Vatroslav Vekaric
Director of the Center
for Strategic Studies (CSS) –
Belgrade.
Paper prepared in
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) during guest
scholarship at COPRI (May 2000)
I am very grateful to Professor Hǻkan
Wiberg, Director of COPRI for his valuable critical remarks that have helped me
improve the text.
BEYOND NATO INTERVENTION IN YUGOSLAVIA
- MOTIVATIONS AND BEHAVIOR OF THE
SERBIAN
LEADERSHIP DURING THE KOSOVO
CRISIS -
ABSTRACT
The
aim of this paper is to identify the main motives and behavior of the Yugoslav regime
in the development of the situation that led to NATO intervention. The focus is on the
attempt to explain the readiness of Serbian leadership to enter confrontation with the
biggest war machinery of contemporary world in an almost fatalistic manner, without
undertaking all necessary political and diplomatic moves aimed at avoiding the
conflict, and its success in drawing to its side – like hypnotized – the strongest
opposition parties and also the majority of the population. The paper is
elaborating the hypothesis that the Milosevic’s only motivation
was to maintain and strengthen his personal power, and that he, in fact, wished NATO
military intervention against Yugoslavia to take place and that on the political,
diplomatic and propaganda level he has made everything necessary to provoke it. The text is
supporting the claim that whatever the international community might have tried to do
in order to lead Belgrade to stop the repression in Kosovo, the Serbian regime would
have reacted in the same/similar manner as it did during the Rambouillet negotiations:
refusing to sign
any agreement.
Introduction
“In the
meantime, we experienced destruction of our dignified cities from the air,
destructions that should have been condemned if it had not been we, who are now
suffering, that were to be blamed. How awkward sounds the accusation raised against
these misdeeds that we ourselves have provoked, when it comes from the mouths of those
who stepped on the stage of history as heralds and carriers of barbarism that was to
rejuvenate the world, organizing feasts in crime and lawlessness!”
Thomas Mann, 1945
Nowadays
there are numerous analyses of the causes and consequences of the Kosovo crisis and of
NATO’s intervention against Yugoslavia that was provoked by it. There seems to be a
huge and inexhaustible number of questions that this crisis has opened both for
politicians and analysts in the field of international relations. The majority of
analyses pertaining to this contemporary crisis were based upon explanations that were
starting from the level of: (a) the international actors (states, nations), and (b)
the system (environment) in which the crisis was evolving. Much less was the
development of this crisis viewed from the level of (c) of individual actors, their
political culture and political behavior.
However, the impression is that the way in
which the Kosovo crisis developed, including events that had led to air raids against
Yugoslavia, reveals some unique features which, to the extent greater than is the case
with the majority of other international crises, emphasizes the significance of
individual actors. Many questions pertaining to this crisis have for the time being remained without adequate
answers, and among them, the following seem to be the most interesting ones:
-
What has convinced Mr. Milosevic, the President of FR Yugoslavia and no
doubt the main, if not the sole decision-maker in this country, to agree with NATO
intervention that he could have avoided through adequate diplomatic moves, since he must have
known that his country had no chances to improve afterwards its position in regard to
the Kosovo conflict?
-
Was the behavior of Mr. Milosevic during the negotiating and diplomatic
process, which ended with NATO’s military intervention, rational,
and should it not, anyway, be seen as deviant not only in the political and diplomatic
(but perhaps also in the psychological) sense of the word?
-
Which are, actually, the roots of Milosevic’s behavior during this
crisis?
The aim of this
article is to identify the main motives and steps of the Serbian regime in the
development of the situation that led to NATO intervention. The focus will be on the attempt to explain the readiness of Milosevic's regime
to enter confrontation with the biggest war machinery of contemporary world in an
almost fatalistic manner, without undertaking all necessary political and diplomatic
moves aimed at avoiding the conflict, and its success in drawing to its side – like
hypnotized – the strongest opposition
parties and also the majority of the population?
We would like to illustrate that it was exactly the steps of the regime and its
diplomacy that made this intervention unavoidable. However, as time goes by, we are
getting the so much needed time distance, and the analyses of NATO intervention
against Yugoslavia are getting more comprehensive and are revealing a multitude of
inconsistencies, failures and long-term harmful consequences produced by the Western
alliance in regard to the Kosovo problem, Balkan stability and perspectives of
development of international relations in general. Still, it seems that insufficient
attention is given to the moves and actions of Milosevic's regime which – as
indicated after analysis based upon insight into local factors - have certainly to a
great extent, like in a chess party, extorted the behavior of the Western alliance and NATO's action
Namely, our
hypothesis is that Mr. Milosevic:
-
Made his calculations on the basis of given circumstances, but actually
genuinely wishing that NATO military intervention against Yugoslavia because of Kosovo
would take place, and
-
On the political, diplomatic and propaganda level has made everything
necessary to stimulate it.
It could be said
that the approach of the Yugoslav (Serbian) regime and its diplomacy to
the problem of Kosovo in the 90ies has been inadequate and counterproductive. It was
much before NATO intervention against Yugoslavia that Belgrade's attitude with regard
to the conflict in Kosovo and the involved international actors has, in a way, puzzled
analysts. Namely, it seems that the majority of the moves of Serbian decision-makers
were performed in such a manner that the problem – in which, actually, many
international legal, political and historical arguments were in favor of FR Yugoslavia
(Serbia) – was transformed into a situation in which these very same argumentation
lost on credibility, and the arguments put forward by the opposing side in the
conflict were gaining in importance. From the very beginning of the contemporary stage
of the Kosovo conflict, it was clear that the international community, particularly the USA and the European Union,
as well as Russia, are determined not to allow for further changes of borders in the
Balkans after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and that they are willing to
impose the solution of this hot issue through various mediating services on the basis
of the mentioned approach. Many analysts
agree that the moves by the Yugoslav (Serbian) regime and its diplomacy did not,
however, contribute to the evolution of the crisis in the direction of authentic
interests of FR Yugoslavia: the preservation of territorial integrity of FR
Yugoslavia, the search for common language with the Albanian population (which, due to
demographic changes in the last thirty-odd years in Kosovo has become a dominant
majority), and the undertaking of measures which could motivate this ethnic group to
look for compromises with the Serbian side.
Since the
beginning of the Yugoslav crisis the regime in Serbia was limiting the space for its
moves in regard to solving the complex problem of Kosovo. There is no lack of proofs
to this statement, and here are some of them:
a) Regardless of
the fact the Serbian-Albanian conflict in Kosovo was latently present (being
intensified in the former Yugoslavia as far as in 1981 after mass demonstrations of
Albanians against the regime and later on used in the rivalries between Serbia and
other Yugoslav republics, particularly Slovenia and Croatia), this issue was not
included into «the package» of the resolution of crises opened in the territory of
the former Yugoslavia at the beginning of the nineties. In other words, at the very
beginning of the crisis Slobodan Milosevic was “left alone” and spared from major
pressures for a democratic solution to the Kosovo problem. Reasons for such an
attitude of international actors were rather self-evident:
First, at the
beginning of the nineties the conflict in Kosovo was lacking visible manifestations of
inter-ethnic violence and was overshadowed by war atrocities in Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina the stopping of which was given clear-cut political priority;
Second, once it became
clear that there are no realistic conditions for the survival of SFRY, all solutions
were based upon the concept of respect of former inter-republican borders as new
inter-state borders – hence, there were no major reasons for including the question
of Kosovo (regardless of the conduct of both conflicting parties) into the “Yugoslav
package”, and it was to be solved later on, within Serbia, namely FR Yugoslavia.
Third, it seems that
in the USA prevailed a rather cynical standpoint that as long as Milosevic could
oppress the Albanian minority without creating large refugee flows that might
destabilize the region, Washington was uninterested in the Kosovo issue. Thus in 1995,
the United States excluded the Kosovo issue and Ibrahim Rugova, the Albanian Kosovar
leader and advocate of non-violence, from the Dayton negotiations; with Rugova's
approach bearing no fruit, the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) soon emerged.
Only when the armed fighting in Kosovo
intensified, and the international actors became strongly involved in the Kosovo
issue, the international community managed to impose negotiations (initially, in
regard to specific questions, such as education and healthcare), but both the Serbs
and Albanians were systematically boycotting and, actually, avoiding them. On the eve
of NATO intervention there was a strong impression that both sides in the Kosovo
conflict, Belgrade and Kosovo Albanians, did see no solution other than armed
conflict. In any case, such a situation was in the long-term very favorable for the
Albanian side. Because of its undemocratic nature, the regime in Belgrade was in no
way capable to demonstrate understanding of anything beyond the language of excessive
force or to comprehend that more subtle diplomacy and more elasticity in regard to
less important questions, and more democracy in the first place, would have if not
solved the problem, certainly contributed to a strengthening of the Serbian positions.
Briefly, the incapability to intelligently evaluate strategic values of its own trumps
in the Kosovo conflict (and these trumps were, both in principle and concretely, very
strong at the beginning) led Milosevic to systematically and gradually “kill” the
alternatives – to a great extent also for domestic political reasons, connected with
his resolve to remain in power at any cost. The Serbian regime was practically
supported by Albanian absence from political life of Serbia (elections), since due to
electoral manipulations Kosovo was the electoral stronghold of the Milosevic’s
Socialist party of Serbia (SPS), and the entire conduct of the regime was limiting the
choice of realistic options for a (even temporary) solution. The Belgrade regime has
in the end tried to convince itself and others that there is no alternative to an
unselective use of force in Kosovo unless there is readiness to accept capitulation in
front of Albanian separatism. “Both sides are confronting the fatal decision: refusal, hence, the war, or
accepting, hence, capitulation. The epilogue of the wrong policy was reduced to this
simplified dilemma.
On the eve of
NATO intervention in Serbia there was created an atmosphere, in the same fatalistic
manner, in which there could be seen no other solution except a stoical acceptance of
this intervention. Such an atmosphere was created by the Belgrade regime through
controlled media, and one of the arguments that should have fostered the “fighting
spirit” of the population was recalling the historical example of rejection by
Serbia of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum in 1914, which, actually, started World War
I.
d) All this said, one should not forget that after signing the Dayton agreements
on ending the conflict in Bosnia, Milosevic had an unequivocal support of the
international community (as “guarantor” of Dayton who even had the authority –
accepted not only by the Bosnian Serbs but also by the Serbian Orthodox Church - to
negotiate on behalf of all Serbs, “on both sides of the river Drina”, i. e. those
from Serbia and those from Bosnia). Without analyzing the hypocritical nature of this
support, one should only say that it was a reality which the Serbian dictator did not
make use of in any way. On the contrary, three years later, the “guarantor of
peace” from yesterday found himself opposing the Western alliance, in whose
propaganda he was now described in a more realistic manner than before: he became
“the Balkans butcher”.
Generally
speaking, because of the regime’s behavior during the process of searching solutions
to the problem – primarily, because of excessive and unselective use of force, which
included also criminal behavior on different levels with an absence of genuine
readiness to negotiate on the issue of Kosovo's autonomy - at the end of March 1999 FR
Yugoslavia was exposed to NATO's air strikes.
Why would Milosevic wish the NATO intervention to happen?
After the signing
of Dayton agreements and expectations that the entire west Balkans, and Serbia as
well, could enter quiet waters with better perspectives for democratization and normal
development, it went without saying that such evolution was not favorable for
Milosevic's dictatorship. The best illustration were massive protests against Serbia's
regime directly provoked by abuses of the Socialist Party in regard to results of
local elections held November 17, 1996, in which the oppositional coalition «Together»
won majority in the biggest towns of Serbia (two thirds of the entire population of FR
Yugoslavia, including Belgrade with two million inhabitants).
The refusal of Milosevic’s regime to recognize electoral defeat in big towns
has revealed not only mass discontent with Milosevic’s rule, but also the already
well known fact: that the ruling party does not accept the principle that governments
should be changed by elections. It showed that the regime did not give up the
principle of a one-party-state that must control the government by all means and at
all essential levels, from the repression apparatus (the army and police) up to the
economy, finances and information media. In fact, the opposition parties are not
accepted as normal and legitimate institutions that are to share the responsibility
for the political and economic life of the country, but are rather seen - like in the
ex-communist regimes - as a subversive factor, which is disturbing the one-party idyll
and as the “fifth column” (the expression explicitly used by Mr. Milosevic in his
speech to his supporters during the counter-meeting in Belgrade on December 24, 1996).
This accusation against the opposition has afterwards become a habitual one in the
political practice of Serbia.
In view of such developments, which actually
meant a loss of legitimization of the regime and showed that there is going to be an
end to his rule, it seems that Milosevic saw the complex problem of Kosovo as the
unique and last instrument for defense of his power.
He has counted, inter alia, upon a
few essential factors:
First,
that the outburst of energy on a massive scale and a strengthening of the
democratization movement occur, as a rule, after improvements and opening of
perspectives for the termination of conflict; speaking in psychological terms, the
population is not capable of thinking about an alternative regime when it is facing
war, mobilization and general hysteria that is a consequence of war. Although
initially supported by the majority of the electorate, Milosevic remained in power by
using this mechanism from the times of war in Slovenia, Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina. He did not forget that mass protests in March 1991 also broke out
at a time when there was a collective sense of progress, namely, when it seemed that
in Serbia, too, an irreversible development of parliamentary democracy was emerging. As is well known,
Milosevic used the army against demonstrators and clearly indicated his political
options.
Second, it seems as if Milosevic (who
is very skillful in manipulating collective emotions) was aware that for him it was
necessary that the population maintained a fear from democratic changes - a fear
which, within his war politics and changes in Europe, pushed the population into the
arms of nationalist ideology. Nationalism proved to be a tool that offered to the
population a strengthened sense of belonging and an affective attachment to the
“glorious past” and historical myths. This induced commitment to a political status quo in Serbia, which was justified
through “patriotism” - it was indicated that it would not be patriotic to ask for
a destabilization of the system and the existing regime at times when the “Serbian
national question” is being solved by calling for a uniting of all Serbs in one
state. During all the wars in the territory of the former Yugoslavia the constant
official thesis of the Serbian regime was that it was necessary first to solve
favorably the national question, and only after that to turn towards development of
democracy.
Milosevic based his evaluation (as
proven through the entire ten-year period 1989 -1999) on, inter alia, following
important factors:
The Kosovo myth. - Counting upon the deeply rooted Kosovo myth within the Serb people,
and assisted by the Serb Orthodox Church and the guided media, Milosevic has made the
Kosovo question a starting point of the so-called “anti-bureaucratic revolution”,
namely of his rise to power in the period 1986-1989. The conflict between Serbs and
Albanians in Kosovo and because of Kosovo was presented as “eternal” and
inevitable, with an attitude that included significant ethnocentric, and even racist,
charges. Kosovo was denied its broad autonomy, which it enjoyed in former Yugoslavia,
and it is exactly in Kosovo, in his speech in Gazimestan (Kosovo) June 28, 1989, that
Milosevic announced armed conflicts for the reorganization of former Yugoslavia. In
front of some million supporters gathered in Kosovo on the occasion of the 600th
anniversary of the battle of Kosovo against Turks, in which Serbian duke Lazar chose
death rather than capitulation, Milosevic send a message that even “today, 600 years
later, armed battles are not excluded”.
The Kosovo myth
served Milosevic as an ideal tool for inflaming nationalist emotions. There are two
basic motives in the foundations of this myth: heroism and treason. Both were instrumentalized in
Milosevic’s political conduct and propaganda so as to support strongly the
expectations of the Serbian dictator. Namely, the motive of heroism in the Kosovo myth
was used to cut down any alternative possibilities to solve the conflict in Kosovo in
a manner that would be “less heroic” and based upon the attempt to take into
account the experience of other peoples in solving similar conflicts (for instance,
the Austrian-Italian conflict in regard to South Tyrol), and thus certainly less
painful for the future of Serbia. The motive of treason in the myth of Kosovo was used
as a basis for the elimination, as “traitors” and “representatives of foreign
interests” that are not to be trusted, of all political forces and individuals in
Serbia which were having in mind alternatives other than the official ones, not only
in regard to the Kosovo conflict, but also in regard to principles of political life
in Serbia.
Public opinion in
Serbia. - Research and
opinion polls conducted in Serbia show a generally unusual level of disinclination and
even hostility in regard to the foreign world. Contrary
to the majority of post-communist states in Eastern Europe, in which the attitude of
the public opinion to changes in the world after the fall of communism was marked with
a high level of acceptance, sometimes very much overfilled with idealism and even
illusions, negative and hostile perceptions of the post-Cold-War environment, of what
is called “the new international order”, seem to be very deeply rooted within
Serbia’s population. Together with frustrations because of defeats in the wars
within Yugoslavia into which Milosevic has led the country, the distance and mistrust
in regard to the international community seem to be strengthening, and so do also
isolationist and xenophobic attitudes. Values based upon realities of a world divided
into blocs prior to 1989 are spread within the population to an unexpectedly wide
scope; they are supplemented with strong beliefs that there is a decisive significance
of secret intrigues of the “world mighty ones” against small peoples and states,
and that the majority of international actors are malicious in regard to FR
Yugoslavia’s interests. The perception that the West has no good intentions towards
Serbia is deeply rooted. As part of such perceptions there is also
the conviction that difficulties accompanying the transition of countries of Eastern
Europe will inevitably lead to a failure of the democratic transformation. The most
important international developments are explained through an optic of confrontation,
hegemony and “clandestine plans” of the West, with a generally catastrophic image
of the contemporary world. Clearly, it is regime’s propaganda and media that are
behind such standpoints. It should also be added that such standpoints are shared by
broad groupings of so-called “democratic”, “pro-reformist” and
“anti-Milosevic” political forces, and even by a part of independent intellectual
circles. Even among a part of democratically oriented intellectuals it is hard to find
the conviction that certain “mistakes” or “wrong moves” of the international
community towards Serbia were actually provoked by undemocratic and extremely
repressive policies of the Serbian regime, which was systematically violating various
norms of ethics, internal and international law.
The economic
situation in Serbia. – Milosevic
must have been aware of the extremely bad economic and social situation in the
country, which worked increasingly against him. Per
capita national product fell at the end of 1998 below 1,000$, aligning Serbia more
and more with underdeveloped countries of the “Third world”. The average monthly salary was reduced
to about 80$ by the end of 1998, and the ruling oligarchy linked with organized crime
has strengthened its control over main natural resources, trade and financial flows in
the country. This relatively small group has managed to get rich in a short time
thanks to corruption that was nurtured by the regime, literal robbery of citizens’
savings in the name of “contribution to national development”, and the halting or
misuse of privatization. Due to outer sanctions and limitations to the free market,
the industry was in a catastrophic shape even prior to NATO intervention. The regime
was maintaining its repressive machinery through constant blows against the
population’s income and occasional sales of the country’s resources, as was the
spectacular selling of part of Telecom Serbia to Italy in 1997. To this one should add
a strong brain-drain process, which took away from Serbia about 300,000 of young
experts and technicians, mainly members of the destroyed middle class.
There is no doubt
that the main problem with the Yugoslav economy is lack of fundamental systemic
changes. Progress with institutional reforms has been extremely slow and
disappointing, since strong anti-reform forces are still influential and vested
interests impede radical change. According to the Yugoslav economists’ estimates of
EBRD’s three groups of transition indicators – referring to markets and trade,
enterprise privatization and financial institutions – in 1997 FRY was in most fields
lagging behind the other Southeast European countries. The economic policy and
institutional development pursued by the Yugoslav government can be seen as moving
into a retrograde direction, having as its main features centralization,
nationalization, anti-liberalization, anti-stabilization and corruption.
The Orthodox Church. - The fact that
after big protests in 1996/97 the Orthodox
Church has distanced its support to the regime has upset Milosevic to a great extent.
The break with Milosevic was indicated as far as in 1994, when the Church spoke
against the blockade of the Serbian entity in Bosnia, on the eve of NATO intervention
it was increasingly visible, and within the Church itself, particularly within the
Eparchy Raska-Prizren in Kosovo, emerged an eminently anti-regime personality of
Bishop Artemije, who managed to get support of the Serbian community in Kosovo. With
voices against Milosevic's expansionist strategy that were becoming more and more
frequent, after NATO air strikes happened something that some time ago could not even
be imagined: the Serb Orthodox Church disassociated itself from actions of Milosevic's
regime in Kosovo and on June 28, 1999, Patriarch Pavle called him in a public address
to resign. In
the entire decade since Milosevic came to power, the strategic alliance of the Church
with Milosevic and the nationally oriented intellectuals has been a very important
element of the legitimacy of his power, so this change represented for Milosevic a
serious, almost irremediable blow. How disturbing this change must have been for
Milosevic one can understand when having in mind the fact that since the beginning of
the nineties the Serbian Orthodox Church had a favorable attitude towards Milosevic,
that it saw him as the right person that will be able to fight for Serbian interests.
Patriarch Pavle’s signature on a relevant document meant support of the Church for
the US proposal that Milosevic represents all (including Bosnian) Serbs during Dayton
negotiations on peace in Bosnia
Montenegro. - One of the most serious problems that Milosevic had to face
in his attempts to preserve indisputable power after the signing of the Dayton
Agreements and the suppression of mass demonstrations in Serbia 1996-97 were the
changes in Montenegro. The development of relations between the two only federal units
that constitute FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) seems to be irrevocably worsened
after the election of Mr. Djukanovic for President of Montenegro in October 1997. The
conflict escalated to the point at which the decision to schedule a referendum on
independence of Montenegro seems to be more likely than ever before, in spite of a
traditional support of the majority of the Montenegrin population for state unity with
Serbia.
The conviction that Milosevic's internal and foreign policy orientation cause damages
led in Montenegro to a strong anti-Milosevic coalition which, after winning the
majority in the Parliament of Montenegro, is working on the democratization of the
country and cooperation with the international community. Violating the existing
Constitution, Milosevic has completely excluded Mr. Djukanovic from the
decision-making process in foreign and defense matters, refusing to invite him to the
meetings of the Supreme Defense Council (the only body that by Constitution is
authorized to decide, by consensus, on military matters, including questions of war
and peace). Since his election to the post of President of FR Yugoslavia Milosevic has
been completely in control of the federal government through exponents from Montenegro
who remained loyal to him. After Mr. Milosevic was elected President of FR Yugoslavia
in mid-1997, the federal bodies – which till then were completely marginalized in
regard to foreign policy decisions - have regained significance, but not in a manner
envisaged by the Constitution (which gives the main authority to the Federal
government), but rather by transferring the center of decision-making and genuine
conduct of foreign policy to the President of the Republic. The Federal Ministry for
Foreign Affairs has always been under Milosevic's strict control, and all foreign
ministers of FR Yugoslavia since 1992 till today were officials of the ruling
Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and people of Milosevic's highest confidence.
Milosevic was particularly worried by expectations that the awakening of the
democratic process in Montenegro could «contaminate» Serbia, too, in which
Djukanovic enjoyed considerable sympathy of opposition parties and the broad strata of
the population.
For quite some
time the Serbian leader has managed to mitigate all these factors which provoked fear
for his political future, factors which proved that there was huge deficiency in the
legitimacy of his regime. He did this by manipulating Serbian nationalism during the
process of a national identity crisis. The victim was also the Serbian opposition,
because this made it direct its political energy not towards reforms and
democratization, but rather to problems of «national interest» and raison d'etat – and these were fields in
which his regime was to be considered the only defender of the deepest national
aspirations.
« The defense of the nation against the Others became an
alternative to reforms. Nationalism became a substitute for democracy. Cooperation and
compromise with other peoples and political actors in Serbia were substituted with a
general political and cultural heterophobia»
Here it seems
appropriate to ask: which were, at least theoretically, the options at the disposal of
Serbian leadership on the eve of NATO intervention? A Manichean approach of the
Belgrade regime in regard to an exit from the vicious circle of the crisis has to a
great extent made impossible any other solution except the one that we think the
Serbian dictator has accepted in advance: to agree with NATO intervention, regardless
of consequences, under the condition that it does not lead to a change of the regime
in Belgrade. Namely, defining the problem as an “or/or” option (where on the one
side one must either capitulate in front of “blackmail” of the international
community and the secessionism of terrorists in Kosovo, or enter conflict with NATO
with all subsequent consequences) seems to have excluded in advance any third
solution, among which one of the possible ones certainly was to accept the Rambouillet
arrangement. Although it is true that the negotiating process and the outcome of the
negotiations in Rambouillet were filled with unusual elements (two negotiating sides,
because of Albanian refusal, did not negotiate directly; the USA have in fact been
acting partially and have to the greatest extent – time-locked because of increased
repression in Kosovo - defined its aims in such a manner to come to whatever agreement
at any cost; from the very beginning the mediators have not tried to create or
strengthen confidence between the two sides, which is a precondition for successful
negotiations, etc.) what this agreement was
offering to the Serbian side was certainly nothing less from what it got in Kumanovo
in the document by which its capitulation was signed after the ending of NATO
intervention. The Serbian side accepted during the negotiations the political part of
the agreement from Rambouillet, and the key unacceptable element – conditions under
which the international military forces in FR Yugoslavia were to be present – seems
to have been the main source of Milosevic’s fears, since the agreement envisaged
significant jurisdiction and immunity to these forces. Although, in our view, these
prerogatives were nothing unusual for a mission that the international forces were to
accomplish, and were primarily aimed at securing there undisturbed activities within
the mission in Kosovo (similar prerogatives was envisaged, for instance, in the
agreement between NATO and Macedonia with regard to the conditions under which its
forces will be present in this country) it is obvious that the Serbian leadership saw
this as a latent source of “occupation” of the entire FRY and, hence, as a major
danger for the maintenance of its undemocratic power. From this standpoint,
Milosevic’s readiness to sacrifice even the ultimate values and accept the
destruction of FR Yugoslavia maybe becomes somewhat more understandable; and, it
reveals even more – in support of our basic hypothesis – his unbelievable lack of
scruples, putting somewhat aside possible arguments in support of his relentlessness
on the eve of NATO intervention.
Prima vista comparative analyses of the
basic provisions of the unrealized agreement from Rambouillet, on the one hand, and
the UN SC Resolution 1244 on Kosovo, which was the basis for concluding the agreement
in Kumanovo, on the other, shows that Rambouillet was more favorable for the Serbian
side with regard to a) the envisaged number of international forces (28,000 -
Rambouillet, 45-50,000 - SC Resolution No. 1244) and b) the envisaged number of
Yugoslav soldiers and police forces to be posted in Kosovo (4,000 - Rambouillet, and
less than 1,000 the Kumanovo agreement). When compared with later agreements, the
Agreement from Rambouillet also had stricter provisions in regard to the respect of
territorial integrity of FRY and provisions in which it is emphasized that Kosovo is
an integral part of Yugoslavia, and in regard to the future status it gave
significantly bigger guarantees to the Serbian side than did the later formulations
contained in the UN SC Resolution.
What did Milosevic do to stimulate the NATO intervention?
What is particularly strongly supporting our hypothesis that there was a
systematic preparation for conflict with NATO are the statements of the Serbian ultra
nationalistic leader Vojislav Seselj, a person who has in countless occasions proven
to be a tool in Slobodan Milosevic's hands and whom Milosevic normally is leaving to
announce the future events on his behalf. He reveals in a very explicit manner
Milosevic’s plans in regard to Albanians in Kosovo and the West: “If there is
going to be an aggression, there will be no more Albanians in Kosovo.” In a hysterical atmosphere of
anti-Western propaganda on the eve of NATO attack, Seselj was calling «patriotic
Serbs» to defend the country and was threatening the oppositional forces and
nongovernmental organizations which, increasingly shy and frightened, expressed the
hope that the worst could be evaded. The report of the International Crisis Group gives in this regard
the following characteristic comment:
«The 72 hours prior to NATO action saw an
entrenchment of Belgrade's defiance. Rather than opting to signal any genuine
willingness to back off and perhaps negotiate a Kosovo peace».
Evidence on the
existence of Milosevic's calculations with regard to a possible usefulness of the
conflict with NATO, despite all consequences, is supported by subsequent statements of
the former Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army general Momcilo Perisic sacked by
Milosevic, who in the previous stages of the Kosovo crisis was standing for
diplomatic, and not military solutions:
«I tried everything in order to convince the
country's leadership that it is an adventure to enter such war. I literally drew all
the consequences that can evolve from a conflict with international forces. All that I
have said, unfortunately, came true. When I saw that they would not listen to me, I
turned to the public and gave a warning about what is going to happen in case that the
demands of the international community were not fulfilled. I warned about the horrible
consequences of the aggression not only the country's leadership, but also
representatives of NATO, Solana and Clark.
Finally, this was
best confirmed at the «meeting of last chance for diplomacy» held between Milosevic
and the American envoy Richard Holbrooke during his mission on March 21, 1999. After
eleven hours of talk, Holbrooke left Yugoslavia visibly upset by Milosevic's
persistence to remain on previous inflexible positions and, one could say, astounded
by the calm manner in which Milosevic reacted to his descriptions of what Yugoslavia
will go through in the following hours. «I know, you will be bombing us» - he said,
according to Holbrooke's words. The regime media once again orchestrated
their support for the rejection of chances to find a way out in the last minutes. The
Parliament of Serbia sided with such an attitude by voting on March 22, 1999, without
any vote against, conclusions in which it is said that «Serbia...is united, determined and firm in defense
of its freedom, independence and territory» and support is given to «... state organs to undertake, in accordance with this,
all necessary measures and activities»
What has
particularly confused the observers is the fact that even those opposition parties
(Serbian Renewal Movement, New Democracy, etc.) which in the parliamentary debate and
earlier, during the negotiating process, had talked about all the fatal consequences
of intervention and wanted to find ways to avoid NATO air strikes regardless of the
costs, on this occasion gave their vote for the proposed conclusions. As if they could
not bear to get – on the eve of NATO intervention which through Milosevic's moves
became inevitable, and in an atmosphere of general confusion and fear among the
population and self-heroism by the government and its media – the label of «traitors». It seemed as if the opposition itself believed
in the similarity between the years 1999 and 1914, when Serbia rejected the ultimatum
of Austro-Hungaria.
War Propaganda .- Although negotiations were still going
on, and NATO intervention was not all that certain, media that were under Milosevic's
control were systematically preparing the public for war. Since the end of 1998 up to
the beginning of NATO air strikes it was possible to note an escalation of the
official war propaganda. It would be natural to expect that a party in the conflict,
which wants appeasement and finding of an at least temporary solution that could be
worked out through diplomatic negotiations (that were going on), is trying to do
anything in order to calm down emotions and to direct its propaganda towards arguments
that could possibly illustrate the validity of its position and the readiness to end
the conflict in a peaceful manner. The features of official Serbian propaganda on the
eve of NATO intervention, however, were completely different. An impression was
created that the Serbian dictator thought that it was of utmost importance to convince
the population that a conflict with the West was inevitable, and that Serbia was a
“just victim” of clandestine manipulations of the “world mighty ones”. Hatred
for everything coming from the West was instigated on a systematic basis, and the
vocabulary of the official propaganda gave unequivocal proof that there is no
readiness for compromise and avoiding conflict. On January 15, 1999, the
vice-president of the Serbian government spoke in Kosovo explicitly that the world is
not prepared to see the “real truth” in Kosovo and will pay for this by Serbia
“... making vital decisions, because there are limits to patience and
self-restraint”. It is very symptomatic that the
official media published statements containing “earnest warnings” to President
Milosevic not to give in to Western demands. Predrag Bulatovic, one of the top
individuals of the Socialist
People’s Party of Montenegro, which is loyal to Milosevic, was publicly threatening
to Milosevic that “he will no longer be his president in case that he agrees to
accept foreign troops in Kosovo”, and pro-regime media in Serbia were extensively
reporting on this “impertinence” targeted at the leader of the nation. Not only on
the eve of NATO intervention, but also during the entire negotiating process in Paris,
Serbian television used hate speech to systematically promote patriotism as the
supreme social value. The sudden purge of all Western entertainment (except for “All
the President’s Men” type films) encouraged xenophobia and anti-American feelings.
On January 12, two and a half months prior to NATO intervention, the regime
declares to have found a “secret CIA document” proving alleged financing of
FRY’s citizens, “domestic traitors”, of independent media and non-governmental
organizations. In the most popular television hour of the state network, three
vice-presidents of the Serbian government on January 12, 1999, were “showing” to
the audience the “document” which was supposed not to have left any doubts in
regard to authenticity and verity. The most popular regime newspaper, Politika,
the day after wrote on its front page: “Revealed CIA document on bribing
political leaders, media, judges, and even members of election commissions”, and
published the speeches of vice-presidents on two of its pages.
The very same day other pro-regime dailies – Borba (“Dollars for imposing
democracy”), Vecernje novosti (“Price-list for democracy”) and Politika
ekspres (Scandalous price-list for treason of Serbia and FRY”) – took the same
direction. These media find “ordinary citizens” who add to the hatred against the
USA. “Wanted are the names, lists and – executions. An atmosphere of lynch is
spreading”.
However, independent media have very quickly and unequivocally proven that this
document was an ordinary (clumsily maid) forgery: it was available on the Internet
much earlier, and it is a not at all secret text, written by Daniel Serwer from the
Institute for Peace in Washington, in which he suggests an increase in the financial
support to opposition media, parties and non-governmental organizations in Serbia, and
it was only attached under the logo of CIA. It is clear that the purpose of such
propaganda in the midst of diplomatic efforts to find a solution for the Kosovo crisis
was, on the one hand, justification of the “inevitability” of conflict with the
West and, on the other, the removal – by spreading threats and fear – of all
political forces on the Serbian scene which would oppose this.
It seemed obvious that Milosevic connected war preparations with the action to
completely silence the alternative institutions and opinions which expressed
doubts in regard to the inevitability of confrontation with NATO. Official propaganda
showed also an attempt to compare Milosevic’s “historic NO” to the West with
Tito’s “historic NO” to Stalin in 1948, which then was a very risky move that
has separated Yugoslavia from the Soviet block and was accompanied with a repression
without precedence against Tito's pro-Stalinist opponents.
What
has Milosevic gained, and what has he lost through NATO intervention?
The outcome of NATO intervention and the
development of events till today show that, in spite of many blows (one of the hardest
ones certainly being the indictment of the Hague Tribunal), Milosevic managed to
accomplish a part of his aims, more or less as he anticipated when he opted for the
described hypothetical scenarios.
First and foremost, Milosevic
remained in power, perhaps even stronger
than before. When NATO campaign came
to an end, the citizens of Yugoslavia, exhausted with bombardments, saw on their TVs
the image of a pale and visibly exhausted dictator standing on one of the destroyed
bridges over the Danube in Novi SAD and promising a rapid reconstruction, talking
about Yugoslavia as the «most democratic state in the world». Expectations that the
intervention will bring substantial changes in Serbia did not become reality even one
year after NATO intervention. Milosevic has only strengthened his power, he
strengthened repression, violating the Constitution and without hesitation leading the
country into an increasingly strong dictatorship.
Second, he strengthened the public
feelings in Serbia against the West, mitigating his responsibility for previous
events. After the intervention, in the focus of Serbia's citizens were the damages and
civil victims of NATO bombardments. Problems of democratization and the deeper causes
of the Kosovo crisis, which were to a great extent linked to the undemocratic nature
of the Belgrade regime, were pushed to the second level of interest. Rare are voices,
even among democratically oriented forces, which condemn the long-lasting repression
and actions against Kosovo Albanians; now, after the withdrawal of Serb forces from
the province, in focus are Kosovo Albanians’ extremist behavior and revenge, which
confirmed the conviction that foreign military troops are unable to put an end to
this, and that they do not have good intentions in regard to Serbian interests. It is
safe to say that an unusually big number of Serbia's citizens is convinced that there
was no ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and that the causes for the growth in the number of
refugees is caused exclusively by NATO bombardments. There is a widespread opinion
that ethnic cleansing on a larger scale in Kosovo occurred only after NATO bombardment
that has very much increased the suffering of all citizens of FRY. Very few people
think that contemporary sufferings of Albanians, as a final part of the
seven-year-long tragedy whose author is Slobodan Milosevic, have led the West to
conclude (rightly, or wrongly, it does not matter) that the bombardment was the only
possible solution for the final stopping of the tragedy in Kosovo and in the territory
of former Yugoslavia.
Missing was the clarification of
basic questions: why did, actually, the Serbian leadership decide to enter
confrontation with NATO and expose the country to destruction greater than the one in
World War II, although it had the opportunity and possibility to avoid it through a
diplomatic process? How can any national value and interest be defended by agreeing to
destruction of the country when at the same time there is an absence of any realistic
chances to gain whatever advantage by entering this confrontation, either in regard to
Kosovo, or the general international position of the country? Likewise, it could not
be noticed that the Serbian opposition had in a clear manner posed maybe the crucial
question: even if by any chance the statement that all the arguments in the Kosovo
conflict are in favor of Serbia, and that the adversary is an aggressive and ruthless
alliance of Western countries, which is resolute in wanting to “take away” Kosovo
from Serbia in an non-legal manner and by force – is the acceptance of the
destruction of the country, with a simultaneous more than predictable loss of control
over Kosovo, an expression of “high statesmanship” and “courage” (as repeated
constantly by regime propaganda), or is it rather a cynical calculation motivated by
the desire to remain in power, with an ultimate despise in regard to the fate of the
entire population?
Third, the situation that emerged after NATO intervention made it easier
for Milosevic to suppress independent media and
the institutions of civil society. During and after the intervention, it was much
easier for the Serbian dictator to limit the influence of oppositional and independent
media, which he rightly sees as his most dangerous adversaries when it comes to
challenging his power. The state of war and the situation in the country after NATO
intervention gave him wings in implementation of the restrictive Information Act by
which he can, with assistance from the judiciary that depends on him, suffocate even
the financially most stable media. Thus, he created conditions to strengthen
pro-regime propaganda, which was to “explain” to the population the causes, and
consequences of NATO intervention and to intensify animosities with regard to the
foreign world (as indicated above, he was counting on these animosities when he
decided to start a conflict with the Western alliance). Because of such an attitude
with regard to media, a significant majority of Serbia's population remained
completely wrongly informed in regard to the essence of the developments in Kosovo.
Those citizens
who uncritically have relied only upon regime media were for a long time not in the
position to hear that NATO is leading the peace operations in Kosovo; that Serb forces
in Kosovo had committed massive crimes; that Serb refugees are leaving Kosovo in
worrying numbers; that the leadership of the Orthodox Church has asked Milosevic and
the entire ruling group to resign; that there is no possibility for any international
assistance for the reconstruction of FR Yugoslavia as long as Milosevic is leading the
country; that the European Union had additionally strengthened economic sanctions
against Yugoslavia by erecting a genuine «cordon
sanitaire», etc. The outcome of NATO intervention was proclaimed to be a victory
of Serbia. Along the tested totalitarian models, the people were divided into «patriots»
and «traitors», and the entire opposition was satanized and reduced to «Western
servants». In Serbia there is a deeply rooted conviction that air raids against
Yugoslavia have on a long-term basis reduced the chances and hopes that the country
could turn towards democratic development. Wavering of the opposition forces in
regard to articulation and conceptualization of an adequate platform for the removal
of Milosevic from power is still visible today, one year after the intervention, and
it confirms very much the soundness of such a conviction.
Fourth, the intervention of NATO has given Milosevic and his oligarchy a
good alibi for the catastrophic shape of the
Serbian economy, which was hopeless before the intervention as well. Moreover, the
destruction of the infrastructure has given the regime the opportunity to announce «reconstruction»,
with ritual openings of provisory renewed objects, and thus earn points in the public
that is already exhausted due to the extremely bad economic situation. With an
aggressive regime propaganda the population looses sight of the economic indicators,
which are definitely placing Serbia among the poorest European countries. Facts
published after NATO intervention show that the general damage inflicted to the
Yugoslav economy amounts to nearly 30 billon US dollars, that the domestic
product per capita in 1999 had fallen to 925
$, that the average monthly salary for November 1999 was 43$, although it could be
only 20$ if the available domestic product would be taken into account! The percentage of the population
considered to be living in poverty increased dramatically: from 33% in July 1998 to
63% in September 1999, where the poverty level includes all people with a monthly
income equivalent to US$ 60 or less (the figure does not include Kosovo).
Fifth, the outcome of NATO intervention and the solution for Kosovo
adopted by the UN Security Council has enabled Milosevic to remove from himself the responsibility for further
developments in Kosovo. With an image of a politician who has in a dignified
manner resisted to a stronger enemy, Milosevic escaped responsibility and
found himself in a relatively comfortable position of a critic of international forces
(KFOR and UNMIK), refusing any cooperation with them and searching for justification
of his attitudes in their failures and incapabilities to calm the local situation. The
fact that the solution of everyday problems in Kosovo is no longer within Serbian
jurisdiction, gives the Serbian dictator a chance to use his exponents and make the
mission of the international community more difficult, playing once again on the card
of the now genuinely existing endangerness of Serbia's population. This is gradually
accepted, and even the most influential opposition parties direct their energy towards
criticisms of failures of the international community in the post-war environment and
its inability to prevent exodus of Serbs, instead of pointing at this as a consequence
of a policy that has created the existing situation and instead of searching for
essential measures to organize resistance to the regime, or revealing Milosevic's
attempts to destabilize Kosovo «from a distance».
Sixth, NATO intervention against Yugoslavia provoked wide-ranging, still insufficiently evaluated, repercussions in the entire
international community. Milosevic's politics has created not only
crises in the relations USA-West Europe, USA-Russia and USA-China, but has to a great
extent also changed prospects for stabilization of the territory of Southeast Europe.
Milosevic is left in a position to destabilize through his activities the democratic
government in Montenegro, and, through his supporters, to make more difficult the
already complicated endeavor to stabilize Bosnia-Herzegovina - which he is still
permanently doing today, one year after NATO intervention. Prospects for the
stabilization of the Balkans after intervention do not seem better than was the case
before. A particularly dangerous aspect of
the problem is the existence of the otherwise justified indictment against Milosevic
and his closest men in the Hague Tribunal, which leaves a very narrow maneuvering
space for the Serbian dictator and is leading him to destructive actions that in the
future will maybe cost him his power, but not without a big price for the
stabilization of the Balkans and, especially, the internal development of Serbia.
Final remarks
We should not like to create an impression that we think that the international
community should not have prevented actions of the Serbian regime in Kosovo, which by
their unacceptability rightly provoked condemnation by a large portion of the world
democratic public. We think, however, that the Western alliance led by the USA has
failed – through mistakes performed during the campaign, and by numerous
inconsistencies into which it has fallen – to use the Kosovo case for a more
convincing proof that humanitarian interventions can be evaluated as a positive
achievement of the new international system that emerged after the end of the Cold
War. Seen from this optics, objections that NATO intervention against Yugoslavia was
not fully in compliance with international law to us do not seem as a sufficient and
unique answer to the problem. Objectively speaking, the Kosovo crisis could not have
been solved on the basis of positive international law and the UN Charter.
Serbian regime’s behavior - not only in
regard to the Kosovo crisis, but also
during the whole period of the Yugoslav crisis from 1991 to these days - constituted
much more serious violations of all applicable laws (internal and international). It
was an impudent challenge to all democratic achievements of the contemporary world,
and it has the predominant responsibility for thousands of deaths, wounded and
refugees. The
abuse of human rights by the Belgrade regime was not an “usual” or “average”
violation of human rights and they really threatened to undermine the values on which
the new Europe is being built. The
Belgrade regime’s plan was entirely unacceptable for the time we are living in: not
only to re-establish the public order in Kosovo (which could be considered as
acceptable) but – as was explicitly stated by the high ranking Serbian officials -
to empty Kosovo from the Albanians. Additionally,
Milosevic’s actions raised the specter of instability, threatened a spill over to
neighboring countries, including derailing the peace process in Bosnia.
Insisting on strict respect of an inoperable law (blocked by veto in the Security
Council whose practice was, par excellence, dominated by a Cold War mental approach)
does not seem to be the basis for the solution of the emerged humanitarian problems
and the Kosovo crisis. In the situation when there is no global readiness for
necessary change in the international legal system, it seems that western democracies
had no substantially different options. In any case, it is our view that refusing to
do something and accepting the UN blockade as an excuse would constitute also some
kind of violation of law, not to speak about the ethical aspect of the problem. Namely, the West – as a winner in the Cold War – is doing the same
thing the Allies had done after World War 2 by introducing Nuremberg rules (also without a basis in the then existing
international law), which were generally welcomed on the global level. From this
standpoint, it seems that their is no alternative in the future to humanitarian
interventions – with the aim to prevent behaviors that are not acceptable at the
contemporary level of democratic development and violation of human rights on a
massive scale.
A prior analysis, however, seems to confirm
the opinion that the entire endeavor to pacify Kosovo under the rule of the USA and
NATO in a manner that – as it was implemented
– did not contribute to the solution of the problem. Up to now the NATO led UN
forces (KFOR) and international civil administration (UNIMIK) have not succeeded
either in stopping the emigration of Serbs from Kosovo, or putting an end to
revanchism and terror of Albanians over Serbs and other non-Albanians, and did not
secure physical and legal security of all citizens of Kosovo. Similar to cases of
Iraq, Libya, Cuba or North Korea, the international community this time, too,
unfortunately did not find adequate ways to neutralize deviant regimes and malign
dictators. By hastily and schematically implementing political and military mechanisms
at its disposal it has in fact intensified the problem and made it more complicated,
leaving it still very far from a solution.
We do not go as
far as to say that Milosevic managed to outwit NATO and that, in essence, he came out
from the confrontation as a victor, all the more so because the price of his politics
has being dearly paid by the population of FR Yugoslavia itself during the last
decade. However, as can be seen from the above analysis, one cannot oversee the high
level of coincidence between the real developments on the political, diplomatic and
military levels during and after NATO intervention and the contents of hypothetical
scenarios of the Serbian dictator upon which he, in our view, relied when entering the
conflict. The outcome of the Kosovo conflict, at least in the contemporary phase,
seems to have coincided more with Milosevic's plans and predictions than with the
expectations of the Western alliance.
Although
it is very difficult to say what would have happened to Mr. Milosevic's power had
there not been NATO intervention, or in which direction would the internal
developments in Serbia have gone, it seems very probable that the space for his
maneuvers and provocative actions in the Balkans would be much narrower had the
Western alliance taken this challenge in a more persistent, gradual and cool-blooded
manner and had it, prior to intervention, used all the instruments at its disposal to
pressurize Milosevic - which, by the way, it began to use more actively only after
intervention (the personalization of sanctions, more active support to the opposition
to the regime and institutions of civil society, etc.). It is hard to escape the
impression that the influence upon the Serbian regime would have been more effective
had the diplomacies of the western allies, particularly the USA, not introduced
unusually much emotions, (very unusual in the history of US foreign policy).
Unnecessary media manipulations, the use of prohibited weapons and making naive and
clumsy moves on the military-strategic level (for instance, declaring in the midst of
the campaign that ground intervention in Yugoslavia is excluded, which has most
probably significantly prolonged the resistance of the Serbian regime and the
destruction of FR Yugoslavia) have to a great extent compromised the intervention
whose aims, in our view, do not seem to be controversial.
Besides, we are
convinced that even before NATO intervention it was necessary to think with much more
creativity and professionalism about an even tougher personalization in regard to
prosecuting the main culprits for developments in Kosovo and the entire region of the
former Yugoslavia, which has been done only partly by indictments against Mr.
Milosevic and his closest allies in the Hague Tribunal.
In our
view, such type of crisis as is the one in Kosovo – with a particularly accentuated
role of the individual actors – actually demanded a much more reliable analysis of
the personality of Slobodan Milosevic, of the technology of his regime and the method
in which he fights his adversaries, of his political culture and preferences in
political behavior. This will be necessary in the future, too, in the activities of
the international community aimed at democratization of the Balkans and Southeast
Europe, since – as things are now – in the foreseeable future Mr. Milosevic will remain the major and indisputable decision-maker in Serbia. It is a widely
spread view that his retreat from power and the establishment of a democratic regime
are a prerequisite for a normalization of the situation in the Balkans – however,
without taking into account his personality and political technology this will for a
long time remain only a correct evaluation, one that is not capable of changing the reality.
Belgrade – Copenhagen, May 2000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Research with
regard to the motivation and behavior of individual actors in international conflicts
faces, as a rule, major difficulties because it is impossible to establish for sure
the real psychological contents which influences the behavior of decision-makers and
the conflict itself. When it comes to the conflict between NATO (USA) with FR
Yugoslavia (Serbia) in regard to Kosovo, it would certainly be relevant to also
investigate – apart from the motivations and intentions of the Serbian dictator S.
Milosevic - whether, and to what extent, have certain elements of personal character
contributed to the behavior of the other conflicting party, or at least of the
decision-makers in the USA. This is mentioned because some of the critics of NATO
intervention in Yugoslavia have rather frequently spoken that the American President
Clinton might have had personal motivations to use the intervention in Yugoslavia for
pushing aside serious domestic political problems which he was facing because of the
Lewinsky scandal or, on the other hand, that the State Secretary M. Albright, due to
her East European origin and the publicly expressed scorn in regard to the regime in
Serbia, demonstrated a lack of impartiality when mediating/arbitrating in the
Albanian-Serbian conflict in Kosovo. See: Sciolino, E. and Bronner, E., The Road to
War: a Special Report, How a President, Distracted by Scandal, Entered Balkan War,
New York Times, 18 April 1999. However,
the aim of this paper is to contribute to the identification of the mainly political
and/or political-historical background of individual motivations of decision makers.
This should not imply that psychological motivations of U.S. individual actors in the
Kosovo conflict are unimportant. We only want to stress that due to institutional
barriers that are built into democratic political systems, they do not seem to be
decisive when it comes to strategic issues. (The
Lewinsky case could be seen also as a proof of democratic control – perhaps somewhat
exagerated and excentric – of individual behavior of the most responsible
politicians). Our confidence that individual and psychological factors were absent
and/or democratically controlled when it comes to the course of conduct of the
decision-makers in Serbia, however, is not equally strong.
I am relying
rather uneasily on the concept and the very term of “rational”, especially on
“rationality in politics”, being aware of numerous controversies connected to this
concept. It is known that the concept of the "rational" in defining human
social activity has substantially evolved in the philosophic and political thinking.
In the last century,
rationalism and scientism understood the human being as essentially rational, and
therefore believed that there are fixed patterns of human behavior; consequently, it
was assumed that in analyzing society the humanities should use methods comparable to
those of the natural sciences..The generation of sociologists who
emerged in the first decades of this century (Pareto, Weber, Parsons ….) doubted the
supposed rationality of human behavior revealing the significant emotional and
instinctive component of human behavior. More recently, although the concept of
irrationality continues to appeal to those who study human behavior, sociological
schools influenced by anthropology and economics have discarded irrationality because
they think all human activity had to be considered as rational. For some
anthropologists and social scientists, rationality and irrationality are merely
cultural concepts. Social behavior cannot be understood without a study from
"within" the social environment in which it has emerged. Therefore, all
human activity, including the mythic is
considered rational. Without entering into theoretical or philosophical discussions
about the rational or irrational essence of human behavior, we should therefore
conclude that in politics – especially if analyzing leaders behavior – as says María
Fernanda Arias - “the charismatic
element exists as a sociological category for analyzing those political phenomena in
which the leader-follower relationship involves strong doses of emotion and
mysticism.” Our use of the concept/term of
“rational” or “rationality in politics” is bounded in this work by the
meanings of the “rational” as “the
best choice” from the democratic optics, i.e. as “good” for the larger community
(people, nation, etc.) and not as a solution that could be described as “optimal”
or “the best solution” from the point of view of the personal interests and
whishes of the charismatic leader or non-charismatic “usurper”. .”
See: María Fernanda Arias “Charismatic Leadership and the Transition to
Democracy: The Rise of Carlos Saúl Menem
in Argentine Politics” , Texas
Papers on Latin America, Paper No. 95-02,
Catholic University of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 1998, http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/ilas/tpla/9502.html;
Johnson, P.E., Rational Actors Versus Adaptive Agents: Social Science Implications, Dept. of Political Science, University of
Kansas, 1997, http://lark.cc.ukans.edu/~pauljohn/ResearchPapers/APSA98-MTHDS/APSA98-Methods.html;
Putnam, H., Reason, Truth and History.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1981, etc.
The syntagmas «diplomacy of FR Yugoslavia» and «foreign policy of Yugoslavia» do not make much
sense, because the two only federal units that constitute FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) have diametrically opposite standpoints with regard to the international
environment and the strategic directions on which the foreign policy and diplomacy of
the country should be based. When we use them, we think of the foreign
policy/diplomacy personified by FR Yugoslavia's President, Mr. Milosevic and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a part of the Federal Government which is not
recognized by Montenegro. For more details - Vatroslav
Vekaric, Critical Assessment of the Achievements of FR Yugoslavia’s Foreign Policy and
Diplomacy, International Studies Association 40th Annual Convention,
16-20 February 1999, Washington, DC, Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO),
http://www.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/confsite1frm.html
Mirko Tepavac: “Od Gazimestana do Rambujea”, Republika, br.207, Belgrade, 1999,
p.6
For a broader
analysis consult: Vekaric, V. , Protests in FR Yugoslavia: Causes and Prospects,
CSS Survey, Belgrade, Center for Strategic Studies, December 1997
Pesic-Golubovic, Z., Stanje i perspektiva demokratije u SR Jugoslaviji, Filozofske, antropoloske i socijalno-teorijske pretpostavke razumevanja drustvenih promena, Filozofija i drustvo, Belgrade, 1997. http://institut.instifdt.bg.ac.yu/casopisi/fid/xiv/08ank.htm
Zirojevic, O., Kosovo u kolektivnom pamcenju («Kosovo Within Collective Memory») in: Srpska strana rata (Serbian Side of the War), Republika-Vikom Grafik, Belgrade-Zrenjanin, 1996, p.229
Vekaric, V. Public Perception of the World as an Element of
Civil Consciousness, Center for Strategic Studies, Belgrade, November 1997,
(mimeographed), p. 53
As an example
which supports this statement one could take, on the one hand, the extreme
unreliability of Milosevic’s promises in negotiating with international mediators.
Many testimonies of participants in these negotiations illustrate disregard for given
words as a constant element of his conduct. On the other hand, experience of
negotiators with the Serbian dictator shows that he is highly impressed by
“arguments of force” and arguments that pertain to his power, more than arguments
of any other kind (political, ethical, etc.). Elie Wiesel wrote: “I know Milosevic.
I met him during the war in Bosnia, first at an international conference on Bosnia in
London and later in Belgrade. I have spoken with officials and journalists who knew
him well. Their analyses confirmed my impression of the man: a cold blooded cynic who
never kept a promise, except when it was in his own best interest. His extremist
political philosophy remained cloaked in facile patriotism. It is no accident that he
is nicknamed "the butcher." He is ruthless with those who stand in his way.
A fanatic, like most dictators whose argument is terror, he believes that the end
always justifies the means. That is why he rejected Richard Holbrooke's last minute
efforts to save peace and Yevgeny Primakov's attempts to stop the hostilities: he is
determined to consistently defy the international community's quest for a peaceful
solution. He is not interested in peace, but absolute domination. See: Elie Wiesel: “The
Question of Genocide”, Newsweek, April 12, 1999., p.16.
Father Sava, the
deputy abbot of the Decani Monastery and the secretary of the Raska-Prizren bishop of
the Serb Orthodox Church Artemije says: “The Serb Church has said what is necessary:
president Milosevic's regime must depart from Serbia forever and a modern democratic
society must be established. Otherwise, the curse which has been following the Serb
people with president Milosevic's regime will continue to sow evil both in Serbia and
Montenegro. We can expect even greater suffering, years spent in poverty, uncertainty,
and isolation. Simply, there is no future for the Serb people, nor the whole region of
South Eastern Europe as long as such dictatorship survives in Belgrade.”, NIN,
Belgrade, 7 August, 1999
The question of
state unity with Serbia was an important issue ever since 1918, when the “Whites”
(Unionists) won over the “Greens” (Independentists). Although there are no
reliable opinion polls in Montenegro showing the attitudes of the population with
regard to state unity with Serbia, there are indications that during the last few
years the “Greens” are gaining in strength, particularly after NATO intervention
against Yugoslavia, which, in the view of the present Montenegrin leadership, could
have been avoided.
Despite these
sympathies, Serbian opposition parties, as well as the broader public in Serbia, do
not support separation of Montenegro from Yugoslavia; they think that basically the
democratization of FR Yugoslavia would remove the reasons which are now leading
Montenegro to think about independence.
Rakic, V.: The Failure of Democratic Transition In Serbia, IRES, Belgrade,1994
Sarinic's last adventures in the land of the Serb
aggressor, Bosnia Report, New Series No. 9/10 April-July 1999 http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/aprjul99/sarinics.ht
United States Information Agency, Kosovo, Hronologija
nedavnog etničkog ciscenja - Pre pocetka NATO napada, http://www.kosovo.usia.co.at/serbian/report/cronol.htm
Hronologija kosovske krize, Dani – Vanredno izdanje, 2 April 1999, Sarajevo, http://www.soros.org.ba/~dani/arhiva/1999/98spec/spec7a.htm
International Crisis Group: Milosevic's Aims in War and Diplomacy, Belgrade-Podgorica, 12 May 1999,
http://www.crisisweb.org/
Blic NEWS MAGAZIN,
Belgrade, No.14, 2 February, 2000, p. 10
Zakljucci Narodne Skupstine Republike Srbije, Ministarstvo inostranih poslova SRJ, Bilten vesti, Posebno izdanje - Belgrade, 23. mart 1999 http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Bilteni/Srpski/si230399_5_s.html
Popov, N.,
Dramatizacija krize: osvescivanje i raspamecivanje, Republika, No. 206, Belgrade, 1999,
p. 6
Dimitrijevic, V. Analyse: Seule la democratie subira des dommages, Institute for War
& Peace Reporting – Belgrade, Rapport sur les crises dans les Balkans n°13, 31
mars 1999
|