With regard to their status, there are a few groups of minorities in FR Yugoslavia:
 

-minorities that in the former Yugoslavia were known under the name of nationalities (narodnost)”2 ;
- minorities that were seen as “ethnic groups” (Romas, Wallahs, Tzintzars), and some of them were classified as “the rest” (Germans);
- the so-called “new minorities” Croats, Macedonians, Slovenes3 and Muslims (whose status is even less certain, since they do not have a constituted “national mother state”, and they are trying to retain the old status of a “people”;
- the “Yugoslavs” due to the war have lost their state (ex-Yugoslavia) and became a minority in the FRY, a state that is carrying their name. They do not have their language, nor an ethnic origin that would differ them from the Others.
It is possible to classify the minorities in FR Yugoslavia also in the following way:
- minorities which have their “mother state” in some of the neighboring states (Albanians, Hungarians, Romanians, Bulgarians);
- “newly established”, or emerging minorities, whose mother-state is one of the republics of the former Yugoslavia (Croats, Macedonians, Slovenes, Muslims);
- ethnic minorities without a “mother state” - Yugoslavs and Muslims (who can belong to this or the previous group, depending on the way in which the existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be dealt with);
- “small minorities” of a European origin (Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Germans and others);
- dispersed minorities of a non-European origin (Romas, Jews);

The constitutional acts of FR Yugoslavia (the Constitution of the FRY was announced on April 27, 1992; the Constitution of Serbia on September 28, 1990; the Constitution of Montenegro on October 12, 1992; the Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina on June 29, 1991) regulate the freedoms and rights of the members of minorities. In these acts there is no basis for discrimination on grounds of ethnic affiliation. Some of the rights are regulated by federal and republic laws, some by laws of a lower rank (decrees, decisions, regulations), municipal statutes, as well as by individual political and legal documents (for instance, the “Declaration on human rights and rights of members of national minorities in the Republic of Serbia”). Generally speaking, however, there is no regulation with regard to the status of a minority, seen as a collective. Since in political life the national minority (and ethnic communities in general)  appears as a collective, the constitutional wording is in contradiction with the practice. This does reduce the possibility to manage ethnic relations.

The minority question in Serbia/FRY is an extremely complex one. Problems differ depending on whether or not it is a territorially concentrated national minority.4 The Serb-Albanian relations and the status of Albanians in Kosovo are the most complex question, the opening of which was the first to indicate a growth of nationalism in the former Yugoslavia. This question became so complicated because of a massive use of violence by the political leadership of the republic.

Albanians in Kosovo constitute the vast majority in a region that is neighboring with Albania and areas in Macedonia with an Albanian majority. A predominant majority of the Albanians in Kosovo want independence, or at least a high degree of autonomy. In view of the ethnic structure of the population, a territorial autonomy of Kosovo would de facto represent also an ethnic autonomy for the Albanians.

Ever since the multi-party system in the FRY was established, the Albanians opted for self-isolation in the political and public life, and they have built their own political field, as well as a parallel system of government. By ignoring the authorities of Serbia and the FRY they have been trying to create an “independent and neutral state”.

The terrorist activities, that in Kosovo started on April 22, 1996 - when in only 65 minutes five people were killed (Serbs) - and continued during summer, represented a bloody warning to all actors in the Kosovo drama. They showed that the attempt of the Serbian authorities to ignore the problem of Kosovo and to push it back from a public discussion, as well as to calm down the public opinion (first of all Serbs in Kosovo) by relying on a strong repressive apparatus, is an untenable one; it showed that the Albanian leadership has seriously shattered its conviction that it can create its own independent state by creating its own political realm and institutions, by prolonged waiting and exhausting of the authorities.

The Hungarians are a minority in Vojvodina, with a local majority in certain municipalities. They do not demand secession, nor joining Hungary. The Hungarians in Vojvodina are preoccupied with the need to protect their cultural identity, to protect themselves from discrimination. The demands of Hungarians for “autonomy” pertain to cultural rights and a local political self-government.

In contrast to Albanians and Hungarians, the Muslims in Sanjak use the same language as the majority Serbs, but like the other minorities, they see themselves as a part of a separate “national being”, whose majority belongs to the neighboring state (Bosnia and Herzegovina). Problems of protection of this minority pertain to securing religious freedoms and protection from discrimination. However, since the relation of Sanjak Muslims to Serbs and Serbia is strongly influenced by hostilities between Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation that could be analogous to the one of Hungarians in Vojvodina, is beginning to resemble the situation of Albanians in Kosovo. In this context both the local political and cultural “autonomy” could be seen as a threat to the integrity of Serbia and Montenegro, i.e. FR Yugoslavia.

The position of Muslims is complicated by the identity problem: the existence of a Muslim nation is rejected by many Serbs and Croats. The question of the Muslims’ national identity goes back to the sixties, when the Muslims were recognized as the “constitutive people” (“state-building people”) in the former Yugoslavia. The consequences of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina seem to indicate some new elements  to this problem. “The Republic of Srpska” and the “Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia” are based upon excluding Muslims from the Serbian and Croatian nation respectively. At the same time the Muslims in Sanjak will have to satisfy themselves with the status of a minority that is constituting a strong local majority - and this according to the status of Hungarians in Vojvodina, and not the one of Albanians in Kosovo.

Other national minorities (Bulgarians, Slovaks, Ruthenians, Romanians, Turks, Romas and others) are not sufficiently organized, and their problems are marginalized. Besides, the authorities have made an effort to create “parallel”, better organized and financed minority organizations whose task it is to repeat that in Serbia everything is fine and that minority rights are secured also according to international standards.

Generally speaking, the minority question is made difficult  because of the attitude of the authorities. A number of laws were passed, with the alleged aim to protect the majority population in Serbia - first of all the Serbs in Kosovo (that in the region are the minority population) - but they discriminated the others, first of all the Albanians.

Despite three attempts (Consultative meeting on the status and rights of national minorities and ethnic communities, held with the President of the FRY, Dobrica Cosic, in Belgrade, August 7 and 8, 1992; talks between the federal government of Milan Panic with representatives of Albanians from Kosovo and Metohia 1993; the signing of an agreement on the revival of schools for Albanians, signed by Milosevic and Rugova in September 1996) there were no serious attempts to make a more complex picture and find solutions for ethnic minorities.

Federal and republican authorities have certain jurisdiction with regard to minority protection, based upon their constitutions. However, their mutual relationship and division of jurisdiction are not clearly identified. Up to now, Serbia and Montenegro have passed a number of laws in this field, and on the federal level laws on travel documents and citizenship (that pertain to this field, too). Judging by the present situation, the authorities of the republics have practiced more “inventiveness” and have regulated numerous questions with regard to protection of minorities; however, there are significant differences between Serbia and Montenegro (in the field of education and the school system; sales of property; the establishment of political parties and associations, etc.).

A relatively well developed structure of scientific, cultural, publishing and media institutions that belong to minorities in Vojvodina and throughout the FRY represent remnants from the previous period. Nowadays this structure is endangered, and the policy of reducing the already ”gained” minority rights and the marginalization of minorities, as well as the war and the UN sanctions, have extremely effected the entire society, including the minorities.
 
Mechanisms for protection of minority rights that are guaranteed constitutionally and by law are the weakest elements of minority rights in FRY. Since protection of minorities is very much a political question, too, it depends upon the mutual relationship of political power and influence between the federal authorities and those of the republics. This relationship is characterized by a strengthening of the influence of the republics, first of all the republic of Serbia, i.e. the President of the Republic of Serbia. With regard to the protection of minorities, in everyday politics (i.e. in efforts to achieve an atmosphere favorable for dialogue and regulating questions pertaining to the status and protection of minorities) this resulted in a situation in which the existing distance between the federal authorities and those of the republics is causing political insecurity and uncertainty on part of the representatives of the federal government.  This creates confusion, it creates doubts and diminishes the already weak image and influence of the federal authorities. It also strengthens hesitation of the political representatives of minorities that already are not sufficiently ready for dialogue - first of all of the Albanians; it strengthens the nationalist and centralizing tendencies on the level of republics and makes the regulation of minority protection more difficult, and postpones it.

Generally speaking, despite proclaimed principles of equality and non-discrimination, the ethnic minorities in the FRY are more and more often facing suppression, and even discrimination: a reduction of the right to education in their own mother language, pushing back from cultural life; dying out of minorities’ institutions in the field of culture, media etc.; an outstanding psychological, political and propagandistic pressure organized by state institutions, parties, scientific and cultural institutions, even those within minorities, with a very active role of media that are controlled by the state. There are also acts of violence that belong to the category of “genocide” (for instance, kidnapping and murdering of Muslims from Sanjak).
 
The ethnic minorities in the FRY express strongly their need to have symbols and attributes that make them clearly identifiable (flags, emblems, national language, etc.). The elites of those ethnic minorities are also trying to establish parties and associations of minorities. Characteristically, none among these forty odd organizations have, upon their establishment, declared themselves as a political party, which was the initial tactical move in view of the then existing basically hostile attitude of Serbian authorities to a multi-party system. Intellectual and cultural centers of these organizations are situated in places with the main agglomerations of the respective minorities (for instance, Ada, Vrsac, Prizren, Novi Pazar etc.), which indicates the decentralization tendencies with regard to the previous centers (Novi Sad and Pristina). That leads to some kind of homogenization of ethnic minorities; through these organizations the ethnic minorities are publicly showing their interests and showing a strong tendency to defend the acquired status or to fight for a new one. All this confirms that the essence of minority identity is linked with a strong desire of the group to preserve its characteristics, as well as that the minority problem is an extremely politicized one. The more numerous and influential ethnic minorities (like the Albanians, Hungarians and Muslims) are demanding more and more clearly political and territorial independence or autonomy. However, in reality, the tendency toward centralization is prevailing and it brings - apart from impoverishment -  also a narrowing of possibilities to fulfill demands of minorities, it makes it more difficult to preserve the “acquired” rights, not to mention a broadening of rights and freedoms for ethnic minorities and mechanisms of their protection.
 
In essence, for an ethnic minority, as well as for the majority, at stake is the impossibility to balance the conflict between loyalty to the state and the nation, the ethnicity.5 In principle, the loyalty of a minority to the state is based upon the conviction of its members that they are equal in their rights and options with other citizens and ethnic communities. In the FRY this is often not the case, first of all because of a widespread chauvinism among members of the majority, as well as among minority ethnic communities. Besides, the FRY is finding itself at the beginning of a process of establishing a new institutional system that would correspond with the present situation and the needs and that could contribute to manage conflicts of national interests and to contribute to their peaceful and democratic resolution.
 
Little hope can be identified in the attitude of the public opinion with regard to minorities. It is a view and a policy according to which one group should dominate the Others. Actually, the public opinion in the FRY is - in view of the ethnically heterogeneous population - “driven from reality” and is strongly influenced by an ethnic and nationalist consciousness that does not see that in reality the society is a plural one (namely, a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and mult-religious society). Such a state of mind in the public opinion is linked with the current crisis with regard to national identity.
 
There is also an orientation of the public opinion to lower the status of minorities with regard to the one they had in the former Yugoslavia (“Pulls of Yugoslavia”). However, none of the minority communities agrees with a lowering of its status and rights. In answers with regard to the status of Kosovo and Metohia advantage is given to a “firm stance”, namely to the present state in which the autonomy is abolished. With regard to the status of other minorities as well (Muslims and Hungarians) the dominant orientation is to preserve the present status of minorities. Actually, the public opinion in the FRY is not sensitive about demands of minorities, and it is even intolerant. This is contrary to the traditional attitude of this public opinion with regard to minorities, in which there are signs of openness. It seems that there is a conflict between two types of political socialization and political propaganda - the first, a former one that is now present on a general scale, according to which minorities are seen as citizens with full rights and as a constructive part of the Yugoslav community; and the second one, that is presently at work and according to which the minorities should be kept in their present status, since they are seen as “not constructive”, as “separatist oriented”, and, as such, are seen to “break the necessary state unity”.