FOREIGN POLICY OF YUGOSLAVIA - PRIORITIES OF A CHANGED COUNTRY IN A CHANGED EUROPE

Any serious consideration of the directions and priorities of the foreign policy of Yugoslavia - a country that is finding itself in a significantly changed international position in changed European circumstances - has to start from a realistic and responsible analysis of these changes and the causes of the new situation. This has become some kind of a debt that remains forgotten in the ruling and non ruling circles in Yugoslavia and is still waiting to be settled.

However, it is understandable that in this short analysis the changes in Europe and the world - representing a major issue in itself - can be dealt with only in fragments and therefore limited to three remarks that are necessary for the elaboration of the central issue. In the overall international, and particularly inter-European relations, a new political situation has been established, with changed power relationships and different tendencies in the politics and behaviour of states.

1. The confrontation between two military-political blocs disappeared, and so did an imposed orientation of a great number of countries to seek their security by relying upon bloc organisations. Now they achieve their security mostly by leaning upon regional military organisations, but also more and more - and many of them only in this way - through international organisations that act on the basis of co-ordinated interests of the leading factors in the world. The characteristic of contemporary political interests and ambitions of the major powers is not to achieve military-political supremacy - that has already been achieved - but first of all to secure sufficient co-ordinated influence upon international bodies that appear as a dominant factor in the domain of collective security and general binding norms with regard to the behaviour of states.

2. The new situation in Europe is primarily marked by integration processes, mainly through regional ties among states.

3. New criteria were established (or the former ones were reinforced and supplemented) with regard to acquiring credibility for an undisturbed co-operation among states and their co-operation with international organisations and institutions - political, economic, and especially the financial and technological ones. Among these criteria, that are particularly strictly being followed in Europe, there are: strict respect for borders and the absence of any threats; peaceful politics and co-operation first of all with the neighbours; respect for human and national rights, as well as for democratic political norms in accordance with international rules and obligations; ownership relations and market economy, accompanied with the rule of law, as guarantees for stability and profitability of free international flow of capital, technologies, etc. These new realities encompass nowadays also the national interests of the majority of countries, which is of special importance for those in transition.

Consideration of the contemporary international position of Yugoslavia demands a fully open analyses of at least the major realities that - in spite of covering up and making them vague - represent substantial marks of the country's reduced weight, respect, influence and acceptability in international relations.

1. After more than seven decades, Yugoslavia is nowadays reduced to a relatively small state, with a substantially decreased credibility, economic potential and power to influence its own destiny. The country's surrounding has changed. It has no more geographic contact with countries integrated into the system of the developed part of Europe. With new neighbours in the West (Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) the relations are heavily burdened due to ambitions and behaviour on all sides that were at the roots of the recently stopped war. And relations with Macedonia were for a longtime specifically subordinated to considerations for the ineterests of a third country and thus brought into an unnatural position of Yugoslavia and on it's account. One can hope that the recently established diplomatic relations with Macedonia mean that this problem is finally overcome. The rest of the Yugoslavia's neighbours have undergone profound changes with regard to their system and status and in the international community they enjoy a more favourable treatment than before, and than does Yugoslavia today. Plainly speaking, this puts Yugoslavia into an inferior position.

2. Leaving aside the problem of succession and of international continuity, it is a fact that there is a discontinuity between the contemporary Yugoslav state and the previous one - with regard to substantial principles, aims and behaviour in internal and foreign policy. Starting from this standpoint the international community does no longer recognise the status, reputation and role of the previous state in international relations. Yugoslavia has been practically deprived of a strong foothold with regard to foreign policy that was represented by the achievements - material and prestigious ones - of the Balkan and the both world wars. There is also no continuity between the recent and the present phase in the foreign policy of the contemporary state. Positive evolution does not seem to be able to neutralise the overall decline of the country. In other words, the country's new position certainly has improved, but generally speaking its status remains highly unfavourable and on a very low level.

3. Yugoslavia is not present in the key international institutions, and therefore is not in the position to participate in the collective creation of new relations in the world and Europe ( the norms of which oblige her, too) and to influence - directly or indirectly - her own destiny.

4. Yugoslavia's present intensive communication with representatives of international organisations and of the leading factors in international relations is (as manifested up to now) of a clear one-way and specified character. Yugoslavia and her leaders represent, as has been stressed, an "unavoidable and key factor", and therefore a partner for numerous meetings - but still primarily with regard to the question of war and peace in the ex-Yugoslav region, to the solution of the crisis, to the establishment of necessary security, and with regard to the engagement of the influence of the country's leaders in order to realise as efficiently as possible the mentioned interests of the international community - more and more beyond Yugoslav borders. These interests are, it must be said, also Yugoslavia's essential interests, but they are being introduced primarily on initiative from outside, under force. However, a substantial development of bilateral relations, joining the international organisations, access to the world market, financial flows, know-how, etc. - that are all available to states that enjoy equal treatment - are still remaining beyond the present partnership.

5. Leaving the ruling centre to its own responsibilities, one should say that Yugoslavia's position and weight in international relations, apart from all other aspects, are very negatively influenced by the situation on the internal political scene. There do not seem to be noticeable either positive fermentation or concepts that are articulated, broad, understandable and acceptable, and at the same time realistic. There is also lack of movements or parties and individuals whose modern vision, strong convictions and behaviour - reflecting the profound interest of the country and its citizens today - would be close to democratic traditions, ideas and achievements in Europe. Without these convincing and feasible visions, without their strong and broadly supported carriers and without individuals who mark them, Yugoslavia is - almost as an European exception - reduced to a country with an outgrown physiognomy, unattractive for others and with a status lower than the necessary minimum. A number of valuable individuals, not burdened by nationalism and with an aspiration to link the country with what is best in Europe, still do represent only torches in the night, and not the critical mass that would be capable of changing the worrisome status of the "spirit of the nation", captured by nationalist prejudices and xenophobia.

6. The entire bundle of economic, social and other problems, the status of minorities and ethnic groups, as well as the image created with regard to Yugoslavia's system, etc., have a very negative influence upon the country's position in the world. Generally speaking, the country is finding itself in a highly difficult international position, without reliable and significant allies, and being mainly rather an object than a subject in international affairs. This also indicates the degree of the country's real independence. The strategic foreign policy concept that is based upon the changed realities within and beyond Yugoslavia, and that is opening a true perspective for a more favourable position in Europe and Yugoslavia's progress, should imply a few starting points, criteria and aims. Some of the most significant ones should be pointed at.

1. The essential basis and precondition for establishing a position and trust in the today's world are the internal democratic values, market economy and behaviour in accordance with law. This is even more the case with smaller countries - they cannot found their role in international relations upon size and power, but rather upon wisdom. Human rights and freedoms, the status of minorities, undisturbed political pluralism, free creation of public opinion, etc., nowadays do not represent anymore a so-called internal affair of a state; nor are they a matter of good will of a state's leadership. The evolution of democratic consciousness and practice in Europe has raised the individual and collective freedoms and human rights to a level of a general civilisation achievement and a matter of interest of the international community, and they have become part of the obligatory international law.

2. Instead of illusions that time is working for Yugoslavia and that tomorrow the country will be in the position to solve everything easier and in a more favourable way, it is necessary without delay and unproductive tactics to continue gettting rid of those open questions with the new neighbours and other states that represent a heavy burden and keep Yugoslavia in a constant defensive position, without a chance that it can be changed by itself.

3. In order to open the space for a new international approach of Yugoslavia it would be necessary to abandon the false notion and to re-evaluate the persistently repeated standpoint on continuity between the recent understanding of politics and that of today, which is a substantially changed one. This only means a devaluation of the positive changes in the country, while the country and its potentials get burdened with something that has undoubtedly been defeated and that is incompatible with international criteria and law and equally with essential national and democratic interests of the country.

4. In the changed world, the main pillars for Yugoslavia should remain the international organisations and the main factors within them, in a balanced way and without giving advantage to anyone. This excludes the naive and risky one-way orientations toward "eternal", "natural" and "true" friends, toward mystic religious Slav-oriented linkages, and is getting the country closer to communities and centres which mark the character of international relations and play the decisive role in the contemporary world. This is where supports for the security of the country should be searched for. "Partnership for Peace" would remain to be seriously evaluated in a further stage.

5. An orientation toward a true openness of the country - first of all by its system and behaviour aimed at joining the democratic and integration trends in Europe - represents a long-term and essential precondition of Yugoslavia's own development and prosperity. Of course, neither are these trends ideal in every respect, nor is Europe always objective and approachable. In Europe's behaviour and there were perhaps both some egoism and misunderstanding. Anyhow, there is no other Europe - and this one is better than the previous one - nor is there another road. This truth is equally valid for Yugoslavia and the others. The alternative is a long-lasting loss of energy, lagging behind and a fall to the bottom of the European scale.

6. The main operational strategic aims nowadays should be the creation of good neighbourly relations, stabilisation of Balkans and co-operation on stable foundations, without nationalist ambitions and without inducing fear based on someone's ungrounded and excessive power. In order to gradually reach the desired position in Europe Yugoslavia must - in the situation in which it is finding herself - confirm her values first of all in the Balkans. This requires also abandoning of emotional, political and other aprioristic burdens. In parallel, it is necessary also to build fast the foundations of a modern regional co-operation, which is an unavoidable step to closer links with integration processes in Europe.

7. Yugoslavia's relationship with the non-aligned countries does also need modifications. Neither Yugoslavia, nor the non-aligned countries, nor the world are today what they used to be yesterday. The degree of cooperation with the non-aligned movement - and Yugoslavia is its member - should be established on a pragmatic basis and in accordance with the role and the aims of the movement today, using those possibilities that the movement is continuing to offer for a strengthening of our own weight in international relations.

8. Finally, foreign policy must be made public, and it must be open to contributions of all those who are capable to make them in a qualified way, from the parliament to the parties, from science to the mass-media; this is not only a democratic obligation, but also an experienced way to make this politics an inventive one and one that is well oriented, that enjoys broadest support and is understood by the country's own public.

This is the way - instead of exhaustive tactics and short-term moves (most frequently influenced by international factors, which makes these moves defensive) - to crystallise, publicly formulate and verify in a legitimate way the integral national and state interest of Yugoslavia, a substantially changed country, and to do so by perceiving the problem with frankness and thoroughly, with full responsibility in conceptualising the strategic directions of Yugoslavia's foreign policy.

In accordance with all this, and without intention and possibility to present an integral foreign policy program, it seems that the priority direction of an operational foreign policy in this stage should encompass a few elements. Some of them already are among the noticeable and justified efforts of Yugoslavia - such activities aimed at renewed access to international financial sources, return to the UN, OSCE, IMF, World Bank and WTO, and a search to normalise the bilateral relations and reach a modus vivendi with the new neighbours.

a. Urgent settlement of relations with all states originating from SFRY represents one of the crucial preconditions for Yugoslavia's strategic position and international credibility. The establishment of regular relations and communication, together with the beginning of economic and other co-operation, is the most rational way for an easier solving of numerous open questions.

b. It seems that it is necessary to re-examine the approach to succession as it is presented to the public and to make a new analysis that would remove - like admixtures - outdated political aspirations and qualifications that appear obsolete in the international community. Instead, it is necessary to lean upon law and political realism. Without this, there is a risk that this open and complex problem becomes also part of the international pressure upon Yugoslavia, with extremely unfavourable results. Of course, it is necessary that others also revise outdated approaches.

c. Yugoslavia's interest to return to the UN and the OSCE, and especially to the IMF, World Bank and WTO, as well as the aspiration to join the Council of Europe and institutionalise co-operation with the European Union, requires serious preparations and changes within the country. This means also many changes in attitudes, intensive work and self-sacrifice. Shortly, the country must change. This inevitable road makes it necessary to realistically perceive and publicly present things instead of lightly given statements filled with ungrounded optimism. Without such an understanding of the situation by the country, its ruling circles and the public, diplomacy will not be capable of overcoming the problem by itself.

d. Also, a rational attitude should be accepted with regard to the Hague Tribunal and co-operation with it, one that will be without wavering and daily oscillations. Yugoslavia's international obligations are clear. Making a distance from crime and criminals, as well as from ethnic cleansing and aggressive nationalism that leads to war and crimes, is not only a matter of justice and international obligation. It is also a precondition for the defence of moral integrity and reputation of the entire people of Yugoslavia, and for positive changes in the relations of forces in the country in favour of democratic tendencies and of the international credibility of the country.

e. Changed circumstances and needs of Yugoslavia require also changes in the present profile and role of her diplomacy. It should be freed from the political and security quarantine, so that the huge potential of professional cadres could give a real creative contribution. Political adjustment to the new trends and the present needs of the country would imply that Yugoslav diplomats, first of all heads of missions, be - by virtue of their political profile and the level of their modern intellectual profile - not only a priori acceptable as partners abroad. They should also be capable of using modern parameters in perceiving the complex surrounding world and in finding created chances in it, without burdens and limitations coming from political parties. A professionalisation of diplomacy excludes the possibility to make it a shelter for the "deserving" or discredited ones. At the same time it implies the right to creative contribution and influence in creating foreign policy. Finally, diplomacy should - as in all organised states - be the basic mechanism for communication with foreign states.

And, at the very end, instead of conclusions there are three general observations with regard to foreign policy and the Yugoslav situation in general.

First, our independent field for manoeuvres and activity is a very limited one. All the main moves are made under the pressure of the international community. The sooner Yugoslavia herself will, in her own substantial interest, arrive at international criteria and build her politics and actions upon them, the sooner and more successfully will be diminished her subordinated position.

Second, the essential and unavoidable condition for a true, stable and reliable progress is to correct the mistakes, overcome the illusion and to present the real situation in public. The world will not approve of mistakes that were made; the mistakes could lead Yugoslavia to new disappointments and shocks. At some point one has to face the brutal truth about oneself and recognise the right ways, right interests of the nation and people, of the state and citizens. Without this, there is the risk to remain for a long, very long time on the margin, with burdens, humiliations and shocks, in poverty and despair, and with some other generation, from positions even lower than are the ones of today, perceiving itself and the reality of the new time, finally taking the rational path - but at that time a much longer and harder one.

And third, the political and diplomatic history of Europe after World War II provides for a precious experience. It says that even those middle and small countries that in one period were - by reputation and treatment - at the bottom of the scale, like Portugal or Austria, Spain or Finland, have very quickly overcome the international solitude and have gained a democratic reputation and equal status, some of them even a privileged one. Offering their convincing democratic profile and their adaptation to modern European criteria and endeavours, and at the same time their own general national effort toward prosperity that is based upon work and general rationality, these states (and not only they) often have a bigger influence and advantage over others than their size itself would imply.

The problem of Yugoslavia is not a lack of realistic chances. The problem is within both decision-makers and the people. Foreign policy remains a captive of this situation.