Philosophy 1
Reading Questions
Set I
“Good Reasoning”
Applying Ethics,
pp. 49-70
1.
What two sorts of
statements comprise an Argument? [See p. 50]
2.
What is the
purpose of an argument? [See p. 50]
3.
What two tests
must A
Good Argument (or, as the author puts it, a “sound” argument) pass?
[See p. 51] (You might want to think, here, about the relation of what the
author calls “validity” to what we will call “the inference test.”)
4.
What is a
counter-example to an argument, and what is a counter-example to an argument
supposed to show? [See pp. 51-52] Provide a counter-example to the following
argument:
1 If
Maria traveled on a plane, then she took a trip.
2 Maria
did not travel on a plane.
3 Therefore,
Maria did not take a trip.
[Hint:
Think of some things other than a plane
on which Maria might have traveled and still have taken a trip. If you can
think of any, then you have a counter-example to the above argument.]
5.
What two
“subtasks” are involved in evaluating an argument? [See p. 55]
6.
Define these
other important terms:
The Premise Test
The Inference Test
Premise
Conclusion
Inference
A Bad Argument
James Rachels, “The Challenge
of Cultural Relativism”
Reason & Responsibility, pages 616-623
1.
What “recurring
theme” is suggested by Rachels’ early examples, which include the example of
the Callatians and the example of the Eskimos? [p. 617]
2.
What is Cultural
Relativism? [p. 618]
3.
What
argumentative strategy do cultural relativists employ? [p. 618]
4.
What is a Sound
Argument? [See page 619 for Rachels’ use of this terminology.] Why
does Rachels think that the Cultural Difference Argument is not a sound argument? Do you agree with
Rachels’ assessment of the argument? Why, or why not?
5.
What is a Fallacious
Argument? [See page 619 for Rachels’ use of this terminology.]
6.
According to
Rachels, what are some of the consequences of taking cultural relativism
seriously? [pp. 619-620] He suggests that these consequences might be bad
enough to lead one to reject cultural relativism. Do you agree that it is
reasonable to reject cultural relativism because it has these consequences?
Why, or why not?
7.
Rachels claims
that “cultures do not differ [in their views of right and wrong] nearly as much
as it appears” (620). How might his arguments in favor of this claim relate to
the Cultural Differences Argument?
8.
On page 622,
Rachels lists the “mistakes” made by cultural relativism. What are these
mistakes? He goes on to say that these mistakes “add up to a pretty thorough
repudiation of the theory” (622). Do you agree with him? Why, or why not?
9.
According to
Rachels, what is the first lesson that we should learn from cultural
relativism? [pp. 622-623]
10.
According to
Rachels, what is the second lesson that we should learn from cultural
relativism? [p. 623]
11.
If you’re
inclined toward cultural relativism, can you think of any of your own arguments
that will support that position? If you’re not inclined toward cultural
relativism, can you think of any of your own arguments against that position?
James Rachels, “Ethical
Egoism”
Reason & Responsibility, pages 559-566
1.
What, according
to Rachels, is the “common-sense view” of, or the “common-sense assumption”
about, which actions we should and should not perform? [p. 560]
2.
What is Ethical
Egoism? [p. 560]
3.
What does the
word ‘Normative’
mean [See page 560 for Rachels’ use of this word.] {Hint: The word ‘normative’
is closely connected to the word ‘norm.’}
4.
What exactly is the first argument for ethical
egoism? [p. 561]
5.
What, according
to Rachels, is the first defect in the first argument for ethical egoism? [p.
561]
6.
What, according
to Rachels, is the “more serious defect” in the first argument for ethical
egoism? [p. 561] Do you agree with Rachels that this is a defect in the argument?
Why, or why not?
7.
What exactly is the second argument for ethical
egoism? [pp. 561-562]
8.
What, according
to Rachels, is the problem with the second argument for ethical egoism? [p.
562] Do you agree with Rachels that this is a problem with the argument? Why,
or why not?
9.
What is “a revisionist moral philosophy”? [p. 562]
10.
What exactly is the third argument for ethical
egoism? [pp. 562-563]
11.
What, according
to Rachels, is the first serious objection to the third argument for ethical
egoism? [p. 563] Do you agree with Rachels that this is a defect in the
argument? Why, or why not?
12.
What, according
to Rachels, is the second serious objection to the third argument for ethical
egoism? [p. 563] Do you agree with Rachels that this is a defect in the
argument? Why, or why not?
13.
What is Kurt
Baier’s objection to ethical egoism? According to Rachels, how might the
ethical egoist respond to Baier’s objection? [p. 564] Can you think of any ways
in which Baier might in turn respond to the ethical egoist?
14.
What is the second
alleged refutation of ethical egoism? What, according to Rachels, is wrong with
this alleged refutation? [pp. 564-565]
15.
What general
principle stands in the way of a defense of, say, racism? [p. 565]
16.
Why, according to
Rachels, is racism “an arbitrary doctrine”?
[p. 566]
17.
Rachels claims
that “Ethical Egoism is an arbitrary doctrine, in the same way that racism is
arbitrary” (566). Do you agree with him? Why, or why not? (If you do not agree with him, then you’ll need to
show why his argument – in the second column of page 544 – is not a good one.)
18.
If you’re
inclined toward ethical egoism, can you think of any of your own arguments that
will support that position? If you’re not inclined toward ethical egoism, can
you think of any of your own arguments against that position?
John Stuart Mill,
“Utilitarianism”
Reason & Responsibility, pages 694-707
1.
What does ‘a priori’
mean? Is a priori reasoning associated with the intuitive or with the inductive
school of ethics? [p. 695]
2.
What “universal
first principle” does Kant propose? [p. 696]
3.
What does “every
[utilitarian] writer from Epicurus to Bentham” mean by ‘utility’? [p. 697]
4.
“The creed which
accepts as the foundation of morals Utility, or the Greatest-Happiness
Principle, holds” something. What do they hold? [p. 697]
5.
What, for Mill,
does ‘happiness’ mean? What does ‘unhappiness’ mean? [p. 697]
6.
Given all that
Mill has said so far, try to define Utilitarianism in your own words.
7.
What, according
to Mill, are “the only things desirable as ends”? [p. 697]
8.
Mill says that
“some kinds of pleasure are more
desirable and more valuable than others” (698). According to Mill, which kinds
of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than “pleasures … of mere
sensation”? Do you agree with Mill here? Why, or why not?
9.
What, according
to Mill, makes one pleasure more desirable than another? [p. 698]
10.
According to
Mill, why do people sometimes choose lower pleasures over higher ones? [p. 699]
11.
According to
Mill, is the utilitarian standard concerned with “the agent’s own greatest
happiness” or with “the greatest amount of happiness altogether”? [pp. 699-700]
Given your answer, do you think that utilitarianism is an egoist theory or a non-egoist
one?
12.
Some object to
utilitarianism on the grounds that happiness is unattainable. How does Mill
respond to this objection? [pp. 700-702]
13.
Explain a few of
the other objections to utilitarianism. Then explain how Mill responds to those
objections. [pp. 702-707]
14.
If you’re
inclined toward utilitarianism, can you think of any of your own arguments that
will support that position? If you’re not inclined toward utilitarianism, can
you think of any of your own arguments against that position?
Immanuel Kant, “The Good Will
& The Categorical Imperative”
Reason & Responsibility, pages 679-694
1.
What do you think
Kant means by “a good will”? [p.
679]
2.
Why, according to
Kant, aren’t “[m]oderation in affects and passions, self-control, and calm
reflection” (680) good without qualification?
3.
In the second column
of page 680, Kant argues for the claim that happiness isn’t “the proper end.”
What’s his argument for that claim?
4.
What, according
to Kant, is “the true vocation of reason”? [p. 681]
5.
Kant claims that
the good will need not be “the sole and complete good, but it must still be the
highest good and the condition of every other” (681). How does this compare
with the utilitarian hierarchy of goods?
6.
What is the
example of duty supposed to show? [p. 681]
7.
According to
Kant, what are the only sorts of actions that have “moral import” or “moral
worth”? [pp. 682-683]
8.
What is a Maxim?
[See page 683 for Kant’s use of this terminology.]
9.
Kant asks, “[M]ay
I, when hard pressed, make a promise with the intention not to keep it?” How
does he answer this question? Why does he provide that answer? [pp. 683-684]
10.
What is an Imperative?
11.
What is a hypothetical imperative? [p. 685]
12.
What is a categorical imperative? [p. 685]
13.
What purpose do
all rational beings have “by a natural necessity”? Is the imperative concerning
happiness a hypothetical one or a categorical one? [p. 686]
14.
What does empirical mean? [See page 687 for Kant’s
use of this terminology.]
15.
Why does Kant say
that “imperatives of prudence cannot, to speak precisely, command at all”? [p.
687]
16.
Why does Kant say
that “the categorical imperative alone has the tenor of a practical law”? [p. 688]
17.
What is The
Categorical Imperative? [p. 689]
18.
Kant also states
the categorical imperative in another way, as “the universal imperative of
duty” (689). What is the universal imperative of duty, and how does it relate
to the categorical imperative? (Are those two imperatives identical? If not,
what are the differences between them? Are those differences substantial, or
are they trivial?)
19.
Kant provides
four examples of the categorical imperative at work. [pp. 689-670] Do you agree
with his treatment of these cases? Why, or why not?
20.
According to
Kant, what is it that “exists as an
end in itself, not merely as a means
to be used by this or that will at its discretion”? [p. 692]
21.
What is the “practical
imperative”? [p. 693] How does it compare to the categorical imperative and to
the universal imperative of duty?
Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence,
and Morality”
Reason & Responsibility, pages 708-715
1.
With what
assumption does Singer begin? [p. 709] Can you think of any reason to question
that assumption?
2.
What is Singer’s
“next point”? [p. 709]
3.
How, according to
Singer, would “our lives, our society, and our world … be fundamentally
changed” if we were to act upon his principle? [p. 709]
4.
Singer says, “The
outcome of [his] argument is that our traditional moral categories are upset”
(711). In what way or ways will our traditional moral categories be upset? [p.
711] Given your answers to these questions, do you think that Singer’s moral
theory is a revisionist moral theory? (See question 9 under Rachels’ “Ethical
Egoism.”) Why, or why not?
5.
What is a Supererogatory
act? [p. 711]
6.
In your own words,
explain the first objection that Singer notes “to the position [he has] taken.”
[p. 712]
7.
What is the
“second objection to [Singer’s] attack on the present distinction between duty
and charity”? [pp. 712-713] How does Singer respond to this objection?
8.
On pages 713-715,
Singer provides two arguments for the claim that we have no obligation to do
anything to prevent famine. Explain in your own words each of these arguments,
and then explain Singer’s response to each argument. Can you think of ways in
which Singer’s responses might be ineffective?
Onora O’Neill, “Kantian
Approaches to Some Famine Problems”
Reason & Responsibility, pages 716-722
1.
What,
according to O’Neill’s reading of Kant, does it mean to “use someone as a mere means”? [p. 717]
2.
What,
according to O’Neill’s reading of Kant, is required if we are to “treat someone
as an end in him or herself”? [p. 718]
3.
Why, according
to O’Neill, might Kant’s moral theory “have little to say about famine
problems”? [p. 718]
4.
Why does
Kant’s moral theory prohibit people from cheating when they are in
famine-stricken populations with a rationing scheme? [p. 719]
5.
What is the
second thing that Kantian principles require in famine situations? [p. 719]
6.
Does Kant’s
moral theory allow for a distinction between “one’s personal responsibilities” and “one’s role responsibilities”? Why, or why not? [p. 720]
7.
What are the “grounds
of duties of beneficence”? [p. 721]
René Descartes, “Meditations
on First Philosophy”
1.
What does
Descartes find doubtful at the very beginning of Meditation I? [151]
2.
According to
Descartes, what reason justifies his rejecting all of his doubtful beliefs?
[151-2]
3.
How has Descartes
learned “[a]ll that up to the present time [he has] accepted as most true and
certain”? [152]
4.
Why does
Descartes doubt his senses with regard to “things which are hardly perceptible,
or very far away”? [152]
5.
It seems to
Descartes that he “cannot reasonably have any doubt” about some things. What
are some of the examples that he gives? [152]
6.
As it turns out,
though, Descartes discovers that he can
doubt these things. Why does he believe that he can doubt them? [152]
7.
Descartes then
suggests that “whether [he is] awake or asleep, two and three together always
form five” (153). Nevertheless, he thinks that he can doubt this, too. Why does
he believe that he can doubt mathematical and geometrical truths? [153-4]
Introduction to Part IV:
Determinism, Free Will, and Responsibility (pages 410-414)
1.
What is Compatibilism?
[412]
2.
What is Libertarianism?
[413]
3.
What is Determinism
(a.k.a. hard determinism)? [410, 413]
Paul Holbach, “The Illusion
of Free Will”
4.
What, according
to Holbach, is the will? By what is the will “necessarily determined”? [417]
5.
Holbach compares
the human will (or the brain) to a bowl. Explain the comparison. [417] Do you
think that the comparison is a good one? Why, or why not?
6.
What is a primum mobile? [418]
7.
Why, according to
Holbach, have philosophers erred “on the free agency of man”? [418]
8.
According to
Holbach, are “the actions of man” ever free? [418] Why does he answer this
question as he does?
9.
At the bottom of
the second column of page 418, Holbach provides an argument for free will.
Explain this argument, and then explain Holbach’s response to it.
10.
At the bottom of
the first column of page 419, Holbach defines “free agency.” How does he define
“free agency”? What does he have to say in opposition to those who think that
we are free agents? [419]
11.
Why, according to
Holbach, do we suppose ourselves to be free agents? [420]
12.
What, according
to Holbach, would we need to perceive in order to “perceive that all [our]
actions [are] necessary”? [420]
A. J. Ayer, “Freedom and
Necessity”
1.
How, according to
Ayer, are free will and moral responsibility connected? [430]
2.
Describe the
“apparent conflict” that Ayer recognizes. [430]
3.
Ayer claims that
some events might not have causes. What is his argument for this claim? [430-1]
4.
Why, according to
Ayer, might someone think that we will one day be able very precisely to
forecast human behavior? [431]
5.
What about human
behavior does “the moralist” wish to imply? What doesn’t she wish to imply? [431-2]
6.
The determinist
has an argument that will serve as a response to the moralist. What is that
argument? [Ayer provides the argument in the first full paragraph of the first
column of page 432.]
7.
What, according
to Ayer, must we do “if we are to retain this idea of moral responsibility”?
[432]
8.
According to
Ayer, with what is freedom to be contrasted? [433]
9.
What shall Ayer
try to show? [432]
10.
In what
circumstances can Ayer legitimately be said to be constrained? [432]
11.
From the end of
page 433 to the beginning of page 434, Ayer seems to be presenting an argument
that is similar to an argument of Holbach’s. How does Ayer respond to that
argument? [434] Do you think that his response is a good one? Why, or why not?
12.
What is a tautology? [See page 434 for Ayer’s use
of this terminology.]
13.
What three
conditions must be fulfilled if “I may be said to have acted freely”? [434] Do
you agree with Ayer that these are the conditions of free action? Why, or why
not?
Roderick M. Chisholm, “Human
Freedom and the Self”
1.
How does Chisholm
characterize “the metaphysical problem of human freedom”? [452]
2.
According to
Chisholm, what does it mean to be “responsible for a certain event or a certain
state of affairs”? [452] On this picture of responsibility, what will it mean
to say that someone is not
responsible for a certain event? Do you agree with this picture of
responsibility? Why, or why not?
3.
How might
determinism conflict “with a familiar view about the nature of God”? [453]
4.
What “stratagem”
do compatibilists sometimes employ? [453] The stratagem yields a particular
argument in favor of compatibilism. [454] State and explain that argument.
5.
How does Chisholm
object to this argument for compatibilism? [454] Do you find his objection
compelling? Why, or why not?
6.
According to
Chisholm, what possibility remains even after we discover that “[o]ur
conception of action … should be neither deterministic nor indeterministic”?
[454]
7.
How does Chisholm
define causation (when considering
“only inanimate natural objects”)? [454]
8.
What is transeunt causation? [454]
9.
What is immanent causation? [454-5]
10.
State and explain
the first objection to Chisholm’s view. How does Chisholm respond to that
objection? [455]
11.
State and explain
the second objection to Chisholm’s view. How does Chisholm respond to that
objection? [455]
12.
Explain what the Hobbist approach is. [457]
13.
Explain what the Kantian approach is. [457]
Introduction
to Part III: Mind and Its Place in Nature
1.
What are bodies? [298]
2.
What is a mind? [298]
3.
What is Dualism? [298]
4.
What is Idealism? [298]
5.
What is Materialism? [298]
Keith
Campbell, “Dualisms”
COMING SOON!
Frank
Jackson, “The Qualia Problem”
6.
What does Jackson mean by ‘physical information’? [333]
7.
What is a “qualia freak”? [333]
8.
By the way, what do you think qualia
are? [See pages 333-4 and page 335 for some ideas.]
9.
What, according to Jackson, is “[t]he major factor in stopping people
from admitting qualia”? [334]
10.
The Fred example and the Mary example are supposed to show that
physicalism – also known as materialism – “leaves something out” (335), or that
physicalism is false. How is the Fred example supposed to show this? [334-5]
How is the Mary example supposed to show this? [335]
11.
In the last section of the paper,
Jackson argues that there is no good reason to think that qualia are causally
efficacious. That is, he argues that there is no good reason to think that
epiphenomenalism is false. What two objections does he provide to
epiphenomenalism, and how does he respond to each objection? [336]
Introduction to Part I:
Reason and Religious Belief
1.
What is an Inductive
Argument? [3]
Saint Anselm, “The
Ontological Argument, from Proslogium”
2.
According to
Anselm, what sort of being do we believe God to be? [6]
3.
State and explain
the argument that Anselm gives for the existence of God in the first paragraph
of Chapter III. [7]
4.
State and explain
the argument that Anselm gives in Chapter IV. [7]
5.
In these
passages, Anselm argues that God exists. State his overall argument in your own
words. Do you think that the argument succeeds? Why, or why not?
William L. Rowe, “The
Ontological Argment”
COMING SOON!
Saint Thomas Aquinas, “The
Five Ways, from Summa Theologica”
1.
State
and explain Aquinas’ “argument from motion.” [18] Do you think that the
argument is a good one? Why, or why not?
2.
State and explain Aquinas’ argument from “the
nature of efficient cause.” [19] Do you think that the argument is a good one?
Why, or why not?
3.
State and explain Aquinas’ argument from
“possibility and necessity.” [19] Do you think that the argument is a good one?
Why, or why not?
4.
State and explain Aquinas’ argument from “the
gradation to be found in things.” [19] Do you think that the argument is a good
one? Why, or why not?
5.
State and explain Aquinas’ argument from “the
governance of the world.” [19] Do you think that the argument is a good one?
Why, or why not?
William L. Rowe, “The Cosmological Argument”
6.
What is
an A
priori argument? [21]
7.
What is an A posteriori
argument? [21]
8.
From what fact does the Cosmological Argument
start? [21] Is it an a priori argument or an
a posteriori argument?
9.
From what fact does the Teleological Argument
(a.k.a. the Argument from Design) start? [21]
Is it an a priori argument or an a posteriori argument?
10.
From what fact does the Ontological Argument
start? [21] Is it an a priori argument or an a posteriori argument?
11.
According to Rowe, how might one object to
Aquinas’ argument? [21]
12.
What does Rowe mean by “a dependent being”? [22]
13.
What does Rowe mean by “a self-existent being”?
[22]
14.
What, according to Rowe, does the first premise
of the Cosmological Argument assert? [23]
15.
State and explain the Principle of Sufficient
Reason (or the PSR). [23-4]
16.
How does the truth of the first premise of the
Cosmological Argument depend on the truth
of the PSR? [23-4]
17.
How does the truth of the second premise of the
Cosmological Argument depend on the truth
of the PSR? [24-5]
18.
According to Rowe, we might object to the
Cosmological Argument in four ways. State and explain the first three of these
objections, and then explain how Rowe responds to them. [25-8]
19.
Rowe also believes that we might object to the
Cosmological Argument by questioning the PSR. How, according to Rowe, might a
proponent of the PSR defend the PSR. Does Rowe think that such defenses work?
Do you think that such defenses work?
Why, or why not? [28-9]
William Paley, “The Argument
from Design”
1.
According to
Paley, “when we come to inspect the watch,” what do we perceive? [30]
2.
Once Paley finds
the watch, he examines it twice. What is the conclusion of the first
examination? [30-2, 34]
3.
For the second
examination, Paley has us suppose that the watch possesses “the unexpected
property of producing in the course of its movement another watch like itself.”
(32) That is, Paley has us suppose that the watch reproduces. What is the
conclusion of this second examination? [32-4]
4.
What similarities
are there between the watch that Paley finds and “the eye, … animals, … plants,
… [and] all the organized parts of the works of nature”? [34] What are these
similarities supposed to suggest about “the organized parts of the works of nature”?
J. L. Mackie, “Evil and
Omnipotence”
1.
Why, according to
Mackie, can the theologian accept the criticism of traditional arguments for
the existence of God? [90]
2.
What, according
to Mackie, can be shown by “the traditional problem of evil”? [90]
3.
What is The Problem of Evil (in “its
simplest form”)? [90] Why is the problem of evil a problem?
4.
What “additional
principles” do we need in order to show that there is a problem of evil? [90]
5.
What, according
to Mackie, could we say in order to adequately solve the problem of evil? [91]
Do you think that it is a good idea to say any of these things? Why, or why
not?
6.
What is “the
general form” of fallacious solutions to the problem of evil? [91]
7.
According to
Mackie, what problems—I think there are three of them—arise for the first
solution to the problem of evil? [92-3]
8.
According to
Mackie, what problem arises for the second solution to the problem of evil?
[93]
9.
What is first
order evil, or Evil (1)? [94]
10.
What is first
order good, or Good (1)? [94]
11.
What is second
order good, or Good (2)? [94] How are evil (1), good (1), and good (2)
supposed to be related?
12.
What is third
order good, or good (3)? [94] How is it supposed to be related to good
(2)?
13.
What is the third
(and “fatal”) objection to the third solution to the problem of evil? [94] Do
you think that this objection is in fact fatal? Why, or why not?
14.
How, according to
Mackie, can the fourth solution be combined with the third solution? How is
this combination supposed to evade Mackie’s criticism of the thrid solution?
[95]
15.
How, according to
Mackie, are freedom and Evil (2) related? [95]
16.
What is Mackie’s
first worry with the fourth solution? [95]
17.
What, according
to Mackie, is “a fundamental difficulty in the notion of an Omnipotent
God creating man with free will”? [95]
18.
What is the
Paradox of Omnipotence? [96] Why is it a paradox? [96]
19.
How, according to
Mackie, can we solve the Paradox of Omnipotence? [97]
Peter van Inwagen, “The
Magnitude, Duration and Distribution of Evil: A Theodicy”
1.
Why did God need
to take a risk? [98]
2.
What “familiar
‘move’ in discussions of the problem of evil” is at the heart of van Inwagen’s
theodicy? [98]
3.
By the way, what is a Theodicy?
4.
van Inwagen
claims that the following claim is true: An omnipotent being cannot insure that
a creature who has a free choice between x and y choose x rather than y. Do you
think that this compromises God’s omnipotence? Why, or why not?
5.
What is the only
source of evil? [98]
6.
What is ‘natural’
evil? [100, 101]
7.
“[G]iven the
facts of history,” what must a theodicist do? [100]
8.
What does van
Inwagen’s tale demonstrate? [101] First of all, do you think that the tale does
in fact demonstrate what van Inwagen thinks it demonstrates? Why, or why not?
Next, do you agree the suffering and death caused by earthquakes is the result
of the actions of human beings? Why, or why not?
9.
How does van
Inwagen respond to Question 1? [103]
10.
What is van
Inwagen’s first response to Question 2? [103]
11.
What are his
second and third responses to Question 2? [103-5]
12.
What three
“speculations” does van Inwagen suggest as responses to Question 3? [105-6]
13.
What are horrors? [106]
14.
On what should
“students of the Problem of Evil” concentrate? [107]
15.
What is van
Inwagen’s response to Question 4? [107]
16.
How does Eleonore
Stump object to van Inwagen’s argument? How does van Inwagen respond to Stump’s
objection? [109]
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