COMMON EUROPEAN FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY

The Maastricht Treaty committed members of the European Union to act in the direction of developing common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The signatories of the Treaty thought that the degree of European integration came to the level that permits to define, through CFSP, common approaches to all questions related to the security of the European Union, including also the common defence policy. Moreover, the Treaty undoubtedly expresses readiness of the signatories to create preconditions to enable common defence to move further from the coordination of national defence policies leading, gradually, to doctrinal justifying and organization of Common Defence (CD).

The task of the EU members to state precisely in next year the common denominators of European Foreign and Security Policy, and even common defence appears as a very delicate, especially remembering that the realization of West European cohesion became very complex in conditions of post-Cold War Europe. Enlargement of the EU, changing of the role and the position of European and Transatlantic institutions, from OSCE and NATO to West European Union (WEU), as well as a need on political and economic plan to order the relations with post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe are some of the factors that additionally complicate defining of the CFDP and CD. Because of all of this, during the last months, inside the governmental and expert circles in the EU, discussion was deepened on the meaning of this part of the Maastricht Treaty. Despite the rather different views of members on future concept of the CFSP and CD, and the difficulties to reach consensus on many concrete solutions, the impression is that the members reached unusually high degree of understanding in approach to strategic and long-term aspects of these questions. It seems to be a certain surprise after the strengthened polarization inside the EU lately, regarding the content and further dynamics of European integration and divisions on supporters of "two-speed Europe" and "Europe a la carte".

What is the basis of that impression?

Firstly, it is evident that not a single member of the EU, not even those that as United Kingdom are standing on positions o the Europe "a la carte", denied the need of common action leading to greater and more solid coherence in the field of foreign policy and defence of the "European fifteen". By accepting the renunciation of sovereignty in this sphere as something that follows naturally, the members mostly agree that the CFSP should enable unique valuation of external threats and more integrated answers to them. That would confirm the desired trend of deepening the integration, considerably confirmed in the field of economic and monetary policies, as well as on the plan of justice and internal affairs, and diminish the disagreement of national policies in the sphere of foreign affairs and security. It would not be exaggerated to claim that one of the impetus for such consensus is a failure of the EU to handle crisis in ex-Yugoslavia.

Secondly, there has been a visible progress in formulation of common interests, values and criteria for actions on which the CFSP should be based. There is an agreement even in the approach that the concept of "common European defence" is attainable, only if it is put in larger frame of the whole foreign policy of the EU, which asks for further consensus and coordination, concerning the perception of importance of some world problems of the post-Cold War order, as well as the EU attitude toward main partners - the USA and Russia. In other words, the conviction is spread that it cannot be common foreign policy of the EU with its stressed common identity in world affairs and EU growing role after the enlargement, if such policy does not contain the strengthen common military-defence and security mechanisms.

Thirdly, on the same line is more or less unanimous attitude that more active building of the institutions and procedures of the common European defence should not be conditioned by waiting for ideal consensus and putting away differences existing between members related to many questions of foreign policy. The more serious conceptualization of common defence, consequently, should start immediately. Common defence should be developed, the opinion is of many West Europeans experts, simultaneously with the construction of a common foreign policy. Priority problems which should be faced on that plan are related to, on the one hand, further horizontal expansion of the EU that, naturally, makes the CFDP more complex, and, on the other, reconstruction of NATO with the initiative "Partnership for Peace" that in general opinion should be conceived so that it doses not put in crisis strategic partnership with Russia.

Fourthly, among the members there is no any dispute about approach that common defence of the EU must cover the largest circle of security questions, including also the common defence of vital interests in case of aggression, according to Art.5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Generally, it is not questioned the possibility and necessity that NATO, in practice, remains the main instrument of European collective self-defence. Laurence Martin and John Roper who were managing the project of the European Strategy Group (ESG) and the Institute for Security Studies of West European Union (ISSWEU) on preconditions for progress towards a common European policy claim that inside the EU is consolidated conviction, after many years of debates, that united European defence can only enforce NATO. Today in conditions of unclear policy of the USA which should not only be prescribed to Clinton s Administration, but also to the changed geopolitical circumstances, the conditions are created the NATO just thanks to that European defence policy that will more clear define the content of partnership with the USA as well as new responsibilities that the EU should take in new international environment. The principle of "double loyalty" therefore, according to them, would not be threatened. On the contrary, a common European defence strengthens Transatlantic Alliance and deters the USA from isolationist temptations. 1

Finally, it can be claimed that inside the EU exists a minimal consensus that WEU should be used as a "natural frame"of the European common defence policy, i. e. of "common defence". There are no bigger objections to the orientation toward strengthening of operative capacities of this organization as it is not contested complementary of WEU with NATO that keeps the obligation of collective defence of Europe, while the EU i.e. WEU primarily concentrates on managing the post-Cold War crisis spots.

It is understood without saying that numerous open questions and obstacles that are standing in front of the conceptualization of common European defence. The differences in aproach regard before all, the roads and dynamics to deepen European common defence., simultaneously with the generally accepted necessity to revitalize NATO. On this point, there are most ambiguities, not because of denial of NATO s functions of collective defence of Europe, but because of perplexities of how to reconcile the united European defence policy with duties of members towards NATO, and that the construction of European defence policy does not put into question arrangements and allied relations with the USA. Namely, common European defence will certainly require the formation of common operative forces - without them the whole concept of CD would remain senseless - but duplicating the capacities with NATO obviously would be politically and financially too expensive. Conceptions of the Group for Interarmy Multinational Action that is introduced to enable Europeans to use the NATO capacities when the USA do not want to interfere in certain local crisis, according to many opinions, are not in sight. Supporting this, N.Gnesotto gives an example of naval control of embargo to arm's delivery to the parties in war in Bosnia, when the USA dissociated from West Europe that almost completely provided control ships. However, the whole operation was handled by the Supreme Allied Command of NATO in Europe.2

Justifying of European common defence would also request not easy answers to the questions how to harmonize future expansion of the European Union and NATO on Central and Eastern European countries. Favorable, but less probable prospect, would be parallel and simultaneous expansion of both organizations towards East. Current circumstances, however, point that several members of Visehrad Group (at the first place Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) are closer to the entering NATO than the EU. If we leave aside for Europeans very unpleasant opposing to Russia for which they do not have coordinated but, on the contrary, pretty divergent answers, a paradoxical situation is created in which the European common defence could be found if, for instance, next year Poland would be accepted in NATO, and stayed outside of EU, and therefore, without possibilities to be join the structures of WEU, which is again, as it is known, institutionally and operatively connected with North Atlantic organizations. The problems of this kind are pretty numerous and actualize, among other things, many aspects of legal-political position of WEU that is stated precisely somehow by the Maastricht Treaty, but not completed till the end. Defining on the place of WEU in the common European defence, as following steps that should be taken at the purpose of its further "merging" into the EU, remain the subject of disagreement between the members of the EU.

Large dilemma connected with the defining of CD regards, finally, the possibilities of taking effective European defence policy in the existing system of decision-making in the EU. The possibility of using veto will remain large obstacle in carrying out the common defence, and the probability of using this instrument will certainly grow with further expansion of the EU. On the other hand, it is obvious that it is not acceptable that the decisions in questions of common defence and use of military forces are made by voting, that is admitted even by the most active supporters of federalization of the EU as Germany.

Therefore, consensus will have to stay the only acceptable principle, which without saying, weakens the prospects for an effective common foreign and defence policy. About these questions in academic and governmental circles of the EU different and very interesting propositions are presented. Germany and France are not against thinking about unequal rights in decision-making in the frame of CFDP that would valorize military and economic power of members. Although these views find broad opposition of the majority of others, especially of smaller members, remains the reality that in realization of common defence financial and military contributions of certain members will be visibly unequal, with all consequences that such fact brings. Finally, it should be noted that Italy, with certain support of France, interceded on formation of a strong Secretariat of CDFP with Secretary general on the top, who would, like a UN Secretary General, have broad authorities in starting the initiatives.3 The results of debates in the European Union on the future of common European foreign and defence policy strengthen the impression that the point is in a serious sign of deepening of European integration. The prospects that on the plan of formation of the CDFP and CD will be realized certain, probably not spectacular, shifts do not seem without importance. The fact alone, that fields most delicate and most difficult to coordinate like common foreign and defence policy is on the agenda of the EU forum, after the many years of debates without results, confirms the rising line of European integration.

The results of debates and negotiations inside the EU about CFDP and CD largely will depend on complete European stability. With all that it is not excluded that intensifying of the critical disturbances in less stabile post-communist part of Europe, especially in Russia, on the Balkans and the Mediterranean could additionally urge the mentioned process, which does not mean that positive movements would necessarily bring it into question. It is, undoubtedly, about serious sign of ripening of the European Union as a supranational reality. Such development together with the non avoidable perspective of further horizontal expansion of the EU, in ever growing number of countries of "the old continent" outside the integration imposes the task of facing the situation in which the neighborhood will have not only economic giant with unique internal space regarding the movement of population and goods, but also a superpower with increasingly expressed foreign policy and military identity.

CSS Survey, No.1, January 1996