RUSSIA AND NATO: PROBLEMS OF PARTNERSHIP

Relationship between Russia and NATO, and specially the problem of the possible enlargement of the alliance to the East, has become a crucial issue of contemporary international relations. A this very moment, the Moscow - NATO relationship is particularly important in view of the presidential elections and campaign in Russia, since it is obviously part of the pre-election political struggle. Undoubtedly, the outcome of the June elections will have a decisive influence on further relations between Moscow and the West. However, many analyst think that, even putting aside internal Russian factors, further development and restructuring of NATO and its relations with Moscow are crucial in shaping the post-cold war system of international relations.

For many generations of citizens of the former USSR the very notion of NATO was absolutely a negative one, as it was always accompanied with the qualification "aggressive imperialist bloc". After the fall of the Soviet power and the dissolution of the USSR, for certain time an opinion was prevailing in Moscow that the NATO is almost irrelevant for Russia, since alliances and inter alliance relations were being made historically obsolete. But soon Moscow started shaping more defined position.

There was a general expectation in Russia that, after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the development of NATO would take one of two paths: either there will be a gradual self dissolution, or NATO will change and be enlarged to become a sort of an organisation for collective security in Europe that would incorporate former Soviet - bloc states, including Russia. In the West, however, there was a little support for dissolution of NATO, due to the fact that what had taken place was not a simultaneous and agreed mutual dissolution of alliances, but a failure of one of them - the one that has initially lost ideological, and then all other cohesion elements. The alliance that survived the cold war didn’t see the reasons for self - dissolution. Still, there was growing opinion in the West that NATO needs rethinking and reorganisation in the circumstances clearly very different from those that caused its foundation and development within forty years.

The events, however, didn’t allow much time for such discussion. Conflicts and instability in the Eastern and South-East Europe, dissolution if the USSR and Yugoslavia have reoriented the thinking of NATO’s future in the new direction. How to behave when the threat of a nuclear war is highly reduced, but there are new sources of instability and risk that are some times even more difficult to control than the nuclear danger. The way out was, at least partly, found in programme "Partnership for Peace", as well as in the plan for enlargement of NATO with some Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic). Russia has accepted "Partnership" since she in a way was the co-author of the plan searching for compromise formula in order to avoid or at least postpone the enlargement of NATO with her former allies. Moscow would like to see the OSCE developing into system of collective security in Europe. If NATO is to play such a role, Moscow would be ready to accept this, but under an important condition that Russia herself be admitted in the alliance as one of its key members. Russia looks upon the idea of NATO enlargement with suspicion, accusing it for the intention to isolate Moscow and form a new "iron curtain". In such a situation the US makes efforts to convince Moscow that Washington regards Russia as a partner, and that the enlargement plan is not directed against Russia’s security. Such kind of approach is confirmed by West’s reaction on the events in Chechnya. Although certain dissatisfaction was expressed with regard to Russia’s suspicions, general reaction was rather mild and pragmatic - clearly shaped by the awareness of the grave consequences of possible worsening of the situation in Russia, of disintegration of the state or intensification political struggle in Moscow. There is an obvious effort made in order not to aggravate Yeltsin’s position. Under such circumstances, Russia’s approach to NATO is characterised by following moments:

First, Moscow thinks that under new circumstances, a transformation and adaptation of NATO is needed, by changing its structure and mode of activity. A possible new isolation of Moscow would have serious consequences for international relations;

Second, Russia is obviously insisting - although in an indirect way - on "accepting" her special position on the territory of the former USSR, particularly regarding "hot spots" (Nagorni Karabakh, Abkhazia, Tadzhikistan); this is practically, certain kind of an "sphere of interest". The former USSR is a priority in Russian foreign policy. It seems that some sort of special Russia’s role in bigger part of the former Soviet territory is inevitable, at least for one simple reason: lack of means and will on part of the international community to solve the conflicts in this area. Russia could be more efficient here. The most important question still will be the difference between objective and legitimate interests of Russia and what could be possibly interpreted as an interference in internal affairs of newly independent states. Moscow’s policy and the reaction of the West will differ from case to case. Russia will probably have more room for manoeuvre in Central Asia and Caucasus, and less in Baltic states and Ukraine;

Third, Moscow could not veto the decisions of the independent states - Poland, Czech Republic etc. Such kind of pressure is counterproductive and Russia would achieve more through dialogue and co-operation with these states, than by trying to prevent them to join NATO already on the earliest stage. Relapses of the past are still strong and Russia has to overcome definitely the idea that the position of Warsaw or Prague could be decisively influenced from Moscow. The best guarantee against new isolation of Russia are good relations with former allies from Warsaw Pact. The pressure from Moscow could make them only more suspicious and less co-operative;

Fourth, by far the most important single factor is the internal situation in Russia. Eastern European states want to join NATO primarily because they fear possible changes in Russia that might lead to restoration of neo-imperialist tendencies. Of course, no one who wants to be realistic could deny that Moscow has done a lot to change the concept and style of the Soviet foreign policy, and to surmount its ideological and expansionist foundations. Still, the states that are bordering Russia or the former Soviet territory are concerned with internal instability in Russia and wish to ensure security guarantees just in case of changes in Moscow that could be unfavourable for them;

Fifth, Russia’s foreign policy is, more than ever before, dependent on internal situation. Under the leadership of Stalin, Khruschev and Brezhnev internal development and living standard of Soviet citizens was subordinated to the strength and superpower role of the Soviet state, which often contained elements of expansionism, hegemonism and intervention. Today’s foreign policy is, primarily, in function of internal reforms. The natural interest of contemporary Russia is that her top priority would be a creation of international environment as favourable as possible for economic reforms and political democratisation. Straining the relations with the West, especially some new Cold War - even some sort of a "Cold Peace" - will not serve Russia’s interests. The former Soviet Union has lost the Cold War, although it was politically, economically and militarily more stable than Russia is today. The main goal of Moscow’s diplomacy should be to avoid repeating such a scenario. Still, the dependence of foreign policy on internal political struggle brings some degree of uncertainly, since influential forces favour at least partly a return to policy of confrontation and isolation. President Yeltsin is well aware of serious consequences of aggravating of the relations with the most developed and economically and technologically strongest countries; but he is - due to the correlation of political forces and the internal problems in Russia - also facing a temptation to make some compromise with those who favour such foreign policy changes.

Current problems between Moscow and the west concerning the enlargement of NATO have, therefore, two dimensions: an objective and subjective one. The objective dimension means that the termination of the Cold War gradually discovers the existence of some (more or less legitimate) interests that had been hidden by layers of ideology and bloc-antagonism. These interests could be more or less conflicting, differing, or simply not always fully overlapping. That’s why a transition period - and obviously a rather difficult one - is necessary. The interests of Russia and her key partners (USA, Western Europe, China, Japan...) should be identified and defined under new circumstances, in order to establish which interests have become closer or overlapped with the end of the Cold war, and which are still differing, or even conflicting. It is a sort of "crystallisation" of interests in their natural and objective form, without ideological and Cold War layers. With certain oscillations, the new Russian policy, is searching for a "middle road" - without confrontation, which is ruinous, but also without absolute harmony, which is impossible. Overcoming of long lasting confrontation is a reality, but the presence of certain differences in also inevitable. The point is that such differences should be accepted as normal and legitimate, and should be solved realistically and reasonably, avoiding moves that could serve in favour of extremists and confrontation - minded on the other side. At this point political wisdom of Russia, as well as of her leading Western partners, is at a very serious test. Russia should, with of all the existing problems, evaluate realistically her position, especially internal needs, and contain or limit all the temptations that could lead to serious confrontation with key partners or to possible new isolation, since this would mostly damage Russia herself, and particularly her population. For their part, the USA, Western Europe and Japan should take into account not only legitimate Russian interests, but also a very sensitive position of this country and oscillations of Russia’s public opinion and the electorate. A possible intention to weaken international position of Russia - which might, intentionally or not, be conjectured from some Western moves, could fire back and hit primarily Western interests. Isolation of Russia and possible internal disturbance would threaten the structure of contemporary international relations as a whole.

The other - subjective - dimension of Russia - NATO relationship seems to be more important at this moment. Russian foreign policy fully depends on internal situation, correlation of political forces and on the elections campaign. Grave economic and social problems, and especially war in Chechnya, have seriously weakened Yeltsin’s position. In order to improve his chances, he started a well-organised and impressive campaign. Foreign policy, certainly, will not be of prevailing importance here. In comparison with tragedy in Chechnya, the problem of NATO enlargement may not seem to be of high importance for Russian voters. Nevertheless, there is a nostalgic sentiment among some Russians for the times when many in the world "feared Russia and her might". The citizens of Russia, faced with every day’s existential difficulties, are ready - at least partly - to accept the claim that their problems are caused by losing previous status and might of their country. Besides, in Russia and the USSR there had always been rather strong inclination to explain internal problems by foreign sources and influences. The idea of constant foreign threat and dangerous intentions of the others have been carefully cultivated and, according to the needs, dosed during all the Soviet period. Also, many Russians unrealistically overestimated possible Western help - after the dissolution of the USSR - and now they feel disappointed. All this influences an considerable part of Russia’s population to accept the position of Yeltsin s opponents.

A thorough analysis would prove that the real situation is quite contrary to this widely shared opinion. What was considered to be the source of Soviet might and influence was actually undermining the Soviet state. Super-power status and imperial policy, which is remembered now with some sort of nostalgia, waste most damaging for the Russians themselves, since it was conducted at the cost of their living standard. Straining relations with the West would not serve interests of Russia, for this is not only a foreign policy issue, but a question of the prospects of internal development as well. Although the influence of the long-time Soviet education based on the idea of super-power policy and might should not be underestimated, one can judge that the majority of Russia’s citizens are not so much is favour of the restoration of the super-power status on Soviet model of confrontation, as they are against current economic and social difficulties that are being erroneously identified with the change of the international status of the country. With more stability and higher standard for average citizen, the issue of international status and influence of the new Russia would cause much less argument and would be discussed without such emotion and mystification as is the case today.

Facing such a situation, Yeltsin obviously tries to conduct his policy on a "double track". On the one side, he partly adopts the demands on the opposition for "firmer" policy towards the West, which is particularly clear from his strong opposition to enlargement of NATO. He is doing this partly out of the intention to beat opposition’s card, and partly because he himself used to be the part of the old Soviet policy mechanism that was based on the super-power idea and has not abandoned the Soviet tradition completely. On the other side, Yeltsin clearly wants to be accepted by the West as the only reliable and perspective partner in Russia, especially in comparison with his opponents whose possible victory would cause at least concern among most foreign partners. Yeltsin probably holds that partial straining of his policy would be more or less tolerated and understood by the West, because of the great importance of the June elections, not only for Russia, but for the others as well. This is a source for dilemma for the West: Western statesmen would clearly prefer Yeltsin as a president and they are willing to make him room for manoeuvre and for certain compromise, but they don’t seem to be ready to concede in such a fundamental question as enlargement of NATO. For them, that would mean that Russia is in a position, out of her internal problems and unclear prospects, to influence - or in some way even blackmail - the West into change of proclaimed and agreed policy. On the other hand, this is a two - edged sward, since a possible fall of Yeltsin may bring more serious complications for the West than his opposition to NATO enlargement plans. Yeltsin’s policy contains some risk that goes beyond the elections campaign, because the questions are rising that were thought to be definitely answered to a long time ago: is his priority the reform, living standard and normal life conditions for citizens of Russia, or the priority is super-power status at any cost. Will the possible straining with the West contribute to solving internal problems of Russia, and could "stronger" foreign policy compensate for internal difficulties. Finally, does Moscow understand clear enough that internal problems and uncertainties in Russia are the strongest incentive for Eastern European countries to seek membership in NATO. This could be well illustrated by the situation created by the decision of the Duma renouncing the agreement on the dissolution of the USSR. If Yeltsin is to create the impression that all previous foreign policy - which for his responsibility as a President - will be put under question, wouldn’t this lead the voters to choose the candidates that had been opposing such policy from the very beginning. Only the further campaign will show to what extent Yeltsin would succeed in this "double strategy".

The room for manoeuvre and compromise between Moscow and the West clearly exists. What is necessary is more tactfulness and flexibility on both sides. The West must understand the complexity and delicacy of the situation in Russia and her wish not to feel isolated or infringed by enlargement of NATO. Russia, on her part, most accept the fact that tension with the West, and particularly manifesting of neo-imperial tendencies toward the neighbours could, primarily, aggravate the position of Russia herself. Moscow also should appreciate the concern of the countries of Eastern Europe for instability in Russia; however, these countries should be aware of the importance of Russia as their essential and unavoidable partner. There are some new signs of a possible compromise: acceptance of Russia as a member of the Council of Europe, a new important loan by the IMF and Yeltsin’s readiness to accept membership of Eastern European countries in political, but not in military, structure of NATO (although this does not seem to be acceptable for the West, at least for the moment). Still, the key for all problems lies in the internal situation in Russia. There is no international factor, nor any foreign policy issue that could decisively influence internal situation in Russia, which has become a first rate factor of international relations. It seems that the world depends more on developments in Russia, than vice versa. For this reason any analysis of Russia - NATO relationship bears the stamp of relativity - particularly now, before the extremely important elections - since it would be easier to formulate various possible forms of NATO enlargement and of institutionalisation of its relations with Moscow, than to predict further developments in Russia herself.
 

CSS Survey, No.4, April 1996