being sunk and two left momentarily dead in the water before emergency repairs enabled them to gain some headway. It was estimated that five to six subs participated, working from both quarters. The convoy resorted to the use of "snowflake" illumination, to help Armed Guard ship's gunners find surfaced subs for targets. Murdaugh, in emergency radio messages to the Chief of Naval Operations, recommended a drastic convoy course change to 285 True and several hours later, after the events of the next paragraph, this was approved.

On the afternoon of the 24th, it became quite clear that what ON-67's commanders feared was in fact, being borne out. The Toward picked up more "traffic" on her high frequency radio direction finder. On a sweep of one of the reported bearings 15 miles ahead, Nicholson sighted two U-boats and forced them to submerge, keeping them down until after dark. Lea was sent out on the starboard flank of the convoy to run down another bearing reported by Toward. At 20 miles out, Lea found a surfaced submarine, which she forced down and depth charged. Again, the wolfpack surfaced after dark and moved ahead to get into attack position. Edison made sound contact on the convoy's starboard bow shortly after nightfall and moments later her lookouts spotted a U-boat silhouette in a sudden shaft of moonlight. Too fast for the deck guns, the sub slithered away and Edison fired a pattern of depth charges. Five more patterns followed and sound contact could not be regained. After a sustained period of search, Murdaugh ordered his ship to return to station on the convoy. On the way back, at a distance of 200 yards, Edison came across a submarine in the night surface gloom-with no sound contact at all having been registered on this ephemeral target. Edison dropped a warning charge and engaged in suppression between the convoy and point of submergence until dawn of the 25th of February.

The escorts of ON-67 were learning valuable lessons about U-boat tactics and developing, on the spot, counter tactics in suppression. The value of Toward's radio direction finder and of her rescue gear was demonstrated. The night of 24-25 February passed without the U-boats making an attack. Fog set in at 1410 on the 25th and escorts were called in from ranging forays. Then, Bernadou, running down another HF-DF report from Toward, made sound contact and dropped a pattern of charges just after 1500. Fog enveloped the convoy all that night and in the morning hours of the 26th, rough weather set in. The US Coast Guard Cutter Spencer was a welcome addition to the screen that morning. Convoy ON-67 had passed through her danger period and the rest of the trip was without incident.

Four of the merchant vessels entrusted to the U.S. escorts were on the bottom and quite likely no subs had been sunk in the counter attacks. In a commendatory citation to Commander Murdaugh, Admiral Bristol (stationed in Argentia) closed his remarks with, "Commander Murdaugh outmaneuvered and outfought a concentration of enemy ships and effectively broke up the enemy's efforts." The record certainly supports those words. The U.S. high command must have agreed, too. Stars to wear on service ribbons were a rare recognition. Such recognition usually came only from participation in some huge invasion force that had a demonstrated bearing on the course of the War.

Copyright 1997 Franklyn E. Dailey, Jr - dailey@crocker.com

Joining The War At Sea

Thanks to Frank Dailey of USS Edison for providing this account of the convoy action in ON-67.

Richard Angelini, Benson class Destroyers