YUGOSLAV-AMERICAN RELATIONS AFTER THE PEACE AGREEMENT

Several high ranking US officials have visited Belgrade recently. All of them - Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary John Shattuck, generals George Joulwan and Leighton Smith - conducted talks with President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic. All this testifies to a serious change in Yugoslav and Serbian-Anerican relations. One has only to remember that for a long time the prevailing opinion concerning US policy was a negative one. The role of the international community and, especially, of the public opinion and media, was greatly underestimated in Belgrade.

American policy towards the Yugoslav crisis was, in a way, ambiguous and indecisive - from the active support of the unity of Yugoslavia at the very beginning of the crisis to disengagement and letting the initiative fall into the hands of Europe. ("The essence of our policy is distancing from the crisis and leaving the initiative and solution searching to Europe" - said Mr. Eagleburger to the Ambassador of Yugoslavia on October 18, 1991). Afterwards, the USA hesitated to support strongly the Vance-Owen plan at the beginning of Clinton’s mandate, but they definitely overtook leadership and this was crowned by the Dayton Agreement. Among the reasons for the US hesitation to take the leading role in solving problems with uncertain outcome one should not disregard the "viet-malian" syndrome - a fear of repeating Vietnam and Somalia disasters. The decisive factor in a new strong American engagement is the fact that Bosnia became a very important internal and, above all, election issue. According to the New York Times it could well happen that sending of the US troops to Bosnia decides the fate of Clinton’s administration. Moreover, even this is not the end of the story. "At a time when isolationist temptations are strong, it is also likely to define the scope of America's global ambitions in the post-cold-war era" - Richard Cohen argues.

Testifying in the Senate Armed Services Committee meeting on December 6, 1995, Richard Holbrooke wrote a note to the Secretary of Defence, William Perry, running as follows: "If we succeed in Bosnia, history may well record that the month of November - December 1995 was a seminal period in the forging of a new American post-cold-war policy in Europe (Dayton, Russia, France, NATO)". What he had in mind was, first, the re-establishment of the US leadership; second, agreement with Russia on the participation of the Russian troops in Bosnia; third, France's return to the military wing of NATO and her acceptance of America's central role in European security; and fourth, the new role of NATO as a crises manager and peacekeeper in a turbulent Europe.

The Dayton Agreement is a middle ground between the two permanently present determinants and oscillations in American foreign policy: moralism and real-politics. Many people consider - R.Holbrooke is one of them - a value-based Wilsonian foreign policy to be naive and unrealistic, and Kissingerian policy based on a focusing on the raison d’Etat too cynical and unproductive - so that the US policy should not choose between the two but has to try to make a successful blend of them. From the point of real-politics, Dayton has - to a significant degree - recognised the war results by dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina into two entities by the line of battle outcome and ethnic cleansing. However, from the point of certain universal principles Dayton is also asking, at least partly, for renouncing of the war results: first, by preserving a united State of Bosnia and Herzegovina; second, by the return of the refugees and third, by guaranteeing bringing war criminals to the Hague Tribunal. After long hesitation, the Americans have found their way. They do not possess European inclination toward conceptual schemes, so they are going to develop their policy on the basis of already achieved undeniable success. "Nothing succeeds like success" - is a favourite American saying. Success of Dayton should not be endangered by the failure in its implementation. Sending of 20.000 troops and accepting responsibility for the success of a whole peace project is too big a stake to let it go out of hands and fall at the mercy of those who were the prime source of war.

Sending the troops is a long-term investment - the Americans have come to the Balkan soil to stay, disregarding the time of their pull-out. Perhaps there could be a rivalry between Europe and the USA, because the Americans don't share the success with anyone and somewhat aggressively create the impression that they not only have made Dayton, but are also going to implement it. Europe is certainly wishing to play a more important role, especially in implementing civil parts of the Agreement.

For decision makers in Yugoslavia, it is very important to understand that the finally found formula will be adhered to. Yugoslav relationship with the USA will not develop unless it is accompanied by absolute fulfilment of the Dayton Agreement. Since, according to Dayton, lifting of the "outer wall" of the UN sanctions (membership in the UN, IMF and World Bank) depends on the Yugoslav position towards Kosovo and on collaboration with the Hague Tribunal. It is absolutely necessary to address these issues very seriously.
All this means that Yugoslav diplomacy should turn to serious and responsible fulfilment of its obligations accepted in Dayton. Political and economic reforms (including a changed approach to privatisation) are also an unavoidable condition for a gradual return into the international community and for improving of the international image of Yugoslavia.

CSS Survey, No.2, February 1996