A Dissertation on the Passions
Contents
Hume: DOP Contents p. vii
Table of Contents: A DISSERTATION ON THE PASSIONS
PAST MASTERS Preface
Section 1
Section 2
Section 3
Section 4
Section 5
Section 6
Footnotes
Variant Readings
Past Masters Preface
Hume: DOP PAST MASTERS Preface
The text of "A Dissertation on the Passions," is drawn from the 1898 Green and
Grose Edition. The page numbers in the reference lines of the folios refer to page numbers
in Green and Grose.
Section 1
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 1/24 p. 139
A DISSERTATION ON THE PASSIONS
SECT. I.
1. Some objects produce immediately an agreeable sensation, by the original structure of
our organs, and are thence denominated GOOD; as others, from their immediate
disagreeable sensation, acquire the appellation of EVIL. Thus moderate warmth is
agreeable and good; excessive heat painful and evil.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 2/24 p. 139
Some objects again, by being naturally conformable or contrary to passion, excite an
agreeable or painful sensation; and are thence called Good or Evil. The punishment of an
adversary, by gratifying revenge, is good; the sickness of a companion, by affecting
friendship, is evil.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 3/24 p. 139
2. All good or evil, whence-ever it arises, produces various passions and affections,
according to the light in which it is surveyed.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 4/24 p. 139
When good is certain or very probable, it produces JOY: When evil is in the same
situation, there arises GRIEF or SORROW.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 5/24 p. 139
When either good or evil is uncertain, it gives rise to FEAR or HOPE, according to
the degree of uncertainty on one side or the other.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 6/24 p. 139
DESIRE arises from good considered simply; and AVERSION, from evil. The
WILL exerts itself, when either the presence of the good or absence of the evil may be
attained by any action of the mind or body.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 7/24 p. 139
3. None of these passions seem to contain any thing curious or remarkable, except
Hope and Fear, which, being derived from the probability of any good or evil, are mixed
passions, that merit our attention.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 8/24 p. 139
Probability arises from an opposition of contrary chances or causes, by which the
mind is not allowed to fix on either side; but is incessantly tossed from one to another, and
is determined, one moment, to consider an object as existent, and another moment as the
contrary. The imagination or understanding, call it which you please, fluctuates between the
opposite views; and though perhaps it may be oftener turned to one side than the other, it is
impossible for it, by reason of the opposition of causes or chances, to rest on either. The pro
and con of the question alternately prevail; and the mind, surveying the objects in their
opposite causes, finds such a contrariety as destroys all certainty or established opinion.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 9/24 p. 140
Suppose, then, that the object, concerning which we are doubtful, produces either
desire or aversion; it is evident, that, according as the mind turns itself to one side or the
other, it must feel a momentary impression of joy or sorrow. An object, whose existence we
desire, gives satisfaction, when we think of those causes, which produce it; and for the
same reason, excites grief or uneasiness from the opposite consideration. So that, as the
understanding, in probable questions, is divided between the contrary points of view, the
heart must in the same manner be divided between opposite emotions.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 10/24 p. 140
Now, if we consider the human mind, we shall observe, that, with regard to the
passions, it is not like a wind instrument of music, which, in running over all the notes,
immediately loses the sound when the breath ceases; but rather resembles a string-
instrument, where, after each stroke, the vibrations still retain some sound, which gradually
and insensibly decays. The imagination is extremely quick and agile; but the passions, in
comparison, are slow and restive: For which reason, when any object is presented, which
affords a variety of views to the one and emotions to the other; though the fancy may
change its views with great celerity; each stroke will not produce a clear and distinct note of
passion, but the one passion will always be mixed and confounded with the other.
According as the probability inclines to good or evil, the passion of grief or joy
predominates in the composition; and these passions being intermingled by means of the
contrary views of the imagination, produce by the union the passions of hope or fear.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 11/24 p. 140
4. As this theory seems to carry its own evidence along with it, we shall be more
concise in our proofs.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 12/24 p. 140
The passions of fear and hope may arise, when the chances are equal on both sides,
and no superiority can be discovered in one above the other. Nay, in this situation the
passions are rather the strongest, as the mind has then the least foundation to rest upon, and
is tost with the greatest uncertainty. Throw in a superior degree of probability to the side of
grief, you immediately see that passion diffuse itself over the composition, and tincture it
into fear. Encrease the probability, and by that means the grief; the fear prevails still more
and more, 'till at last it runs insensibly, as the joy continually diminishes, into pure grief.
After you have brought it to this situation, diminish the grief, by a contrary operation to
that, which encreased it, to wit, by diminishing the probability on the melancholy side; and
you will see the passion clear every moment, 'till it changes insensibly into hope; which
again runs, by slow degrees, into joy, as you encrease that part of the composition, by the
encrease of the probability. Are not these as plain proofs, that the passions of fear and hope
are mixtures of grief and joy, as in optics it is a proof, that a coloured ray of the sun,
passing through a prism, is a composition of two others, when, as you diminish or encrease
the quantity of either, you find it prevail proportionably, more or less, in the composition?
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 13/24 p. 141
5. Probability is of two kinds; either when the object is itself uncertain, and to be
determined by chance: or when, though the object be already certain, yet it is uncertain to
our judgment, which finds a number of proofs or presumptions on each side of the question.
Both these kinds of probability cause fear and hope; which must proceed from that
property, in which they agree; namely, the uncertainty and fluctuation which they bestow
on the passion, by that contrariety of views, which is common to both.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 14/24 p. 141
6. It is a probable good or evil, which commonly causes hope or fear; because
probability, producing an inconstant and wavering survey of an object, occasions naturally
a like mixture and uncertainty of passion. But we may observe, that, wherever, from other
causes, this mixture can be produced, the passions of fear and hope will arise, even though
there be no probability.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 15/24 p. 141
An evil, conceived as barely possible, sometimes produces fear; especially if the
evil be very great. A man cannot think on excessive pain and torture without trembling, if
he runs the least risque of suffering them. The smallness of the probability is compensated
by the greatness of the evil.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 16/24 p. 141
But even impossible evils cause fear; as when we tremble on the brink of a
precipice, though we know ourselves to be in perfect security, and have it in our choice,
whether we will advance a step farther. The immediate presence of the evil influences the
imagination and produces a species of belief; but being opposed by the reflection on our
security, that belief is immediately retracted, and causes the same kind of passion, as when,
from a contrariety of chances, contrary passions are produced.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 17/24 p. 142
Evils, which are certain, have sometimes the same effect as the possible or
impossible. A man, in a strong prison, without the least means of escape, trembles at the
thoughts of the rack, to which he is sentenced. The evil is here fixed in itself; but the mind
has not courage to fix upon it; and this fluctuation gives rise to a passion of a similar
appearance with fear.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 18/24 p. 142
7. But it is not only where good or evil is uncertain as to its existence, but also as to
its kind, that fear or hope arises. If any one were told that one of his sons is suddenly killed;
the passion, occasioned by this event, would not settle into grief, 'till he got certain
information which of his sons he had lost. Though each side of the question produces here
the same passion; that passion cannot settle, but receives from the imagination, which is
unfixed, a tremulous unsteady motion, resembling the mixture and contention of grief and
joy.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 19/24 p. 142
8. Thus all kinds of uncertainty have a strong connexion with fear, even though they
do not cause any opposition of passions, by the opposite views, which they present to us.
Should I leave a friend in any malady, I should feel more anxiety upon his account, than if
he were present; though perhaps I am not only incapable of giving him assistance, but
likewise of judging concerning the event of his sickness. There are a thousand little
circumstances of his situation and condition, which I desire to know; and the knowledge of
them would prevent that fluctuation and uncertainty, so nearly allied to fear. Horace has
remarked this phenomenon.
Ut assidens implumibus pulls avisi
Serpentum allapsus timet,
Magis relictis; non, ut adsit, auxili
Latura plus praesentibus.
A virgin on her bridal-night goes to bed full of fears and apprehensions, though she expects
nothing but pleasure. The confusion of wishes and joys, the newness and greatness of the
unknown event, so embarrass the mind, that it knows not in what image or passion to fix
itself.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 20/24 p. 143
9. Concerning the mixture of affections, we may remark, in general, that when
contrary passions arise from objects nowise connected together, they take place alternately.
Thus when a man is afflicted for the loss of a law-suit, and joyful for the birth of a son, the
mind, running from the agreeable to the calamitous object; with whatever celerity it may
perform this motion, can scarcely temper the one affection with the other, and remain
between them in a state of indifference.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 21/24 p. 143
It more easily attains that calm situation, when the same event is of a mixed nature,
and contains something adverse and something prosperous in its different circumstances.
For in that case, both the passions, mingling with each other by means of the relation, often
become mutually destructive, and leave the mind in perfect tranquillity.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 22/24 p. 143
But suppose, that the object is not a compound of good and evil, but is considered as
probable or improbable in any degree; in that case, the contrary passions will both of them
be present at once in the soul, and instead of balancing and tempering each other, will
subsist together, and by their union produce a third impression or affection, such as hope or
fear.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 23/24 p. 143
The influence of the relations of ideas (which we shall explain more fully
afterwards) is plainly seen in this affair. In contrary passions, if the objects be totally
different, the passions are like two opposite liquors in different bottles, which have no
influence on each other. If the objects be intimately connected, the passions are like an
alcali and an acid, which, being mingled, destroy each other. If the relation be more
imperfect, and consist in the contradictory views of the same object, the passions are like
oil and vinegar, which, however mingled, never perfectly unite and incorporate.
Hume: DOP Sect. 1 Para. 24/24 p. 143
The effect of a mixture of passions, when one of them is predominant, and swallows
up the other, shall be explained afterwards.
Section 2
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 1/47 p. 144
BSECT. II.
1. Besides those passions above-mentioned, which arise from a direct pursuit of good and
aversion to evil, there are others which are of a more complicated nature, and imply more
than one view or consideration. Thus Pride is a certain satisfaction in ourselves, on account
of some accomplishment or possession, which we enjoy: Humility, on the other hand, is a
dissatisfaction with ourselves, on account of some defect or infirmity.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 2/47 p. 144
Love or Friendship is a complacency in another, on account of his accomplishments
or services: Hatred, the contrary.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 3/47 p. 144
2. In these two sets of passion, there is an obvious distinction to be made between
the object of the passion and its cause. The object of pride and humility is self: The cause of
the passion is some excellence in the former case; some fault, in the latter. The object of
love and hatred is some other person: The causes, in like manner, are either excellencies or
faults.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 4/47 p. 144
With regard to all these passions, the causes are what excite the emotion; the object
is what the mind directs its view to when the emotion is excited. Our merit, for instance,
raises pride; and it is essential to pride to turn our view on ourselves with complacency and
satisfaction.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 5/47 p. 144
Now, as the causes of these passions are very numerous and various, though their
object be uniform and simple; it may be a subject of curiosity to consider, what that
circumstance is, in which all these various causes agree; or in other words, what is the real
efficient cause of the passion. We shall begin with pride and humility.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 6/47 p. 144
3. In order to explain the causes of these passions, we must reflect on certain
principles, which, though they have a mighty influence on every operation, both of the
understanding and passions, are not commonly much insisted on by philosophers. The first
of these is the association of ideas, or that principle, by which we make an easy transition
from one idea to another. However uncertain and changeable our thoughts may be, they are
not entirely without rule and method in their changes. They usually pass with regularity,
from one object, to what resembles it, is contiguous to it, or produced by it.†1 When one
idea is present to the imagination, any other, united by these relations, naturally follows it,
and enters with more facility, by means of that introduction.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 7/47 p. 145
The second property, which I shall observe in the human mind, is a like association
of impressions or emotions. All resembling impressions are connected together; and no
sooner one arises, than the rest naturally follow. Grief and disappointment give rise to
anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again. In like manner, our temper,
when elevated with joy, naturally throws itself into love, generosity, courage, pride, and
other resembling affections.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 8/47 p. 145
In the third place, it is observable of these two kinds of association, that they very
much assist and forward each other, and that the transition is more easily made, where they
both concur in the same object. Thus, a man, who, by an injury received from another, is
very much discomposed and ruffled in his temper, is apt to find a hundred subjects of
hatred, discontent, impatience, fear, and other uneasy passions; especially, if he can
discover these subjects in or near the person, who was the object of his first emotion. Those
principles, which forward the transition of ideas, here concur with those which operate on
the passions; and both, uniting in one action, bestow on the mind a double impulse.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 9/47 p. 145
Upon this occasion I may cite a passage from an elegant writer, who expresses
himself in the following manner:†2 'As the fancy delights in every thing, that is great,
strange, or beautiful, and is still the more pleased the more it finds of these perfections in
the same object, so it is capable of receiving new satisfaction by the assistance of another
sense. Thus, any continual sound, as the music of birds, or a fall of waters, awakens every
moment the mind of the beholder, and makes him more attentive to the several beauties of
the place, that lie before him. Thus, if there arises a fragrancy of smells or perfumes, they
heighten the pleasure of the imagination, and make even the colours and verdure of the
landscape appear more agreeable; for the ideas of both senses recommend each other, and
are pleasanter together than where they enter the mind separately: As the different colours
of a picture, when they are well disposed, set off one another, and receive an additional
beauty from the advantage of the situation.' In these phenomena, we may remark the
association both of impressions and ideas: as well as the mutual assistance these
associations lend to each other.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 10/47 p. 146
4. It seems to me, that both these species of relations have place in producing Pride
or Humility, and are the real, efficient causes of the passion.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 11/47 p. 146
With regard to the first relation, that of ideas, there can be no question. Whatever we
are proud of must, in some manner, belong to us. It is always our knowledge, our sense,
beauty, possessions, family, on which we value ourselves. Self, which is the object of the
passion, must still be related to that quality or circumstance, which causes the passion.
There must be a connexion between them; an easy transition of the imagination; or a
facility of the conception in passing from one to the other. Where this connexion is
wanting, no object can either excite pride or humility; and the more you weaken the
connexion, the more you weaken the passion.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 12/47 p. 146
5. The only subject of enquiry is, whether there be a like relation of impressions or
sentiments, wherever pride or humility is felt; whether the circumstance, which causes the
passion, previously excites a sentiment similar to the passion; and whether there be an easy
transfusion of the one into the other.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 13/47 p. 146
The feeling or sentiment of pride is agreeable; of humility, painful. An agreeable
sensation is, therefore, related to the former; a painful, to the latter. And if we find, after
examination, that every object, which produces pride, produces also a separate pleasure;
and every object, which causes humility, excites in like manner a separate uneasiness; we
must allow, in that case, that the present theory is fully proved and ascertained. The double
relation of ideas and sentiments will be acknowledged incontestable.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 14/47 p. 146
6. To begin with personal merit and demerit, the most obvious causes of these
passions; it would be entirely foreign to our present purpose to examine the foundation of
moral distinctions. It is sufficient to observe, that the foregoing theory concerning the origin
of the passions may be defended on any hypothesis. The most probable system, which has
been advanced to explain the difference between vice and virtue, is, that either from a
primary constitution of nature, or from a sense of public or private interest, certain
characters, upon the very view and contemplation, produce uneasiness; and others, in like
manner, excite pleasure. The uneasiness and satisfaction, produced in the spectator, are
essential to vice and virtue. To approve of a character, is to feel a delight upon its
appearance. To disapprove of it, is to be sensible of an uneasiness. The pain and pleasure,
therefore, being, in a manner, the primary source of blame or praise, must also be the
causes of all their effects; and consequently, the causes of pride and humility, which are the
unavoidable attendants of that distinction.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 15/47 p. 147
But supposing this theory of morals should not be received; it is still evident that
pain and pleasure, if not the sources of moral distinctions, are at least inseparable from
them. A generous and noble character affords a satisfaction even in the survey; and when
presented to us, though only in a poem or fable, never fails to charm and delight us. On the
other hand, cruelty and treachery displease from their very nature; nor is it possible ever to
reconcile us to these qualities, either in ourselves or others. Virtue, therefore, produces
always a pleasure distinct from the pride or self-satisfaction which attends it: Vice, an
uneasiness separate from the humility or remorse.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 16/47 p. 147
But a high or low conceit of ourselves arises not from those qualities alone of the
mind, which, according to common systems of ethics, have been defined parts of moral
duty; but from any other, which have a connexion with pleasure or uneasiness. Nothing
flatters our vanity more than the talent of pleasing by our wit, good-humour, or any other
accomplishment; and nothing gives us a more sensible mortification, than a disappointment
in any attempt of that kind. No one has ever been able to tell precisely, what wit is, and to
shew why such a system of thought must be received under that denomination, and such
another rejected. It is by taste alone we can decide concerning it; nor are we possessed of
any other standard, by which we can form a judgment of this nature. Now what is this taste,
from which true and false wit in a manner receive their being, and without which no
thought can have a title to either of these denominations? It is plainly nothing but a
sensation of pleasure from true wit, and of disgust from false, without our being able to tell
the reasons of that satisfaction or uneasiness. The power of exciting these opposite
sensations is, therefore, the very essence of true or false wit; and consequently, the cause of
that vanity or mortification, which arises from one or the other.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 17/47 p. 148
7. Beauty of all kinds gives us a peculiar delight and satisfaction; as deformity
produces pain, upon whatever subject it may be placed, and whether surveyed in an animate
or inanimate object. If the beauty or deformity belong to our own face, shape, or person,
this pleasure or uneasiness is converted into pride or humility; as having in this case all the
circumstances requisite to produce a perfect transition, according to the present theory.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 18/47 p. 148
It would seem, that the very essence of beauty consists in its power of producing
pleasure. All its effects, therefore, must proceed from this circumstance: And if beauty is so
universally the subject of vanity, it is only from its being the cause of pleasure.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 19/47 p. 148
Concerning all other bodily accomplishments, we may observe in general, that
whatever in ourselves is either useful, beautiful, or surprizing, is an object of pride; and the
contrary of humility. These qualities agree in producing a separate pleasure; and agree in
nothing else.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 20/47 p. 148
We are vain of the surprizing adventures which we have met with, the escapes
which we have made, the dangers to which we have been exposed; as well as of our
surprizing feats of vigour and activity. Hence the origin of vulgar lying; where men,
without any interest, and merely out of vanity, heap up a number of extraordinary events,
which are either the fictions of their brain; or, if true, have no connexion with themselves.
Their fruitful invention supplies them with a variety of adventures; and where that talent is
wanting, they appropriate such as belong to others, in order to gratify their vanity: For
between that passion, and the sentiment of pleasure, there is always a close connexion.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 21/47 p. 148
8. But though pride and humility have the qualities of our mind and body, that is, of
self, for their natural and more immediate causes; we find by experience, that many other
objects produce these affections. We found vanity upon houses, gardens, equipage, and
other external objects; as well as upon personal merit and accomplishments. This happens
when external objects acquire any particular relation to ourselves, and are associated or
connected with us. A beautiful fish in the ocean, a well-proportioned animal in a forest, and
indeed, any thing, which neither belongs nor is related to us, has no manner of influence on
our vanity: whatever extraordinary qualities it may be endowed with, and whatever degree
of surprize and admiration it may naturally occasion. It must be someway associated with
us, in order to touch our pride. Its idea must hang, in a manner, upon that of ourselves; and
the transition from one to the other must be easy and natural.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 22/47 p. 149
Men are vain of the beauty either of their country, or their county, or even of their
parish. Here the idea of beauty plainly produces a pleasure. This pleasure is related to pride.
The object or cause of this pleasure is, by the supposition, related to self, the object of
pride. By this double relation of sentiments and ideas, a transition is made from one to the
other.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 23/47 p. 149
Men are also vain of the happy temperature of the climate, in which they are born;
of the fertility of their native soil; of the goodness of the wines, fruits, or victuals, produced
by it; of the softness or force of their language, with other particulars of that kind. These
objects have plainly a reference to the pleasures of sense, and are originally considered as
agreeable to the feeling, taste or hearing. How could they become causes of pride, except
by means of that transition above explained?
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 24/47 p. 149
There are some, who discover a vanity of an opposite kind, and affect to depreciate
their own country, in comparison of those, to which they have travelled. These persons
find, when they are at home, and surrounded with their countrymen, that the strong relation
between them and their own nation is shared with so many, that it is in a manner lost to
them; whereas, that distant relation to a foreign country, which is formed by their having
seen it, and lived in it, is augmented by their considering how few have done the same. For
this reason, they always admire the beauty, utility, and rarity of what they met with abroad,
above what they find at home.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 25/47 p. 149
Since we can be vain of a country, climate or any inanimate object, which bears a
relation to us; it is no wonder we should be vain of the qualities of those, who are connected
with us by blood or friendship. Accordingly we find, that any qualities which, when
belonging to ourselves, produce pride, produce also, in a less degree, the same affection,
when discovered in persons, related to us. The beauty, address, merit, credit, and honours of
their kindred are carefully displayed by the proud, and are considerable sources of their
vanity.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 26/47 p. 150
As we are proud of riches in ourselves, we desire, in order to gratify our vanity, that
every one who has any connexion with us, should likewise be possessed of them, and are
ashamed of such as are mean or poor among our friends and relations. Our forefathers
being regarded as our nearest relations; every one naturally affects to be of a good family,
and to be descended from a long succession of rich and honourable ancestors.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 27/47 p. 150
Those, who boast of the antiquity of their families, are glad when they can join this
circumstance, that their ancestors, for many generations, have been uninterrupted
proprietors of the same portion of land, and that their family has never changed its
possessions, or been transplanted into any other county or province. It is an additional
subject of vanity, when they can boast, that these possessions have been transmitted
through a descent, composed entirely of males, and that the honours and fortune have never
passed through any female. Let us endeavour to explain these phenomena from the
foregoing theory.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 28/47 p. 150
When any one values himself on the antiquity of his family, the subjects of his
vanity are not merely the extent of time and number of ancestors (for in that respect all
mankind are alike), but these circumstances, joined to the riches and credit of his ancestors,
which are supposed to reflect a lustre on himself, upon account of his connexion with them.
Since therefore the passion depends on the connexion, whatever strengthens the connexion
must also encrease the passion, and whatever weakens the connexion must diminish the
passion. But it is evident, that the sameness of the possessions must strengthen the relation
of ideas, arising from blood and kindred, and convey the fancy with greater facility from
one generation to another; from the remotest ancestors to their posterity, who are both their
heirs and their descendants. By this facility, the sentiment is transmitted more entire, and
excites a greater degree of pride and vanity.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 29/47 p. 150
The case is the same with the transmission of the honours and fortune, through a
succession of males, without their passing through any female. It is an obvious quality of
human nature, that the imagination naturally turns to whatever is important and
considerable; and where two objects are presented, a small and a great, it usually leaves the
former, and dwells entirely on the latter. This is the reason, why children commonly bear
their father's name, and are esteemed to be of a nobler or meaner birth, according to his
family. And though the mother should be possessed of superior qualities to the father, as
often happens, the general rule prevails, notwithstanding the exception, according to the
doctrine, which shall be explained afterwards. Nay, even when a superiority of any kind is
so great, or when any other reasons have such an effect, as to make the children rather
represent the mother's family than the father's, the general rule still retains an efficacy,
sufficient to weaken the relation, and make a kind of breach in the line of ancestors. The
imagination runs not along them with the same facility, nor is able to transfer the honour
and credit of the ancestors to their posterity of the same name and family so readily, as
when the transition is conformable to the general rule, and passes through the male line,
from father to son, or from brother to brother.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 30/47 p. 151
9. But property, as it gives the fullest power and authority over any object, is the
relation, which has the greatest influence on these passions.†3
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 31/47 p. 151
Every thing, belonging to a vain man, is the best that is any where to be found. His
houses, equipage, furniture, cloaths, horses, hounds, excel all others in his conceit; and it is
easy to observe, that, from the least advantage in any of these he draws a new subject of
pride and vanity. His wine, if you will believe him, has a finer flavour than any other; his
cookery is more exquisite; his table more orderly; his servants more expert: the air, in
which he lives, more healthful; the soil, which he cultivates, more fertile; his fruits ripen
earlier, and to greater perfection: Such a thing is remarkable for its novelty; such another
for its antiquity: This is the workmanship of a famous artist; that belonged once to such a
prince or great man. All objects, in a word, which are useful, beautiful, or surprizing, or are
related to such, may, by means of property, give rise to this passion. These all agree in
giving pleasure. This alone is common to them; and therefore must be the quality, that
produces the passion, which is their common effect. As every new instance is a new
argument, and as the instances are here without number; it would seem, that this theory is
sufficiently confirmed by experience.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 32/47 p. 152
Riches imply the power of acquiring whatever is agreeable; and as they comprehend
many particular objects of vanity, necessarily become one of the chief causes of that
passion.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 33/47 p. 152
10. Our opinions of all kinds are strongly affected by society and sympathy, and it is
almost impossible for us to support any principle or sentiment, against the universal consent
of every one, with whom we have any friendship or correspondence. But of all our
opinions, those, which we form in our own favour; however lofty or presuming; are, at
bottom, the frailest, and the most easily shaken by the contradiction and opposition of
others. Our great concern, in this case, makes us soon alarmed, and keeps our passions upon
the watch: Our consciousness of partiality still makes us dread a mistake: And the very
difficulty of judging concerning an object, which is never set at a due distance from us, nor
is seen in a proper point of view, makes us hearken anxiously to the opinions of others, who
are better qualified to form just opinions concerning us. Hence that strong love of fame,
with which all mankind are possessed. It is in order to fix and confirm their favourable
opinion of themselves, not from any original passion, that they seek the applauses of others.
And when a man desires to be praised, it is for the same reason, that a beauty is pleased
with surveying herself in a favourable looking-glass, and seeing the reflection of her own
charms.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 34/47 p. 152
Though it be difficult, in all points of speculation, to distinguish a cause, which
encreases an effect, from one, which solely produces it; yet in the present case the
phenomena seem pretty strong and satisfactory in confirmation of the foregoing principle.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 35/47 p. 152
We receive a much greater satisfaction from the approbation of those whom we
ourselves esteem and approve of, than of those whom we contemn and despise.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 36/47 p. 153
When esteem is obtained after a long and intimate acquaintance, it gratifies our
vanity in a peculiar manner.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 37/47 p. 153
The suffrage of those, who are shy and backward in giving praise, is attended with
an additional relish and enjoyment, if we can obtain it in our favour.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 38/47 p. 153
Where a great man is delicate in his choice of favourites, every one courts with
greater earnestness his countenance and protection.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 39/47 p. 153
Praise never gives us much pleasure, unless it concur with our own opinion, and
extol us for those qualities, in which we chiefly excel.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 40/47 p. 153
These phenomena seem to prove, that the favourable suffrages of the world are
regarded only as authorities, or as confirmations of our own opinion, And if the opinions of
others have more influence in this subject than in any other, it is easily accounted for from
the nature of the subject.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 41/47 p. 153
11. Thus few objects, however related to us, and whatever pleasure they produce,
are able to excite a great degree of pride or self-satisfaction; unless they be also obvious to
others, and engage the approbation of the spectators. What disposition of mind so desirable
as the peaceful, resigned, contented; which readily submits to all the dispensations of
providence, and preserves a constant serenity amidst the greatest misfortunes and
disappointments? Yet this disposition, though acknowledged to be a virtue or excellence, is
seldom the foundation of great vanity or self-applause; having no brilliancy or exterior
lustre, and rather cheering the heart, than animating the behaviour and conversation. The
case is the same with many other qualities of the mind, body, or fortune; and this
circumstance, as well as the double relations above mentioned, must be admitted to be of
consequence in the production of these passions.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 42/47 p. 153
A second circumstance, which is of consequence in this affair, is the constancy and
durableness of the object. What is very casual and inconstant, beyond the common course
of human affairs, gives little joy, and less pride. We are not much satisfied with the thing
itself; and are still less apt to feel any new degree of self-satisfaction upon its account. We
foresee and anticipate its change; which makes us little satisfied with the thing itself: We
compare it to ourselves, whose existence is more durable; by which means its inconstancy
appears still greater. It seems ridiculous to make ourselves the object of a passion, on
account of a quality or possession, which is of so much shorter duration, and attends us
during so small a part of our existence.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 43/47 p. 154
A third circumstance, not to be neglected, is that the objects, in order to produce
pride or self-value, must be peculiar to us, or at least common to us with a few others. The
advantages of sun-shine, good weather, a happy climate, &c. distinguish us not from any of
our companions, and give us no preference or superiority. The comparison, which we are
every moment apt to make, presents no inference to our advantage; and we still remain,
notwithstanding these enjoyments, on a level with all our friends and acquaintance.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 44/47 p. 154
As health and sickness vary incessantly to all men, and there is no one, who is solely
or certainly fixed in either; these accidental blessings and calamities are in a manner
separated from us, and are not considered as a foundation for vanity or humiliation. But
wherever a malady of any kind is so rooted in our constitution, that we no longer entertain
any hope of recovery, from that moment it damps our self-conceit, as is evident in old men,
whom nothing mortifies more than the consideration of their age and infirmities. They
endeavour, as long as possible, to conceal their blindness and deafness, their rheums and
gouts; nor do they ever avow them without reluctance and uneasiness. And though young
men are not ashamed of every head-ach or cold which they fall into; yet no topic is more
proper to mortify human pride, and make us entertain a mean opinion of our nature, than
this, that we are every moment of our lives subject to such infirmities. This proves, that
bodily pain and sickness are in themselves proper causes of humility; though the custom of
estimating every thing, by comparison, more than by its intrinsic worth and value, makes us
overlook those calamities, which we find incident to every one, and causes us to form an
idea of our merit and character, independent of them.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 45/47 p. 154
We are ashamed of such maladies as affect others, and are either dangerous or
disagreeable to them. Of the epilepsy; because it gives horror to every one present: Of the
itch; because it is infectious: Of the king's evil; because it often goes to posterity. Men
always consider the sentiments of others in their judgment of themselves.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 46/47 p. 155
A fourth circumstance, which has an influence on these passions, is general rules;
by which we form a notion of different ranks of men, suitably to the power or riches of
which they are possessed; and this notion is not changed by any peculiarities of health or
temper of the persons, which may deprive them of all enjoyment in their possessions.
Custom readily carries us beyond the just bounds in our passions, as well as in our
reasonings.
Hume: DOP Sect. 2 Para. 47/47 p. 155
It may not be amiss to observe on this occasion, that the influence of general rules
and maxims on the passions very much contributes to facilitate the effects of all the
principles or internal mechanism, which we here explain. For it seems evident, that, if a
person full grown, and of the same nature with ourselves, were on a sudden transported into
our world, he would be much embarrassed with every object, and would not readily
determine what degree of love or hatred, of pride or humility, or of any other passion
should be excited by it. The passions are often varied by very inconsiderable principles; and
these do not always play with perfect regularity, especially on the first trial. But as custom
or practice has brought to light all these principles, and has settled the just value of every
thing: this must certainly contribute to the easy production of the passions, and guide us, by
means of general established rules, in the proportions, which we ought to observe in
preferring one object to another. This remark may, perhaps, serve to obviate difficulties,
that arise concerning some causes, which we here ascribe to particular passions, and which
may be esteemed too refined to operate so universally and certainly, as they are found to
do.
Section 3
Hume: DOP Sect. 3 Para. 1/14 p. 155
SECT. III.
1. In running over all the causes, which produce the passion of pride or that of humility; it
would readily occur, that the same circumstance, if transferred from ourselves to another
person, would render him the object of love or hatred, esteem or contempt. The virtue,
genius, beauty, family, riches, and authority of others beget favourable sentiments in their
behalf; and their vice, folly, deformity, poverty, and meanness excite the contrary
sentiments. The double relation of impressions and ideas still operates on these passions of
love and hatred; as on the former of pride and humility. Whatever gives a separate pleasure
or pain, and is related to another person or connected with him, makes him the object of our
affection or disgust.
Hume: DOP Sect. 3 Para. 2/14 p. 156
Hence too injury or contempt towards us is one of the greatest sources of our hatred;
services or esteem, of our friendship.
Hume: DOP Sect. 3 Para. 3/14 p. 156
2. Sometimes a relation to ourselves excites affection towards any person. But there
is always here implied a relation of sentiments, without which the other relation would have
no influence.†4
Hume: DOP Sect. 3 Para. 4/14 p. 156
A person, who is related to us, or connected with us, by blood, by similitude of
fortune, of adventures, profession, or country, soon becomes an agreeable companion to us;
because we enter easily and familiarly into his sentiments and conceptions: Nothing is
strange or new to us: Our imagination, passing from self, which is ever intimately present to
us, runs smoothly along the relation or connexion, and conceives with a full sympathy the
person, who is nearly related to self. He renders himself immediately acceptable, and is at
once on an easy footing with us: No distance, no reserve has place, where the person
introduced is supposed so closely connected with us.
Hume: DOP Sect. 3 Para. 5/14 p. 156
Relation has here the same influence as custom or acquaintance, in exciting
affection; and from like causes. The ease and satisfaction, which, in both cases, attend our
intercourse or commerce, is the source of the friendship.
Hume: DOP Sect. 3 Para. 6/14 p. 156
3. The passions of love and hatred are always followed by, or rather conjoined with,
benevolence and anger. It is this conjunction, which chiefly distinguishes these affections
from pride and humility. For pride and humility are pure emotions in the soul, unattended
with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action. But love and hatred are not
compleat within themselves, nor rest in that emotion, which they produce; but carry the
mind to something farther. Love is always followed by a desire of happiness to the person
beloved, and an aversion to his misery: As hatred produces a desire of the misery, and an
aversion to the happiness of the person hated. These opposite desires seem to be originally
and primarily conjoined with the passions of love and hatred. It is a constitution of nature,
of which we can give no farther explication.
Hume: DOP Sect. 3 Para. 7/14 p. 157
4. Compassion frequently arises, where there is no preceding esteem or friendship;
and compassion is an uneasiness in the sufferings of another. It seems to spring from the
intimate and strong conception of his sufferings; and our imagination proceeds by degrees,
from the lively idea to the real feeling of another's misery.
Hume: DOP Sect. 3 Para. 8/14 p. 157
Malice and envy also arise in the mind without any preceding hatred or injury;
though their tendency is exactly the same with that of anger and ill-will. The comparison of
ourselves with others seems to be the source of envy and malice. The more unhappy
another is, the more happy do we ourselves appear in our own conception.
Hume: DOP Sect. 3 Para. 9/14 p. 157
5. The similar tendency of compassion to that of benevolence, and of envy to anger,
forms a very close relation between these two sets of passions; though of a different kind
from that which was insisted on above. It is not a resemblance of feeling or sentiment, but a
resemblance of tendency or direction. Its effect, however, is the same, in producing an
association of passions. Compassion is seldom or never felt without some mixture of
tenderness or friendship: and envy is naturally accompanied with anger or ill-will. To desire
the happiness of another, from whatever motive, is a good preparative to affection; and to
delight in another's misery almost unavoidably begets aversion towards him.
Hume: DOP Sect. 3 Para. 10/14 p. 157
Even where interest is the source of our concern, it is commonly attended with the
same consequences. A partner is a natural object of friendship; a rival of enmity.
Hume: DOP Sect. 3 Para. 11/14 p. 157
6. Poverty, meanness, disappointment, produce contempt and dislike: But when
these misfortunes are very great, or are represented to us in very strong colours, they excite
compassion, and tenderness, and friendship. How is this contradiction to be accounted for?
The poverty and meanness of another, in their common appearance, gives us uneasiness, by
a species of imperfect sympathy; and this uneasiness produces aversion or dislike, from the
resemblance of sentiment. But when we enter more intimately into another's concerns, and
wish for his happiness, as well as feel his misery, friendship or goodwill arises, from the
similar tendency of the inclinations.
Hume: DOP Sect. 3 Para. 12/14 p. 158
†b A bankrupt, at first, while the idea of his misfortunes is fresh and recent, and
while the comparison of his present unhappy situation with his former prosperity operates
strongly upon us, meets with compassion and friendship. After these ideas are weakened or
obliterated by time, he is in danger of compassion and contempt.
Hume: DOP Sect. 3 Para. 13/14 p. 158
7. In respect, there is a mixture of humility, with the esteem or affection: In
contempt, a mixture of pride.
Hume: DOP Sect. 3 Para. 14/14 p. 158
The amorous passion is usually compounded of complacency in beauty, a bodily
appetite, and friendship or affection. The close relation of these sentiments is very obvious,
as well as their origin from each other, by means of that relation. Were there no other
phenomenon to reconcile us to the present theory, this alone, methinks, were sufficient.
Section 4
Hume: DOP Sect. 4 Para. 1/13 p. 158
SECT. IV
1. The present theory of the passions depends entirely on the double relations of sentiments
and ideas, and the mutual assistance, which these relations lend to each other. It may not,
therefore, be improper to illustrate these principles by some farther instances.
Hume: DOP Sect. 4 Para. 2/13 p. 158
2. The virtues, talents, accomplishments, and possessions of others, make us love
and esteem them: Because these objects excite a pleasing sensation, which is related to
love; and as they have also a relation or connexion with the person, this union of ideas
forwards the union of sentiments, according to the foregoing reasoning.
Hume: DOP Sect. 4 Para. 3/13 p. 158
But suppose, that the person, whom we love, is also related to us, by blood, country,
or friendship; it is evident, that a species of pride must also be excited by his
accomplishments and possessions; there being the same double relation, which we have all
along insisted on. The person is related to us, or there is an easy transition of thought from
him to us; and sentiments, excited by his advantages and virtues, are agreeable, and
consequently related to pride. Accordingly we find, that people are naturally vain of the
good qualities or high fortune of their friends and countrymen.
Hume: DOP Sect. 4 Para. 4/13 p. 159
3. But it is observable, that, if we reverse the order of the passions, the same effect
does not follow. We pass easily from love and affection to pride and vanity; but not from
the latter passions to the former, though all the relations be the same. We love not those
who are related to us, on account of our own merit; though they are naturally vain on
account of our merit. What is the reason of this difference? The transition of the
imagination to ourselves, from objects related to us, is always easy; both on account of the
relation, which facilitates the transition, and because we there pass from remoter objects, to
those which are contiguous. But in passing from ourselves to objects, related to us; though
the former principle forwards the transition of thought, yet the latter opposes it; and
consequently there is not the same easy transfusion of passions from pride to love as from
love to pride.
Hume: DOP Sect. 4 Para. 5/13 p. 159
4. The virtues, services, and fortune of one man inspire us readily with esteem and
affection for another related to him. The son of our friend is naturally entitled to our
friendship: The kindred of a very great man value themselves, and are valued by others, on
account of that relation. The force of the double relation is here fully displayed.
Hume: DOP Sect. 4 Para. 6/13 p. 159
5. The following are instances of another kind, where the operation of these
principles may still be discovered. Envy arises from a superiority in others; but it is
observable, that it is not the great disproportion between us, which excites that passion, but
on the contrary, our proximity. A great disproportion cuts off the relation of the ideas, and
either keeps us from comparing ourselves with what is remote from us, or diminishes the
effects of the comparison.
Hume: DOP Sect. 4 Para. 7/13 p. 159
A poet is not apt to envy a philosopher, or a poet of a different kind, of a different
nation, or of a different age. All these differences, if they do not prevent, at least weaken
the comparison, and consequently the passion.
Hume: DOP Sect. 4 Para. 8/13 p. 159
This too is the reason, why all objects appear great or little, merely by a comparison
with those of the same species. A mountain neither magnifies nor diminishes a horse in our
eyes: But when a FLEMISH and a WELSH horse are seen together, the one appears greater
and the other less, than when viewed apart.
Hume: DOP Sect. 4 Para. 9/13 p. 159
From the same principle we may account for that remark of historians, that any
party, in a civil war, or even factious division, always choose to call in a foreign enemy at
any hazard, rather than submit to their fellow-citizens. GUICCIARDIN applies this remark
to the wars in ITALY; where the relations between the different states are, properly
speaking, nothing but of name, language, and contiguity. Yet even these relations, when
joined with superiority, by making the comparison more natural, make it likewise more
grievous, and cause men to search for some other superiority, which may be attended with
no relation, and by that means, may have a less sensible influence on the imagination.
When we cannot break the association, we feel a stronger desire to remove the superiority.
This seems to be the reason, why travellers, though commonly lavish of their praise to the
CHINESE and PERSIANS take care to depreciate those neighbouring nations, which may
stand upon a footing of rivalship with their native country.
Hume: DOP Sect. 4 Para. 10/13 p. 160
6. The fine arts afford us parallel instances. Should an author compose a treatise, of
which one part was serious and profound, another light and humorous; every one would
condemn so strange a mixture, and would blame him for the neglect of all rules of art and
criticism. Yet we accuse not PRIOR for joining his Alma and Solomon in the same volume;
though that amiable poet has perfectly succeeded in the gaiety of the one, as well as in the
melancholy of the other. Even suppose the reader should peruse these two compositions
without any interval, he would feel little or no difficulty in the change of the passions.
Why? but because he considers these performances as entirely different; and by that break
in the ideas, breaks the progress of the affections, and hinders the one from influencing or
contradicting the other.
Hume: DOP Sect. 4 Para. 11/13 p. 160
An heroic and burlesque design, united in one picture, would be monstrous; though
we place two pictures of so opposite a character in the same chamber, and even close
together, without any scruple.
Hume: DOP Sect. 4 Para. 12/13 p. 160
7. It needs be no matter of wonder, that the easy transition of the imagination should
have such an influence on all the passions. It is this very circumstance, which forms all the
relations and connexions amongst objects. We know no real connexion between one thing
and another. We only know, that the idea of one thing is associated with that of another,
and that the imagination makes an easy transition between them. And as the easy transition
of ideas, and that of sentiments mutually assist each other; we might beforehand expect,
that this principle must have a mighty influence on all our internal movements and
affections. And experience sufficiently confirms the theory.
Hume: DOP Sect. 4 Para. 13/13 p. 161
For, not to repeat all the foregoing instances: Suppose, that I were travelling with a
companion through a country, to which we are both utter strangers; it is evident, that, if the
prospects be beautiful, the roads agreeable, and the fields finely cultivated; this may serve
to put me in good-humour, both with myself and fellow-traveller. But as the country has no
connexion with myself or friend, it can never be the immediate cause either of self-value or
of regard to him: And therefore, if I found not the passion on some other object, which
bears to one of us a closer relation, my emotions are rather to be considered as the
overflowings of an elevated or humane disposition, than as an established passion. But
supposing the agreeable prospect before us to be surveyed either from his country-seat or
from mine; this new connexion of ideas gives a new direction to the sentiment of pleasure,
derived from the prospect, and raises the emotion of regard or vanity, according to the
nature of the connexion. There is not here, methinks, much room for doubt or difficulty.
Section 5
Hume: DOP Sect. 5 Para. 1/4 p. 161
SECT. V.
1. It seems evident, that reason, in a strict sense, as meaning the judgment of truth and
falsehood, can never, of itself, be any motive to the will, and can have no influence but so
far as it touches some passion or affection. Abstract relations of ideas are the object of
curiosity, not of volition. And matters of fact, where they are neither good nor evil, where
they neither excite desire nor aversion, are totally indifferent, and whether known or
unknown, whether mistaken or rightly apprehended, cannot be regarded as any motive to
action.
Hume: DOP Sect. 5 Para. 2/4 p. 161
2. What is commonly, in a popular sense, called reason, and is so much
recommended in moral discourses, is nothing but a general and a calm passion, which takes
a comprehensive and a distant view of its object, and actuates the will, without exciting any
sensible emotion. A man, we say, is diligent in his profession from reason; that is, from a
calm desire of riches and a fortune. A man adheres to justice from reason; that is, from a
calm regard to public good, or to a character with himself and others.
Hume: DOP Sect. 5 Para. 3/4 p. 162
8. The same objects, which recommend themselves to reason in this sense of the
word, are also the objects of what we call passion, when they are brought near to us, and
acquire some other advantages, either of external situation, or congruity to our internal
temper; and by that means excite a turbulent and sensible emotion. Evil, at a great distance,
is avoided, we say, from reason: Evil, near at hand, produces aversion, horror, fear, and is
the object of passion.
Hume: DOP Sect. 5 Para. 4/4 p. 162
4. The common error of metaphysicians has lain in ascribing the direction of the
will entirely to one of these principles, and supposing the other to have no influence. Men
often act knowingly against their interest: It is not therefore the view of the greatest
possible good which always influences them. Men often counteract a violent passion, in
prosecution of their distant interests and designs: It is not therefore the present uneasiness
alone, which determines them. In general, we may observe, that both these principles
operate on the will; and where they are contrary, that either of them prevails, according to
the general character or present disposition of the person. What we call strength of mind
implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent; though we may easily
observe, that there is no person so constantly possessed of this virtue, as never, on any
occasion, to yield to the solicitation of violent affection and desire. From these variations of
temper proceeds the great difficulty of deciding with regard to the future actions and
resolutions of men, where there is any contrariety of motives and passions.
Section 6
Hume: DOP Sect. 6 Para. 1/19 p. 162
SECT. VI.
1. We shall here enumerate some of those circumstances, which render a passion calm or
violent, which heighten or diminish any emotion.
Hume: DOP Sect. 6 Para. 2/19 p. 162
It is a property in human nature, that any emotion, which attends a passion, is easily
converted into it; though in their natures they be originally different from, and even
contrary to each other. It is true, in order to cause a perfect union amongst passions, and
make one produce the other, there is always required a double relation, according to the
theory above delivered. But when two passions are already produced by their separate
causes, and are both present in the mind, they readily mingle and unite; though they have
but one relation, and sometimes without any. The predominant passion swallows up the
inferior, and converts it into itself. The spirits, when once excited, easily receive a change
in their direction; and it is natural to imagine, that this change will come from the prevailing
affection. The connexion is in many cases closer between any two passions than between
any passion and indifference.
Hume: DOP Sect. 6 Para. 3/19 p. 163
When a person is once heartily in love, the little faults and caprices of his mistress,
the jealousies and quarrels, to which that commerce is so subject: however unpleasant they
be, and rather connected with anger and hatred; are yet found, in many instances, to give
additional force to the prevailing passion. It is a common artifice of politicians, when they
would affect any person very much by a matter of fact, of which they intend to inform him,
first to excite his curiosity; delay as long as possible the satisfying of it; and by that means
raise his anxiety and patience to the utmost, before they give him a full insight into the
business. They know, that this curiosity will precipitate him into the passion, which they
purpose to raise, and will assist the object in its influence on the mind. A soldier advancing
to battle, is naturally inspired with courage and confidence, when he thinks on his friends
and fellow-soldiers; and is struck with fear and terror, when he reflects on the enemy.
Whatever new emotion therefore proceeds from the former, naturally encreases the
courage; as the same emotion proceeding from the latter, augments the fear. Hence in
martial discipline, the uniformity and lustre of habit, the regularity of figures and motions,
with all the pomp and majesty of war, encourage ourselves and our allies; while the same
objects in the enemy strike terror into us, though agreeable and beautiful in themselves.
Hume: DOP Sect. 6 Para. 4/19 p. 163
Hope is, in itself, an agreeable passion, and allied to friendship and benevolence; yet
is it able sometimes to blow up anger, when that is the predominant passion. Spes addita
suscitat iras. VIRG.
Hume: DOP Sect. 6 Para. 5/19 p. 163
2. Since passions, however independent, are naturally transfused into each other, if
they be both present at the same time; it follows, that when good or evil is placed in such a
situation as to cause any particular emotion, besides its direct passion of desire or aversion,
this latter passion must acquire new force and violence.
Hume: DOP Sect. 6 Para. 6/19 p. 164
3. This often happens, when any object excites contrary passions. For it is
observable, that an opposition of passions commonly causes a new emotion in the spirits,
and produces more disorder than the concurrence of any two affections of equal force. This
new emotion is easily converted into the predominant passion, and in many instances, is
observed to encrease its violence, beyond the pitch, at which it would have arrived, had it
met with no opposition. Hence we naturally desire what is forbid, and often take a pleasure
in performing actions, merely because they are unlawful. The notion of duty, when opposite
to the passions, is not always able to overcome them; and when it fails of that effect, is apt
rather to encrease and irritate them, by producing an opposition in our motives and
principles.
Hume: DOP Sect. 6 Para. 7/19 p. 164
4. The same effect follows, whether the opposition arise from internal motives or
external obstacles. The passion commonly acquires new force in both cases. The efforts,
which the mind makes to surmount the obstacle, excite the spirits, and enliven the passion.
Hume: DOP Sect. 6 Para. 8/19 p. 164
5. Uncertainty has the same effect as opposition. The agitation of the thought, the
quick turns which it makes from one view to another, the variety of passions which succeed
each other, according to the different views: All these produce an emotion in the mind; and
this emotion transfuses itself into the predominant passion.
Hume: DOP Sect. 6 Para. 9/19 p. 164
Security, on the contrary, diminishes the passions. The mind, when left to itself,
immediately languishes; and in order to preserve its ardour, must be every moment
supported by a new flow of passion. For the same reason, despair, though contrary to
security, has a like influence.
Hume: DOP Sect. 6 Para. 10/19 p. 164
6. Nothing more powerfully excites any affection than to conceal some part of its
object, by throwing it into a kind of shade, which at the same time that it shows enough to
prepossess us in favour of the object, leaves still some work for the imagination. Besides
that obscurity is always attended with a kind of uncertainty; the effort, which the fancy
makes to compleat the idea, rouzes the spirits, and gives an additional force to the passion.
Hume: DOP Sect. 6 Para. 11/19 p. 165
7. As despair and security, though contrary, produce the same effects; so absence is
observed to have contrary effects, and in different circumstances, either encreases or
diminishes our affection. ROCHEFOUCAULT has very well remarked, that absence
destroys weak passions, but encreases strong; as the wind extinguishes a candle, but blows
up a fire. Long absence naturally weakens our idea, and diminishes the passion: But where
the affection is so strong and lively as to support itself, the uneasiness, arising from
absence, encreases the passion, and gives it new force and influence.
Hume: DOP Sect. 6 Para. 12/19 p. 165
8. When the soul applies itself to the performance of any action, or the conception
of any object, to which it is not accustomed, there is a certain unpliableness in the faculties,
and a difficulty of the spirits moving in their new direction. As this difficulty excites the
spirits, it is the source of wonder, surprize, and of all the emotions, which arise from
novelty; and is, in itself, agreeable, like every thing which enlivens the mind to a moderate
degree. But though surprize be agreeable in itself, yet, as it puts the spirits in agitation, it
not only augments our agreeable affections, but also our painful, according to the foregoing
principle. Hence every thing that is new, is most affecting, and gives us either more
pleasure or pain, than what, strictly speaking, should naturally follow from it. When it often
returns upon us, the novelty wears off; the passions subside; the hurry of the spirits is over;
and we survey the object with greater tranquillity.
Hume: DOP Sect. 6 Para. 13/19 p. 165
9. The imagination and affections have a close union together. The vivacity of the
former gives force to the latter. Hence the prospect of any pleasure, with which we are
acquainted, affects us more than any other pleasure, which we may own superior, but of
whose nature we are wholly ignorant. Of the one we can form a particular and determinate
idea. The other we conceive under the general notion of pleasure.
Hume: DOP Sect. 6 Para. 14/19 p. 165
Any satisfaction, which we lately enjoyed, and of which the memory is fresh and
recent, operates on the will with more violence, than another of which the traces are
decayed and almost obliterated.
Hume: DOP Sect. 6 Para. 15/19 p. 165
A pleasure, which is suitable to the way of life, in which we are engaged, excites
more our desire and appetite than another, which is foreign to it.
Hume: DOP Sect. 6 Para. 16/19 p. 165
Nothing is more capable of infusing any passion into the mind, than eloquence, by
which objects are represented in the strongest and most lively colours. The bare opinion of
another, especially when enforced with passion, will cause an idea to have an influence
upon us, though that idea might otherwise have been entirely neglected.
Hume: DOP Sect. 6 Para. 17/19 p. 166
It is remarkable, that lively passions commonly attend a lively imagination. In this
respect, as well as in others, the force of the passion depends as much on the temper of the
person, as on the nature and situation of the object.
Hume: DOP Sect. 6 Para. 18/19 p. 166
What is distant, either in place or time, has not equal influence with what is near and
contiguous.
*** *** ***
* * *
Hume: DOP Sect. 6 Para. 19/19 p. 166
I pretend not to have here exhausted this subject. It is sufficient for my purpose, if I
have made it appear, that, in the production and conduct of the passions, there is a certain
regular mechanism, which is susceptible of as accurate a disquisition, as the laws of motion,
optics, hydrostatics, or any part of natural philosophy.
Notes
Hume: DOP Foot. 1 p. 145
†1 See Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Sect. III, Of the Association of
Ideas.
Hume: DOP Foot. 2 p. 145
†2 ADDISON, Spectator, No. 412.
Hume: DOP Foot. 3 p. 151
†3 That property is a species of relation, which produces a connexion between the
person and the object is evident: The imagination passes naturally and easily from the
consideration of a field to that of the person to whom it belongs. It may only be asked, how
this relation is resolvable into any of those three, viz. causation, contiguity, and
resemblance, which we have affirmed to be the only connecting principles among ideas. To
be the proprietor of any thing is to be the sole person, who, by the laws of society, has a
right to dispose of it, and to enjoy the benefit of it. This right has at least a tendency to
procure the person the exercise of it; and in fact does commonly procure him that
advantage. For rights which had no influence, and never took place, would be no rights at
all. Now a person who disposes of an object, and reaps benefit from it, both produces, or
may produce, effects on it, and is affected by it. Property therefore is a species of causation,
It enables the person to produce alterations on the object, and it supposes that his condition
is improved and altered by it. It is indeed the relation the most interesting of any, and
occurs the most frequently to the mind.†a
Hume: DOP Foot. 4 p. 156
†4 The affection of parents to children seems founded on an original instinct. The
affection towards other relations depends on the principles here explained.
Variants
Hume: DOP Var. a p. 151
†a This note was added in Ed. N.
Hume: DOP Var. b p. 158
†b This paragraph was added in Edition R.
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