Tuesday, October 11, 1994

By Lally Weymouth

" Having in effect occupied the neighboring independent republic of Georgia, the Russians are now endeavoring to expand their influence to another former Soviet colony-Azerbaijan.

Moscow's goals in Azerbaijan include reintroducing troops, reestablishing a military base, controlling the oil reserves and manning the frontiers. Thus, the Clinton administration must decide what to do about the ex-Soviet republic -whether to bow to Moscow's wishes or help Azerbaijan remain independent. It is, says Jack Maresca, the former high level negotiator for the region, a test case for U.S.-Russian relations.

Azerbaijan differs from the other ex-Soviet republics in two important ways: First, there are no Russian ground troops stationed there, second, while Moscow can argue that in Georgia and other republics there's no one else to conduct peace-keeping operations, in Azerbaijan the basis for an international peace-keeping force already exists.

It was created in response to the continuing strife with Armenia. Two years ago, the international "Minsk Group" of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) reached an agreement to send monitors to the area. And just this year, the CSCE expanded this agreement to include an international peace-keeping force for the region.

While the United States, under this arrangement, would not be required to send ground troops, Washington has offered to contribute logistical equipment, funds and monitors. The United States would also pick up some 9 percent of the CSCE peace-keeping costs. (If a U.N. force were dispatched to the area, 33 percent of the expenses would be billed to Washington.)

But since the CSCE effort got underway, the Russians have consistently attempted to block its implementation-setting up their own negotiating track and ultimately advancing an offer for a separate Russian or CIS "peace-keeping" force.

Understandably, the Azerbaijanis are adamantly opposed to the Russian plan, seeing it as a means by which Moscow would reestablish its primacy in their country.

Since the collapse of the Soviet empire, political life in Azerbaijan has been chaotic. Back in June 1992, an election was held and the Azerbaijanis elected Abulfez Elchibey president. A close ally of Turkey, he was distrusted by the Russians. Elchibey attempted to assert his independence from Moscow by encouraging the CSCE group to find a solution to the brutal and long-lasting Nagorno Karabakh conflict- the battle between his country and Armenia. He also sought to complete a deal between oil-rich Azerbaijan and Western oil companies.

In Russia's eyes, he went too far. Just as the president was getting close to initialing the oil agreement in London, he was overthrown in a coup engineered by a renegade warlord who enjoyed close ties to the Russian military- Suret Husseinov. Indeed, the coup was reportedly financed and supported by Moscow, which continues to see the Caucasus as part of its "sphere of influence."

A power struggle ensued during which a former KGB general and Communist Party boss, Haidar Aliyev, emerged as president, with Husseinov as prime minister. But since then, Aliyev has gradually transformed himself from Communist Party apparatchix into a nationalist leader, cleverly balancing external and internal forces and pressures.

Under him, nevertheless, the military situation continued to deteriorate. In addition to securing full control of the disputed province of Nagorno Karabakh, the Armenians managed to seize about one-fourth of Azeri territory. It's widely believed that Russia has been supporting the Armenians, even providing them arms.

Meanwhile, Moscow repeatedly warned Azerbaijan's government not to sign the proposed oil deal, in spite of the fact that Aliyev granted Russia a 10 percent share of it. But Aliyev went ahead and signed an agreement Sept. 20 with a consortium that included Amoco and Pennzoil - thus potentially moving closer to the West.

In reaction, the Russians actually issued diplomatic notes to the British, cling for talks on the future of the Caspian Sea and its resources, and demanding an equal share of benefits from the sea- including Azerbaijan's oil.

Undaunted by the Russians, Aliyev set off to visit the United States in September. On the very day a dinner was being hosted to celebrate the signing of the oil agreement- with U.S. officials and representatives of the oil companies as guests- Aliyev received news that two high level officials in his government had been assassinated in Baku.

Those who see a Russian hand in these slayings claim they were meant to serve as a warning both to the Azeri parliamentarians and to Aliyev himself. When Aliyev returned to Baku, he discovered a coup in the making in one of Azerbaijan's largest cities, Ganje. There was also trouble in Baku, where groups of special forces trained by the KGB as well as private forces loyal to the deputy interior minister, Rushen Jevadov, clashed with troops loyal to Aliyev.

The president went on TV, rallying people to his side. Although he "forgave" Jevadov, Aliyev subsequently fired Prime Minister Husseinov holding him responsible for the unrest. There's no smoking gun, to be sure. but Moscow's complicity is impossible to doubt. To increase the pressure on Azerbaijan, Russia is also trying to amend the ceding on tanks armored personnel carriers and short-range artillery that it agreed to when it signed the Conventional Forces Agreement (CFE). These changes would enable Moscow to deploy forces along Azerbaijan's northern frontier.

Washington would be wise to take a firm stand on the question of Azerbaijan's independence. It's time to put a stop to Russian expansionism, to cease turning a blind eye to the Caucasus. If Russia reestablishes its primacy in former Soviet provinces, hard-liners in Moscow will be strengthened and emboldened. Having abandoned Georgia, the administration cannot turn its back on Azerbaijan, where even a former Communist apparatchik is willing to fight Moscow. If he's up to the challenge, surely Washington ought to be. "