Yugoslav Foreign Policy – the Need for Fundamental ChangeBy
Dusan Lazic, Member of the CSS International Advisory Council
The absence of a comprehensive, politically rational and realistic foreign policy in Yugoslavia, a policy based on balanced and credible estimates of the true potential, interests and needs of the country and citizens in the light of the current grave domestic crisis and far-reaching changes in international relations, accounts to a great extent for the fact that Yugoslavia is drifting away from the international community and sinking into an ever deeper isolation, which has increasingly adverse effects on the country as a whole.
The international status of Yugoslavia and Serbia (with certain positive differences in the case of Montenegro) is extremely unfavorable and complex. As a result of the policies pursued by the present regime, the FRY and Serbia have been ostracized by the international community and left out of the mainstream of modern development. The FRY is the only one among the countries that have emerged from the breakup of the former Yugoslavia (SFRY) and the only European country that has not resolved the issue of its international and legal status and identity. The FRY is not a full member of any major international political, economic or financial organization or any other major organization or institution (the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the IMF, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, Interpol). More than three years after the Dayton-Paris Accords were signed and the sanctions imposed during the war against Yugoslavia by the UN Security Council were lifted, what is known as the outer wall of sanctions is still in place, keeping the FRY out of international organizations. New international sanctions and bans were slapped on the FRY in connection with the escalation of the crisis in Kosovo and the FRY's reluctance to resolve that problem by political means (the ban on investments in Yugoslavia, the freezing of Yugoslav and Serbian funds and other assets in a number of states, the arms embargo, the ban on JAT flights to the countries of the European Union, the abolishment of privileges for Yugoslavia in trade with the EU countries, the exclusion of Yugoslavia from the regional SECI initiative, etc.). Yugoslavia may yet be subjected to NATO military intervention – which was avoided in October of 1998 with the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement about the political settlement of the Kosovo dispute – unless an agreement is soon reached in talks at Rambouillet and unless the FRY accepts the conclusions reached by the Contact Group and supported by the international community as a whole.
Provoked by Yugoslavia's refusal to honor the pledges made in Dayton regarding the international War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, especially regarding its obligation to hand over those indicted for war crimes, Tribunal President Gabrielle Kirk McDonald said recently that the FRY is an outlaw state rejecting international justice and a haven for war crimes indictees. One can hardly imagine a more condemning description of a country that claims to want to become a part of the civilized world and today's Europe. Basically, Kirk McDonald's statement reflects the view of the FRY and Serbia generally held by political circles and ordinary people in democratic countries. There is a great deal of mistrust in the world towards the policies and behavior of the Yugoslav authorities because the FRY is seen as a country that accepts neither the basic values and standards of democracy nor the generally accepted norms of international law and behavior in international relations. It stubbornly rejects demands made by the international community which, if met, would give the FRY the place in that community it is entitled to. It should be noted that none of these demands run counter to the interests of our country. Yugoslavia is now therefore an object rather than a subject in international relations and is constantly at odds with the international community. For this situation to be overcome fundamental changes in domestic and foreign policy are required. Yugoslavia must undergo a complex process of international rehabilitation along these very lines.
The enormous changes that have taken place in the world and in international relations – the end of the cold war and bloc divisions, the elimination of ideological, military and other antagonisms between the superpowers, the collapse of the political and economic system of the socialist countries and the beginning of a process of transition and democratic transformation – in short, everything epitomized by the fall of the Berlin Wall – is not understood and supported by the Serbian and Yugoslav regime. On the contrary, there is direct and indirect resistance to these changes, which are claimed to be the results of "conspiracies hatched by international centers of power" or by representatives of "the new world order", especially the US, rather than the results of profound global social changes and processes.
While one cannot say that the development of international relations after the collapse of cold war barriers has been harmonious and without any conflicts, new criteria and views are being defined to ensure relations of equality and comprehensive cooperation and development. The main features of the current situation in Europe are integration processes and regional linking. Freed from rigid bloc constraints, the former European socialist countries have opted for cooperation with Europe's developed part, embracing its values and standards and trying to join numerous international organizations. They see this as an opportunity for development and for leaving decades of backwardness behind them. Respect for individual and collective freedoms and rights is a result of democratic development but also an integral part of international law and international relations. A country's sovereignty, territorial integrity, security and stability are ensured through increasingly successful development and comprehensive international cooperation rather than through bloc-type military "umbrellas", confrontation and irrational resistance to the main trends and changes in today's world. The classical concept of sovereignty has evolved in international law and international relations. The countries that are members of the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and other international organizations and institutions have willingly given up part of their sovereignty, especially when it comes to the protection of peace, human rights, arms control and environmental protection – in the interests of each individual country and all the countries together.
The preconditions for a constructive foreign policy in Yugoslavia are fundamental democratic changes and economic reforms. The strong links and interaction between domestic and foreign policies is particularly accentuated by the above-mentioned global processes and changes. Only democracy in Yugoslavia and Serbia can ensure internal stability and prosperity, secure the most favorable international conditions for the country's development and contribute to the general efforts of the international community to ensure peace, stability and development.
There are no signs, however, that the regime in Yugoslavia and Serbia is ready for changes necessary in domestic and foreign policies. In foreign policy xenophobia is still very much in evidence. Yugoslavia is constantly discovering new enemies rather than creating friends, allies and partners. It will not even stop short of flagrant violations of the elementary norms of behavior in international relations.
The policies and behavior of the regime in their entirety suggest that the gap between the interests and needs of the political establishment on the one hand and the country and its citizens on the other is widening. The regime, intent on prolonging its life and evading responsibility for the country's present situation, is going out of its way to portray itself as an unswerving champion of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia and Yugoslavia and as a patriotic protector of Kosovo and the national and state interests threatened by "the foreign factor". Its irresponsible political and propagandist confrontations with the international community and its frequent acts of open defiance are putting the vital interests of the country at risk. All this may result in new uncertainties, troubles and dangers for the country.
Constitutional and legal regulation of foreign policy
Under the FRY's 1992 Constitution, the FRY, which consists of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro, as federal units, can be joined by other member republics in accordance with the Constitution (Article 2). Under the Constitution, the Federation, through its bodies, formulates policies and passes and enforces federal laws and other regulations and acts in the area of international relations (Article 77, Item 6). Also, the FRY should in good faith meet its commitments arising from international agreements it is a signatory to. International agreements which have been ratified and published in accordance with the Constitution and generally accepted rules of international law are an integral part of Yugoslav law (Article 16). According to Article 124 of the FRY Constitution, the Federal Constitutional Court shall decide whether laws and other legal and general regulations are consistent with ratified international agreements.
The Constitution also defines the powers of the Federal Parliament, the President of the Republic and the Federal Government in foreign policy. The Federal Parliament decides on the admission of other member republics to the FRY, on alliances with other states, the FRY's accession to international organizations, changes in the FRY's borders and war and peace. It also declares a state of war, a state of immediate war danger and a state of emergency and confirms international agreements within the competence of the FRY (Article 78).
The President of the Republic represents the FRY in the country and abroad. He issues documents about ratified international agreements, appoints and recalls FRY ambassadors by decree at the suggestion of the Federal Government, and receives accreditation and letters of recall from foreign diplomatic representatives (Article 96).
The Federal Government formulates and implements foreign policy and maintains relations between the FRY and other states and international organizations (Article 99). It also gives approval to the Yugoslav Army to provide services for international organizations (Article 133).
Under the FRY Constitution, member republics, within their competence, may maintain international relations, found representative offices in other states and join international organizations. A member republic, within its own competence, may enter into international agreements but not to the detriment of the FRY or another member republic (Article 7).
The FRY Constitution also determines the powers of the FRY and the highest state bodies as well as the member republics, but it makes no mention of any program commitments, principles, objectives or content of foreign policy. These solutions are characteristic of classical constitutions, based on the old concept of sovereignty. They a priori give state bodies carte blanche to carry out foreign policy and act on the international scene. Modern constitutions, however, partly deal with the content of issues and invoke, at least in outline, certain principles and goals such as the ideas of the UN Charter. They proclaim a policy of peace, condemn or ban aggressive warfare, call for the peaceful resolution of international disputes, support processes of integration and regional cooperation. That approach reflects the democratic changes taking place in foreign policy and international relations, the awareness of an increasing global interdependency and connectedness and the interest of the state in being a part of that process.
The legislators tried to compensate for the above-mentioned and obviously deliberate "weakness" of the FRY Constitution by passing a Declaration along with the Constitution. The Declaration states that the FRY accepts all the basic principles of the UN Charter and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, especially the principles of parliamentary democracy, a market economy and respect for human rights and the rights of ethnic minorities. The Declaration also underscores a strong commitment to the principle of nonuse of force in resolving the Yugoslav crisis or any other outstanding dispute. In its democratic development the FRY will be guided by the standards and achievements of the Council of Europe, the European Union and other European institutions with a view to joining them in the foreseeable future. The Declaration also states that the FRY lays no territorial claims vis a vis any of its neighbors.
The Declaration states that the FRY is the successor to the SFRY as an international legal and political entity and that the FRY will honor all international commitments made by the SFRY in the past. On the other hand, the Declaration also states that the FRY is willing to fully respect the rights and interests of the Yugoslav republics which have declared themselves independent and to negotiate about the division of the SFRY's assets. (In case of a dispute, the FRY is willing to accept the arbitration of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.) None of these principles and proclamations have been incorporated into the FRY Constitution but they are contained in the Declaration, which is not constitutional or legal in nature. (It has not even appeared in the Official Gazette of the FRY.) The Declaration is obviously a political document with essentially two purposes: (a) to signal to the international community that the FRY is carrying out a peaceful policy, that it is against war and respects the norms of international law and the generally accepted rules of behavior in international relations; and (b) to avoid giving this a constitutional form but rather formulate it in a much less committing fashion and, ultimately, to make it possible even to carry out a policy contrary to what is being proclaimed, as was particularly done during the war.
The Federal Government has the greatest constitutional powers in foreign policy. The Federal Parliament has less authority, while the powers of the President of the Republic are largely formal and ceremonial. There is, however, a big discrepancy between constitutional regulations and real life. The Federal Parliament has never held a serious public or closed-door debate about foreign policy, its objectives, priorities and problems. Nor does the Federal Parliament make important decisions with regard to foreign policy. The Federal Parliament did not even discuss and ratify, in accordance with the Constitution, the Dayton-Paris peace accords, under which Yugoslavia made major international commitments.
Nor does the Federal Government, which, under the Constitution, formulates and carries out foreign policy, exercise its powers. Its role in foreign policy is reduced to adopting platforms for various visits and issuing reports on these international contacts.
Foreign policy decisions crucial to the country are not made by state bodies which, under the Constitution, should do so. Such decisions are made undemocratically and far from the public eye, in quarters where real political power is concentrated. Earlier it was Slobodan Milosevic in his capacity as President of the Republic of Serbia, and now it is Milosevic as President of the FRY. This constitutes blatant political abuse, usurpation of authority and a violation of the FRY Constitution (Article 97 – removal from office).
The Constitution and other laws do not define precisely relations between the federal state and federal units in the implementation of the FRY's foreign policy. The Foreign Policy Act (1998) governs foreign policy issues within the competence of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and federal bodies and organizations as well as their mutual relations. Yugoslav law, however, makes no mention of relations between competent federal bodies and the foreign-policy agencies of the member republics, which is not in line with the international powers the FRY Constitution grants to the federal units.
The Law on the Conclusion and Execution of International Agreements (1978), which has not been brought into line with the FRY Constitution, governs these issues. Under this Law, however, the Federal Government makes decisions on negotiating about and entering into international agreements in accordance with a foreign policy formulated by the Parliament of the SFRY. The Federal Government cooperates with the competent bodies in the member republics, autonomous provinces and other bodies and organizations concerned (Article 3). The Law also specifies which international agreements require approval from republican and provincial bodies (Article 23) and the approval of platforms for negotiating about and entering into agreements (Article 25), which is also a precondition for ratifying certain agreements (Article 29). This Law also specifies the powers and obligations of the republics and provinces in executing international agreements (Articles 33, 34, 35).
The political conflict between Yugoslav and Serbian leaders on the one hand and the highest state bodies of Montenegro on the other, the latter advocating fundamental changes in domestic and foreign policy, highlight the importance of the provisions of the FRY Constitution concerning the powers of the member republics in foreign policy. Unable to exert any significant influence on the federal state's foreign policy, Montenegro is trying to alleviate, through its own international activities, the adverse effects it is suffering as a result of the situation the country is in. The quarrels in the Federation only underscore the importance of a unified foreign policy democratically agreed at the federal level and expressing the interests of the country as a whole as well as the interests of the member republics.
The provisions of the FRY Constitution concerning the authority of the member republics at the international level grant them considerable rights and powers and what is for all practical purposes a limited international legal status - much broader than the status of federal units in other countries (maintaining international relations, founding independent representative offices in other countries, membership in international organizations, entering into international agreements). These rights are limited by the constitutional provision that member republics can exercise these rights "within their competence" and by the fact that the most important issues lie within the competence of the federal state. It should be noted that there are other restrictions: most international organizations require that their members be sovereign states as defined by international law. Nevertheless, the international community may make political decisions about its separate cooperation with Montenegro, and there is a political will for this in many countries. (This is especially true of the view that the sanctions imposed against the FRY and Serbia should not be applied to Montenegro.) At the moment, Montenegro is opening representative offices in a number of countries, and these offices may grow into informal diplomatic missions, which will depend on the development of the situation in the FRY, i.e. on the attitude of the Yugoslav and Serbian authorities towards the legitimately elected state bodies of Montenegro and their policies and positions.
In 1998 Montenegro proposed that a comprehensive strategy for Yugoslavia's readmission to the international community be formulated and adopted at the federal level and that the federal state as well as Serbia and Montenegro, within their competences, implement this strategy. So far the federal leadership and Serbia have ignored this proposal. Also, Montenegro, as one of the two equal federal units, does not recognize the current Federal Government and, consequently, does not recognize the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its current foreign policy, which it regards as being contrary to the country's fundamental interests. Accordingly, Montenegro recently opened its border with Croatia without consulting the Federal Government.
The problem of international-legal continuity between the SFRY and the FRY and the conditions set by the international community
Since the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, officials in Belgrade have insisted on the recognition of international-legal continuity between the SFRY and the FRY while never stating publicly and explicitly their reasons for doing so.
Obviously the reasons, motives and goals were different in different periods of the Yugoslav crisis and war. During the war the regime used the issue of continuity to present its war option and nationalist policies as the defense of the integrity of the former Yugoslavia against "secessionist tendencies and the republics" that tried to "secede unconstitutionally" and which were therefore blamed for the breakup of the SFRY. This approach also included nonrecognition of the so-called AVNOJ borders, which were declared as administrative boundaries, while the right to draw new borders was asserted on the basis of the right of Serbs outside Serbia and Montenegro to self-determination. An attempt was made to expand this concept of continuity so as to include the issue of Yugoslav succession, even thought these are two different things. The FRY's obvious goal was to secure the exclusive right to the assets and funds of the SFRY. These plans, however, were thwarted. The so-called administrative boundaries became international borders and the former Yugoslav republics are now internationally recognized within those borders.
The legal grounds for the international recognition of the former Yugoslav republics were the conclusions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission in 1991, as part of the Hague Peace Conference on Yugoslavia. According to these conclusions, the SFRY broke up and ceased to exist, and its former republics did not secede from it. A 1992 UN Security Council Resolution based on these conclusions states that the SFRY ceased to exist and that the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot automatically continue the membership of the SFRY in the UN but should apply for admission. This decision was also supported by the UN General Assembly. The international community denied international-legal continuity between the SFRY and the FRY and put all the states that had emerged from the SFRY's breakup on the same footing. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia have applied for UN membership and have been admitted to the UN, just as they have been admitted to numerous other international organizations and institutions.
Even though there are different interpretations, the position taken by the Badinter Commission remains the only legal venue for Yugoslavia's admission to international organizations, and this is something that a realistic policy must reckon with. The recognition of international-legal continuity depends on political decisions made by states and international organizations and is not a compulsory norm in international law. The attempt to draw a parallel between the breakup of the SFRY and the disintegration of the USSR – one of the arguments being that Russia automatically secured continuity with the USSR – was unfounded basically because the former Soviet republics recognized continuity between the USSR and Russia as soon as the USSR broke up, which the international community also accepted.
Since the signing of the Dayton-Paris peace agreement, the Yugoslav authorities have assumed that the international recognition of continuity between the FRY and SFRY would ensure the FRY's readmission to the UN and other international organizations and spare it unpleasant evaluations of its compliance with the demands of the international community concerning democratic changes on the domestic front and in foreign policy.
The international community has on several occasions formulated a number of demands that the FRY must meet in order to be readmitted to international organizations and institutions. These demands include: recognizing all former Yugoslav republics; meeting the commitments arising from the Dayton agreement, including genuine cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague; reaching an agreement with other former Yugoslav republics on Yugoslav succession; respecting the right of refugees and expellees to return to their homes; respecting human rights and observing the recommendations of the Gonzalez mission in order to ensure legal and other conditions for free and fair elections; respecting the rights of minorities; and recognizing broad autonomy for Kosovo. The latest additions to these demands include the recognition of the legitimately elected state bodies in Montenegro and respect for the rights violated by Serbia's antidemocratic laws on the media and the University. The claim that the international community constantly expands the list of its demands presented to the FRY and Serbia is true only on the surface. In fact, these are not new demands since they arise from the underlying demand that the FRY respect the principles and values of democracy.
An analysis of the conditions set by the international community indicates that none of them is contrary to the interests of the FRY and Serbia. (Montenegro has accepted all these conditions.) Even without the international community making these demands, they should form the basis of the domestic and foreign policies of our country. That would create favorable international circumstances in which Yugoslavia and Serbia, by carrying out constructive policies, would secure broad international support for overcoming their huge problems and for developing their economy. By stubbornly refusing to meet these demands, the regime is trying to prove the validity of its policies during and after the war in order to avoid responsibility for the effects of these policies. The country's isolation from the rest of the world obviously suits the regime because it ensures its monopoly on political and economic power.
The European Union's address to the citizens of Yugoslavia in 1997 – unusual as it is in international relations – stressed that the EU wants a peaceful, prosperous and democratic FRY that will assume its rightful place in the European family, which in turn requires that the FRY respect the same norms as the rest of Europe. While condemning the nationalist policies that had harmed the FRY and its citizens, making them one of the poorest nation in the region, the EU said that the EU and the international community could not be blamed for it.
Current foreign policy
Yugoslav foreign policy and Yugoslav diplomacy have been greatly degraded in the past few years, losing their international credibility. While the main causes of that should be sought in domestic politics, foreign policy and diplomacy have greatly contributed to this degradation with their irrational and unprofessional actions with regard to the international community.
Foreign policy and diplomacy, rather than being instruments of the state, have been reduced to mere instruments of the regime. They are used for the regime's internal daily political and propagandist purposes. The FRY's foreign policy may only be compared to the foreign policies of Iraq, Libya, North Korea and other totalitarian countries, which are more or less constantly in conflict with the international community. Yugoslav diplomacy, which should be the principal professional service for the implementation of foreign policy, has been deprived of professional independence and creativity.
Various claims about "sinister international conspiracies" and the hegemony of "the new world order", whose alleged goal is to destabilize, break up and destroy our country and set up a "puppet regime" fuel xenophobia as an expression of authoritarian consciousness, creating a climate suitable for a confrontation with the international community. The regime has declared Yugoslavia the most stable and most independent country and a peace factor in the region and, as such, the main obstacle to geostrategic political and economic aspirations. According to this view, that is why it is under immense pressure from "global powers", notably the US. This irresponsible defiance towards the most developed and most powerful nations, has put our country into an extremely grave position, isolating it from the international community.
The announced change of US policy towards the Yugoslav and Serbian regime and FRY President Slobodan Milosevic personally, resulting from the view that they cannot be regarded as guarantors of agreements and factors contributing to peace and stability but rather as a threat to peace and stability in the region and that emphasis should be placed on democratic forces in Yugoslavia and Serbia has been met by the regime as an extremely hostile and subversive activity against the interests of our country and nation. In December 1998 the Federal Parliament passed an ardently anti-American declaration. An allegedly top secret document attributed to the CIA but in fact a publicly available proposal for the promotion of democracy in Yugoslavia prepared by the Balkan Institute for Peace in Washington was exploited in a way never seen before for the obvious purpose of stoking up anti-American sentiments in the FRY. Yugoslav policies were further discredited after William Walker, head of the OSCE verification mission in Kosovo, was proclaimed a persona non grata, after which this decision was suspended under strong pressure from the entire international community. It is difficult to estimate all the direct and indirect damage that Yugoslavia and Serbia may suffer because of that at the international level. It should be noted, however, that these and similar actions of the regime have helped the international community to distinguish between the undemocratic regime in Yugoslavia and Serbia and the citizens of our country, who are themselves victims of that regime.
The widespread practice of our officials to make promises in their contacts with the international communities which they later break has earned the FRY the reputation of a country that cannot be trusted. This is particularly noticeable in the implementation of the Dayton accords, which the regime first obstructs in various ways only to present itself later to the international community as a constructive player holding the key to the problem.
Uncivilized communication with the world is on the increase, which is only further destroying the international reputation of the FRY and Serbia. We are talking here about the practice of insulting foreign governments, international organizations, statesmen, politicians and diplomats in the most vulgar ways, which the legal systems of all countries treat as a criminal act.
The bulk of Yugoslav foreign-policy and diplomatic activity has, volens-nolens, had to do with the problem of Kosovo, especially since the escalation of the crisis. These activities provide good examples of inappropriate estimates and incompetent actions that, rather than solving the problem, only made it worse, creating unnecessary conflicts with the international community and bringing the country to the brink of international military intervention.
The main position of the international community from the outset was that the problem of Kosovo can be resolved only by political means, ensuring broad autonomy for Kosovo within Yugoslavia. This view is widely supported by the international community because an independent Kosovo, i.e. its secession from Yugoslavia, would destabilize the region as a whole and might lead to new conflicts in the Balkans. The resolution of the Kosovo crisis is closely linked to the further successful implementation of the Dayton peace accords. This is where the interests of the international community and our country overlap. Any reasonable policy would attempt to make most of that fact and to ensure as broad international support as possible. Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy, however, are doing just the opposite.
The Yugoslav delegation walked out of the International Conference of the Peace Implementation Council in Bonn in December 1997 in protest merely because the Conference document pointed out the danger of ethnic conflicts in Kosovo while stating that this was strictly an internal matter for Yugoslavia and Serbia. By walking out of the Conference, Yugoslavia confronted the international community in an offensive way, evincing unreasonable recalcitrance and unwillingness to appraise the Kosovo problem soberly and realistically.
That no lesson was learned from this was suggested by the behavior of the Yugoslav delegation at the meeting of foreign ministers from the countries of southeastern Europe in Istanbul in 1998. The Yugoslav delegation stubbornly refused to allow mentioning the Kosovo problem in the final document, insisting that Kosovo was strictly Yugoslavia's internal affair. This was, however, far from reality. The foreign ministers of the region were forced to bypass the Yugoslav foreign minister and adopted a document about the Kosovo crisis and its resolution at a separate meeting. Instead of using the concern of the neighboring countries about peace and stability in the region, the FRY opted for the most unfavorable solution – it made other participants even more anxious and increased their dilemma whether Yugoslavia really wanted to resolve the Kosovo problem peacefully or whether it was only paying lip service to such a solution. This behavior on the part of the FRY certainly helped the countries of the region to decide to form joint rapid-intervention military units.
The April 1998 referendum on the participation of foreign representatives in the resolution of the Kosovo problem proved the regime's extreme myopia. The Kosovo problem was already internationalized to the greatest possible extent, and that process was irreversible. The referendum only supported the belief held by many that no political solution could be reached without an even greater involvement and mediation on the part of the international community, which subsequent developments only confirmed.
After failed attempts to persuade the Yugoslav side and representatives of Kosovo's Albanians to negotiate, while fighting was beginning to flare up, the Contact Group agreed in June 1998 on a number of key demands submitted primarily to the Yugoslav side and aimed at preventing a further escalation of the crisis in Kosovo. Shortly after that, Milosevic and Yeltsin met in Moscow and signed a Joint Declaration on June 16. The Yugoslav side tried to use this summit to buy time in order to find a way to avoid meeting the demands of the Contact Group. Yugoslavia apparently interpreted the Joint Declaration as Russia's support and as the Yugoslav right to continue its armed activities aimed at wiping out the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). This, however, only worsened the situation. The number of refugees increased threatening to create a humanitarian disaster, which the international community could not have ignored.
The Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement on Kosovo and the agreements which, on the basis of that document, the FRY signed with the OSCE and NATO in October 1998 came after strong pressure and direct threats of force from the international community, especially the US and NATO. The country's interests cannot be used to explain why the agreements were signed only after a repeated confrontation with the international community, which in the meantime had slapped new sanctions on Yugoslavia and Serbia, and after armed clashes in Kosovo with many casualties and a great deal of material destruction. The reluctance, or inability, of the regime to deal with the Kosovo problem by peaceful means, through genuine talks, resulted in the need for increasing the involvement of the international community in resolving this crisis and saving peace. If the Yugoslav and Serbian authorities had shown timely willingness to give Kosovo broad autonomy, the entire international community would not have issued its latest unanimous ultimatum demanding that talks with very tight deadlines and basic solutions proposed in advance be held at Rambouillet with the active participation and mediation of the international community. The implementation of the agreement, which will probably be reached at Rambouillet, will certainly call for the military involvement of the international community, which will turn Kosovo into a protectorate.
One of the characteristics of the FRY's present foreign policy is its attempts to exploit differences within the international community, especially differences between Russia and its Western partners. The regime is trying, crudely and inappropriately, to use cold war stereotypes. The proposal for Yugoslavia's accession to the alliance of Russia and Belarus (the FRY has been granted permanent observer status in the Parliamentary Assembly of Russia and Belarus), conceals an attempt to get Russia to confront the West while securing its military "umbrella" as a counterweight to NATO's threats and thus getting carte blanche to employ undemocratic methods in dealing with the domestic situation. It is ironic that a regime that insists on the sovereignty and independence of the FRY offers the FRY as Russia's sphere of interest, which, the SFRY managed to avoid even when cold war tensions were at their highest.
That is why official claims about the FRY's pro-European orientation are nothing but lip service. Admission to the developed Europe requires the adoption of and respect for European values and norms such as democracy, a market economy, a genuine multi-party system and freedom of the press, which the regime wants to avoid any way it can.
Yugoslavia's behavior on the international stage is often based on criteria that cannot form the basis of a serious foreign policy in modern international relations such as the insistence on Christian Orthodoxy and pan-Slavism. Without denying the importance of spiritual links, which may be an additional factor in creating a favorable climate for the development of relations, it should be noted that alliances along Orthodox and pan-Slavic lines, instead of cooperation based on state and other mutual interests, are also conducive to new divisions and barriers in the world. Various theories of conspiracies organized against Orthodoxy by the Vatican or Islam should be viewed in this context.
A new foreign policy
In formulating the concept and strategy of a new, constructive and realistic foreign policy for Yugoslavia, it is necessary to start from several international and domestic assumptions and conditions:
--- The overcoming of the cold war, bloc divisions, confrontations and ideological exclusiveness is the most important change in international relations after World War II. This has created a much more favorable international climate and conditions, establishing new avenues of development and progress for all countries, with their active participation in broader integration processes, which are especially characteristic of Europe.
--- These changes also have a specific effect on the situation in Yugoslavia's immediate neighborhood. The breakup of the former Yugoslavia has radically altered the political map of the Balkans and southeastern Europe. Yugoslavia is no longer the dominant country of the Balkans but only one of a number of relatively small countries. Its total potential is much smaller, it is isolated and without real allies in the world. Relations among the countries of the region, especially among the countries that emerged from the breakup of the SFRY, are saddled by new disputes as a result of this breakup and the Yugoslav wars. Meanwhile, other former socialist countries in the region have all expressed a strong desire to seek their total development, political and economic transformation, independence and stability in links with Europe's developed part.
On the other hand, Western institutions and systems are also adjusting in response to the new trends in international relations.
--- All this is without doubt also inevitable for Yugoslavia. Its foreign policy must seriously take into account the country's new international and internal realities if the FRY is to end its present crisis and international isolation in the optimum way. Yugoslavia must overcome its closed society syndrome and xenophobia, ensure true openness and develop bilateral and multilateral international relations and cooperation. The classical and outdated concept of absolute sovereignty cannot be used as an excuse for a policy of self-isolation and for stifling democracy. It is also necessary to rid foreign policy of ideological approaches and criteria and of cold war procedures and formulas that do not correspond to the current global trends and relations. The discrepancy between professed goals and real actions and behavior at the international level should be narrowed as much as possible because that is one of the preconditions Yugoslav policy must meet in order to regain its international credibility.
All the circumstances and facts point to the conclusion that present-day Yugoslavia has neither the potential nor the need to pursue a global foreign policy, as the former Yugoslavia did. Yugoslav foreign policy should be adjusted to the size of present-day Yugoslavia and to its rationally evaluated role and place in the region, Europe and the world. This policy should be selective both in its goals and in its content, but it should also be inventive so that the tragic effects of the current policy can be overcome as quickly as possible. Foreign policy should increasingly be at the service of economic, financial, scientific and technological goals.
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If Yugoslavia's foreign policy is to express the interests of the country, it should be clearly governed by the Constitution and laws. First of all, it is necessary to define precisely jurisdictions, rights and responsibilities in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. It is also necessary to define in principle its nature and content, using the general principles and norms of international law and the generally accepted rules in international relations as the starting point. The serious negative experiences and dead ends of the present foreign policy and behavior at the international level only make these needs more pressing.It is particularly important to clearly define jurisdictions and divide them between the Federal Parliament, as the highest law-making body, and the Government, as an executive body. Under the FRY Constitution, the Federal Government formulates and carries out foreign policy and maintains the FRY's relations with other countries and international organizations. In this way, the chief authority in foreign policy is concentrated in the executive branch of government. However, the division of power and the need for ensuring checks and balances require that the Parliament be given back some of its earlier powers which rightfully belong to it. The Federal Parliament should be given the right to formulate foreign policy, and the Federal Government should be given the right to carry out that policy. As for the President of the FRY, he should essentially has the same powers the Constitution gives him now, which has more or less been accepted in the constitutions and laws of the countries that have opted for a chancellorship as their political system.
Given the federal character of the country and the fact that the member republics play an important role in international relations, it is necessary to define in detail the jurisdictions of and relations between the federal units. This should be done through legislation rather than through the Constitution for the purpose of meeting two basic needs – ensuring a single, democratically agreed foreign policy of the country; and enabling the republics to fully meet their specific needs at the international level.
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If Yugoslavia is to be accepted and respected in international relations as a reliable partner and an active participant, it should unconditionally ratify and execute in good faith bilateral and multilateral contracts and agreements, signed by both the FRY and the SFRY. This applies, among other things, to the universal international legal documents such as the UN Charter, international conventions on the respect for civil, political, social and economic rights, the Helsinki Final Act, The Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the Dayton-Paris peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina, including full and genuine cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, and other agreements with the international community concerning the resolution of problems in the former Yugoslavia, agreements on Kosovo, UN Security Council resolutions pertinent to the former Yugoslavia and present-day Yugoslavia, etc.
A detailed and comprehensive analysis of the goals and priorities of the new foreign policy exceeds the framework of this paper, which only suggests the fundamental foreign policy trend that should protect state and national interests. This approach is essentially in line with the commitments from the Draft Platform for an Alternative Foreign Policy (1997) adopted by the Forum for International Relations, which is a part of the European Movement in Serbia.
--- The development of good-neighborly relations, cooperation with new and old neighbors and peace and stability in the region are the most important priorities in foreign policy, without which Yugoslavia cannot have a favorable and safe international status. Particularly important in this context is the active resolution of problems resulting from the war and breakup of the former federation. Without this there will be no rebuilding of mutual trust or a full normalization of relations. Instead of stalling and setting unrealistic conditions, it is necessary to propose, immediately and systematically, ideas for a full normalization of relations with the countries that have emerged from the SFRY and for developing comprehensive cooperation with them.
There is a tradition of good relations with most of the old neighbors (the neighbors of the former Yugoslavia). This tradition should be brought into line with the present circumstances and needs. Meanwhile, some problems and limitations from the past have been overcome. It is a good thing that there are no longer any bloc constraints and obstacles and that the former neighboring socialist countries are in the process of democratic change. This can generally only help the development of bilateral and multilateral relations along new lines. For this to happen, however, it is necessary that Yugoslavia also begin a process of democratic change.
Regional cooperation allowing the countries of the Balkans to cooperate with the EU as the backbone of European development, is a political and economic necessity and not just one of the options. The EU's regional approach and the American SECI initiative are indispensable forms in this respect. The countries of the region must depend on each other. They have similar problems, needs and interests but also numerous disputes that they must settle. This cooperation – or Yugoslavia's development for that matter – can hardly be successful without Yugoslavia's active and constructive participation in it.
--- Yugoslavia's cooperation with the international community is particularly important in connection with the problem of Kosovo, which is without doubt Yugoslavia's most complex and most serious problem. The Kosovo problem may not only destabilize Yugoslavia or even break it up but it may also lead to new wars in the region. The basic positions of the international community, which have already been explained in this paper, are in line with the country's state and national interests. This makes possible successful cooperation with the international community, without whose mediation and intensive involvement, both in the process of negotiation and in the implementation of the agreement, the situation in Kosovo cannot return to normal.
--- The consistent implementation of the Dayton-Paris peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina should also be a priority in Yugoslavia's foreign policy. The Dayton agreement defined the goals and content of the normalization of relations, primarily between Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia and Croatia, but also in the region as a whole. Under this Agreement, Yugoslavia made major international commitments, which must be met in full. This will be an important way to test Yugoslavia's policies, which will largely determine the position of the international community with regard to Yugoslavia. It is particularly important that Yugoslavia show in practice that it honors its pledge to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The right to special parallel relations between Bosnia's entities and neighboring countries – Yugoslavia and Croatia – foreseen by the Agreement, cannot be exercised in order to boost disintegrative process in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, possibly, cause it to break up. (This, mutatis mutandis, also applies to Croatia's policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina.)
--- If Yugoslavia is to join international political, economic, financial and other organizations and institutions, it must unconditionally meet the demands made by these organizations. Years of experience suggest that trying to doge out of meeting these demands will not solve the problems and that it will only make the adverse consequences for the country worse.
The immediate task is ensuring full membership for Yugoslavia in the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Membership in the UN is the green light for Yugoslavia's admission to other organizations, and membership in the OSCE and the Council of Europe is proof of a country's pro-European orientation and its democratic character. At the same time, it is a precondition for Yugoslavia's cooperation with the EU in the course of which Yugoslavia will gradually be meeting conditions for EU membership. That requires that Yugoslavia's political and economic systems be compatible with those of the EU. Yugoslavia's linking to the EU has a strategic importance because it will give our country access to developed markets and modern scientific and technological achievements.
The most important international economic and financial organizations and institutions are the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization in view of the role they play in the functioning of the global economy and in international economic relations. Membership in these organizations ensures free access to the international capital market and participation in world trade on an equal footing with others.
For now there are no conditions for the FRY's membership in NATO. We should not forget, however, that nearly all European nations, especially the former socialist countries, have expressed interest in joining NATO (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are already members) and that they have agreed to participate in the Partnership for Peace program as a transitional solution (a special form of bilateral military-security association with NATO). There is no doubt that it is not in Yugoslavia's interests to remain an exception in Europe and stay outside the European system of military security and cooperation, all the more so since neighboring countries are involved in this cooperation. Even though leading NATO countries believe that at present there is no point in discussing Partnership for Peace with Yugoslavia, it is necessary to begin working on a positive approach to this program so that it can be put into practice when the moment comes.
--- The development of relations and cooperation between Yugoslavia and the most important countries – the US, the leading European countries (Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and Spain), Russia and China – is a long-term priority for our country. In light of the prominent role of these countries in international relations and their involvement in the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, good partnership relations with them can hardly be overestimated. These relations link Yugoslavia's vital interests in a number of areas – politics, economics, finance, science, security – which greatly determine the international status of our country.
In our approach to the Western countries and the US it is necessary to eradicate our years-long xenophobia and anti-Americanism, which have exceeded even the worst cold war methods and vocabulary and which can bring nothing good to a small country such as Yugoslavia. Relations with Russia and China should be rid of all their outdated ideological ingredients, and mutual interests should be promoted as the basis of cooperation with them.
..........Foreign policy can be democratic and successful only if the public is allowed to critically examine foreign-policy interests and activities and if different views and arguments can be confronted. Public opinion and the provision of objective information about foreign policy and developments in the world are very important for the democratic control of foreign policy. Public opinion can often have a crucial influence in forcing politicians to abide by the Constitution and other laws and to carry out realistic policies.
For foreign policy to be successful it is necessary to have qualified and professional diplomats. Diplomacy should be removed from direct party influences and engagements, and it must be protected from usurpation by centers of nonconstitutional political power. Only in this way can diplomacy be an authentic interpreter and representative of the interests of the state, federal units and citizens in international relations.
February 7, 1999