Dialogues concerning Natural Religion
Contents
Hume: DNR Contents

Table of Contents: DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION

	 PAST MASTERS Preface

	 Pamphilus to Hermippus
	 Part 1
	 Part 2
	 Part 3
	 Part 4
	 Part 5
	 Part 6
	 Part 7
	 Part 8
	 Part 9
	 Part 10
	 Part 11
	 Part 12

	 Footnotes

Past Masters Preface
Hume: DNR PAST MASTERS Preface
	
	The text of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is a corrected version of the 1854 Works. The 
page numbers which identify each folio, refer to the Kemp Smith Dialogues.

Pamphilus to Hermippus
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DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION.

PAMPHILUS TO HERMIPPUS.

It has been remarked, my Hermippus, that though the ancient philosophers conveyed most of their instruction 
in the form of dialogue, this method of composition has been little practised in later ages, and has seldom 
succeeded in the hands of those who have attempted it. Accurate and regular argument, indeed, such as is now 
expected of philosophical enquirers, naturally throws a man into the methodical and didactic manner; where 
he can immediately, without preparation, explain the point at which he aims; and thence proceed, without 
interruption, to deduce the proofs on which it is established. To deliver a SYSTEM in conversation, scarcely 
appears natural; and while the dialogue-writer desires, by departing from the direct style of composition, to 
give a freer air to his performance, and avoid the appearance of Author and Reader, he is apt to run into a 
worse inconvenience, and convey the image of Pedagogue and Pupil. Or, if he carries on the dispute in the 
natural spirit of good company, by throwing in a variety of topics, and preserving a proper balance among the 
speakers, he often loses so much time in preparations and transitions, that the reader will scarcely think 
himself compensated, by all the graces of dialogue, for the order, brevity, and precision, which are sacrificed 
to them.
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	There are some subjects, however, to which dialogue-writing is peculiarly adapted, and where it is 
still preferable to the direct and simple method of composition.
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	Any point of doctrine, which is so obvious that it scarcely admits of dispute, but at the same time so 
important that it cannot be too often inculcated, seems to require some such method of handling it; where the 
novelty of the manner may compensate the triteness of the subject; where the vivacity of conversation may 
enforce the precept; and where the variety of lights, presented by various personages and characters, may 
appear neither tedious nor redundant.
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	Any question of philosophy, on the other hand, which is so obscure and uncertain, that human reason 
can reach no fixed determination with regard to it; if it should be treated at all, seems to lead us naturally into 
the style of dialogue and conversation. Reasonable men may be allowed to differ, where no one can 
reasonably be positive. Opposite sentiments, even without any decision, afford an agreeable amusement; and 
if the subject be curious and interesting, the book carries us, in a manner, into company; and unites the two 
greatest and purest pleasures of human life, study and society.
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	Happily, these circumstances are all to be found in the subject of NATURAL RELIGION. What truth 
so obvious, so certain, as the being of a God, which the most ignorant ages have acknowledged, for which the 
most refined geniuses have ambitiously striven to produce new proofs and arguments? What truth so 
important as this, which is the ground of all our hopes, the surest foundation of morality, the firmest support 
of society, and the only principle which ought never to be a moment absent from our thoughts and 
meditations? But, in treating of this obvious and important truth, what obscure questions occur concerning the 
nature of that Divine Being, his attributes, his decrees, his plan of providence? These have been always 
subjected to the disputations of men; concerning these human reason has not reached any certain 
determination. But these are topics so interesting, that we cannot restrain our restless enquiry with regard to 
them; though nothing but doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction, have as yet been the result of our most 
accurate researches.
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	This I had lately occasion to observe, while I passed, as usual, part of the summer season with 
Cleanthes, and was present at those conversations of his with Philo and Demea, of which I gave you lately 
some imperfect account. Your curiosity, you then told me, was so excited, that I must, of necessity, enter into 
a more exact detail of their reasonings, and display those various systems which they advanced with regard to 
so delicate a subject as that of natural religion. The remarkable contrast in their characters still further raised 
your expectations; while you opposed the accurate philosophical turn of Cleanthes to the careless scepticism 
of Philo, or compared either of their dispositions with the rigid inflexible orthodoxy of Demea. My youth 
rendered me a mere auditor of their disputes; and that curiosity, natural to the early season of life, has so 
deeply imprinted in my memory the whole chain and connexion of their arguments, that, I hope, I shall not 
omit or confound any considerable part of them in the recital.

Part 1
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PART I.

After I joined the company, whom I found sitting in Cleanthes's library, Demea paid Cleanthes some 
compliments on the great care which he took of my education, and on his unwearied perseverance and 
constancy in all his friendships. The father of Pamphilus, said he, was your intimate friend: The son is your 
pupil; and may indeed be regarded as your adopted son, were we to judge by the pains which you bestow in 
conveying to him every useful branch of literature and science. You are no more wanting, I am persuaded, in 
prudence, than in industry. I shall, therefore, communicate to you a maxim, which I have observed with 
regard to my own children, that I may learn how far it agrees with your practice. The method I follow in their 
education is founded on the saying of an ancient, "That students of philosophy ought first to learn logics, then 
ethics, next physics, last of all the nature of the gods."†1 This science of natural theology, according to him, 
being the most profound and abstruse of any, required the maturest judgment in its students; and none but a 
mind enriched with all the other sciences, can safely be intrusted with it.
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	Are you so late, says Philo, in teaching your children the principles of religion? Is there no danger of 
their neglecting, or rejecting altogether those opinions of which they have heard so little during the whole 
course of their education? It is only as a science, replied Demea, subjected to human reasoning and 
disputation, that I postpone the study of Natural Theology. To season their minds with early piety, is my chief 
care; and by continual precept and instruction, and I hope too by example, I imprint deeply on their tender 
minds an habitual reverence for all the principles of religion. While they pass through every other science, I 
still remark the uncertainty of each part; the eternal disputations of men; the obscurity of all philosophy; and 
the strange, ridiculous conclusions, which some of the greatest geniuses have derived from the principles of 
mere human reason. Having thus tamed their mind to a proper submission and self-diffidence, I have no 
longer any scruple of opening to them the greatest mysteries of religion; nor apprehend any danger from that 
assuming arrogance of philosophy, which may lead them to reject the most established doctrines and 
opinions.
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	Your precaution, says Philo, of seasoning your children's minds early with piety, is certainly very 
reasonable; and no more than is requisite in this profane and irreligious age. But what I chiefly admire in your 
plan of education, is your method of drawing advantage from the very principles of philosophy and learning, 
which, by inspiring pride and self-sufficiency, have commonly, in all ages, been found so destructive to the 
principles of religion. The vulgar, indeed, we may remark, who are unacquainted with science and profound 
enquiry, observing the endless disputes of the learned, have commonly a thorough contempt for philosophy; 
and rivet themselves the faster, by that means, in the great points of theology which have been taught them. 
Those who enter a little into study and enquiry, finding many appearances of evidence in doctrines the newest 
and most extraordinary, think nothing too difficult for human reason; and, presumptuously breaking through 
all fences, profane the inmost sanctuaries of the temple. But Cleanthes will, I hope, agree with me, that, after 
we have abandoned ignorance, the surest remedy, there is still one expedient left to prevent this profane 
liberty. Let Demea's principles be improved and cultivated: let us become thoroughly sensible of the 
weakness, blindness, and narrow limits of human reason: let us duly consider its uncertainty and endless 
contrarieties, even in subjects of common life and practice: let the errors and deceits of our very senses be set 
before us; the insuperable difficulties which attend first principles in all systems; the contradictions which 
adhere to the very ideas of matter, cause and effect, extension, space, time, motion; and in a word, quantity of 
all kinds, the object of the only science that can fairly pretend to any certainty or evidence. When these topics 
are displayed in their full light, as they are by some philosophers and almost all divines; who can retain such 
confidence in this frail faculty of reason as to pay any regard to its determinations in points so sublime, so 
abstruse, so remote from common life and experience? When the coherence of the parts of a stone, or even 
that composition of parts which renders it extended; when these familiar objects, I say, are so inexplicable, 
and contain circumstances so repugnant and contradictory; with what assurance can we decide concerning the 
origin of worlds, or trace their history from eternity to eternity?
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	While Philo pronounced these words, I could observe a smile in the countenance both of Demea and 
Cleanthes. That of Demea seemed to imply an unreserved satisfaction in the doctrines delivered: but, in 
Cleanthes's features, I could distinguish an air of finesse; as if he perceived some raillery or artificial malice in 
the reasonings of Philo.
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	You propose then, Philo, said Cleanthes, to erect religious faith on philosophical scepticism; and you 
think, that if certainty or evidence be expelled from every other subject of enquiry, it will all retire to these 
theological doctrines, and there acquire a superior force and authority. Whether your scepticism be as absolute 
and sincere as you pretend, we shall learn by and by, when the company breaks up: we shall then see, whether 
you go out at the door or the window; and whether you really doubt if your body has gravity, or can be injured 
by its fall; according to popular opinion, derived from our fallacious senses, and more fallacious experience. 
And this consideration, Demea, may, I think, fairly serve to abate our ill-will to this humourous sect of the 
sceptics. If they be thoroughly in earnest, they will not long trouble the world with their doubts, cavils, and 
disputes: if they be only in jest, they are, perhaps, bad railers; but can never be very dangerous, either to the 
state, to philosophy, or to religion.
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	In reality, Philo, continued he, it seems certain, that though a man, in a flush of humour, after intense 
reflection on the many contradictions and imperfections of human reason, may entirely renounce all belief and 
opinion, it is impossible for him to persevere in this total scepticism, or make it appear in his conduct for a 
few hours. External objects press in upon him; passions solicit him; his philosophical melancholy dissipates; 
and even the utmost violence upon his own temper will not be able, during any time, to preserve the poor 
appearance of scepticism. And for what reason impose on himself such a violence? This is a point in which it 
will be impossible for him ever to satisfy himself, consistently with his sceptical principles. So that, upon the 
whole, nothing could be more ridiculous than the principles of the ancient Pyrrhonians; if in reality they 
endeavoured, as is pretended, to extend, throughout, the same scepticism which they had learned from the 
declamations of their schools, and which they ought to have confined to them.
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	In this view, there appears a great resemblance between the sects of the Stoics and Pyrrhonians, 
though perpetual antagonists; and both of them seem founded on this erroneous maxim, That what a man can 
perform sometimes, and in some dispositions, he can perform always, and in every disposition. When the 
mind, by Stoical reflections, is elevated into a sublime enthusiasm of virtue, and strongly smit with any 
species of honour or public good, the utmost bodily pain and sufferings will not prevail over such a high sense 
of duty; and it is possible, perhaps, by its means, even to smile and exult in the midst of tortures. If this 
sometimes may be the case in fact and reality, much more may a philosopher, in his school, or even in his 
closet, work himself up to such an enthusiasm, and support in imagination the acutest pain or most calamitous 
event which he can possibly conceive. But how shall he support this enthusiasm itself? The bent of his mind 
relaxes, and cannot be recalled at pleasure; avocations lead him astray; misfortunes attack him unawares; and 
the philosopher sinks by degrees into the plebeian.
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	I allow of your comparison between the Stoics and Sceptics, replied Philo. But you may observe, at 
the same time, that though the mind cannot, in Stoicism, support the highest flights of philosophy, yet, even 
when it sinks lower, it still retains somewhat of its former disposition; and the effects of the Stoic's reasoning 
will appear in his conduct in common life, and through the whole tenor of his actions. The ancient schools, 
particularly that of Zeno, produced examples of virtue and constancy which seem astonishing to present 
times.

Vain Wisdom all and false Philosophy.
Yet with a pleasing sorcery could charm
Pain, for a while, or anguish; and excite
Fallacious Hope, or arm the obdurate breast
With stubborn Patience, as with triple steel.

In like manner, if a man has accustomed himself to sceptical considerations on the uncertainty and narrow 
limits of reason, he will not entirely forget them when he turns his reflection on other subjects; but in all his 
philosophical principles and reasoning, I dare not say in his common conduct, he will be found different from 
those, who either never formed any opinions in the case, or have entertained sentiments more favourable to 
human reason.
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	To whatever length any one may push his speculative principles of scepticism, he must act, I own, 
and live, and converse, like other men; and for this conduct he is not obliged to give any other reason, than the 
absolute necessity he lies under of so doing. If he ever carries his speculations further than this necessity 
constrains him, and philosophizes either on natural or moral subjects, he is allured by a certain pleasure and 
satisfaction which he finds in employing himself after that manner. He considers besides, that every one, even 
in common life, is constrained to have more or less of this philosophy; that from our earliest infancy we make 
continual advances in forming more general principles of conduct and reasoning; that the larger experience 
we acquire, and the stronger reason we are endued with, we always render our principles the more general and 
comprehensive; and that what we call philosophy is nothing but a more regular and methodical operation of 
the same kind. To philosophize on such subjects, is nothing essentially different from reasoning on common 
life; and we may only expect greater stability, if not greater truth, from our philosophy, on account of its 
exacter and more scrupulous method of proceeding.
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	But when we look beyond human affairs and the properties of the surrounding bodies: when we carry 
our speculations into the two eternities, before and after the present state of things; into the creation and 
formation of the universe; the existence and properties of spirits; the powers and operations of one universal 
Spirit existing without beginning and without end; omnipotent, omniscient, immutable, infinite, and 
incomprehensible: we must be far removed from the smallest tendency to scepticism not to be apprehensive, 
that we have here got quite beyond the reach of our faculties. So long as we confine our speculations to trade, 
or morals, or politics, or criticism, we make appeals, every moment, to common sense and experience, which 
strengthen our philosophical conclusions, and remove, at least in part, the suspicion which we so justly 
entertain with regard to every reasoning that is very subtile and refined. But, in theological reasonings, we 
have not this advantage; while, at the same time, we are employed upon objects, which, we must be sensible, 
are too large for our grasp, and of all others, require most to be familiarized to our apprehension. We are like 
foreigners in a strange country, to whom every thing must seem suspicious, and who are in danger every 
moment of transgressing against the laws and customs of the people with whom they live and converse. We 
know not how far we ought to trust our vulgar methods of reasoning in such a subject; since, even in common 
life, and in that province which is peculiarly appropriated to them, we cannot account for them, and are 
entirely guided by a kind of instinct or necessity in employing them.
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	All sceptics pretend, that, if reason be considered in an abstract view, it furnishes invincible 
arguments against itself; and that we could never retain any conviction or assurance, on any subject, were not 
the sceptical reasonings so refined and subtile, that they are not able to counterpoise the more solid and more 
natural arguments derived from the senses and experience. But it is evident, whenever our arguments lose this 
advantage, and run wide of common life, that the most refined scepticism comes to be upon a footing with 
them, and is able to oppose and counterbalance them. The one has no more weight than the other. The mind 
must remain in suspense between them; and it is that very suspense or balance, which is the triumph of 
scepticism.
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	But I observe, says Cleanthes, with regard to you, Philo, and all speculative sceptics, that your 
doctrine and practice are as much at variance in the most abstruse points of theory as in the conduct of 
common life. Wherever evidence discovers itself, you adhere to it, notwithstanding your pretended 
scepticism; and I can observe, too, some of your sect to be as decisive as those who make greater professions 
of certainty and assurance. In reality, would not a man be ridiculous, who pretended to reject Newton's 
explication of the wonderful phenomenon of the rainbow, because that explication gives a minute anatomy of 
the rays of light; a subject, forsooth, too refined for human comprehension? And what would you say to one, 
who, having nothing particular to object to the arguments of Copernicus and Galileo for the motion of the 
earth, should withhold his assent, on that general principle, that these subjects were too magnificent and 
remote to be explained by the narrow and fallacious reason of mankind?
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	There is indeed a kind of brutish and ignorant scepticism, as you well observed, which gives the 
vulgar a general prejudice against what they do not easily understand, and makes them reject every principle 
which requires elaborate reasoning to prove and establish it. This species of scepticism is fatal to knowledge, 
not to religion; since we find, that those who make greatest profession of it, give often their assent, not only to 
the great truths of Theism and natural theology, but even to the most absurd tenets which a traditional 
superstition has recommended to them. They firmly believe in witches, though they will not believe nor attend 
to the most simple proposition of Euclid. But the refined and philosophical sceptics fall into an inconsistence 
of an opposite nature. They push their researches into the most abstruse corners of science; and their assent 
attends them in every step, proportioned to the evidence which they meet with. They are even obliged to 
acknowledge, that the most abstruse and remote objects are those which are best explained by philosophy. 
Light is in reality anatomized. The true system of the heavenly bodies is discovered and ascertained. But the 
nourishment of bodies by food is still an inexplicable mystery. The cohesion of the parts of matter is still 
incomprehensible. These sceptics, therefore, are obliged, in every question, to consider each particular 
evidence apart, and proportion their assent to the precise degree of evidence which occurs. This is their 
practice in all natural, mathematical, moral, and political science. And why not the same, I ask, in the 
theological and religious? Why must conclusions of this nature be alone rejected on the general presumption 
of the insufficiency of human reason, without any particular discussion of the evidence? Is not such an 
unequal conduct a plain proof of prejudice and passion?
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	Our senses, you say, are fallacious; our understanding erroneous; our ideas, even of the most familiar 
objects, extension, duration, motion, full of absurdities and contradictions. You defy me to solve the 
difficulties, or reconcile the repugnancies which you discover in them. I have not capacity for so great an 
undertaking: I have not leisure for it: I perceive it to be superfluous. Your own conduct, in every 
circumstance, refutes your principles, and shews the firmest reliance on all the received maxims of science, 
morals, prudence, and behaviour.
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	I shall never assent to so harsh an opinion as that of a celebrated writer,†2 who says, that the Sceptics 
are not a sect of philosophers: they are only a sect of liars. I may, however, affirm (I hope without offence), 
that they are a sect of jesters or railers. But for my part, whenever I find myself disposed to mirth and 
amusement, I shall certainly choose my entertainment of a less perplexing and abstruse nature. A comedy, a 
novel, or at most a history, seems a more natural recreation than such metaphysical subtilties and abstractions.
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	In vain would the sceptic make a distinction between science and common life, or between one 
science and another. The arguments employed in all, if just, are of a similar nature, and contain the same force 
and evidence. Or if there be any difference among them, the advantage lies entirely on the side of theology 
and natural religion. Many principles of mechanics are founded on very abstruse reasoning; yet no man who 
has any pretensions to science, even no speculative sceptic, pretends to entertain the least doubt with regard to 
them. The Copernican system contains the most surprising paradox, and the most contrary to our natural 
conceptions, to appearances, and to our very senses: yet even monks and inquisitors are now constrained to 
withdraw their opposition to it. And shall Philo, a man of so liberal a genius and extensive knowledge, 
entertain any general undistinguished scruples with regard to the religious hypothesis, which is founded on the 
simplest and most obvious arguments, and, unless it meets with artificial obstacles, has such easy access and 
admission into the mind of man?
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	And here we may observe, continued he, turning himself towards Demea, a pretty curious 
circumstance in the history of the sciences. After the union of philosophy with the popular religion, upon the 
first establishment of Christianity, nothing was more usual, among all religious teachers, than declamations 
against reason, against the senses, against every principle derived merely from human research and enquiry. 
All the topics of the ancient Academics were adopted by the fathers; and thence propagated for several ages in 
every school and pulpit throughout Christendom. The Reformers embraced the same principles of reasoning, 
or rather declamation; and all panegyrics on the excellency of faith, were sure to be interlarded with some 
severe strokes of satire against natural reason. A celebrated prelate too,†3 of the Romish communion, a man 
of the most extensive learning, who wrote a demonstration of Christianity, has also composed a treatise, 
which contains all the cavils of the boldest and most determined Pyrrhonism. Locke seems to have been the 
first Christian who ventured openly to assert, that faith was nothing but a species of reason; that religion was 
only a branch of philosophy; and that a chain of arguments, similar to that which established any truth in 
morals, politics, or physics, was always employed in discovering all the principles of theology, natural and 
revealed. The ill use which Bayle and other libertines made of the philosophical scepticism of the fathers and 
first reformers, still further propagated the judicious sentiment of Mr. Locke: and it is now in a manner 
avowed, by all pretenders to reasoning and philosophy, that Atheist and Sceptic are almost synonymous. And 
as it is certain that no man is in earnest when he professes the latter principle, I would fain hope that there are 
as few who seriously maintain the former.
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	Don't you remember, said Philo, the excellent saying of Lord Bacon on this head? That a little 
philosophy, replied Cleanthes, makes a man an Atheist: a great deal converts him to religion. That is a very 
judicious remark too, said Philo. But what I have in my eye is another passage, where, having mentioned 
David's fool, who said in his heart there is no God, this great philosopher observes, that the Atheists nowadays 
have a double share of folly; for they are not contented to say in their hearts there is no God, but they also 
utter that impiety with their lips, and are thereby guilty of multiplied indiscretion and imprudence. Such 
people, though they were ever so much in earnest, cannot, methinks, be very formidable.
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	But though you should rank me in this class of fools, I cannot forbear communicating a remark that 
occurs to me, from the history of the religious and irreligious scepticism with which you have entertained us. 
It appears to me, that there are strong symptoms of priestcraft in the whole progress of this affair. During 
ignorant ages, such as those which followed the dissolution of the ancient schools, the priests perceived, that 
Atheism, Deism, or heresy of any kind, could only proceed from the presumptuous questioning of received 
opinions, and from a belief that human reason was equal to every thing. Education had then a mighty 
influence over the minds of men, and was almost equal in force to those suggestions of the senses and 
common understanding, by which the most determined sceptic must allow himself to be governed. But at 
present, when the influence of education is much diminished, and men, from a more open commerce of the 
world, have learned to compare the popular principles of different nations and ages, our sagacious divines 
have changed their whole system of philosophy, and talk the language of Stoics, Platonists, and Peripatetics, 
not that of Pyrrhonians and Academics. If we distrust human reason, we have now no other principle to lead 
us into religion. Thus, sceptics in one age, dogmatists in another; whichever system best suits the purpose of 
these reverend gentlemen, in giving them an ascendant over mankind, they are sure to make it their favourite 
principle, and established tenet.
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	It is very natural, said Cleanthes, for men to embrace those principles, by which they find they can 
best defend their doctrines; nor need we have any recourse to priestcraft to account for so reasonable an 
expedient. And, surely nothing can afford a stronger presumption, that any set of principles are true, and 
ought to be embraced, than to observe that they tend to the confirmation of true religion, and serve to 
confound the cavils of Atheists, Libertines, and Freethinkers of all denominations.

Part 2
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PART II.

I must own, Cleanthes, said Demea, that nothing can more surprize me, than the light in which you have all 
along put this argument. By the whole tenor of your discourse, one would imagine that you were maintaining 
the Being of a God, against the cavils of Atheists and Infidels; and were necessitated to become a champion 
for that fundamental principle of all religion. But this, I hope, is not by any means a question among us. No 
man, no man at least of common sense, I am persuaded, ever entertained a serious doubt with regard to a truth 
so certain and self-evident. The question is not concerning the BEING, but the NATURE of GOD. This, I 
affirm, from the infirmities of human understanding, to be altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us. 
The essence of that supreme Mind, his attributes, the manner of his existence, the very nature of his duration; 
these, and every particular which regards so divine a Being, are mysterious to men. Finite, weak, and blind 
creatures, we ought to humble ourselves in his august presence; and, conscious of our frailties, adore in 
silence his infinite perfections, which eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, neither hath it entered into the 
heart of man to conceive. They are covered in a deep cloud from human curiosity. It is profaneness to attempt 
penetrating through these sacred obscurities. And, next to the impiety of denying his existence, is the temerity 
of prying into his nature and essence, decrees and attributes.
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	But lest you should think that my piety has here got the better of my philosophy, I shall support my 
opinion, if it needs any support, by a very great authority. I might cite all the divines, almost, from the 
foundation of Christianity, who have ever treated of this or any other theological subject: but I shall confine 
myself, at present, to one equally celebrated for piety and philosophy. It is Father Malebranche, who, I 
remember, thus expresses himself.†4 "One ought not so much," says he, "to call God a spirit, in order to 
express positively what he is, as in order to signify that he is not matter. He is a Being infinitely perfect: of 
this we cannot doubt. But in the same manner as we ought not to imagine, even supposing him corporeal, that 
he is clothed with a human body, as the Anthropomorphites asserted, under colour that that figure was the 
most perfect of any; so, neither ought we to imagine that the spirit of God has human ideas, or bears any 
resemblance to our spirit, under colour that we know nothing more perfect than a human mind. We ought 
rather to believe, that as he comprehends the perfections of matter without being material . . . he comprehends 
also the perfections of created spirits without being spirit, in the manner we conceive spirit: that his true name 
is, He that is; or, in other words, Being without restriction, All Being, the Being infinite and universal."
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	After so great an authority, Demea, replied Philo, as that which you have produced, and a thousand 
more which you might produce, it would appear ridiculous in me to add my sentiment, or express my 
approbation of your doctrine. But surely, where reasonable men treat these subjects, the question can never be 
concerning the Being, but only the Nature, of the Deity. The former truth, as you well observe, is 
unquestionable and self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause; and the original cause of this universe 
(whatever it be) we call God; and piously ascribe to him every species of perfection. Whoever scruples this 
fundamental truth, deserves every punishment which can be inflicted among philosophers, to wit, the greatest 
ridicule, contempt, and disapprobation. But as all perfection is entirely relative, we ought never to imagine 
that we comprehend the attributes of this divine Being, or to suppose that his perfections have any analogy or 
likeness to the perfections of a human creature. Wisdom, Thought, Design, Knowledge; these we justly 
ascribe to him; because these words are honourable among men, and we have no other language or other 
conceptions by which we can express our adoration of him. But let us beware, lest we think that our ideas 
anywise correspond to his perfections, or that his attributes have any resemblance to these qualities among 
men. He is infinitely superior to our limited view and comprehension; and is more the object of worship in the 
temple, than of disputation in the schools.
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	In reality, Cleanthes, continued he, there is no need of having recourse to that affected scepticism so 
displeasing to you, in order to come at this determination. Our ideas reach no further than our experience. We 
have no experience of divine attributes and operations. I need not conclude my syllogism. You can draw the 
inference yourself. And it is a pleasure to me (and I hope to you too) that just reasoning and sound piety here 
concur in the same conclusion, and both of them establish the adorably mysterious and incomprehensible 
nature of the Supreme Being.
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	Not to lose any time in circumlocutions, said Cleanthes, addressing himself to Demea, much less in 
replying to the pious declamations of Philo; I shall briefly explain how I conceive this matter. Look round the 
world: contemplate the whole and every part of it: you will find it to be nothing but one great machine, 
subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond 
what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most 
minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have 
ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, 
though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human designs, thought, wisdom, and 
intelligence. Since, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, 
that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though 
possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this 
argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his 
similarity to human mind and intelligence.
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	I shall be so free, Cleanthes, said Demea, as to tell you, that from the beginning, I could not approve 
of your conclusion concerning the similarity of the Deity to men; still less can I approve of the mediums by 
which you endeavour to establish it. What! No demonstration of the Being of God! No abstract arguments! 
No proofs a priori! Are these, which have hitherto been so much insisted on by philosophers, all fallacy, all 
sophism? Can we reach no further in this subject than experience and probability? I will not say that this is 
betraying the cause of a Deity: but surely, by this affected candour, you give advantages to Atheists, which 
they never could obtain by the mere dint of argument and reasoning.
Hume: DNR Pt. 2 Para. 7/28 p. 144
	What I chiefly scruple in this subject, said Philo, is not so much that all religious arguments are by 
Cleanthes reduced to experience, as that they appear not to be even the most certain and irrefragable of that 
inferior kind. That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the earth has solidity, we have observed a thousand 
and a thousand times; and when any new instance of this nature is presented, we draw without hesitation the 
accustomed inference. The exact similarity of the cases gives us a perfect assurance of a similar event; and a 
stronger evidence is never desired nor sought after. But wherever you depart, in the least, from the similarity 
of the cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy, which 
is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty. After having experienced the circulation of the blood in human 
creatures, we make no doubt that it takes place in Titius and Maevius. But from its circulation in frogs and 
fishes, it is only a presumption, though a strong one, from analogy, that it takes place in men and other 
animals. The analogical reasoning is much weaker, when we infer the circulation of the sap in vegetables 
from our experience that the blood circulates in animals; and those, who hastily followed that imperfect 
analogy, are found, by more accurate experiments, to have been mistaken.
Hume: DNR Pt. 2 Para. 8/28 p. 144
	If we see a house, Cleanthes, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect or 
builder; because this is precisely that species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that 
species of cause. But surely you will not affirm, that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house that we 
can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The 
dissimilitude is so striking, that the utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture, a presumption 
concerning a similar cause; and how that pretension will be received in the world, I leave you to consider.
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	It would surely be very ill received, replied Cleanthes; and I should be deservedly blamed and 
detested, did I allow, that the proofs of a Deity amounted to no more than a guess or conjecture. But is the 
whole adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a resemblance? The economy of 
final causes? The order, proportion, and arrangement of every part? Steps of a stair are plainly contrived, that 
human legs may use them in mounting; and this inference is certain and infallible. Human legs are also 
contrived for walking and mounting; and this inference, I allow, is not altogether so certain, because of the 
dissimilarity which you remark; but does it, therefore, deserve the name only of presumption or conjecture?
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	Good God! cried Demea, interrupting him, where are we? Zealous defenders of religion allow, that 
the proofs of a Deity fall short of perfect evidence! And you, Philo, on whose assistance I depended in 
proving the adorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature, do you assent to all these extravagant opinions of 
Cleanthes? For what other name can I give them? or, why spare my censure, when such principles are 
advanced, supported by such an authority, before so young a man as Pamphilus?
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	You seem not to apprehend, replied Philo, that I argue with Cleanthes in his own way; and, by 
shewing him the dangerous consequences of his tenets, hope at last to reduce him to our opinion. But what 
sticks most with you, I observe, is the representation which Cleanthes has made of the argument a posteriori; 
and finding that that argument is likely to escape your hold and vanish into air, you think it so disguised, that 
you can scarcely believe it to be set in its true light. Now, however much I may dissent, in other respects, 
from the dangerous principles of Cleanthes, I must allow that he has fairly represented that argument; and I 
shall endeavour so to state the matter to you, that you will entertain no further scruples with regard to it.
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	Were a man to abstract from every thing which he knows or has seen, he would be altogether 
incapable, merely from his own ideas, to determine what kind of scene the universe must be, or to give the 
preference to one state or situation of things above another. For as nothing which he clearly conceives could 
be esteemed impossible or implying a contradiction, every chimera of his fancy would be upon an equal 
footing; nor could he assign any just reason why he adheres to one idea or system, and rejects the others 
which are equally possible.
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	Again; after he opens his eyes, and contemplates the world as it really is, it would be impossible for 
him at first to assign the cause of any one event, much less of the whole of things, or of the universe. He 
might set his fancy a rambling; and she might bring him in an infinite variety of reports and representations. 
These would all be possible; but being all equally possible, he would never of himself give a satisfactory 
account for his preferring one of them to the rest. Experience alone can point out to him the true cause of any 
phenomenon.
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	Now, according to this method of reasoning, Demea, it follows, (and is, indeed, tacitly allowed by 
Cleanthes himself,) that order, arrangement, or the adjustment of final causes, is not of itself any proof of 
design; but only so far as it has been experienced to proceed from that principle. For ought we can know a 
priori, matter may contain the source or spring of order originally within itself as well as mind does; and there 
is no more difficulty in conceiving, that the several elements, from an internal unknown cause, may fall into 
the most exquisite arrangement, than to conceive that their ideas, in the great universal mind, from a like 
internal unknown cause, fall into that arrangement. The equal possibility of both these suppositions is 
allowed. But, by experience, we find, (according to Cleanthes,) that there is a difference between them. Throw 
several pieces of steel together, without shape or form; they will never arrange themselves so as to compose a 
watch. Stone, and mortar, and wood, without an architect, never erect a house. But the ideas in a human mind, 
we see, by an unknown, inexplicable economy, arrange themselves so as to form the plan of a watch or house. 
Experience, therefore, proves, that there is an original principle of order in mind, not in matter. From similar 
effects we infer similar causes. The adjustment of means to ends is alike in the universe, as in a machine of 
human contrivance. The causes, therefore, must be resembling.
Hume: DNR Pt. 2 Para. 15/28 p. 146
	I was from the beginning scandalized, I must own, with this resemblance, which is asserted, between 
the Deity and human creatures; and must conceive it to imply such a degradation of the Supreme Being as no 
sound Theist could endure. With your assistance, therefore, Demea, I shall endeavour to defend what you 
justly call the adorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature, and shall refute this reasoning of Cleanthes, 
provided he allows that I have made a fair representation of it.
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	When Cleanthes had assented, Philo, after a short pause, proceeded in the following manner.
Hume: DNR Pt. 2 Para. 17/28 p. 147
	That all inferences, Cleanthes, concerning fact, are founded on experience; and that all experimental 
reasonings are founded on the supposition that similar causes prove similar effects, and similar effects similar 
causes; I shall not at present much dispute with you. But observe, I entreat you, with what extreme caution all 
just reasoners proceed in the transferring of experiments to similar cases. Unless the cases be exactly similar, 
they repose no perfect confidence in applying their past observation to any particular phenomenon. Every 
alteration of circumstances occasions a doubt concerning the event; and it requires new experiments to prove 
certainly, that the new circumstances are of no moment or importance. A change in bulk, situation, 
arrangement, age, disposition of the air, or surrounding bodies; any of these particulars may be attended with 
the most unexpected consequences: and unless the objects be quite familiar to us, it is the highest temerity to 
expect with assurance, after any of these changes, an event similar to that which before fell under our 
observation. The slow and deliberate steps of philosophers here, if any where, are distinguished from the 
precipitate march of the vulgar, who, hurried on by the smallest similitude, are incapable of all discernment or 
consideration.
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	But can you think, Cleanthes, that your usual phlegm and philosophy have been preserved in so wide 
a step as you have taken, when you compared to the universe houses, ships, furniture, machines, and, from 
their similarity in some circumstances, inferred a similarity in their causes? Thought, design, intelligence, 
such as we discover in men and other animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the 
universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred others, which fall under daily 
observation. It is an active cause, by which some particular parts of nature, we find, produce alterations on 
other parts. But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? Does not the 
great disproportion bar all comparison and inference? From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn any 
thing concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a leaf's blowing, even though perfectly 
known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree?
Hume: DNR Pt. 2 Para. 19/28 p. 148
	But, allowing that we were to take the operations of one part of nature upon another, for the 
foundation of our judgment concerning the origin of the whole, (which never can be admitted,) yet why select 
so minute, so weak, so bounded a principle, as the reason and design of animals is found to be upon this 
planet? What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we call thought, that we must thus 
make it the model of the whole universe? Our partiality in our own favour does indeed present it on all 
occasions; but sound philosophy ought carefully to guard against so natural an illusion.
Hume: DNR Pt. 2 Para. 20/28 p. 148
	So far from admitting, continued Philo, that the operations of a part can afford us any just conclusion 
concerning the origin of the whole, I will not allow any one part to form a rule for another part, if the latter be 
very remote from the former. Is there any reasonable ground to conclude, that the inhabitants of other planets 
possess thought, intelligence, reason, or any thing similar to these faculties in men? When nature has so 
extremely diversified her manner of operation in this small globe, can we imagine that she incessantly copies 
herself throughout so immense a universe? And if thought, as we may well suppose, be confined merely to 
this narrow corner, and has even there so limited a sphere of action, with what propriety can we assign it for 
the original cause of all things? The narrow views of a peasant, who makes his domestic economy the rule for 
the government of kingdoms, is in comparison a pardonable sophism.
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	But were we ever so much assured, that a thought and reason, resembling the human, were to be 
found throughout the whole universe, and were its activity elsewhere vastly greater and more commanding 
than it appears in this globe; yet I cannot see, why the operations of a world constituted, arranged, adjusted, 
can with any propriety be extended to a world which is in its embryo state, and is advancing towards that 
constitution and arrangement. By observation, we know somewhat of the economy, action, and nourishment 
of a finished animal; but we must transfer with great caution that observation to the growth of a foetus in the 
womb, and still more in the formation of an animalcule in the loins of its male parent. Nature, we find, even 
from our limited experience, possesses an infinite number of springs and principles, which incessantly 
discover themselves on every change of her position and situation. And what new and unknown principles 
would actuate her in so new and unknown a situation as that of the formation of a universe, we cannot, 
without the utmost temerity, pretend to determine.
Hume: DNR Pt. 2 Para. 22/28 p. 149
	A very small part of this great system, during a very short time, is very imperfectly discovered to us; 
and do we then pronounce decisively concerning the origin of the whole?
Hume: DNR Pt. 2 Para. 23/28 p. 149
	Admirable conclusion! Stone, wood, brick, iron, brass, have not, at this time, in this minute globe of 
earth, an order or arrangement without human art and contrivance; therefore the universe could not originally 
attain its order and arrangement, without something similar to human art. But is a part of nature a rule for 
another part very wide of the former? Is it a rule for the whole? Is a very small part a rule for the universe? Is 
nature in one situation, a certain rule for nature in another situation vastly different from the former?
Hume: DNR Pt. 2 Para. 24/28 p. 149
	And can you blame me, Cleanthes, if I here imitate the prudent reserve of Simonides, who, according 
to the noted story, being asked by Hiero, What God was? desired a day to think of it, and then two days more; 
and after that manner continually prolonged the term, without ever bringing in his definition or description? 
Could you even blame me, if I answered at first, that I did not know, and was sensible that this subject lay 
vastly beyond the reach of my faculties? You might cry out sceptic and rallier, as much as you pleased: but 
having found, in so many other subjects much more familiar, the imperfections and even contradictions of 
human reason, I never should expect any success from its feeble conjectures, in a subject so sublime, and so 
remote from the sphere of our observation. When two species of objects have always been observed to be 
conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one wherever I see the existence of the other; and 
this I call an argument from experience. But how this argument can have place, where the objects, as in the 
present case, are single, individual, without parallel, or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And 
will any man tell me with a serious countenance, that an orderly universe must arise from some thought and 
art like the human, because we have experience of it? To ascertain this reasoning, it were requisite that we had 
experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely, that we have seen ships and cities arise from 
human art and contrivance.
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	Philo was proceeding in this vehement manner, somewhat between jest and earnest, as it appeared to 
me, when he observed some signs of impatience in Cleanthes, and then immediately stopped short. What I 
had to suggest, said Cleanthes, is only that you would not abuse terms, or make use of popular expressions to 
subvert philosophical reasonings. You know, that the vulgar often distinguish reason from experience, even 
where the question relates only to matter of fact and existence; though it is found, where that reason is 
properly analyzed, that it is nothing but a species of experience. To prove by experience the origin of the 
universe from mind, is not more contrary to common speech, than to prove the motion of the earth from the 
same principle. And a caviller might raise all the same objections to the Copernican system, which you have 
urged against my reasonings. Have you other earths, might he say, which you have seen to move? Have . . . . . 
.
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	Yes! cried Philo, interrupting him, we have other earths. Is not the moon another earth, which we see 
to turn round its centre? Is not Venus another earth, where we observe the same phenomenon? Are not the 
revolutions of the sun also a confirmation, from analogy, of the same theory? All the planets, are they not 
earths, which revolve about the sun? Are not the satellites moons, which move round Jupiter and Saturn, and 
along with these primary planets round the sun? These analogies and resemblances, with others which I have 
not mentioned, are the sole proofs of the Copernican system; and to you it belongs to consider, whether you 
have any analogies of the same kind to support your theory.
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	In reality, Cleanthes, continued he, the modern system of astronomy is now so much received by all 
enquirers, and has become so essential a part even of our earliest education, that we are not commonly very 
scrupulous in examining the reasons upon which it is founded. It is now become a matter of mere curiosity to 
study the first writers on that subject, who had the full force of prejudice to encounter, and were obliged to 
turn their arguments on every side in order to render them popular and convincing. But if we peruse Galileo's 
famous Dialogues concerning the system of the world, we shall find, that that great genius, one of the 
sublimest that ever existed, first bent all his endeavours to prove, that there was no foundation for the 
distinction commonly made between elementary and celestial substances. The schools, proceeding from the 
illusions of sense, had carried this distinction very far; and had established the latter substances to be 
ingenerable, incorruptible, unalterable, impassible; and had assigned all the opposite qualities to the former. 
But Galileo, beginning with the moon, proved its similarity in every particular to the earth; its convex figure, 
its natural darkness when not illuminated, its density, its distinction into solid and liquid, the variations of its 
phases, the mutual illuminations of the earth and moon, their mutual eclipses, the inequalities of the lunar 
surface, etc. After many instances of this kind, with regard to all the planets, men plainly saw that these 
bodies became proper objects of experience; and that the similarity of their nature enabled us to extend the 
same arguments and phenomena from one to the other.
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	In this cautious proceeding of the astronomers, you may read your own condemnation, Cleanthes; or 
rather may see, that the subject in which you are engaged exceeds all human reason and enquiry. Can you 
pretend to shew any such similarity between the fabric of a house, and the generation of a universe? Have you 
ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles the first arrangement of the elements? Have worlds ever 
been formed under your eye; and have you had leisure to observe the whole progress of the phenomenon, 
from the first appearance of order to its final consummation? If you have, then cite your experience, and 
deliver your theory.

Part 3
Hume: DNR Pt. 3 Para. 1/13 p. 152
PART III.

How the most absurd argument, replied Cleanthes, in the hands of a man of ingenuity and invention, may 
acquire an air of probability! Are you not aware, Philo, that it became necessary for Copernicus and his first 
disciples to prove the similarity of the terrestrial and celestial matter; because several philosophers, blinded by 
old systems, and supported by some sensible appearances, had denied that similarity? but that it is by no 
means necessary, that Theists should prove the similarity of the works of Nature to those of Art; because this 
similarity is self-evident and undeniable? The same matter, a like form; what more is requisite to shew an 
analogy between their causes, and to ascertain the origin of all things from a divine purpose and intention? 
Your objections, I must freely tell you, are no better than the abstruse cavils of those philosophers who denied 
motion; and ought to be refuted in the same manner, by illustrations, examples, and instances, rather than by 
serious argument and philosophy.
Hume: DNR Pt. 3 Para. 2/13 p. 152
	Suppose, therefore, that an articulate voice were heard in the clouds, much louder and more 
melodious than any which human art could ever reach: suppose, that this voice were extended in the same 
instant over all nations, and spoke to each nation in its own language and dialect: suppose, that the words 
delivered not only contain a just sense and meaning, but convey some instruction altogether worthy of a 
benevolent Being, superior to mankind: could you possibly hesitate a moment concerning the cause of this 
voice? and must you not instantly ascribe it to some design or purpose? Yet I cannot see but all the same 
objections (if they merit that appellation) which lie against the system of Theism, may also be produced 
against this inference.
Hume: DNR Pt. 3 Para. 3/13 p. 152
	Might you not say, that all conclusions concerning fact were founded on experience: that when we 
hear an articulate voice in the dark, and thence infer a man, it is only the resemblance of the effects which 
leads us to conclude that there is a like resemblance in the cause: but that this extraordinary voice, by its 
loudness, extent, and flexibility to all languages, bears so little analogy to any human voice, that we have no 
reason to suppose any analogy in their causes: and consequently, that a rational, wise, coherent speech 
proceeded, you know not whence, from some accidental whistling of the winds, not from any divine reason or 
intelligence? You see clearly your own objections in these cavils, and I hope too you see clearly, that they 
cannot possibly have more force in the one case than in the other.
Hume: DNR Pt. 3 Para. 4/13 p. 153
	But to bring the case still nearer the present one of the universe, I shall make two suppositions, which 
imply not any absurdity or impossibility. Suppose that there is a natural, universal, invariable language, 
common to every individual of human race; and that books are natural productions, which perpetuate 
themselves in the same manner with animals and vegetables, by descent and propagation. Several expressions 
of our passions contain a universal language: all brute animals have a natural speech, which, however limited, 
is very intelligible to their own species. And as there are infinitely fewer parts and less contrivance in the 
finest composition of eloquence, than in the coarsest organized body, the propagation of an Iliad or Aeneid is 
an easier supposition than that of any plant or animal.
Hume: DNR Pt. 3 Para. 5/13 p. 153
	Suppose, therefore, that you enter into your library, thus peopled by natural volumes, containing the 
most refined reason and most exquisite beauty; could you possibly open one of them, and doubt, that its 
original cause bore the strongest analogy to mind and intelligence? When it reasons and discourses; when it 
expostulates, argues, and enforces its views and topics; when it applies sometimes to the pure intellect, 
sometimes to the affections; when it collects, disposes, and adorns every consideration suited to the subject; 
could you persist in asserting, that all this, at the bottom, had really no meaning; and that the first formation of 
this volume in the loins of its original parent proceeded not from thought and design? Your obstinacy, I know, 
reaches not that degree of firmness: even your sceptical play and wantonness would be abashed at so glaring 
an absurdity.
Hume: DNR Pt. 3 Para. 6/13 p. 154
	But if there be any difference, Philo, between this supposed case and the real one of the universe, it is 
all to the advantage of the latter. The anatomy of an animal affords many stronger instances of design than the 
perusal of Livy or Tacitus; and any objection which you start in the former case, by carrying me back to so 
unusual and extraordinary a scene as the first formation of worlds, the same objection has place on the 
supposition of our vegetating library. Choose, then, your party, Philo, without ambiguity or evasion; assert 
either that a rational volume is no proof of a rational cause, or admit of a similar cause to all the works of 
nature.
Hume: DNR Pt. 3 Para. 7/13 p. 154
	Let me here observe too, continued Cleanthes, that this religious argument, instead of being 
weakened by that scepticism so much affected by you, rather acquires force from it, and becomes more firm 
and undisputed. To exclude all argument or reasoning of every kind, is either affectation or madness. The 
declared profession of every reasonable sceptic is only to reject abstruse, remote, and refined arguments; to 
adhere to common sense and the plain instincts of nature; and to assent, wherever any reasons strike him with 
so full a force that he cannot, without the greatest violence, prevent it. Now the arguments for Natural 
Religion are plainly of this kind; and nothing but the most perverse, obstinate metaphysics can reject them. 
Consider, anatomize the eye; survey its structure and contrivance; and tell me, from your own feeling, if the 
idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a force like that of sensation. The most 
obvious conclusion, surely, is in favour of design; and it requires time, reflection, and study, to summon up 
those frivolous, though abstruse objections, which can support Infidelity. Who can behold the male and 
female of each species, the correspondence of their parts and instincts, their passions, and whole course of life 
before and after generation, but must be sensible, that the propagation of the species is intended by Nature? 
Millions and millions of such instances present themselves through every part of the universe; and no 
language can convey a more intelligible irresistible meaning, than the curious adjustment of final causes. To 
what degree, therefore, of blind dogmatism must one have attained, to reject such natural and such convincing 
arguments?
Hume: DNR Pt. 3 Para. 8/13 p. 155
	Some beauties in writing we may meet with, which seem contrary to rules, and which gain the 
affections, and animate the imagination, in opposition to all the precepts of criticism, and to the authority of 
the established masters of art. And if the argument for Theism be, as you pretend, contradictory to the 
principles of logic; its universal, its irresistible influence proves clearly, that there may be arguments of a like 
irregular nature. Whatever cavils may be urged, an orderly world, as well as a coherent, articulate speech, will 
still be received as an incontestable proof of design and intention.
Hume: DNR Pt. 3 Para. 9/13 p. 155
	It sometimes happens, I own, that the religious arguments have not their due influence on an ignorant 
savage and barbarian; not because they are obscure and difficult, but because he never asks himself any 
question with regard to them. Whence arises the curious structure of an animal? From the copulation of its 
parents. And these whence? From their parents? A few removes set the objects at such a distance, that to him 
they are lost in darkness and confusion; nor is he actuated by any curiosity to trace them further. But this is 
neither dogmatism nor scepticism, but stupidity: a state of mind very different from your sifting, inquisitive 
disposition, my ingenious friend. You can trace causes from effects: you can compare the most distant and 
remote objects: and your greatest errors proceed not from barrenness of thought and invention, but from too 
luxuriant a fertility, which suppresses your natural good sense, by a profusion of unnecessary scruples and 
objections.
Hume: DNR Pt. 3 Para. 10/13 p. 155
	Here I could observe, Hermippus, that Philo was a little embarrassed and confounded: but while he 
hesitated in delivering an answer, luckily for him, Demea broke in upon the discourse, and saved his 
countenance.
Hume: DNR Pt. 3 Para. 11/13 p. 155
	Your instance, Cleanthes, said he, drawn from books and language, being familiar, has, I confess, so 
much more force on that account: but is there not some danger too in this very circumstance; and may it not 
render us presumptuous, by making us imagine we comprehend the Deity, and have some adequate idea of his 
nature and attributes? When I read a volume, I enter into the mind and intention of the author: I become him, 
in a manner, for the instant; and have an immediate feeling and conception of those ideas which revolved in 
his imagination while employed in that composition. But so near an approach we never surely can make to the 
Deity. His ways are not our ways. His attributes are perfect, but incomprehensible. And this volume of nature 
contains a great and inexplicable riddle, more than any intelligible discourse or reasoning.
Hume: DNR Pt. 3 Para. 12/13 p. 156
	The ancient Platonists, you know, were the most religious and devout of all the Pagan philosophers; 
yet many of them, particularly Plotinus, expressly declare, that intellect or understanding is not to be ascribed 
to the Deity; and that our most perfect worship of him consists, not in acts of veneration, reverence, gratitude, 
or love; but in a certain mysterious self-annihilation, or total extinction of all our faculties. These ideas are, 
perhaps, too far stretched; but still it must be acknowledged, that, by representing the Deity as so intelligible 
and comprehensible, and so similar to a human mind, we are guilty of the grossest and most narrow partiality, 
and make ourselves the model of the whole universe.
Hume: DNR Pt. 3 Para. 13/13 p. 156
	All the sentiments of the human mind, gratitude, resentment, love, friendship, approbation, blame, 
pity, emulation, envy, have a plain reference to the state and situation of man, and are calculated for 
preserving the existence and promoting the activity of such a being in such circumstances. It seems, therefore, 
unreasonable to transfer such sentiments to a supreme existence, or to suppose him actuated by them; and the 
phenomena besides of the universe will not support us in such a theory. All our ideas derived from the senses 
are confusedly false and illusive; and cannot therefore be supposed to have place in a supreme intelligence: 
and as the ideas of internal sentiment, added to those of the external senses, compose the whole furniture of 
human understanding, we may conclude, that none of the materials of thought are in any respect similar in the 
human and in the divine intelligence. Now, as to the manner of thinking; how can we make any comparison 
between them, or suppose them anywise resembling? Our thought is fluctuating, uncertain, fleeting, 
successive, and compounded; and were we to remove these circumstances, we absolutely annihilate its 
essence, and it would in such a case be an abuse of terms to apply to it the name of thought or reason. At least 
if it appear more pious and respectful (as it really is) still to retain these terms, when we mention the Supreme 
Being, we ought to acknowledge, that their meaning, in that case, is totally incomprehensible; and that the 
infirmities of our nature do not permit us to reach any ideas which in the least correspond to the ineffable 
sublimity of the Divine attributes.

Part 4
Hume: DNR Pt. 4 Para. 1/14 p. 158
PART IV.

It seems strange to me, said Cleanthes, that you, Demea, who are so sincere in the cause of religion, should 
still maintain the mysterious, incomprehensible nature of the Deity, and should insist so strenuously that he 
has no manner of likeness or resemblance to human creatures. The Deity, I can readily allow, possesses many 
powers and attributes of which we can have no comprehension: but if our ideas, so far as they go, be not just, 
and adequate, and correspondent to his real nature, I know not what there is in this subject worth insisting on. 
Is the name, without any meaning, of such mighty importance? Or how do you mystics, who maintain the 
absolute incomprehensibility of the Deity, differ from Sceptics or Atheists, who assert, that the first cause of 
all is unknown and unintelligible? Their temerity must be very great, if, after rejecting the production by a 
mind, I mean a mind resembling the human, (for I know of no other,) they pretend to assign, with certainty, 
any other specific intelligible cause: and their conscience must be very scrupulous indeed, if they refuse to 
call the universal unknown cause a God or Deity; and to bestow on him as many sublime eulogies and 
unmeaning epithets as you shall please to require of them.
Hume: DNR Pt. 4 Para. 2/14 p. 158
	Who could imagine, replied Demea, that Cleanthes, the calm philosophical Cleanthes, would attempt 
to refute his antagonists by affixing a nickname to them; and, like the common bigots and inquisitors of the 
age, have recourse to invective and declamation, instead of reasoning? Or does he not perceive, that these 
topics are easily retorted, and that Anthropomorphite is an appellation as invidious, and implies as dangerous 
consequences, as the epithet of Mystic, with which he has honoured us? In reality, Cleanthes, consider what it 
is you assert when you represent the Deity as similar to a human mind and understanding. What is the soul of 
man? A composition of various faculties, passions, sentiments, ideas; united, indeed, into one self or person, 
but still distinct from each other. When it reasons, the ideas, which are the parts of its discourse, arrange 
themselves in a certain form or order; which is not preserved entire for a moment, but immediately gives 
place to another arrangement. New opinions, new passions, new affections, new feelings arise, which 
continually diversify the mental scene, and produce in it the greatest variety and most rapid succession 
imaginable. How is this compatible with that perfect immutability and simplicity which all true Theists 
ascribe to the Deity? By the same act, say they, he sees past, present, and future: his love and hatred, his 
mercy and justice, are one individual operation: he is entire in every point of space; and compleat in every 
instant of duration. No succession, no change, no acquisition, no diminution. What he is implies not in it any 
shadow of distinction or diversity. And what he is this moment he ever has been, and ever will be, without 
any new judgment, sentiment, or operation. He stands fixed in one simple, perfect state: nor can you ever say, 
with any propriety, that this act of his is different from that other; or that this judgment or idea has been lately 
formed, and will give place, by succession, to any different judgment or idea.
Hume: DNR Pt. 4 Para. 3/14 p. 159
	I can readily allow, said Cleanthes, that those who maintain the perfect simplicity of the Supreme 
Being, to the extent in which you have explained it, are compleat Mystics, and chargeable with all the 
consequences which I have drawn from their opinion. They are, in a word, Atheists, without knowing it. For 
though it be allowed, that the Deity possesses attributes of which we have no comprehension, yet ought we 
never to ascribe to him any attributes which are absolutely incompatible with that intelligent nature essential 
to him. A mind, whose acts and sentiments and ideas are not distinct and successive; one, that is wholly 
simple, and totally immutable, is a mind which has no thought, no reason, no will, no sentiment, no love, no 
hatred; or, in a word, is no mind at all. It is an abuse of terms to give it that appellation; and we may as well 
speak of limited extension without figure, or of number without composition.
Hume: DNR Pt. 4 Para. 4/14 p. 159
	Pray consider, said Philo, whom you are at present inveighing against. You are honouring with the 
appellation of Atheist all the sound, orthodox divines, almost, who have treated of this subject; and you will at 
last be, yourself, found, according to your reckoning, the only sound Theist in the world. But if idolaters be 
Atheists, as, I think, may justly be asserted, and Christian Theologians the same, what becomes of the 
argument, so much celebrated, derived from the universal consent of mankind?
Hume: DNR Pt. 4 Para. 5/14 p. 160
	But because I know you are not much swayed by names and authorities, I shall endeavour to shew 
you, a little more distinctly, the inconveniences of that Anthropomorphism, which you have embraced; and 
shall prove, that there is no ground to suppose a plan of the world to be formed in the Divine mind, consisting 
of distinct ideas, differently arranged, in the same manner as an architect forms in his head the plan of a house 
which he intends to execute.
Hume: DNR Pt. 4 Para. 6/14 p. 160
	It is not easy, I own, to see what is gained by this supposition, whether we judge of the matter by 
Reason or by Experience. We are still obliged to mount higher, in order to find the cause of this cause, which 
you had assigned as satisfactory and conclusive.
Hume: DNR Pt. 4 Para. 7/14 p. 160
	If Reason (I mean abstract reason, derived from enquiries a priori) be not alike mute with regard to 
all questions concerning cause and effect, this sentence at least it will venture to pronounce, That a mental 
world, or universe of ideas, requires a cause as much, as does a material world, or universe of objects; and, if 
similar in its arrangement, must require a similar cause. For what is there in this subject, which should 
occasion a different conclusion or inference? In an abstract view, they are entirely alike; and no difficulty 
attends the one supposition, which is not common to both of them.
Hume: DNR Pt. 4 Para. 8/14 p. 161
	Again, when we will needs force Experience to pronounce some sentence, even on these subjects 
which lie beyond her sphere, neither can she perceive any material difference in this particular, between these 
two kinds of worlds; but finds them to be governed by similar principles, and to depend upon an equal variety 
of causes in their operations. We have specimens in miniature of both of them. Our own mind resembles the 
one; a vegetable or animal body the other. Let experience, therefore, judge from these samples. Nothing 
seems more delicate, with regard to its causes, than thought; and as these causes never operate in two persons 
after the same manner, so we never find two persons who think exactly alike. Nor indeed does the same 
person think exactly alike at any two different periods of time. A difference of age, of the disposition of his 
body, of weather, of food, of company, of books, of passions; any of these particulars, or others more minute, 
are sufficient to alter the curious machinery of thought, and communicate to it very different movements and 
operations. As far as we can judge, vegetables and animal bodies are not more delicate in their motions, nor 
depend upon a greater variety or more curious adjustment of springs and principles.
Hume: DNR Pt. 4 Para. 9/14 p. 161
	How, therefore, shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of that Being whom you suppose the 
Author of Nature, or, according to your system of Anthropomorphism, the ideal world, into which you trace 
the material? Have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal world, or new 
intelligent principle? But if we stop, and go no further; why go so far? why not stop at the material world? 
How can we satisfy ourselves without going on in infinitum? And, after all, what satisfaction is there in that 
infinite progression? Let us remember the story of the Indian philosopher and his elephant. It was never more 
applicable than to the present subject. If the material world rests upon a similar ideal world, this ideal world 
must rest upon some other; and so on, without end. It were better, therefore, never to look beyond the present 
material world. By supposing it to contain the principle of its order within itself, we really assert it to be God; 
and the sooner we arrive at that Divine Being, so much the better. When you go one step beyond the mundane 
system, you only excite an inquisitive humour which it is impossible ever to satisfy.
Hume: DNR Pt. 4 Para. 10/14 p. 162
	To say, that the different ideas which compose the reason of the Supreme Being, fall into order of 
themselves, and by their own nature, is really to talk without any precise meaning. If it has a meaning, I would 
fain know, why it is not as good sense to say, that the parts of the material world fall into order of themselves 
and by their own nature. Can the one opinion be intelligible, while the other is not so?
Hume: DNR Pt. 4 Para. 11/14 p. 162
	We have, indeed, experience of ideas which fall into order of themselves, and without any known 
cause. But, I am sure, we have a much larger experience of matter which does the same; as, in all instances of 
generation and vegetation, where the accurate analysis of the cause exceeds all human comprehension. We 
have also experience of particular systems of thought and of matter which have no order; of the first in 
madness, of the second in corruption. Why, then, should we think, that order is more essential to one than the 
other? And if it requires a cause in both, what do we gain by your system, in tracing the universe of objects 
into a similar universe of ideas? The first step which we make leads us on for ever. It were, therefore, wise in 
us to limit all our enquiries to the present world, without looking further. No satisfaction can ever be attained 
by these speculations, which so far exceed the narrow bounds of human understanding.
Hume: DNR Pt. 4 Para. 12/14 p. 162
	It was usual with the Peripatetics, you know, Cleanthes, when the cause of any phenomenon was 
demanded, to have recourse to their faculties or occult qualities; and to say, for instance, that bread, nourished 
by its nutritive faculty, and senna purged by its purgative. But it has been discovered, that this subterfuge was 
nothing but the disguise of ignorance; and that these philosophers, though less ingenuous, really said the same 
thing with the sceptics or the vulgar, who fairly confessed that they knew not the cause of these phenomena. 
In like manner, when it is asked, what cause produces order in the ideas of the Supreme Being; can any other 
reason be assigned by you, Anthropomorphites, than that it is a rational faculty, and that such is the nature of 
the Deity? But why a similar answer will not be equally satisfactory in accounting for the order of the world, 
without having recourse to any such intelligent creator as you insist on, may be difficult to determine. It is 
only to say, that such is the nature of material objects, and that they are all originally possessed of a faculty of 
order and proportion. These are only more learned and elaborate ways of confessing our ignorance; nor has 
the one hypothesis any real advantage above the other, except in its greater conformity to vulgar prejudices.
Hume: DNR Pt. 4 Para. 13/14 p. 163
	You have displayed this argument with great emphasis, replied Cleanthes. You seem not sensible 
how easy it is to answer it. Even in common life, if I assign a cause for any event, is it any objection, Philo, 
that I cannot assign the cause of that cause, and answer every new question which may incessantly be started? 
And what philosophers could possibly submit to so rigid a rule? philosophers, who confess ultimate causes to 
be totally unknown; and are sensible, that the most refined principles into which they trace the phenomena, 
are still to them as inexplicable as these phenomena themselves are to the vulgar. The order and arrangement 
of nature, the curious adjustment of final causes, the plain use and intention of every part and organ; all these 
bespeak in the clearest language an intelligent cause or author. The heavens and the earth join in the same 
testimony: the whole chorus of Nature raises one hymn to the praises of its Creator. You alone, or almost 
alone, disturb this general harmony. You start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections: you ask me, what is the 
cause of this cause? I know not; I care not; that concerns not me. I have found a Deity; and here I stop my 
enquiry. Let those go further, who are wiser or more enterprising.
Hume: DNR Pt. 4 Para. 14/14 p. 163
	I pretend to be neither, replied Philo: and for that very reason, I should never perhaps have attempted 
to go so far; especially when I am sensible, that I must at last be contented to sit down with the same answer, 
which, without further trouble, might have satisfied me from the beginning. If I am still to remain in utter 
ignorance of causes, and can absolutely give an explication of nothing, I shall never esteem it any advantage 
to shove off for a moment a difficulty, which, you acknowledge, must immediately, in its full force, recur 
upon me. Naturalists indeed very justly explain particular effects by more general causes, though these 
general causes themselves should remain in the end totally inexplicable; but they never surely thought it 
satisfactory to explain a particular effect by a particular cause, which was no more to be accounted for than 
the effect itself. An ideal system, arranged of itself, without a precedent design, is not a whit more explicable 
than a material one, which attains its order in a like manner; nor is there any more difficulty in the latter 
supposition than in the former.

Part 5
Hume: DNR Pt. 5 Para. 1/13 p. 165
PART V.

But to shew you still more inconveniences, continued Philo, in your Anthropomorphism, please to take a new 
survey of your principles. Like effects prove like causes. This is the experimental argument; and this, you say 
too, is the sole theological argument. Now, it is certain, that the liker the effects are which are seen, and the 
liker the causes which are inferred, the stronger is the argument. Every departure on either side diminishes the 
probability, and renders the experiment less conclusive. You cannot doubt of the principle; neither ought you 
to reject its consequences.
Hume: DNR Pt. 5 Para. 2/13 p. 165
	All the new discoveries in astronomy, which prove the immense grandeur and magnificence of the 
works of Nature, are so many additional arguments for a Deity, according to the true system of Theism; but, 
according to your hypothesis of experimental Theism, they become so many objections, by removing the 
effect still further from all resemblance to the effects of human art and contrivance. For, if Lucretius,†5 even 
following the old system of the world, could exclaim,

Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi
Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas?
Quis pariter coelos omnes convertere? et omnes
Ignibus aetheriis terras suffire feraces?
Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore praesto?

If Tully†6 esteemed this reasoning so natural, as to put it into the mouth of his Epicurean: "Quibus enim 
oculis animi intueri potuit vester Plato fabricam illam tanti operis, qua construi a Deo atque aedificari 
mundum facit? quae molitio? quae ferramenta? qui vectes? quae machinae? qui minstri tanti muneris fuerunt? 
quemadmodum autem obedire et parere voluntati architecti aer, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt?" If this argument, 
I say, had any force in former ages, how much greater must it have at present, when the bounds of Nature are 
so infinitely enlarged, and such a magnificent scene is opened to us? It is still more unreasonable to form our 
idea of so unlimited a cause from our experience of the narrow productions of human design and invention.
Hume: DNR Pt. 5 Para. 3/13 p. 166
	The discoveries by microscopes, as they open a new universe in miniature, are still objections, 
according to you, arguments, according to me. The further we push our researches of this kind, we are still led 
to infer the universal cause of all to be vastly different from mankind, or from any object of human experience 
and observation.
Hume: DNR Pt. 5 Para. 4/13 p. 166
	And what say you to the discoveries in anatomy, chemistry, botany? . . . . . These surely are no 
objections, replied Cleanthes; they only discover new instances of art and contrivance. It is still the image of 
mind reflected on us from innumerable objects. Add, a mind like the human, said Philo. I know of no other, 
replied Cleanthes. And the liker the better, insisted Philo. To be sure, said Cleanthes.
Hume: DNR Pt. 5 Para. 5/13 p. 166
	Now, Cleanthes, said Philo, with an air of alacrity and triumph, mark the consequences. First, By this 
method of reasoning, you renounce all claim to infinity in any of the attributes of the Deity. For, as the cause 
ought only to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognizance, is not 
infinite; what pretensions have we, upon your suppositions, to ascribe that attribute to the Divine Being? You 
will still insist, that, by removing him so much from all similarity to human creatures, we give in to the most 
arbitrary hypothesis, and at the same time weaken all proofs of his existence.
Hume: DNR Pt. 5 Para. 6/13 p. 166
	Secondly, You have no reason, on your theory, for ascribing perfection to the Deity, even in his finite 
capacity, or for supposing him free from every error, mistake, or incoherence, in his undertakings. There are 
many inexplicable difficulties in the works of Nature, which, if we allow a perfect author to be proved a 
priori, are easily solved, and become only seeming difficulties, from the narrow capacity of man, who cannot 
trace infinite relations. But according to your method of reasoning, these difficulties become all real; and 
perhaps will be insisted on, as new instances of likeness to human art and contrivance. At least, you must 
acknowledge, that it is impossible for us to tell, from our limited views, whether this system contains any 
great faults, or deserves any considerable praise, if compared to other possible, and even real systems. Could a 
peasant, if the Aeneid were read to him, pronounce that poem to be absolutely faultless, or even assign to it its 
proper rank among the productions of human wit, he, who had never seen any other production?
Hume: DNR Pt. 5 Para. 7/13 p. 167
	But were this world ever so perfect a production, it must still remain uncertain, whether all the 
excellences of the work can justly be ascribed to the workman. If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must 
we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and beautiful a machine? And 
what surprize must we feel, when we find him a stupid mechanic, who imitated others, and copied an art, 
which, through a long succession of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections, deliberations, and 
controversies, had been gradually improving? Many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout 
an eternity, ere this system was struck out; much labour lost, many fruitless trials made; and a slow, but 
continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in the art of world-making. In such subjects, who can 
determine, where the truth; nay, who can conjecture where the probability lies, amidst a great number of 
hypotheses which may be proposed, and a still greater which may be imagined?
Hume: DNR Pt. 5 Para. 8/13 p. 167
	And what shadow of an argument, continued Philo, can you produce, from your hypothesis, to prove 
the unity of the Deity? A great number of men join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a 
commonwealth; why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world? This is only so 
much greater similarity to human affairs. By sharing the work among several, we may so much further limit 
the attributes of each, and get rid of that extensive power and knowledge, which must be supposed in one 
deity, and which, according to you, can only serve to weaken the proof of his existence. And if such foolish, 
such vicious creatures as man, can yet often unite in framing and executing one plan, how much more those 
deities or demons, whom we may suppose several degrees more perfect!
Hume: DNR Pt. 5 Para. 9/13 p. 168
	To multiply causes without necessity, is indeed contrary to true philosophy: but this principle applies 
not to the present case. Were one deity antecedently proved by your theory, who were possessed of every 
attribute requisite to the production of the universe; it would be needless, I own, (though not absurd,) to 
suppose any other deity existent. But while it is still a question, Whether all these attributes are united in one 
subject, or dispersed among several independent beings, by what phenomena in nature can we pretend to 
decide the controversy? Where we see a body raised in a scale, we are sure that there is in the opposite scale, 
however concealed from sight, some counterpoising weight equal to it; but it is still allowed to doubt, whether 
that weight be an aggregate of several distinct bodies, or one uniform united mass. And if the weight requisite 
very much exceeds any thing which we have ever seen conjoined in any single body, the former supposition 
becomes still more probable and natural. An intelligent being of such vast power and capacity as is necessary 
to produce the universe, or, to speak in the language of ancient philosophy, so prodigious an animal exceeds 
all analogy, and even comprehension.
Hume: DNR Pt. 5 Para. 10/13 p. 168
	But further, Cleanthes: men are mortal, and renew their species by generation; and this is common to 
all living creatures. The two great sexes of male and female, says Milton, animate the world. Why must this 
circumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous and limited deities? Behold, then, 
the theogony of ancient times brought back upon us.
Hume: DNR Pt. 5 Para. 11/13 p. 168
	And why not become a perfect Anthropomorphite? Why not assert the deity or deities to be 
corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears, etc.? Epicurus maintained, that no man had ever seen reason 
but in a human figure; therefore the gods must have a human figure. And this argument, which is deservedly 
so much ridiculed by Cicero, becomes, according to you, solid and philosophical.
Hume: DNR Pt. 5 Para. 12/13 p. 168
	In a word, Cleanthes, a man who follows your hypothesis is able perhaps to assert, or conjecture, that 
the universe, sometime, arose from something like design: but beyond that position he cannot ascertain one 
single circumstance; and is left afterwards to fix every point of his theology by the utmost license of fancy 
and hypothesis. This world, for aught he knows, is very faulty and imperfect, compared to a superior standard; 
and was only the first rude essay of some infant deity, who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame 
performance: it is the work only of some dependent, inferior deity; and is the object of derision to his 
superiors: it is the production of old age and dotage in some superannuated deity; and ever since his death, has 
run on at adventures, from the first impulse and active force which it received from him. You justly give signs 
of horror, Demea, at these strange suppositions; but these, and a thousand more of the same kind, are 
Cleanthes's suppositions, not mine. From the moment the attributes of the Deity are supposed finite, all these 
have place. And I cannot, for my part, think that so wild and unsettled a system of theology is, in any respect, 
preferable to none at all.
Hume: DNR Pt. 5 Para. 13/13 p. 169
	These suppositions I absolutely disown, cried Cleanthes: they strike me, however, with no horror, 
especially when proposed in that rambling way in which they drop from you. On the contrary, they give me 
pleasure, when I see, that, by the utmost indulgence of your imagination, you never get rid of the hypothesis 
of design in the universe, but are obliged at every turn to have recourse to it. To this concession I adhere 
steadily; and this I regard as a sufficient foundation for religion.

Part 6
Hume: DNR Pt. 6 Para. 1/13 p. 170
PART VI.

It must be a slight fabric, indeed, said Demea, which can be erected on so tottering a foundation. While we are 
uncertain whether there is one deity or many; whether the deity or deities, to whom we owe our existence, be 
perfect or imperfect, subordinate or supreme, dead or alive, what trust or confidence can we repose in them? 
What devotion or worship address to them? What veneration or obedience pay them? To all the purposes of 
life the theory of religion becomes altogether useless: and even with regard to speculative consequences, its 
uncertainty, according to you, must render it totally precarious and unsatisfactory.
Hume: DNR Pt. 6 Para. 2/13 p. 170
	To render it still more unsatisfactory, said Philo, there occurs to me another hypothesis, which must 
acquire an air of probability from the method of reasoning so much insisted on by Cleanthes. That like effects 
arise from like causes: this principle he supposes the foundation of all religion. But there is another principle 
of the same kind, no less certain, and derived from the same source of experience; that where several known 
circumstances are observed to be similar, the unknown will also be found similar. Thus, if we see the limbs of 
a human body, we conclude that it is also attended with a human head, though hid from us. Thus, if we see, 
through a chink in a wall, a small part of the sun, we conclude, that, were the wall removed, we should see the 
whole body. In short, this method of reasoning is so obvious and familiar, that no scruple can ever be made 
with regard to its solidity.
Hume: DNR Pt. 6 Para. 3/13 p. 170
	Now, if we survey the universe, so far as it falls under our knowledge, it bears a great resemblance to 
an animal or organized body, and seems actuated with a like principle of life and motion. A continual 
circulation of matter in it produces no disorder: a continual waste in every part is incessantly repaired: the 
closest sympathy is perceived throughout the entire system: and each part or member, in performing its proper 
offices, operates both to its own preservation and to that of the whole. The world, therefore, I infer, is an 
animal; and the Deity is the SOUL of the world, actuating it, and actuated by it.
Hume: DNR Pt. 6 Para. 4/13 p. 171
	You have too much learning, Cleanthes, to be at all surprized at this opinion, which, you know, was 
maintained by almost all the Theists of antiquity, and chiefly prevails in their discourses and reasonings. For 
though, sometimes, the ancient philosophers reason from final causes, as if they thought the world the 
workmanship of God; yet it appears rather their favourite notion to consider it as his body, whose organization 
renders it subservient to him. And it must be confessed, that, as the universe resembles more a human body 
than it does the works of human art and contrivance, if our limited analogy could ever, with any propriety, be 
extended to the whole of nature, the inference seems juster in favour of the ancient than the modern theory.
Hume: DNR Pt. 6 Para. 5/13 p. 171
	There are many other advantages, too, in the former theory, which recommended it to the ancient 
theologians. Nothing more repugnant to all their notions, because nothing more repugnant to common 
experience, than mind without body; a mere spiritual substance, which fell not under their senses nor 
comprehension, and of which they had not observed one single instance throughout all nature. Mind and body 
they knew, because they felt both: an order, arrangement, organization, or internal machinery, in both, they 
likewise knew, after the same manner: and it could not but seem reasonable to transfer this experience to the 
universe; and to suppose the divine mind and body to be also coeval, and to have, both of them, order and 
arrangement naturally inherent in them, and inseparable from them.
Hume: DNR Pt. 6 Para. 6/13 p. 171
	Here, therefore, is a new species of Anthropomorphism, Cleanthes, on which you may deliberate; 
and a theory which seems not liable to any considerable difficulties. You are too much superior, surely, to 
systematical prejudices, to find any more difficulty in supposing an animal body to be, originally, of itself, or 
from unknown causes, possessed of order and organization, than in supposing a similar order to belong to 
mind. But the vulgar prejudice, that body and mind ought always to accompany each other, ought not, one 
should think, to be entirely neglected; since it is founded on vulgar experience, the only guide which you 
profess to follow in all these theological enquiries. And if you assert, that our limited experience is an unequal 
standard, by which to judge of the unlimited extent of nature; you entirely abandon your own hypothesis, and 
must thenceforward adopt our Mysticism, as you call it, and admit of the absolute incomprehensibility of the 
Divine Nature.
Hume: DNR Pt. 6 Para. 7/13 p. 172
	This theory, I own, replied Cleanthes, has never before occurred to me, though a pretty natural one; 
and I cannot readily, upon so short an examination and reflection, deliver any opinion with regard to it. You 
are very scrupulous, indeed, said Philo: were I to examine any system of yours, I should not have acted with 
half that caution and reserve, in starting objections and difficulties to it. However, if any thing occur to you, 
you will oblige us by proposing it.
Hume: DNR Pt. 6 Para. 8/13 p. 172
	Why then, replied Cleanthes, it seems to me, that, though the world does, in many circumstances, 
resemble an animal body; yet is the analogy also defective in many circumstances the most material: no 
organs of sense; no seat of thought or reason; no one precise origin of motion and action. In short, it seems to 
bear a stronger resemblance to a vegetable than to an animal, and your inference would be so far inconclusive 
in favour of the soul of the world.
Hume: DNR Pt. 6 Para. 9/13 p. 172
	But, in the next place, your theory seems to imply the eternity of the world; and that is a principle, 
which, I think, can be refuted by the strongest reasons and probabilities. I shall suggest an argument to this 
purpose, which, I believe, has not been insisted on by any writer. Those, who reason from the late origin of 
arts and sciences, though their inference wants not force, may perhaps be refuted by considerations derived 
from the nature of human society, which is in continual revolution, between ignorance and knowledge, liberty 
and slavery, riches and poverty; so that it is impossible for us, from our limited experience, to foretell with 
assurance what events may or may not be expected. Ancient learning and history seem to have been in great 
danger of entirely perishing after the inundation of the barbarous nations; and had these convulsions 
continued a little longer, or been a little more violent, we should not probably have now known what passed 
in the world a few centuries before us. Nay, were it not for the superstition of the Popes, who preserved a little 
jargon of Latin, in order to support the appearance of an ancient and universal church, that tongue must have 
been utterly lost; in which case, the Western world, being totally barbarous, would not have been in a fit 
disposition for receiving the Greek language and learning, which was conveyed to them after the sacking of 
Constantinople. When learning and books had been extinguished, even the mechanical arts would have fallen 
considerably to decay; and it is easily imagined, that fable or tradition might ascribe to them a much later 
origin than the true one. This vulgar argument, therefore, against the eternity of the world, seems a little 
precarious.
Hume: DNR Pt. 6 Para. 10/13 p. 173
	But here appears to be the foundation of a better argument. Lucullus was the first that brought 
cherry-trees from Asia to Europe; though that tree thrives so well in many European climates, that it grows in 
the woods without any culture. Is it possible, that throughout a whole eternity, no European had ever passed 
into Asia, and thought of transplanting so delicious a fruit into his own country? Or if the tree was once 
transplanted and propagated, how could it ever afterwards perish? Empires may rise and fall, liberty and 
slavery succeed alternately, ignorance and knowledge give place to each other; but the cherry-tree will still 
remain in the woods of Greece, Spain, and Italy, and will never be affected by the revolutions of human 
society.
Hume: DNR Pt. 6 Para. 11/13 p. 173
	It is not two thousand years since vines were transplanted into France, though there is no climate in 
the world more favourable to them. It is not three centuries since horses, cows, sheep, swine, dogs, corn, were 
known in America. Is it possible, that during the revolutions of a whole eternity, there never arose a 
Columbus, who might open the communication between Europe and that continent? We may as well imagine, 
that all men would wear stockings for ten thousand years, and never have the sense to think of garters to tie 
them. All these seem convincing proofs of the youth, or rather infancy of the world; as being founded on the 
operation of principles more constant and steady than those by which human society is governed and directed. 
Nothing less than a total convulsion of the elements will ever destroy all the European animals and vegetables 
which are now to be found in the Western world.
Hume: DNR Pt. 6 Para. 12/13 p. 174
	And what argument have you against such convulsions? replied Philo. Strong and almost 
incontestable proofs may be traced over the whole earth, that every part of this globe has continued for many 
ages entirely covered with water. And though order were supposed inseparable from matter, and inherent in it; 
yet may matter be susceptible of many and great revolutions, through the endless periods of eternal duration. 
The incessant changes, to which every part of it is subject, seem to intimate some such general 
transformations; though, at the same time, it is observable, that all the changes and corruptions of which we 
have ever had experience, are but passages from one state of order to another; nor can matter ever rest in total 
deformity and confusion. What we see in the parts, we may infer in the whole; at least, that is the method of 
reasoning on which you rest your whole theory. And were I obliged to defend any particular system of this 
nature, which I never willingly should do, I esteem none more plausible than that which ascribes an eternal 
inherent principle of order to the world, though attended with great and continual revolutions and alterations. 
This at once solves all difficulties; and if the solution, by being so general, is not entirely compleat and 
satisfactory, it is at least a theory that we must sooner or later have recourse to, whatever system we embrace. 
How could things have been as they are, were there not an original inherent principle of order somewhere, in 
thought or in matter? And it is very indifferent to which of these we give the preference. Chance has no place, 
on any hypothesis, sceptical or religious. Every thing is surely governed by steady, inviolable laws. And were 
the inmost essence of things laid open to us, we should then discover a scene, of which, at present, we can 
have no idea. Instead of admiring the order of natural beings, we should clearly see that it was absolutely 
impossible for them, in the smallest article, ever to admit of any other disposition.
Hume: DNR Pt. 6 Para. 13/13 p. 175
	Were any one inclined to revive the ancient Pagan Theology, which maintained, as we learn from 
Hesiod, that this globe was governed by thirty thousand deities, who arose from the unknown powers of 
nature: you would naturally object, Cleanthes, that nothing is gained by this hypothesis; and that it is as easy 
to suppose all men animals, beings more numerous, but less perfect, to have sprung immediately from a like 
origin. Push the same inference a step further, and you will find a numerous society of deities as explicable as 
one universal deity, who possesses within himself the powers and perfections of the whole society. All these 
systems, then, of Scepticism, Polytheism, and Theism, you must allow, on your principles, to be on a like 
footing, and that no one of them has any advantage over the others. You may thence learn the fallacy of your 
principles.

Part 7
Hume: DNR Pt. 7 Para. 1/17 p. 176
PART VII.

But here, continued Philo, in examining the ancient system of the soul of the world, there strikes me, all on a 
sudden, a new idea, which, if just, must go near to subvert all your reasoning, and destroy even your first 
inferences, on which you repose such confidence. If the universe bears a greater likeness to animal bodies and 
to vegetables, than to the works of human art, it is more probable that its cause resembles the cause of the 
former than that of the latter, and its origin ought rather to be ascribed to generation or vegetation, than to 
reason or design. Your conclusion, even according to your own principles, is therefore lame and defective.
Hume: DNR Pt. 7 Para. 2/17 p. 176
	Pray open up this argument a little further, said Demea, for I do not rightly apprehend it in that 
concise manner in which you have expressed it.
Hume: DNR Pt. 7 Para. 3/17 p. 176
	Our friend Cleanthes, replied Philo, as you have heard, asserts, that since no question of fact can be 
proved otherwise than by experience, the existence of a Deity admits not of proof from any other medium. 
The world, says he, resembles the works of human contrivance; therefore its cause must also resemble that of 
the other. Here we may remark, that the operation of one very small part of nature, to wit man, upon another 
very small part, to wit that inanimate matter lying within his reach, is the rule by which Cleanthes judges of 
the origin of the whole; and he measures objects, so widely disproportioned, by the same individual standard. 
But to waive all objections drawn from this topic, I affirm, that there are other parts of the universe (besides 
the machines of human invention) which bear still a greater resemblance to the fabric of the world, and which, 
therefore, afford a better conjecture concerning the universal origin of this system. These parts are animals 
and vegetables. The world plainly resembles more an animal or a vegetable, than it does a watch or a knitting-
loom. Its cause, therefore, it is more probable, resembles the cause of the former. The cause of the former is 
generation or vegetation. The cause, therefore, of the world, we may infer to be something similar or 
analogous to generation or vegetation.
Hume: DNR Pt. 7 Para. 4/17 p. 177
	But how is it conceivable, said Demea, that the world can arise from any thing similar to vegetation 
or generation?
Hume: DNR Pt. 7 Para. 5/17 p. 177
	Very easily, replied Philo. In like manner as a tree sheds its seeds into the neighbouring fields, and 
produces other trees; so the great vegetable, the world, or this planetary system, produces within itself certain 
seeds, which, being scattered into the surrounding chaos, vegetate into new worlds. A comet, for instance, is 
the seed of a world; and after it has been fully ripened, by passing from sun to sun, and star to star, it is at last 
tossed into the unformed elements which every where surround this universe, and immediately sprouts up into 
a new system.
Hume: DNR Pt. 7 Para. 6/17 p. 177
	Or if, for the sake of variety (for I see no other advantage), we should suppose this world to be an 
animal; a comet is the egg of this animal: and in like manner as an ostrich lays its egg in the sand, which, 
without any further care, hatches the egg, and produces a new animal; so . . . I understand you, says Demea: 
but what wild, arbitrary suppositions are these! What data have you for such extraordinary conclusions? And 
is the slight, imaginary resemblance of the world to a vegetable or an animal sufficient to establish the same 
inference with regard to both? Objects, which are in general so widely different, ought they to be a standard 
for each other?
Hume: DNR Pt. 7 Para. 7/17 p. 177
	Right, cries Philo: this is the topic on which I have all along insisted. I have still asserted, that we 
have no data to establish any system of cosmogony. Our experience, so imperfect in itself, and so limited both 
in extent and duration, can afford us no probable conjecture concerning the whole of things. But if we must 
needs fix on some hypothesis; by what rule, pray, ought we to determine our choice? Is there any other rule 
than the greater similarity of the objects compared? And does not a plant or an animal, which springs from 
vegetation or generation, bear a stronger resemblance to the world, than does any artificial machine, which 
arises from reason and design?
Hume: DNR Pt. 7 Para. 8/17 p. 177
	But what is this vegetation and generation of which you talk? said Demea. Can you explain their 
operations, and anatomize that fine internal structure on which they depend?
Hume: DNR Pt. 7 Para. 9/17 p. 178
	As much, at least, replied Philo, as Cleanthes can explain the operations of reason, or anatomize that 
internal structure on which it depends. But without any such elaborate disquisitions, when I see an animal, I 
infer, that it sprang from generation; and that with as great certainty as you conclude a house to have been 
reared by design. These words, generation, reason, mark only certain powers and energies in nature, whose 
effects are known, but whose essence is incomprehensible; and one of these principles, more than the other, 
has no privilege for being made a standard to the whole of nature.
Hume: DNR Pt. 7 Para. 10/17 p. 178
	In reality, Demea, it may reasonably be expected, that the larger the views are which we take of 
things, the better will they conduct us in our conclusions concerning such extraordinary and such magnificent 
subjects. In this little corner of the world alone, there are four principles, reason, instinct, generation, 
vegetation, which are similar to each other, and are the causes of similar effects. What a number of other 
principles may we naturally suppose in the immense extent and variety of the universe, could we travel from 
planet to planet, and from system to system, in order to examine each part of this mighty fabric? Any one of 
these four principles above mentioned, (and a hundred others which lie open to our conjecture,) may afford us 
a theory by which to judge of the origin of the world; and it is a palpable and egregious partiality to confine 
our view entirely to that principle by which our own minds operate. Were this principle more intelligible on 
that account, such a partiality might be somewhat excusable: but reason, in its internal fabric and structure, is 
really as little known to us as instinct or vegetation; and, perhaps, even that vague, undeterminate word, 
Nature, to which the vulgar refer every thing, is not at the bottom more inexplicable. The effects of these 
principles are all known to us from experience; but the principles themselves, and their manner of operation, 
are totally unknown; nor is it less intelligible, or less conformable to experience, to say, that the world arose 
by vegetation, from a seed shed by another world, than to say that it arose from a divine reason or 
contrivance, according to the sense in which Cleanthes understands it.
Hume: DNR Pt. 7 Para. 11/17 p. 178
	But methinks, said Demea, if the world had a vegetative quality, and could sow the seeds of new 
worlds into the infinite chaos, this power would be still an additional argument for design in its author. For 
whence could arise so wonderful a faculty but from design? Or how can order spring from any thing which 
perceives not that order which it bestows?
Hume: DNR Pt. 7 Para. 12/17 p. 179
	You need only look around you, replied Philo, to satisfy yourself with regard to this question. A tree 
bestows order and organization on that tree which springs from it, without knowing the order; an animal in the 
same manner on its offspring; a bird on its nest; and instances of this kind are even more frequent in the world 
than those of order, which arise from reason and contrivance. To say, that all this order in animals and 
vegetables proceeds ultimately from design, is begging the question; nor can that great point be ascertained 
otherwise than by proving, a priori, both that order is, from its nature, inseparably attached to thought; and 
that it can never of itself, or from original unknown principles, belong to matter.
Hume: DNR Pt. 7 Para. 13/17 p. 179
	But further, Demea; this objection which you urge can never be made use of by Cleanthes, without 
renouncing a defence which he has already made against one of my objections. When I enquired concerning 
the cause of that supreme reason and intelligence into which he resolves every thing; he told me, that the 
impossibility of satisfying such enquiries could never be admitted as an objection in any species of 
philosophy. We must stop somewhere, says he; nor is it ever within the reach of human capacity to explain 
ultimate causes, or shew the last connexions of any objects. It is sufficient, if any steps, so far as we go, are 
supported by experience and observation. Now, that vegetation and generation, as well as reason, are 
experienced to be principles of order in nature, is undeniable. If I rest my system of cosmogony on the former, 
preferably to the latter, it is at my choice. The matter seems entirely arbitrary. And when Cleanthes asks me 
what is the cause of my great vegetative or generative faculty, I am equally entitled to ask him the cause of his 
great reasoning principle. These questions we have agreed to forbear on both sides; and it is chiefly his 
interest on the present occasion to stick to this agreement. Judging by our limited and imperfect experience, 
generation has some privileges above reason: for we see every day the latter arise from the former, never the 
former from the latter.
Hume: DNR Pt. 7 Para. 14/17 p. 180
	Compare, I beseech you, the consequences on both sides. The world, say I, resembles an animal; 
therefore it is an animal, therefore it arose from generation. The steps, I confess, are wide; yet there is some 
small appearance of analogy in each step. The world, says Cleanthes, resembles a machine; therefore it is a 
machine, therefore it arose from design. The steps are here equally wide, and the analogy less striking. And if 
he pretends to carry on my hypothesis a step further, and to infer design or reason from the great principle of 
generation, on which I insist; I may, with better authority, use the same freedom to push further his 
hypothesis, and infer a divine generation or theogony from his principle of reason. I have at least some faint 
shadow of experience, which is the utmost that can ever be attained in the present subject. Reason, in 
innumerable instances, is observed to arise from the principle of generation, and never to arise from any other 
principle.
Hume: DNR Pt. 7 Para. 15/17 p. 180
	Hesiod, and all the ancient mythologists, were so struck with this analogy, that they universally 
explained the origin of nature from an animal birth, and copulation. Plato too, so far as he is intelligible, 
seems to have adopted some such notion in his Timaeus.
Hume: DNR Pt. 7 Para. 16/17 p. 180
	The Brahmins assert, that the world arose from an infinite spider, who spun this whole complicated 
mass from his bowels, and annihilates afterwards the whole or any part of it, by absorbing it again, and 
resolving it into his own essence. Here is a species of cosmogony, which appears to us ridiculous; because a 
spider is a little contemptible animal, whose operations we are never likely to take for a model of the whole 
universe. But still here is a new species of analogy, even in our globe. And were there a planet wholly 
inhabited by spiders, (which is very possible,) this inference would there appear as natural and irrefragable as 
that which in our planet ascribes the origin of all things to design and intelligence, as explained by Cleanthes. 
Why an orderly system may not be spun from the belly as well as from the brain, it will be difficult for him to 
give a satisfactory reason.
Hume: DNR Pt. 7 Para. 17/17 p. 181
	I must confess, Philo, replied Cleanthes, that of all men living, the task which you have undertaken, 
of raising doubts and objections, suits you best, and seems, in a manner, natural and unavoidable to you. So 
great is your fertility of invention, that I am not ashamed to acknowledge myself unable, on a sudden, to solve 
regularly such out-of-the-way difficulties as you incessantly start upon me: though I clearly see, in general, 
their fallacy and error. And I question not, but you are yourself, at present, in the same case, and have not the 
solution so ready as the objection: while you must be sensible, that common sense and reason are entirely 
against you; and that such whimsies as you have delivered, may puzzle, but never can convince us.

Part 8
Hume: DNR Pt. 8 Para. 1/12 p. 182
PART VIII.

What you ascribe to the fertility of my invention, replied Philo, is entirely owing to the nature of the subject. 
In subjects adapted to the narrow compass of human reason, there is commonly but one determination, which 
carries probability or conviction with it; and to a man of sound judgment, all other suppositions, but that one, 
appear entirely absurd and chimerical. But in such questions as the present, a hundred contradictory views 
may preserve a kind of imperfect analogy; and invention has here full scope to exert itself. Without any great 
effort of thought, I believe that I could, in an instant, propose other systems of cosmogony, which would have 
some faint appearance of truth, though it is a thousand, a million to one, if either yours or any one of mine be 
the true system.
Hume: DNR Pt. 8 Para. 2/12 p. 182
	For instance, what if I should revive the old Epicurean hypothesis? This is commonly, and I believe 
justly esteemed the most absurd system that has yet been proposed; yet I know not whether, with a few 
alterations, it might not be brought to bear a faint appearance of probability. Instead of supposing matter 
infinite, as Epicurus did, let us suppose it finite. A finite number of particles is only susceptible of finite 
transpositions: and it must happen, in an eternal duration, that every possible order or position must be tried 
an infinite number of times. This world, therefore, with all its events, even the most minute, has before been 
produced and destroyed, and will again be produced and destroyed, without any bounds and limitations. No 
one, who has a conception of the powers of infinite, in comparison of finite, will ever scruple this 
determination.
Hume: DNR Pt. 8 Para. 3/12 p. 182
	But this supposes, said Demea, that matter can acquire motion, without any voluntary agent or first 
mover.
Hume: DNR Pt. 8 Para. 4/12 p. 182
	And where is the difficulty, replied Philo, of that supposition? Every event, before experience, is 
equally difficult and incomprehensible; and every event, after experience, is equally easy and intelligible. 
Motion, in many instances, from gravity, from elasticity, from electricity, begins in matter, without any 
known voluntary agent: and to suppose always, in these cases, an unknown voluntary agent, is mere 
hypothesis; and hypothesis attended with no advantages. The beginning of motion in matter itself is as 
conceivable a priori as its communication from mind and intelligence.
Hume: DNR Pt. 8 Para. 5/12 p. 183
	Besides, why may not motion have been propagated by impulse through all eternity, and the same 
stock of it, or nearly the same, be still upheld in the universe? As much is lost by the composition of motion, 
as much is gained by its resolution. And whatever the causes are, the fact is certain, that matter is, and always 
has been, in continual agitation, as far as human experience or tradition reaches. There is not probably, at 
present, in the whole universe, one particle of matter at absolute rest.
Hume: DNR Pt. 8 Para. 6/12 p. 183
	And this very consideration too, continued Philo, which we have stumbled on in the course of the 
argument, suggests a new hypothesis of cosmogony, that is not absolutely absurd and improbable. Is there a 
system, an order, an economy of things, by which matter can preserve that perpetual agitation which seems 
essential to it, and yet maintain a constancy in the forms which it produces? There certainly is such an 
economy; for this is actually the case with the present world. The continual motion of matter, therefore, in less 
than infinite transpositions, must produce this economy or order; and by its very nature, that order, when once 
established, supports itself, for many ages, if not to eternity. But wherever matter is so poised, arranged, and 
adjusted, as to continue in perpetual motion, and yet preserve a constancy in the forms, its situation must, of 
necessity, have all the same appearance of art and contrivance which we observe at present. All the parts of 
each form must have a relation to each other, and to the whole; and the whole itself must have a relation to the 
other parts of the universe; to the element in which the form subsists; to the materials with which it repairs its 
waste and decay; and to every other form which is hostile or friendly. A defect in any of these particulars 
destroys the form; and the matter of which it is composed is again set loose, and is thrown into irregular 
motions and fermentations, till it unite itself to some other regular form. If no such form be prepared to 
receive it, and if there be a great quantity of this corrupted matter in the universe, the universe itself is entirely 
disordered; whether it be the feeble embryo of a world in its first beginnings that is thus destroyed, or the 
rotten carcase of one languishing in old age and infirmity. In either case, a chaos ensues; till finite, though 
innumerable revolutions produce at last some forms, whose parts and organs are so adjusted as to support the 
forms amidst a continued succession of matter.
Hume: DNR Pt. 8 Para. 7/12 p. 184
	Suppose (for we shall endeavour to vary the expression), that matter were thrown into any position, 
by a blind, unguided force; it is evident that this first position must, in all probability, be the most confused 
and most disorderly imaginable, without any resemblance to those works of human contrivance, which, along 
with a symmetry of parts, discover an adjustment of means to ends, and a tendency to self-preservation. If the 
actuating force cease after this operation, matter must remain for ever in disorder, and continue an immense 
chaos, without any proportion or activity. But suppose that the actuating force, whatever it be, still continues 
in matter, this first position will immediately give place to a second, which will likewise in all probability be 
as disorderly as the first, and so on through many successions of changes and revolutions. No particular order 
or position ever continues a moment unaltered. The original force, still remaining in activity, gives a perpetual 
restlessness to matter. Every possible situation is produced, and instantly destroyed. If a glimpse or dawn of 
order appears for a moment, it is instantly hurried away, and confounded, by that never-ceasing force which 
actuates every part of matter.
Hume: DNR Pt. 8 Para. 8/12 p. 184
	Thus the universe goes on for many ages in a continued succession of chaos and disorder. But is it 
not possible that it may settle at last, so as not to lose its motion and active force (for that we have supposed 
inherent in it), yet so as to preserve an uniformity of appearance, amidst the continual motion and fluctuation 
of its parts? This we find to be the case with the universe at present. Every individual is perpetually changing, 
and every part of every individual; and yet the whole remains, in appearance, the same. May we not hope for 
such a position, or rather be assured of it, from the eternal revolutions of unguided matter; and may not this 
account for all the appearing wisdom and contrivance which is in the universe? Let us contemplate the subject 
a little, and we shall find, that this adjustment, if attained by matter of a seeming stability in the forms, with a 
real and perpetual revolution or motion of parts, affords a plausible, if not a true solution of the difficulty.
Hume: DNR Pt. 8 Para. 9/12 p. 185
	It is in vain, therefore, to insist upon the uses of the parts in animals or vegetables, and their curious 
adjustment to each other. I would fain know, how an animal could subsist, unless its parts were so adjusted? 
Do we not find, that it immediately perishes whenever this adjustment ceases, and that its matter corrupting 
tries some new form? It happens indeed, that the parts of the world are so well adjusted, that some regular 
form immediately lays claim to this corrupted matter: and if it were not so, could the world subsist? Must it 
not dissolve as well as the animal, and pass through new positions and situations, till in great, but finite 
succession, it falls at last into the present or some such order?
Hume: DNR Pt. 8 Para. 10/12 p. 185
	It is well, replied Cleanthes, you told us, that this hypothesis was suggested on a sudden, in the 
course of the argument. Had you had leisure to examine it, you would soon have perceived the insuperable 
objections to which it is exposed. No form, you say, can subsist, unless it possess those powers and organs 
requisite for its subsistence: some new order or economy must be tried, and so on, without intermission; till at 
last some order, which can support and maintain itself, is fallen upon. But according to this hypothesis, 
whence arise the many conveniences and advantages which men and all animals possess? Two eyes, two ears, 
are not absolutely necessary for the subsistence of the species. Human race might have been propagated and 
preserved, without horses, dogs, cows, sheep, and those innumerable fruits and products which serve to our 
satisfaction and enjoyment. If no camels had been created for the use of man in the sandy deserts of Africa 
and Arabia, would the world have been dissolved? If no loadstone had been framed to give that wonderful and 
useful direction to the needle, would human society and the human kind have been immediately extinguished? 
Though the maxims of Nature be in general very frugal, yet instances of this kind are far from being rare; and 
any one of them is a sufficient proof of design, and of a benevolent design, which gave rise to the order and 
arrangement of the universe.
Hume: DNR Pt. 8 Para. 11/12 p. 186
	At least, you may safely infer, said Philo, that the foregoing hypothesis is so far incompleat and 
imperfect, which I shall not scruple to allow. But can we ever reasonably expect greater success in any 
attempts of this nature? Or can we ever hope to erect a system of cosmogony, that will be liable to no 
exceptions, and will contain no circumstance repugnant to our limited and imperfect experience of the 
analogy of Nature? Your theory itself cannot surely pretend to any such advantage, even though you have run 
into Anthropomorphism, the better to preserve a conformity to common experience. Let us once more put it to 
trial. In all instances which we have ever seen, ideas are copied from real objects, and are ectypal, not 
archetypal, to express myself in learned terms: you reverse this order, and give thought the precedence. In all 
instances which we have ever seen, thought has no influence upon matter, except where that matter is so 
conjoined with it as to have an equal reciprocal influence upon it. No animal can move immediately any thing 
but the members of its own body; and indeed, the equality of action and reaction seems to be an universal law 
of nature: but your theory implies a contradiction to this experience. These instances, with many more, which 
it were easy to collect, (particularly the supposition of a mind or system of thought that is eternal, or, in other 
words, an animal ingenerable and immortal); these instances, I say, may teach all of us sobriety in 
condemning each other, and let us see, that as no system of this kind ought ever to be received from a slight 
analogy, so neither ought any to be rejected on account of a small incongruity. For that is an inconvenience 
from which we can justly pronounce no one to be exempted.
Hume: DNR Pt. 8 Para. 12/12 p. 186
	All religious systems, it is confessed, are subject to great and insuperable difficulties. Each disputant 
triumphs in his turn; while he carries on an offensive war, and exposes the absurdities, barbarities, and 
pernicious tenets of his antagonist. But all of them, on the whole, prepare a compleat triumph for the Sceptic; 
who tells them, that no system ought ever to be embraced with regard to such subjects: for this plain reason, 
that no absurdity ought ever to be assented to with regard to any subject. A total suspense of judgment is here 
our only reasonable resource. And if every attack, as is commonly observed, and no defence, among 
Theologians, is successful; how compleat must be his victory, who remains always, with all mankind, on the 
offensive, and has himself no fixed station or abiding city, which he is ever, on any occasion, obliged to 
defend?

Part 9
Hume: DNR Pt. 9 Para. 1/11 p. 188
PART IX.

But if so many difficulties attend the argument a posteriori, said Demea, had we not better adhere to that 
simple and sublime argument a priori, which, by offering to us infallible demonstration, cuts off at once all 
doubt and difficulty? By this argument, too, we may prove the INFINITY of the Divine attributes, which, I 
am afraid, can never be ascertained with certainty from any other topic. For how can an effect, which either is 
finite, or, for aught we know, may be so; how can such an effect, I say, prove an infinite cause? The unity too 
of the Divine Nature, it is very difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to deduce merely from contemplating 
the works of nature; nor will the uniformity alone of the plan, even were it allowed, give us any assurance of 
that attribute. Whereas the argument a priori . . . . .
Hume: DNR Pt. 9 Para. 2/11 p. 188
	You seem to reason, Demea, interposed Cleanthes, as if those advantages and conveniences in the 
abstract argument were full proofs of its solidity. But it is first proper, in my opinion, to determine what 
argument of this nature you choose to insist on; and we shall afterwards, from itself, better than from its 
useful consequences, endeavour to determine what value we ought to put upon it.
Hume: DNR Pt. 9 Para. 3/11 p. 188
	The argument, replied Demea, which I would insist on, is the common one. Whatever exists must 
have a cause or reason of its existence; it being absolutely impossible for any thing to produce itself, or be the 
cause of its own existence. In mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, we must either go on in tracing 
an infinite succession, without any ultimate cause at all; or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause, 
that is necessarily existent: now, that the first supposition is absurd, may be thus proved. In the infinite chain 
or succession of causes and effects, each single effect is determined to exist by the power and efficacy of that 
cause which immediately preceded; but the whole eternal chain or succession, taken together, is not 
determined or caused by any thing; and yet it is evident that it requires a cause or reason, as much as any 
particular object which begins to exist in time. The question is still reasonable, why this particular succession 
of causes existed from eternity, and not any other succession, or no succession at all. If there be no necessarily 
existent being, any supposition which can be formed is equally possible; nor is there any more absurdity in 
Nothing's having existed from eternity, than there is in that succession of causes which constitutes the 
universe. What was it, then, which determined Something to exist rather than Nothing, and bestowed being on 
a particular possibility, exclusive of the rest? External causes, there are supposed to be none. Chance is a word 
without a meaning. Was it Nothing? But that can never produce any thing. We must, therefore, have recourse 
to a necessarily existent Being, who carries the REASON of his existence in himself, and who cannot be 
supposed not to exist, without an express contradiction. There is, consequently, such a Being; that is, there is a 
Deity.
Hume: DNR Pt. 9 Para. 4/11 p. 189
	I shall not leave it to Philo, said Cleanthes, though I know that the starting objections is his chief 
delight, to point out the weakness of this metaphysical reasoning. It seems to me so obviously ill-grounded, 
and at the same time of so little consequence to the cause of true piety and religion, that I shall myself venture 
to shew the fallacy of it.
Hume: DNR Pt. 9 Para. 5/11 p. 189
	I shall begin with observing, that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter 
of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a 
contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as 
existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a 
contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as 
entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it.
Hume: DNR Pt. 9 Para. 6/11 p. 189
	It is pretended that the Deity is a necessarily existent being; and this necessity of his existence is 
attempted to be explained by asserting, that if we knew his whole essence or nature, we should perceive it to 
be as impossible for him not to exist, as for twice two not to be four. But it is evident that this can never 
happen, while our faculties remain the same as at present. It will still be possible for us, at any time, to 
conceive the non-existence of what we formerly conceived to exist; nor can the mind ever lie under a 
necessity of supposing any object to remain always in being; in the same manner as we lie under a necessity 
of always conceiving twice two to be four. The words, therefore, necessary existence, have no meaning; or, 
which is the same thing, none that is consistent.
Hume: DNR Pt. 9 Para. 7/11 p. 190
	But further, why may not the material universe be the necessarily existent being, according to this 
pretended explication of necessity? We dare not affirm that we know all the qualities of matter; and for aught 
we can determine, it may contain some qualities, which, were they known, would make its non-existence 
appear as great a contradiction as that twice two is five. I find only one argument employed to prove, that the 
material world is not the necessarily existent Being: and this argument is derived from the contingency both 
of the matter and the form of the world. "Any particle of matter," it is said,†7 "may be conceived to be 
annihilated; and any form may be conceived to be altered. Such an annihilation or alteration, therefore, is not 
impossible." But it seems a great partiality not to perceive, that the same argument extends equally to the 
Deity, so far as we have any conception of him; and that the mind can at least imagine him to be non-existent, 
or his attributes to be altered. It must be some unknown, inconceivable qualities, which can make his non-
existence appear impossible, or his attributes unalterable: and no reason can be assigned, why these qualities 
may not belong to matter. As they are altogether unknown and inconceivable, they can never be proved 
incompatible with it.
Hume: DNR Pt. 9 Para. 8/11 p. 190
	Add to this, that in tracing an eternal succession of objects, it seems absurd to enquire for a general 
cause or first author. How can any thing, that exists from eternity, have a cause, since that relation implies a 
priority in time, and a beginning of existence?
Hume: DNR Pt. 9 Para. 9/11 p. 190
	In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each part is caused by that which preceded it, and 
causes that which succeeds it. Where then is the difficulty? But the WHOLE, you say, wants a cause. I 
answer, that the uniting of these parts into a whole, like the uniting of several distinct countries into one 
kingdom, or several distinct members into one body, is performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and 
has no influence on the nature of things. Did I shew you the particular causes of each individual in a 
collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, 
what was the cause of the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts.
Hume: DNR Pt. 9 Para. 10/11 p. 191
	Though the reasonings which you have urged, Cleanthes, may well excuse me, said Philo, from 
starting any further difficulties, yet I cannot forbear insisting still upon another topic. It is observed by 
arithmeticians, that the products of 9, compose always either 9, or some lesser product of 9, if you add 
together all the characters of which any of the former products is composed. Thus, of 18, 27, 36, which are 
products of 9, you make 9 by adding 1 to 8, 2 to 7, 3 to 6. Thus, 369 is a product also of 9; and if you add 3, 6, 
and 9, you make 18, a lesser product of 9.†8 To a superficial observer, so wonderful a regularity may be 
admired as the effect either of chance or design: but a skilful algebraist immediately concludes it to be the 
work of necessity, and demonstrates, that it must forever result from the nature of these numbers. Is it not 
probable, I ask, that the whole economy of the universe is conducted by a like necessity, though no human 
algebra can furnish a key which solves the difficulty? And instead of admiring the order of natural beings, 
may it not happen, that, could we penetrate into the intimate nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it 
was absolutely impossible they could ever admit of any other disposition? So dangerous is it to introduce this 
idea of necessity into the present question! and so naturally does it afford an inference directly opposite to the 
religious hypothesis!
Hume: DNR Pt. 9 Para. 11/11 p. 191
	But dropping all these abstractions, continued Philo, and confining ourselves to more familiar topics, 
I shall venture to add an observation, that the argument a priori has seldom been found very convincing, 
except to people of a metaphysical head, who have accustomed themselves to abstract reasoning, and who, 
finding from mathematics, that the understanding frequently leads to truth through obscurity, and, contrary to 
first appearances, have transferred the same habit of thinking to subjects where it ought not to have place. 
Other people, even of good sense and the best inclined to religion, feel always some deficiency in such 
arguments, though they are not perhaps able to explain distinctly where it lies; a certain proof that men ever 
did, and ever will derive their religion from other sources than from this species of reasoning.

Part 10
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 1/37 p. 193
PART X.

It is my opinion, I own, replied Demea, that each man feels, in a manner, the truth of religion within his own 
breast, and, from a consciousness of his imbecility and misery, rather than from any reasoning, is led to seek 
protection from that Being, on whom he and all nature is dependent. So anxious or so tedious are even the 
best scenes of life, that futurity is still the object of all our hopes and fears. We incessantly look forward, and 
endeavour, by prayers, adoration, and sacrifice, to appease those unknown powers, whom we find, by 
experience, so able to afflict and oppress us. Wretched creatures that we are! what resource for us amidst the 
innumerable ills of life, did not religion suggest some methods of atonement, and appease those terrors with 
which we are incessantly agitated and tormented?
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 2/37 p. 193
	I am indeed persuaded, said Philo, that the best, and indeed the only method of bringing every one to 
a due sense of religion, is by just representations of the misery and wickedness of men. And for that purpose a 
talent of eloquence and strong imagery is more requisite than that of reasoning and argument. For is it 
necessary to prove what every one feels within himself? It is only necessary to make us feel it, if possible, 
more intimately and sensibly.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 3/37 p. 193
	The people, indeed, replied Demea, are sufficiently convinced of this great and melancholy truth. 
The miseries of life; the unhappiness of man; the general corruptions of our nature; the unsatisfactory 
enjoyment of pleasures, riches, honours; these phrases have become almost proverbial in all languages. And 
who can doubt of what all men declare from their own immediate feeling and experience?
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 4/37 p. 193
	In this point, said Philo, the learned are perfectly agreed with the vulgar; and in all letters, sacred and 
profane, the topic of human misery has been insisted on with the most pathetic eloquence that sorrow and 
melancholy could inspire. The poets, who speak from sentiment, without a system, and whose testimony has 
therefore the more authority, abound in images of this nature. From Homer down to Dr. Young, the whole 
inspired tribe have ever been sensible, that no other representation of things would suit the feeling and 
observation of each individual.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 5/37 p. 194
	As to authorities, replied Demea, you need not seek them. Look round this library of Cleanthes. I 
shall venture to affirm, that, except authors of particular sciences, such as chemistry or botany, who have no 
occasion to treat of human life, there is scarce one of those innumerable writers, from whom the sense of 
human misery has not, in some passage or other, extorted a complaint and confession of it. At least, the 
chance is entirely on that side; and no one author has ever, so far as I can recollect, been so extravagant as to 
deny it.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 6/37 p. 194
	There you must excuse me, said Philo: Leibnitz has denied it; and is perhaps the first†9 who ventured 
upon so bold and paradoxical an opinion; at least, the first who made it essential to his philosophical system.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 7/37 p. 194
	And by being the first, replied Demea, might he not have been sensible of his error? For is this a 
subject in which philosophers can propose to make discoveries especially in so late an age? And can any man 
hope by a simple denial (for the subject scarcely admits of reasoning), to bear down the united testimony of 
mankind, founded on sense and consciousness?
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 8/37 p. 194
	And why should man, added he, pretend to an exemption from the lot of all other animals? The 
whole earth, believe me, Philo, is cursed and polluted. A perpetual war is kindled amongst all living creatures. 
Necessity, hunger, want, stimulate the strong and courageous: fear, anxiety, terror, agitate the weak and 
infirm. The first entrance into life gives anguish to the new-born infant and to its wretched parent: weakness, 
impotence, distress, attend each stage of that life: and it is at last finished in agony and horror.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 9/37 p. 194
	Observe too, says Philo, the curious artifices of Nature, in order to embitter the life of every living 
being. The stronger prey upon the weaker, and keep them in perpetual terror and anxiety. The weaker too, in 
their turn, often prey upon the stronger, and vex and molest them without relaxation.  Consider that 
innumerable race of insects, which either are bred on the body of each animal, or, flying about, infix their 
stings in him. These insects have others still less than themselves, which torment them. And thus on each 
hand, before and behind, above and below, every animal is surrounded with enemies, which incessantly seek 
his misery and distruction.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 10/37 p. 195
	Man alone, said Demea, seems to be, in part, an exception to this rule. For by combination in society, 
he can easily master lions, tigers, and bears, whose greater strength and agility naturally enable them to prey 
upon him.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 11/37 p. 195
	On the contrary, it is here chiefly, cried Philo, that the uniform and equal maxims of Nature are most 
apparent. Man, it is true, can, by combination, surmount all his real enemies, and become master of the whole 
animal creation: but does he not immediately raise up to himself imaginary enemies, the demons of his fancy, 
who haunt him with superstitious terrors, and blast every enjoyment of life? His pleasure, as he imagines, 
becomes, in their eyes, a crime: his food and repose give them umbrage and offence: his very sleep and 
dreams furnish new materials to anxious fear: and even death, his refuge from every other ill, presents only 
the dread of endless and innumerable woes. Nor does the wolf molest more the timid flock, than superstition 
does the anxious breast of wretched mortals.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 12/37 p. 195
	Besides, consider, Demea: this very society, by which we surmount those wild beasts, our natural 
enemies; what new enemies does it not raise to us? What woe and misery does it not occasion? Man is the 
greatest enemy of man. Oppression, injustice, contempt, contumely, violence, sedition, war, calumny, 
treachery, fraud; by these they mutually torment each other; and they would soon dissolve that society which 
they had formed, were it not for the dread of still greater ills, which must attend their separation.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 13/37 p. 195
	But though these external insults, said Demea, from animals, from men, from all the elements, which 
assault us, form a frightful catalogue of woes, they are nothing in comparison of those which arise within 
ourselves, from the distempered condition of our mind and body. How many lie under the lingering torment 
of diseases? Hear the pathetic enumeration of the great poet.

Intestine stone and ulcer, colic-pangs,
Demoniac frenzy, moping melancholy,
And moon-struck madness, pining atrophy,
Marasmus, and wide-wasting pestilence.
Dire was the tossing, deep the groans: DESPAIR
Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch.
And over them triumphant DEATH his dart
Shook: but delay'd to strike, though oft invok'd
With vows, as their chief good and final hope.

Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 14/37 p. 196
	The disorders of the mind, continued Demea, though more secret, are not perhaps less dismal and 
vexatious. Remorse, shame, anguish, rage, disappointment, anxiety, fear, dejection, despair; who has ever 
passed through life without cruel inroads from these tormentors? How many have scarcely ever felt any better 
sensations? Labour and poverty, so abhorred by every one, are the certain lot of the far greater number; and 
those few privileged persons, who enjoy ease and opulence, never reach contentment or true felicity. All the 
goods of life united would not make a very happy man; but all the ills united would make a wretch indeed; 
and any one of them almost (and who can be free from every one?) nay often the absence of one good (and 
who can possess all?) is sufficient to render life ineligible.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 15/37 p. 196
	Were a stranger to drop on a sudden into this world, I would shew him, as a specimen of its ills, an 
hospital full of diseases, a prison crowded with malefactors and debtors, a field of battle strewed with 
carcases, a fleet foundering in the ocean, a nation languishing under tyranny, famine, or pestilence. To turn 
the gay side of life to him and give him a notion of its pleasures; whither should I conduct him? to a ball, to an 
opera, to court? He might justly think, that I was only shewing him a diversity of distress and sorrow.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 16/37 p. 196
	There is no evading such striking instances, said Philo, but by apologies, which still further aggravate 
the charge. Why have all men, I ask, in all ages, complained incessantly of the miseries of life? . . .  . They 
have no just reason, says one: these complaints proceed only from their discontented, repining, anxious 
disposition . . . . And can there possibly, I reply, be a more certain foundation of misery, than such a wretched 
temper?
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 17/37 p. 196
	But if they were really as unhappy as they pretend, says my antagonist, why do they remain in life? . 
. . .

Not satisfied with life, afraid of death.

This is the secret chain, say I, that holds us. We are terrified, not bribed to the continuance of our existence.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 18/37 p. 197
	It is only a false delicacy, he may insist, which a few refined spirits indulge, and which has spread 
these complaints among the whole race of mankind.  . . . And what is this delicacy, I ask, which you blame? Is 
it any thing but a greater sensibility to all the pleasures and pains of life? and if the man of a delicate, refined 
temper, by being so much more alive than the rest of the world, is only so much more unhappy, what 
judgment must we form in general of human life?
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 19/37 p. 197
	Let men remain at rest, says our adversary, and they will be easy. They are willing artificers of their 
own misery.  . . . No! reply I: an anxious languor follows their repose; disappointment, vexation, trouble, their 
activity and ambition.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 20/37 p. 197
	I can observe something like what you mention in some others, replied Cleanthes: but I confess I feel 
little or nothing of it in myself, and hope that it is not so common as you represent it.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 21/37 p. 197
	If you feel not human misery yourself, cried Demea, I congratulate you on so happy a singularity. 
Others, seemingly the most prosperous, have not been ashamed to vent their complaints in the most 
melancholy strains. Let us attend to the great, the fortunate emperor, Charles V., when, tired with human 
grandeur, he resigned all his extensive dominions into the hands of his son. In the last harangue which he 
made on that memorable occasion, he publicly avowed, that the greatest prosperities which he had ever 
enjoyed, had been mixed with so many adversities, that he might truly say he had never enjoyed any 
satisfaction or contentment. But did the retired life, in which he sought for shelter, afford him any greater 
happiness? If we may credit his son's account, his repentance commenced the very day of his resignation.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 22/37 p. 197
	Cicero's fortune, from small beginnings, rose to the greatest lustre and renown; yet what pathetic 
complaints of the ills of life do his familiar letters, as well as philosophical discourses, contain? And suitably 
to his own experience, he introduces Cato, the great, the fortunate Cato, protesting in his old age, that had he a 
new life in his offer, he would reject the present.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 23/37 p. 197
	Ask yourself, ask any of your acquaintance, whether they would live over again the last ten or twenty 
years of their lives. No! but the next twenty, they say, will be better:

And from the dregs of life, hope to receive
What the first sprightly running could not give.

Thus at last they find (such is the greatness of human misery, it reconciles even contradictions), that they 
complain at once of the shortness of life, and of its vanity and sorrow.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 24/37 p. 198
	And is it possible, Cleanthes, said Philo, that after all these reflections, and infinitely more, which 
might be suggested, you can still persevere in your Anthropomorphism, and assert the moral attributes of the 
Deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of the same nature with these virtues in human 
creatures? His power we allow is infinite: whatever he wills is executed: but neither man nor any other animal 
is happy: therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: he is never mistaken in choosing 
the means to any end: but the course of Nature tends not to human or animal felicity: therefore it is not 
established for that purpose. Through the whole compass of human knowledge, there are no inferences more 
certain and infallible than these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the 
benevolence and mercy of men?
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 25/37 p. 198
	Epicurus's old questions are yet unanswered.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 26/37 p. 198
	Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he 
malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 27/37 p. 198
	You ascribe, Cleanthes (and I believe justly), a purpose and intention to Nature. But what, I beseech 
you, is the object of that curious artifice and machinery, which she has displayed in all animals? The 
preservation alone of individuals, and propagation of the species. It seems enough for her purpose, if such a 
rank be barely upheld in the universe, without any care or concern for the happiness of the members that 
compose it. No resource for this purpose: no machinery, in order merely to give pleasure or ease: no fund of 
pure joy and contentment: no indulgence, without some want or necessity accompanying it. At least, the few 
phenomena of this nature are overbalanced by opposite phenomena of still greater importance.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 28/37 p. 198
	Our sense of music, harmony, and indeed beauty of all kinds, gives satisfaction, without being 
absolutely necessary to the preservation and propagation of the species. But what racking pains, on the other 
hand, arise from gouts, gravels, megrims, toothaches, rheumatisms, where the injury to the animal machinery 
is either small or incurable? Mirth, laughter, play, frolic, seems gratuitous satisfactions, which have no further 
tendency: spleen, melancholy, discontent, superstition, are pains of the same nature. How then does the 
Divine benevolence display itself, in the sense of you Anthropomorphites? None but we Mystics, as you were 
pleased to call us, can account for this strange mixture of phenomena, by deriving it from attributes, infinitely 
perfect, but incomprehensible.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 29/37 p. 199
	And have you at last, said Cleanthes, smiling, betrayed your intentions, Philo? Your long agreement 
with Demea did indeed a little surprize me; but I find you were all the while erecting a concealed battery 
against me. And I must confess, that you have now fallen upon a subject worthy of your noble spirit of 
opposition and controversy. If you can make out the present point, and prove mankind to be unhappy or 
corrupted, there is an end at once of all religion. For to what purpose establish the natural attributes of the 
Deity, while the moral are still doubtful and uncertain?
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 30/37 p. 199
	You take umbrage very easily, replied Demea, at opinions the most innocent, and the most generally 
received, even amongst the religious and devout themselves: and nothing can be more surprising than to find a 
topic like this, concerning the wickedness and misery of man, charged with no less than Atheism and 
profaneness. Have not all pious divines and preachers, who have indulged their rhetoric on so fertile a subject; 
have they not easily, I say, given a solution of any difficulties which may attend it? This world is but a point 
in comparison of the universe; this life but a moment in comparison of eternity. The present evil phenomena, 
therefore, are rectified in other regions, and in some future period of existence. And the eyes of men, being 
then opened to larger views of things, see the whole connexion of general laws; and trace with adoration, the 
benevolence and rectitude of the Deity, through all the mazes and intricacies of his providence.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 31/37 p. 199
	No! replied Cleanthes, No! These arbitrary suppositions can never be admitted, contrary to matter of 
fact, visible and uncontroverted. Whence can any cause be known but from its known effects? Whence can 
any hypothesis be proved but from the apparent phenomena? To establish one hypothesis upon another, is 
building entirely in the air; and the utmost we ever attain, by these conjectures and fictions, is to ascertain the 
bare possibility of our opinion; but never can we, upon such terms, establish its reality.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 32/37 p. 200
	The only method of supporting Divine benevolence, and it is what I willingly embrace, is to deny 
absolutely the misery and wickedness of man. Your representations are exaggerated; your melancholy views 
mostly fictitious; your inferences contrary to fact and experience. Health is more common than sickness; 
pleasure than pain; happiness than misery. And for one vexation which we meet with, we attain, upon 
computation, a hundred enjoyments.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 33/37 p. 200
	Admitting your position, replied Philo, which yet is extremely doubtful, you must at the same time 
allow, that if pain be less frequent than pleasure, it is infinitely more violent and durable. One hour of it is 
often able to outweigh a day, a week, a month of our common insipid enjoyments; and how many days, 
weeks, and months, are passed by several in the most acute torments? Pleasure, scarcely in one instance, is 
ever able to reach ecstasy and rapture; and in no one instance can it continue for any time at its highest pitch 
and altitude. The spirits evaporate, the nerves relax, the fabric is disordered, and the enjoyment quickly 
degenerates into fatigue and uneasiness. But pain often, good God, how often! rises to torture and agony; and 
the longer it continues, it becomes still more genuine agony and torture. Patience is exhausted, courage 
languishes, melancholy seizes us, and nothing terminates our misery but the removal of its cause, or another 
event, which is the sole cure of all evil, but which, from our natural folly, we regard with still greater horror 
and consternation.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 34/37 p. 200
	But not to insist upon these topics, continued Philo, though most obvious, certain, and important; I 
must use the freedom to admonish you, Cleanthes, that you have put the controversy upon a most dangerous 
issue, and are unawares introducing a total scepticism into the most essential articles of natural and revealed 
theology. What! no method of fixing a just foundation for religion, unless we allow the happiness of human 
life, and maintain a continued existence even in this world, with all our present pains, infirmities, vexations, 
and follies, to be eligible and desirable! But this is contrary to every one's feeling and experience: it is 
contrary to an authority so established as nothing can subvert. No decisive proofs can ever be produced 
against this authority; nor is it possible for you to compute, estimate, and compare, all the pains and all the 
pleasures in the lives of all men and of all animals: and thus, by your resting the whole system of religion on a 
point, which, from its very nature, must for ever be uncertain, you tacitly confess, that that system is equally 
uncertain.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 35/37 p. 201
	But allowing you what never will be believed, at least what you never possibly can prove, that 
animal, or at least human happiness, in this life, exceeds its misery, you have yet done nothing: for this is not, 
by any means, what we expect from infinite power, infinite wisdom, and infinite goodness. Why is there any 
misery at all in the world? Not by chance surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the Deity? 
But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the 
solidity of this reasoning, so short, so clear, so decisive; except we assert, that these subjects exceed all human 
capacity, and that our common measures of truth and falsehood are not applicable to them; a topic which I 
have all along insisted on, but which you have, from the beginning, rejected with scorn and indignation.
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 36/37 p. 201
	But I will be contented to retire still from this intrenchment, for I deny that you can ever force me in 
it. I will allow, that pain or misery in man is compatible with infinite power and goodness in the Deity, even 
in your sense of these attributes: what are you advanced by all these concessions? A mere possible 
compatibility is not sufficient. You must prove these pure, unmixed, and uncontrollable attributes from the 
present mixed and confused phenomena, and from these alone. A hopeful undertaking! Were the phenomena 
ever so pure and unmixed, yet being finite, they would be insufficient for that purpose. How much more, 
where they are also so jarring and discordant!
Hume: DNR Pt. 10 Para. 37/37 p. 201
	Here, Cleanthes, I find myself at ease in my argument. Here I triumph. Formerly, when we argued 
concerning the natural attributes of intelligence and design, I needed all my sceptical and metaphysical 
subtilty to elude your grasp. In many views of the universe and of its parts, particularly the latter, the beauty 
and fitness of final causes strike us with such irresistible force, that all objections appear (what I believe they 
really are) mere cavils and sophisms; nor can we then imagine how it was ever possible for us to repose any 
weight on them. But there is no view of human life, or of the condition of mankind, from which, without the 
greatest violence, we can infer the moral attributes, or learn that infinite benevolence, conjoined with infinite 
power and infinite wisdom, which we must discover by the eyes of faith alone. It is your turn now to tug the 
laboring oar, and to support your philosophical subtilties against the dictates of plain reason and experience.

Part 11
Hume: DNR Pt. 11 Para. 1/21 p. 203
PART XI.

I scruple not to allow, said Cleanthes, that I have been apt to suspect the frequent repetition of the word 
infinite, which we meet with in all theological writers, to savour more of panegyric than of philosophy; and 
that any purposes of reasoning, and even of religion, would be better served, were we to rest contented with 
more accurate and more moderate expressions. The terms, admirable, excellent, superlatively great, wise, and 
holy; these sufficiently fill the imaginations of men; and any thing beyond, besides that it leads into 
absurdities, has no influence on the affections or sentiments. Thus, in the present subject, if we abandon all 
human analogy, as seems your intention, Demea, I am afraid we abandon all religion, and retain no 
conception of the great object of our adoration. If we preserve human analogy, we must for ever find it 
impossible to reconcile any mixture of evil in the universe with infinite attributes; much less can we ever 
prove the latter from the former. But supposing the Author of Nature to be finitely perfect, though far 
exceeding mankind, a satisfactory account may then be given of natural and moral evil, and every untoward 
phenomenon be explained and adjusted. A less evil may then be chosen, in order to avoid a greater; 
inconveniences be submitted to, in order to reach a desirable end; and in a word, benevolence, regulated by 
wisdom, and limited by necessity, may produce just such a world as the present. You, Philo, who are so 
prompt at starting views, and reflections, and analogies, I would gladly hear, at length, without interruption, 
your opinion of this new theory; and if it deserve our attention, we may afterwards, at more leisure, reduce it 
into form.
Hume: DNR Pt. 11 Para. 2/21 p. 203
	My sentiments, replied Philo, are not worth being made a mystery of; and therefore, without any 
ceremony, I shall deliver what occurs to me with regard to the present subject. It must, I think, be allowed, 
that if a very limited intelligence, whom we shall suppose utterly unacquainted with the universe, were 
assured, that it were the production of a very good, wise, and powerful Being, however finite, he would, from 
his conjectures, form beforehand a different notion of it from what we find it to be by experience; nor would 
he ever imagine, merely from these attributes of the cause, of which he is informed, that the effect could be so 
full of vice and misery and disorder, as it appears in this life. Supposing now, that this person were brought 
into the world, still assured that it was the workmanship of such a sublime and benevolent Being; he might, 
perhaps, be surprized at the disappointment; but would never retract his former belief, if founded on any very 
solid argument; since such a limited intelligence must be sensible of his own blindness and ignorance, and 
must allow, that there may be many solutions of those phenomena, which will for ever escape his 
comprehension. But supposing, which is the real case with regard to man, that this creature is not antecedently 
convinced of a supreme intelligence, benevolent and powerful, but is left to gather such a belief from the 
appearances of things; this entirely alters the case, nor will he ever find any reason for such a conclusion. He 
may be fully convinced of the narrow limits of his understanding; but this will not help him in forming an 
inference concerning the goodness of superior powers, since he must form that inference from what he knows, 
not from what he is ignorant of. The more you exaggerate his weakness and ignorance, the more diffident you 
render him, and give him the greater suspicion that such subjects are beyond the reach of his faculties. You 
are obliged, therefore, to reason with him merely from the known phenomena, and to drop every arbitrary 
supposition or conjecture.
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	Did I shew you a house or palace, where there was not one apartment convenient or agreeable; where 
the windows, doors, fires, passages, stairs, and the whole economy of the building, were the source of noise, 
confusion, fatigue, darkness, and the extremes of heat and cold; you would certainly blame the contrivance, 
without any further examination. The architect would in vain display his subtilty, and prove to you, that if this 
door or that window were altered, greater ills would ensue. What he says may be strictly true: the alteration of 
one particular, while the other parts of the building remain, may only augment the inconveniences. But still 
you would assert in general, that, if the architect had had skill and good intentions, he might have formed such 
a plan of the whole, and might have adjusted the parts in such a manner, as would have remedied all or most 
of these inconveniences.  His ignorance, or even your own ignorance of such a plan, will never convince you 
of the impossibility of it. If you find any inconveniences and deformities in the building, you will always, 
without entering into any detail, condemn the architect.
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	In short, I repeat the question: Is the world, considered in general, and as it appears to us in this life, 
different from what a man, or such a limited being, would, beforehand, expect from a very powerful, wise, 
and benevolent Deity? It must be strange prejudice to assert the contrary. And from thence I conclude, that 
however consistent the world may be, allowing certain suppositions and conjectures, with the idea of such a 
Deity, it can never afford us an inference concerning his existence. The consistence is not absolutely denied, 
only the inference. Conjectures, especially where infinity is excluded from the Divine attributes, may perhaps 
be sufficient to prove a consistence, but can never be foundations for any inference.
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	There seems to be four circumstances, on which depend all, or the greatest part of the ills, that molest 
sensible creatures; and it is not impossible but all these circumstances may be necessary and unavoidable. We 
know so little beyond common life, or even of common life, that, with regard to the economy of a universe, 
there is no conjecture, however wild, which may not be just; nor any one, however plausible, which may not 
be erroneous. All that belongs to human understanding, in this deep ignorance and obscurity, is to be 
sceptical, or at least cautious, and not to admit of any hypothesis whatever, much less of any which is 
supported by no appearance of probability. Now, this I assert to be the case with regard to all the causes of 
evil, and the circumstances on which it depends. None of them appear to human reason in the least degree 
necessary or unavoidable; nor can we suppose them such, without the utmost license of imagination.
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	The first circumstance which introduces evil, is that contrivance or economy of the animal creation, 
by which pains, as well as pleasures, are employed to excite all creatures to action, and make them vigilant in 
the great work of self-preservation. Now pleasure alone, in its various degrees, seems to human understanding 
sufficient for this purpose. All animals might be constantly in a state of enjoyment: but when urged by any of 
the necessities of nature, such as thirst, hunger, weariness; instead of pain, they might feel a diminution of 
pleasure, by which they might be prompted to seek that object which is necessary to their subsistence. Men 
pursue pleasure as eagerly as they avoid pain; at least they might have been so constituted. It seems, therefore, 
plainly possible to carry on the business of life without any pain. Why then is any animal ever rendered 
susceptible of such a sensation? If animals can be free from it an hour, they might enjoy a perpetual 
exemption from it; and it required as particular a contrivance of their organs to produce that feeling, as to 
endow them with sight, hearing, or any of the senses. Shall we conjecture, that such a contrivance was 
necessary, without any appearance of reason? and shall we build on that conjecture as on the most certain 
truth?
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	But a capacity of pain would not alone produce pain, were it not for the second circumstance, viz. the 
conducting of the world by general laws; and this seems nowise necessary to a very perfect Being. It is true, if 
every thing were conducted by particular volitions, the course of nature would be perpetually broken, and no 
man could employ his reason in the conduct of life. But might not other particular volitions remedy this 
inconvenience? In short, might not the Deity exterminate all ill, wherever it were to be found; and produce all 
good, without any preparation, or long progress of causes and effects?
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	Besides, we must consider, that, according to the present economy of the world, the course of nature, 
though supposed exactly regular, yet to us appears not so, and many events are uncertain, and many 
disappoint our expectations. Health and sickness, calm and tempest, with an infinite number of other 
accidents, whose causes are unknown and variable, have a great influence both on the fortunes of particular 
persons and on the prosperity of public societies; and indeed all human life, in a manner, depends on such 
accidents. A being, therefore, who knows the secret springs of the universe, might easily, by particular 
volitions, turn all these accidents to the good of mankind, and render the whole world happy, without 
discovering himself in any operation. A fleet, whose purposes were salutary to society, might always meet 
with a fair wind. Good princes enjoy sound health and long life. Persons born to power and authority, be 
framed with good tempers and virtuous dispositions. A few such events as these, regularly and wisely 
conducted, would change the face of the world; and yet would no more seem to disturb the course of nature, 
or confound human conduct, than the present economy of things, where the causes are secret, and variable, 
and compounded. Some small touches given to Caligula's brain in his infancy, might have converted him into 
a Trajan. One wave, a little higher than the rest, by burying Caesar and his fortune in the bottom of the ocean, 
might have restored liberty to a considerable part of mankind. There may, for aught we know, be good 
reasons why Providence interposes not in this manner; but they are unknown to us; and though the mere 
supposition, that such reasons exist, may be sufficient to save the conclusion concerning the Divine attributes, 
yet surely it can never be sufficient to establish that conclusion.
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	If every thing in the universe be conducted by general laws, and if animals be rendered susceptible of 
pain, it scarcely seems possible but some ill must arise in the various shocks of matter, and the various 
concurrence and opposition of general laws; but this ill would be very rare, were it not for the third 
circumstance, which I proposed to mention, viz. the great frugality with which all powers and faculties are 
distributed to every particular being. So well adjusted are the organs and capacities of all animals, and so well 
fitted to their preservation, that, as far as history or tradition reaches, there appears not to be any single species 
which has yet been extinguished in the universe. Every animal has the requisite endowments; but these 
endowments are bestowed with so scrupulous an economy, that any considerable diminution must entirely 
destroy the creature. Wherever one power is encreased, there is a proportional abatement in the others. 
Animals which excel in swiftness are commonly defective in force. Those which possess both are either 
imperfect in some of their senses, or are oppressed with the most craving wants. The human species, whose 
chief excellency is reason and sagacity, is of all others the most necessitous, and the most deficient in bodily 
advantages; without clothes, without arms, without food, without lodging, without any convenience of life, 
except what they owe to their own skill and industry. In short, nature seems to have formed an exact 
calculation of the necessities of her creatures; and, like a rigid master, has afforded them little more powers or 
endowments than what are strictly sufficient to supply those necessities. An indulgent parent would have 
bestowed a large stock, in order to guard against accidents, and secure the happiness and welfare of the 
creature in the most unfortunate concurrence of circumstances. Every course of life would not have been so 
surrounded with precipices, that the least departure from the true path, by mistake or necessity, must involve 
us in misery and ruin. Some reserve, some fund, would have been provided to insure happiness; nor would the 
powers and the necessities have been adjusted with so rigid an economy. The Author of Nature is 
inconceivably powerful: his force is supposed great, if not altogether inexhaustible: nor is there any reason, as 
far as we can judge, to make him observe this strict frugality in his dealings with his creatures. It would have 
been better, were his power extremely limited, to have created fewer animals, and to have endowed these with 
more faculties for their happiness and preservation. A builder is never esteemed prudent, who undertakes a 
plan beyond what his stock will enable him to finish.
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	In order to cure most of the ills of human life, I require not that man should have the wings of the 
eagle, the swiftness of the stag, the force of the ox, the arms of the lion, the scales of the crocodile or 
rhinoceros; much less do I demand the sagacity of an angel or cherubim. I am contented to take an increase in 
one single power or faculty of his soul. Let him be endowed with a greater propensity to industry and labour; 
a more vigorous spring and activity of mind; a more constant bent to business and application. Let the whole 
species possess naturally an equal diligence with that which many individuals are able to attain by habit and 
reflection; and the most beneficial consequences, without any alloy of ill, is the immediate and necessary 
result of this endowment. Almost all the moral, as well as natural evils of human life, arise from idleness; and 
were our species, by the original constitution of their frame, exempt from this vice or infirmity, the perfect 
cultivation of land, the improvement of arts and manufactures, the exact execution of every office and duty, 
immediately follow; and men at once may fully reach that state of society, which is so imperfectly attained by 
the best regulated government. But as industry is a power, and the most valuable of any, Nature seems 
determined, suitably to her usual maxims, to bestow it on men with a very sparing hand; and rather to punish 
him severely for his deficiency in it, than to reward him for his attainments. She has so contrived his frame, 
that nothing but the most violent necessity can oblige him to labour; and she employs all his other wants to 
overcome, at least in part, the want of diligence, and to endow him with some share of a faculty of which she 
has thought fit naturally to bereave him. Here our demands may be allowed very humble, and therefore the 
more reasonable. If we required the endowments of superior penetration and judgment, of a more delicate 
taste of beauty, of a nicer sensibility to benevolence and friendship; we might be told, that we impiously 
pretend to break the order of Nature; that we want to exalt ourselves into a higher rank of being; that the 
presents which we require, not being suitable to our state and condition, would only be pernicious to us. But it 
is hard; I dare to repeat it, it is hard, that being placed in a world so full of wants and necessities, where almost 
every being and element is either our foe or refuses its assistance . . . we should also have our own temper to 
struggle with, and should be deprived of that faculty which can alone fence against these multiplied evils.
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	The fourth circumstance, whence arises the misery and ill of the universe, is the inaccurate 
workmanship of all the springs and principles of the great machine of nature. It must be acknowledged, that 
there are few parts of the universe, which seem not to serve some purpose, and whose removal would not 
produce a visible defect and disorder in the whole. The parts hang all together; nor can one be touched 
without affecting the rest, in a greater or less degree. But at the same time, it must be observed, that none of 
these parts or principles, however useful, are so accurately adjusted, as to keep precisely within those bounds 
in which their utility consists; but they are, all of them, apt, on every occasion, to run into the one extreme or 
the other. One would imagine, that this grand production had not received the last hand of the maker; so little 
finished is every part, and so coarse are the strokes with which it is executed. Thus, the winds are requisite to 
convey the vapours along the surface of the globe, and to assist men in navigation: but how oft, rising up to 
tempests and hurricanes, do they become pernicious? Rains are necessary to nourish all the plants and animals 
of the earth: but how often are they defective? how often excessive? Heat is requisite to all life and 
vegetation; but is not always found in the due proportion. On the mixture and secretion of the humours and 
juices of the body depend the health and prosperity of the animal: but the parts perform not regularly their 
proper function. What more useful than all the passions of the mind, ambition, vanity, love, anger? But how 
oft do they break their bounds, and cause the greatest convulsions in society? There is nothing so 
advantageous in the universe, but what frequently becomes pernicious, by its excess or defect; nor has Nature 
guarded, with the requisite accuracy, against all disorder or confusion. The irregularity is never perhaps so 
great as to destroy any species; but is often sufficient to involve the individuals in ruin and misery.
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	On the concurrence, then, of these four circumstances, does all or the greatest part of natural evil 
depend. Were all living creatures incapable of pain, or were the world administered by particular volitions, 
evil never could have found access into the universe: and were animals endowed with a large stock of powers 
and faculties, beyond what strict necessity requires; or were the several springs and principles of the universe 
so accurately framed as to preserve always the just temperament and medium; there must have been very little 
ill in comparison of what we feel at present. What then shall we pronounce on this occasion? Shall we say that 
these circumstances are not necessary, and that they might easily have been altered in the contrivance of the 
universe? This decision seems too presumptuous for creatures so blind and ignorant. Let us be more modest in 
our conclusions. Let us allow, that, if the goodness of the Deity (I mean a goodness like the human) could be 
established on any tolerable reasons a priori, these phenomena, however untoward, would not be sufficient to 
subvert that principle; but might easily, in some unknown manner, be reconcilable to it. But let us still assert, 
that as this goodness is not antecedently established, but must be inferred from the phenomena, there can be 
no grounds for such an inference, while there are so many ills in the universe, and while these ills might so 
easily have been remedied, as far as human understanding can be allowed to judge on such a subject. I am 
Sceptic enough to allow, that the bad appearances, notwithstanding all my reasonings, may be compatible 
with such attributes as you suppose; but surely they can never prove these attributes. Such a conclusion cannot 
result from Scepticism, but must arise from the phenomena, and from our confidence in the reasonings which 
we deduce from these phenomena.
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	Look round this universe. What an immense profusion of beings, animated and organized, sensible 
and active! You admire this prodigious variety and fecundity. But inspect a little more narrowly these living 
existences, the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and destructive to each other! How insufficient all of 
them for their own happiness! How contemptible or odious to the spectator! The whole presents nothing but 
the idea of a blind Nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without 
discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children!
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	Here the Manichaean system occurs as a proper hypothesis to solve the difficulty: and no doubt, in 
some respects, it is very specious, and has more probability than the common hypothesis, by giving a 
plausible account of the strange mixture of good and ill which appears in life. But if we consider, on the other 
hand, the perfect uniformity and agreement of the parts of the universe, we shall not discover in it any marks 
of the combat of a malevolent with a benevolent being. There is indeed an opposition of pains and pleasures 
in the feelings of sensible creatures: but are not all the operations of Nature carried on by an opposition of 
principles, of hot and cold, moist and dry, light and heavy? The true conclusion is, that the original Source of 
all things is entirely indifferent to all these principles; and has no more regard to good above ill, than to heat 
above cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light above heavy.
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	There may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the universe: that they are 
endowed with perfect goodness; that they have perfect malice; that they are opposite, and have both goodness 
and malice; that they have neither goodness nor malice. Mixed phenomena can never prove the two former 
unmixed principles; and the uniformity and steadiness of general laws seem to oppose the third. The fourth, 
therefore, seems by far the most probable.
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	What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little or no variation; and we have 
no more reason to infer, that the rectitude of the Supreme Being resembles human rectitude, than that his 
benevolence resembles the human. Nay, it will be thought, that we have still greater cause to exclude from 
him moral sentiments, such as we feel them; since moral evil, in the opinion of many, is much more 
predominant above moral good than natural evil above natural good.
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	But even though this should not be allowed, and though the virtue which is in mankind should be 
acknowledged much superior to the vice, yet so long as there is any vice at all in the universe, it will very 
much puzzle you Anthropomorphites, how to account for it. You must assign a cause for it, without having 
recourse to the first cause. But as every effect must have a cause, and that cause another, you must either carry 
on the progression in infinitum, or rest on that original principle, who is the ultimate cause of all things . . . .
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	Hold! hold! cried Demea: whither does your imagination hurry you? I joined in alliance with you, in 
order to prove the incomprehensible nature of the Divine Being, and refute the principles of Cleanthes, who 
would measure every thing by human rule and standard. But I now find you running into all the topics of the 
greatest libertines and infidels, and betraying that holy cause which you seemingly espoused. Are you 
secretly, then, a more dangerous enemy than Cleanthes himself?
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	And are you so late in perceiving it? replied Cleanthes. Believe me, Demea, your friend Philo, from 
the beginning, has been amusing himself at both our expense; and it must be confessed, that the injudicious 
reasoning of our vulgar theology has given him but too just a handle of ridicule. The total infirmity of human 
reason, the absolute incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature, the great and universal misery, and still greater 
wickedness of men; these are strange topics, surely, to be so fondly cherished by orthodox divines and 
doctors. In ages of stupidity and ignorance, indeed, these principles may safely be espoused; and perhaps no 
views of things are more proper to promote superstition, than such as encourage the blind amazement, the 
diffidence, and melancholy of mankind. But at present . . . . . .
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	Blame not so much, interposed Philo, the ignorance of these reverend gentlemen. They know how to 
change their style with the times. Formerly it was a most popular theological topic to maintain, that human 
life was vanity and misery, and to exaggerate all the ills and pains which are incident to men. But of late 
years, divines, we find, begin to retract this position; and maintain, though still with some hesitation, that 
there are more goods than evils, more pleasures than pains, even in this life. When religion stood entirely 
upon temper and education, it was thought proper to encourage melancholy; as indeed mankind never have 
recourse to superior powers so readily as in that disposition. But as men have now learned to form principles, 
and to draw consequences, it is necessary to change the batteries, and to make use of such arguments as will 
endure at least some scrutiny and examination. This variation is the same (and from the same causes) with 
that which I formerly remarked with regard to Scepticism.
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	Thus Philo continued to the last his spirit of opposition, and his censure of established opinions. But I 
could observe that Demea did not at all relish the latter part of the discourse; and he took occasion soon after, 
on some pretence or other, to leave the company.

Pt. 12
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PART XII.

After Demea's departure, Cleanthes and Philo continued the conversation in the following manner. Our friend, 
I am afraid, said Cleanthes, will have little inclination to revive this topic of discourse, while you are in 
company; and to tell truth, Philo, I should rather wish to reason with either of you apart on a subject so 
sublime and interesting. Your spirit of controversy, joined to your abhorrence of vulgar superstition, carries 
you strange lengths, when engaged in an argument; and there is nothing so sacred and venerable, even in your 
own eyes, which you spare on that occasion.
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	I must confess, replied Philo, that I am less cautious on the subject of Natural Religion than on any 
other; both because I know that I can never, on that head, corrupt the principles of any man of common sense; 
and because no one, I am confident, in whose eyes I appear a man of common sense, will ever mistake my 
intentions. You, in particular, Cleanthes, with whom I live in unreserved intimacy; you are sensible, that 
notwithstanding the freedom of my conversation, and my love of singular arguments, no one has a deeper 
sense of religion impressed on his mind, or pays more profound adoration to the Divine Being, as he discovers 
himself to reason, in the inexplicable contrivance and artifice of nature. A purpose, an intention, a design, 
strikes every where the most careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened in absurd 
systems, as at all times to reject it. That Nature does nothing in vain, is a maxim established in all the schools, 
merely from the contemplation of the works of Nature, without any religious purpose; and, from a firm 
conviction of its truth, an anatomist, who had observed a new organ or canal, would never be satisfied till he 
had also discovered its use and intention. One great foundation of the Copernican system is the maxim, That 
Nature acts by the simplest methods, and chooses the most proper means to any end; and astronomers often, 
without thinking of it, lay this strong foundation of piety and religion. The same thing is observable in other 
parts of philosophy: and thus all the sciences almost lead us insensibly to acknowledge a first intelligent 
Author; and their authority is often so much the greater, as they do not directly profess that intention.
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	It is with pleasure I hear Galen reason concerning the structure of the human body. The anatomy of a 
man, says he,†10 discovers above six hundred different muscles; and whoever duly considers these, will find, 
that, in each of them, Nature must have adjusted at least ten different circumstances, in order to attain the end 
which she proposed; proper figure, just magnitude, right disposition of the several ends, upper and lower 
position of the whole, the due insertion of the several nerves, veins, and arteries: so that, in the muscles alone, 
above six thousand several views and intentions must have been formed and executed. The bones he 
calculates to be two hundred and eighty-four: the distinct purposes aimed at in the structure of each, above 
forty. What a prodigious display of artifice, even in these simple and homogeneous parts! But if we consider 
the skin, ligaments, vessels, glandules, humours, the several limbs and members of the body; how must our 
astonishment rise upon us, in proportion to the number and intricacy of the parts so artificially adjusted! The 
further we advance in these researches, we discover new scenes of art and wisdom: but descry still, at a 
distance, further scenes beyond our reach; in the fine internal structure of the parts, in the economy of the 
brain, in the fabric of the seminal vessels. All these artifices are repeated in every different species of animal, 
with wonderful variety, and with exact propriety, suited to the different intentions of Nature in framing each 
species. And if the infidelity of Galen, even when these natural sciences were still imperfect, could not 
withstand such striking appearances, to what pitch of pertinacious obstinacy must a philosopher in this age 
have attained, who can now doubt of a Supreme Intelligence!
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	Could I meet with one of this species (who, I thank God, are very rare), I would ask him: Supposing 
there were a God, who did not discover himself immediately to our senses, were it possible for him to give 
stronger proofs of his existence, than what appear on the whole face of Nature? What indeed could such a 
Divine Being do, but copy the present economy of things; render many of his artifices so plain, that no 
stupidity could mistake them; afford glimpses of still greater artifices, which demonstrate his prodigious 
superiority above our narrow apprehensions; and conceal altogether a great many from such imperfect 
creatures? Now, according to all rules of just reasoning, every fact must pass for undisputed, when it is 
supported by all the arguments which its nature admits of; even though these arguments be not in themselves, 
very numerous or forcible: how much more, in the present case, where no human imagination can compute 
their number, and no understanding estimate their cogency!
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	I shall further add, said Cleanthes, to what you have so well urged, that one great advantage of the 
principle of Theism, is, that it is the only system of cosmogony which can be rendered intelligible and 
compleat, and yet can throughout preserve a strong analogy to what we every day see and experience in the 
world. The comparison of the universe to a machine of human contrivance, is so obvious and natural, and is 
justified by so many instances of order and design in Nature, that it must immediately strike all unprejudiced 
apprehensions, and procure universal approbation. Whoever attempts to weaken this theory, cannot pretend to 
succeed by establishing in its place any other that is precise and determinate: it is sufficient for him if he start 
doubts and difficulties; and by remote and abstract views of things, reach that suspense of judgment, which is 
here the utmost boundary of his wishes. But, besides that this state of mind is in itself unsatisfactory, it can 
never be steadily maintained against such striking appearances as continually engage us into the religious 
hypothesis. A false, absurd system, human nature, from the force of prejudice, is capable of adhering to with 
obstinacy and perseverance: but no system at all, in opposition to theory supported by strong and obvious 
reason, by natural propensity, and by early education, I think it absolutely impossible to maintain or defend.
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	So little, replied Philo, do I esteem this suspense of judgment in the present case to be possible, that I 
am apt to suspect there enters somewhat of a dispute of words into this controversy, more than is usually 
imagined. That the works of Nature bear a great analogy to the productions of art, is evident; and according to 
all the rules of good reasoning, we ought to infer, if we argue at all concerning them, that their causes have a 
proportional analogy. But as there are also considerable differences, we have reason to suppose a proportional 
difference in the causes; and in particular, ought to attribute a much higher degree of power and energy to the 
supreme cause, than any we have ever observed in mankind. Here then the existence of a DEITY is plainly 
ascertained by reason: and if we make it a question, whether, on account of these analogies, we can properly 
call him a mind or intelligence, notwithstanding the vast difference which may reasonably be supposed 
between him and human minds; what is this but a mere verbal controversy? No man can deny the analogies 
between the effects: to restrain ourselves from enquiring concerning the causes is scarcely possible. From this 
enquiry, the legitimate conclusion is, that the causes have also an analogy: and if we are not contented with 
calling the first and supreme cause a GOD or DEITY, but desire to vary the expression; what can we call him 
but MIND or THOUGHT, to which he is justly supposed to bear a considerable resemblance?
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	All men of sound reason are disgusted with verbal disputes, which abound so much in philosophical 
and theological enquiries; and it is found, that the only remedy for this abuse, must arise from clear 
definitions, from the precision of those ideas which enter into any argument, and from the strict and uniform 
use of those terms which are employed. But there is a species of controversy, which, from the very nature of 
language and of human ideas, is involved in perpetual ambiguity, and can never, by any precaution or any 
definitions, be able to reach a reasonable certainty or precision. These are the controversies concerning the 
degrees of any quality or circumstance. Men may argue to all eternity, whether Hannibal be a great, or a very 
great, or a superlatively great man, what degree of beauty Cleopatra possessed, what epithet of praise Livy or 
Thucydides is entitled to, without bringing the controversy to any determination. The disputants may here 
agree in their sense, and differ in the terms, or vice versa; yet never be able to define their terms, so as to enter 
into each other's meaning: because the degrees of these qualities are not, like quantity or number, susceptible 
of any exact mensuration, which may be the standard in the controversy. That the dispute concerning Theism 
is of this nature, and consequently is merely verbal, or perhaps, if possible, still more incurably ambiguous, 
will appear upon the slightest enquiry. I ask the Theist, if he does not allow, that there is a great and 
immeasurable, because incomprehensible difference between the human and the divine mind: the more pious 
he is, the more readily will he assent to the affirmative, and the more will he be disposed to magnify the 
difference: he will even assert, that the difference is of a nature which cannot be too much magnified. I next 
turn to the Atheist, who, I assert, is only nominally so, and can never possibly be in earnest; and I ask him, 
whether, from the coherence and apparent sympathy in all the parts of this world, there be not a certain degree 
of analogy among all the operations of Nature, in every situation and in every age; whether the rotting of a 
turnip, the generation of an animal, and the structure of human thought, be not energies that probably bear 
some remote analogy to each other: it is impossible he can deny it: he will readily acknowledge it. Having 
obtained this concession, I push him still further in his retreat; and I ask him, if it be not probable, that the 
principle which first arranged, and still maintains order in this universe, bears not also some remote 
inconceivable analogy to the other operations of nature, and, among the rest, to the economy of human mind 
and thought. However reluctant, he must give his assent. Where then, cry I to both these antagonists, is the 
subject of your dispute? The Theist allows, that the original intelligence is very different from human reason: 
the Atheist allows, that the original principle of order bears some remote analogy to it. Will you quarrel, 
gentlemen, about the degrees, and enter into a controversy, which admits not of any precise meaning, nor 
consequently of any determination? If you should be so obstinate, I should not be surprized to find you 
insensibly change sides; while the Theist, on the one hand, exaggerates the dissimilarity between the Supreme 
Being, and frail, imperfect, variable, fleeting, and mortal creatures; and the Atheist, on the other, magnifies 
the analogy among all the operations of Nature, in every period, every situation, and every position. Consider 
then, where the real point of controversy lies; and if you cannot lay aside your disputes, endeavour, at least, to 
cure yourselves of your animosity.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 8/34 p. 219
	And here I must also acknowledge, Cleanthes, that as the works of Nature have a much greater 
analogy to the effects of our art and contrivance, than to those of our benevolence and justice, we have reason 
to infer, that the natural attributes of the Deity have a greater resemblance to those of men, than his moral 
have to human virtues. But what is the consequence? Nothing but this, that the moral qualities of man are 
more defective in their kind than his natural abilities. For, as the Supreme Being is allowed to be absolutely 
and entirely perfect, whatever differs most from him, departs the furthest from the supreme standard of 
rectitude and perfection.†11
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 9/34 p. 219
	These, Cleanthes, are my unfeigned sentiments on this subject; and these sentiments, you know, I 
have ever cherished and maintained. But in proportion to my veneration for true religion, is my abhorrence of 
vulgar superstitions; and I indulge a peculiar pleasure, I confess, in pushing such principles, sometimes into 
absurdity, sometimes into impiety. And you are sensible, that all bigots, notwithstanding their great aversion 
to the latter above the former, are commonly equally guilty of both.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 10/34 p. 219
	My inclination, replied Cleanthes, lies, I own, a contrary way. Religion, however corrupted, is still 
better than no religion at all. The doctrine of a future state is so strong and necessary a security to morals, that 
we never ought to abandon or neglect it. For if finite and temporary rewards and punishments have so great an 
effect, as we daily find; how much greater must be expected from such as are infinite and eternal?
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 11/34 p. 220
	How happens it then, said Philo, if vulgar superstition be so salutary to society, that all history 
abounds so much with accounts of its pernicious consequences on public affairs? Factions, civil wars, 
persecutions, subversions of government, oppression, slavery; these are the dismal consequences which 
always attend its prevalency over the minds of men. If the religious spirit be ever mentioned in any historical 
narration, we are sure to meet afterwards with a detail of the miseries which attend it. And no period of time 
can be happier or more prosperous, than those in which it is never regarded or heard of.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 12/34 p. 220
	The reason of this observation, replied Cleanthes, is obvious. The proper office of religion is to 
regulate the heart of men, humanize their conduct, infuse the spirit of temperance, order, and obedience; and 
as its operation is silent, and only enforces the motives of morality and justice, it is in danger of being 
overlooked, and confounded with these other motives. When it distinguishes itself, and acts as a separate 
principle over men, it has departed from its proper sphere, and has become only a cover to faction and 
ambition.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 13/34 p. 220
	And so will all religion, said Philo, except the philosophical and rational kind. Your reasonings are 
more easily eluded than my facts. The inference is not just, because finite and temporary rewards and 
punishments have so great influence, that therefore such as are infinite and eternal must have so much greater. 
Consider, I beseech you, the attachment which we have to present things, and the little concern which we 
discover for objects so remote and uncertain. When divines are declaiming against the common behaviour and 
conduct of the world, they always represent this principle as the strongest imaginable (which indeed it is); and 
describe almost all human kind as lying under the influence of it, and sunk into the deepest lethargy and 
unconcern about their religious interests. Yet these same divines, when they refute their speculative 
antagonists, suppose the motives of religion to be so powerful, that, without them, it were impossible for civil 
society to subsist; nor are they ashamed of so palpable a contradiction. It is certain, from experience, that the 
smallest grain of natural honesty and benevolence has more effect on men's conduct, than the most pompous 
views suggested by theological theories and systems. A man's natural inclination works incessantly upon him; 
it is for ever present to the mind, and mingles itself with every view and consideration: whereas religious 
motives, where they act at all, operate only by starts and bounds; and it is scarcely possible for them to 
become altogether habitual to the mind. The force of the greatest gravity, say the philosophers, is infinitely 
small, in comparison of that of the least impulse: yet it is certain, that the smallest gravity will, in the end, 
prevail above a great impulse; because no strokes or blows can be repeated with such constancy as attraction 
and gravitation.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 14/34 p. 221
	Another advantage of inclination: it engages on its side all the wit and ingenuity of the mind; and 
when set in opposition to religious principles, seeks every method and art of eluding them: in which it is 
almost always successful. Who can explain the heart of man, or account for those strange salvos and excuses, 
with which people satisfy themselves, when they follow their inclinations in opposition to their religious 
duty? This is well understood in the world; and none but fools ever repose less trust in a man, because they 
hear, that from study and philosophy, he has entertained some speculative doubts with regard to theological 
subjects. And when we have to do with a man, who makes a great profession of religion and devotion, has this 
any other effect upon several, who pass for prudent, than to put them on their guard, lest they be cheated and 
deceived by him?
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 15/34 p. 221
	We must further consider, that philosophers, who cultivate reason and reflection, stand less in need 
of such motives to keep them under the restraint of morals; and that the vulgar, who alone may need them, are 
utterly incapable of so pure a religion as represents the Deity to be pleased with nothing but virtue in human 
behaviour. The recommendations to the Divinity are generally supposed to be either frivolous observances, or 
rapturous ecstasies, or a bigoted credulity. We need not run back into antiquity, or wander into remote 
regions, to find instances of this degeneracy. Amongst ourselves, some have been guilty of that atrociousness, 
unknown to the Egyptian and Grecian superstitions, of declaiming in express terms, against morality; and 
representing it as a sure forfeiture of the Divine favour, if the least trust or reliance be laid upon it.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 16/34 p. 222
	But even though superstition or enthusiasm should not put itself in direct opposition to morality; the 
very diverting of the attention, the raising up a new and frivolous species of merit, the preposterous 
distribution which it makes of praise and blame, must have the most pernicious consequences, and weaken 
extremely men's attachment to the natural motives of justice and humanity.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 17/34 p. 222
	Such a principle of action likewise, not being any of the familiar motives of human conduct, acts 
only by intervals on the temper; and must be rouzed by continual efforts, in order to render the pious zealot 
satisfied with his own conduct, and make him fulfil his devotional task. Many religious exercises are entered 
into with seeming fervour, where the heart, at the time, feels cold and languid: a habit of dissimulation is by 
degrees contracted; and fraud and falsehood become the predominant principle. Hence the reason of that 
vulgar observation, that the highest zeal in religion and the deepest hypocrisy, so far from being inconsistent, 
are often or commonly united in the same individual character.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 18/34 p. 222
	The bad effects of such habits, even in common life, are easily imagined; but where the interests of 
religion are concerned, no morality can be forcible enough to bind the enthusiastic zealot. The sacredness of 
the cause sanctifies every measure which can be made use of to promote it.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 19/34 p. 222
	The steady attention alone to so important an interest as that of eternal salvation, is apt to extinguish 
the benevolent affections, and beget a narrow, contracted selfishness. And when such a temper is encouraged, 
it easily eludes all the general precepts of charity and benevolence.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 20/34 p. 222
	Thus, the motives of vulgar superstition have no great influence on general conduct; nor is their 
operation favourable to morality, in the instances where they predominate.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 21/34 p. 223
	Is there any maxim in politics more certain and infallible, than that both the number and authority of 
priests should be confined within very narrow limits; and that the civil magistrate ought, for ever, to keep his 
fasces and axes from such dangerous hands? But if the spirit of popular religion were so salutary to society, a 
contrary maxim ought to prevail. The greater number of priests, and their greater authority and riches, will 
always augment the religious spirit. And though the priests have the guidance of this spirit, why may we not 
expect a superior sanctity of life, and greater benevolence and moderation, from persons who are set apart for 
religion, who are continually inculcating it upon others, and who must themselves imbibe a greater share of 
it? Whence comes it then, that, in fact, the utmost a wise magistrate can propose with regard to popular 
religions, is, as far as possible, to make a saving game of it, and to prevent their pernicious consequences with 
regard to society? Every expedient which he tries for so humble a purpose is surrounded with inconveniences. 
If he admits only one religion among his subjects, he must sacrifice, to an uncertain prospect of tranquillity, 
every consideration of public liberty, science, reason, industry, and even his own independency. If he gives 
indulgence to several sects, which is the wiser maxim, he must preserve a very philosophical indifference to 
all of them, and carefully restrain the pretensions of the prevailing sect; otherwise he can expect nothing but 
endless disputes, quarrels, factions, persecutions, and civil commotions.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 22/34 p. 223
	True religion, I allow, has no such pernicious consequences: but we must treat of religion, as it has 
commonly been found in the world; nor have I any thing to do with that speculative tenet of Theism, which, 
as it is a species of philosophy, must partake of the beneficial influence of that principle, and at the same time 
must lie under a like inconvenience, of being always confined to very few persons.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 23/34 p. 224
	Oaths are requisite in all courts of judicature; but it is a question whether their authority arises from 
any popular religion. It is the solemnity and importance of the occasion, the regard to reputation, and the 
reflecting on the general interests of society, which are the chief restraints upon mankind. Custom-house oaths 
and political oaths are but little regarded even by some who pretend to principles of honesty and religion; and 
a Quaker's asseveration is with us justly put upon the same footing with the oath of any other person. I know, 
that Polybius†12 ascribes the infamy of Greek faith to the prevalency of the Epicurean philosophy: but I know 
also, that Punic faith had as bad a reputation in ancient times as Irish evidence has in modern; though we 
cannot account for these vulgar observations by the same reason. Not to mention that Greek faith was 
infamous before the rise of the Epicurean philosophy; and Euripides,†13 in a passage which I shall point out 
to you, has glanced a remarkable stroke of satire against his nation, with regard to this circumstance.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 24/34 p. 224
	Take care, Philo, replied Cleanthes, take care: push not matters too far: allow not your zeal against 
false religion to undermine your veneration for the true. Forfeit not this principle, the chief, the only great 
comfort in life; and our principal support amidst all the attacks of adverse fortune. The most agreeable 
reflection, which it is possible for human imagination to suggest, is that of genuine Theism, which represents 
us as the workmanship of a Being perfectly good, wise, and powerful; who created us for happiness; and who, 
having implanted in us immeasurable desires of good, will prolong our existence to all eternity, and will 
transfer us into an infinite variety of scenes, in order to satisfy those desires, and render our felicity compleat 
and durable. Next to such a Being himself (if the comparison be allowed), the happiest lot which we can 
imagine, is that of being under his guardianship and protection.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 25/34 p. 224
	These appearances, said Philo, are most engaging and alluring; and with regard to the true 
philosopher, they are more than appearances. But it happens here, as in the former case, that, with regard to 
the greater part of mankind, the appearances are deceitful, and that the terrors of religion commonly prevail 
above its comforts.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 26/34 p. 225
	It is allowed, that men never have recourse to devotion so readily as when dejected with grief or 
depressed with sickness. Is not this a proof, that the religious spirit is not so nearly allied to joy as to sorrow?
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 27/34 p. 225
	But men, when afflicted, find consolation in religion, replied Cleanthes. Sometimes, said Philo: but it 
is natural to imagine, that they will form a notion of those unknown beings, suitably to the present gloom and 
melancholy of their temper, when they betake themselves to the contemplation of them. Accordingly, we find 
the tremendous images to predominate in all religions; and we ourselves, after having employed the most 
exalted expression in our descriptions of the Deity, fall into the flattest contradiction in affirming that the 
damned are infinitely superior in number to the elect.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 28/34 p. 225
	I shall venture to affirm, that there never was a popular religion, which represented the state of 
departed souls in such a light, as would render it eligible for human kind that there should be such a state. 
These fine models of religion are the mere product of philosophy. For as death lies between the eye and the 
prospect of futurity, that event is so shocking to Nature, that it must throw a gloom on all the regions which 
lie beyond it; and suggest to the generality of mankind the idea of Cerberus and Furies; devils, and torrents of 
fire and brimstone.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 29/34 p. 225
	It is true, both fear and hope enter into religion; because both these passions, at different times, 
agitate the human mind, and each of them forms a species of divinity suitable to itself. But when a man is in a 
cheerful disposition, he is fit for business, or company, or entertainment of any kind; and he naturally applies 
himself to these, and thinks not of religion. When melancholy and dejected, he has nothing to do but brood 
upon the terrors of the invisible world, and to plunge himself still deeper in affliction. It may indeed happen, 
that after he has, in this manner, engraved the religious opinions deep into his thought and imagination, there 
may arrive a change of health or circumstances, which may restore his good-humour, and raising cheerful 
prospects of futurity, make him run into the other extreme of joy and triumph. But still it must be 
acknowledged, that, as terror is the primary principle of religion, it is the passion which always predominates 
in it, and admits but of short intervals of pleasure.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 30/34 p. 226
	Not to mention, that these fits of excessive, enthusiastic joy, by exhausting the spirits, always prepare 
the way for equal fits of superstitious terror and dejection; nor is there any state of mind so happy as the calm 
and equable. But this state it is impossible to support, where a man thinks that he lies in such profound 
darkness and uncertainty, between an eternity of happiness and an eternity of misery. No wonder that such an 
opinion disjoints the ordinary frame of the mind, and throws it into the utmost confusion. And though that 
opinion is seldom so steady in its operation as to influence all the actions; yet it is apt to make a considerable 
breach in the temper, and to produce that gloom and melancholy so remarkable in all devout people.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 31/34 p. 226
	It is contrary to common sense to entertain apprehensions or terrors upon account of any opinion 
whatsoever, or to imagine that we run any risk hereafter, by the freest use of our reason. Such a sentiment 
implies both an absurdity and an inconsistency. It is an absurdity to believe that the Deity has human passions, 
and one of the lowest of human passions, a restless appetite for applause. It is an inconsistency to believe, 
that, since the Deity has this human passion, he has not others also; and, in particular, a disregard to the 
opinions of creatures so much inferior.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 32/34 p. 226
	To know God, says Seneca, is to worship him. All other worship is indeed absurd, superstitious, and 
even impious. It degrades him to the low condition of mankind, who are delighted with entreaty, solicitation, 
presents, and flattery. Yet is this impiety the smallest of which superstition is guilty. Commonly, it depresses 
the Deity far below the condition of mankind; and represents him as a capricious demon, who exercises his 
power without reason and without humanity! And were that Divine Being disposed to be offended at the vices 
and follies of silly mortals, who are his own workmanship, ill would it surely fare with the votaries of most 
popular superstitions. Nor would any of human race merit his favour, but a very few, the philosophical 
Theists, who entertain, or rather indeed endeavour to entertain, suitable notions of his Divine perfections: as 
the only persons entitled to his compassion and indulgence would be the philosophical Sceptics, a sect almost 
equally rare, who, from a natural diffidence of their own capacity, suspend, or endeavour to suspend, all 
judgment with regard to such sublime and such extraordinary subjects.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 33/34 p. 227
	If the whole of Natural Theology, as some people seem to maintain, resolves itself into one simple, 
though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, That the cause or causes of order in the universe 
probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence: if this proposition be not capable of extension, 
variation, or more particular explication: if it affords no inference that affects human life, or can be the source 
of any action or forbearance: and if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried no further than to the human 
intelligence, and cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the qualities of the mind; if this 
really be the case, what can the most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than give a plain, 
philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs, and believe that the arguments on which it is 
established exceed the objections which lie against it? Some astonishment, indeed, will naturally arise from 
the greatness of the object; some melancholy from its obscurity; some contempt of human reason, that it can 
give no solution more satisfactory with regard to so extraordinary and magnificent a question. But believe me, 
Cleanthes, the most natural sentiment which a well-disposed mind will feel on this occasion, is a longing 
desire and expectation that Heaven would be pleased to dissipate, at least alleviate, this profound ignorance, 
by affording some particular revelation to mankind, and making discoveries of the nature, attributes, and 
operations of the Divine object of our faith. A person, seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of 
natural reason, will fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity: while the haughty Dogmatist, persuaded that 
he can erect a compleat system of Theology by the mere help of philosophy, disdains any further aid, and 
rejects this adventitious instructor. To be a philosophical Sceptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most 
essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian; a proposition which I would willingly recommend 
to the attention of Pamphilus: and I hope Cleanthes will forgive me for interposing so far in the education and 
instruction of his pupil.
Hume: DNR Pt. 12 Para. 34/34 p. 227
	Cleanthes and Philo pursued not this conversation much further: and as nothing ever made greater 
impression on me, than all the reasonings of that day, so I confess, that, upon a serious review of the whole, I 
cannot but think, that Philo's principles are more probable than Demea's; but that those of Cleanthes approach 
still nearer to the truth.

Notes
Hume: DNR Foot. 1 p. 130
	†1 Chrysippus apud Plut. de repug. Stoicorum.
Hume: DNR Foot. 2 p. 137
	†2 L'art de penser.
Hume: DNR Foot. 3 p. 138
	†3 Mons. Huet.
Hume: DNR Foot. 4 p. 141
	†4 Recherche de la Verite, liv. 3, cap. 9.
Hume: DNR Foot. 5 p. 165
	†5 Lib. xi. 1094.
Hume: DNR Foot. 6 p. 165
	†6 De Nat. Deor. lib. i.
Hume: DNR Foot. 7 p. 190
	†7 Dr. Clarke.
Hume: DNR Foot. 8 p. 191
	†8 Republique des Lettres, Aout 1685.
Hume: DNR Foot. 9 p. 194
	†9 That sentiment had been maintained by Dr. King, and some few others, before Leibnitz, though 
by none of so great fame as that German philosopher.
Hume: DNR Foot. 10 p. 215
	†10 De Formatione Foetus.
Hume: DNR Foot. 11 p. 219
	†11 It seems evident that the dispute between the Sceptics and Dogmatists is entirely verbal, or at 
least regards only the degrees of doubt and assurance which we ought to indulge with regard to all reasoning; 
and such disputes are commonly, at the bottom, verbal, and admit not of any precise determination. No 
philosophical Dogmatist denies that there are difficulties both with regard to the senses and to all science, and 
that these difficulties are in a regular, logical method, absolutely insolvable. No Sceptic denies that we lie 
under an absolute necessity, notwithstanding these difficulties, of thinking, and believing, and reasoning, with 
regard to all kinds of subjects, and even of frequently assenting with confidence and security. The only 
difference, then, between these sects, if they merit that name, is, that the Sceptic, from habit, caprice, or 
inclination, insists most on the difficulties; the Dogmatist, for like reasons, on the necessity.
Hume: DNR Foot. 12 p. 224
	†12 Lib. vi. cap. 54.
Hume: DNR Foot. 13 p. 224
	†13 Iphigenia in Tauride.

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