U.S. Responsibility for the Coup in Chile
Daniel Brandt
Author's note, November 28, 1998:
Recent news reports tell us that some U.S. officials want to pursue an
extradition request for Pinochet, because of the junta's role in the
assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington DC, in September 1976.
Other reports indicate that if Spain ends up pursuing its case against
Pinochet, their investigators will come to the U.S. and petition
officials for CIA and other documents about Chile.
Meanwhile, only an occasional news report in the U.S. even bothers to
acknowledge our role in Chilean affairs. Pinochet took tea with his
friend Margaret Thatcher just before he was arrested in Britain, and
it's safe to assume that Henry Kissinger will get involved if this
thing goes much farther. As Henry's Rolodex spins, so spins our media.
It will be interesting to see how major U.S. players come down on the
issue of the globalization of human rights, as personified so
dramatically in the current Pinochet affair. But it will be much more
instructive if one has a bit more background on the U.S. role in
Chile.
Accordingly, I dug out a paper I wrote in 1975,[1] and keyed in two
sections. The first section is on U.S. economic policy in Chile, and
the second is on U.S. covert activities in Chile. They may seem
disjointed, having been ripped from the context of the paper, but that
context is unimportant today. Moreover, it was contrived primarily to
justify the research I wanted to do for these sections.
Note that Michael Townley is mentioned at one point, and this was
nearly a year before he became a key participant in the Letelier
assassination. Townley's activities were noted in one tiny publication
more than two years before the assassination, and in several
additional tiny publications one year before. The truth was out there,
but you needed a shovel to find it.
What was the major media's response right after the assassination?
Predictable. The FBI started searching for a jealous mistress, and
Newsweek's Periscope column announced authoritatively that the CIA
"has concluded that the Chilean secret police were not involved in the
death of Orlando Letelier." The New York Times editorialized that it
was an open question whether the assassination had been committed "by
the government of Chile or by leftist extremists who will stop at
nothing to heap discredit" on the Chilean junta. Business as usual for
our major media.
If Pinochet goes to trial in Spain, expect more of the same.
U.S. Responsibility for the Coup in Chile
I. U.S. Economic Policy in Chile
At the end of 1968, according to Department of Commerce data, U.S.
corporate holdings in Chile amounted to $964 million. During that
year, U.S. corporations averaged 17.4 percent profit on invested
capital, and mining enterprises alone turned an average of 26
percent.[2] Copper companies, notably Anaconda and Kennecott,
accounted for 28 percent of U.S. holdings, but ITT had the largest
holding of any single corporation with an investment of $200
million.[3] Chilean copper accounts for 21 percent of the world's
proven copper reserves, and demand is expected to increase. Laura
Allende recently stated in San Francisco that "over a 42 year period
the copper companies earned $420 billion on original investments
totalling $35 million."[4]
Before Allende's election, ITT channeled $700,000 to Allende's
opponent Jorge Allesandri, and used the advice of the CIA on how to
channel this money safely.[5] They also compiled a list of leading
U.S. corporations in Chile in February, 1970, and through John McCone
(CIA director, 1961-1965, and now on the ITT board), ITT president
Harold Geneen offered $1 million to the CIA to help defeat Allende.[6]
ITT was not the only participant at this early stage. ITT
vice-president William R. Merriam testified that he assembled a
committee of representatives of U.S. corporations in February, 1971 to
work out an anti-Allende strategy.[7] The "united front" began after
Allende's election, and included Treasury Secretary John Connally and
his assistant John Hennessy (a man with solid Wall Street
connections).[8] But there is evidence that other corporations were
independently conspiracy-minded at an earlier date:
The weight of evidence available from the ITT papers and other
sources indicates that Anaconda helped finance a campaign of
disruption before the election, and that it also joined with
Kennecott in what was effectively sabotage in the copper mines.
Ralston Purina cut back production sharply. NIBSA, the leading
producers of brass valves and other fittings, a subsidiary of
Northern Indiana Brass Company, shut down its plant and laid off 280
workers the day before Allende's inauguration. A representative of
the parent company, Northern Indiana Brass, was accused of
suggesting an "Indonesian solution" (killing all communists) for
Chile. Purina, a subsidiary of Ralston Purina and the country's
largest producer of animal feed, also cut production sharply.[9]
After Allende's election in 1970, commercial banks, including Chase
Manhattan, Chemical, First National City, Manufacturers Hanover, and
Morgan Guaranty, cancelled credits to Chile.[10] In 1972, Kennecott
tied up Chilean copper exports with lawsuits in France, Sweden, Italy,
and Germany, forcing Chile to spend $150,000 in legal expenses.[11]
The campaign continued even after Allende agreed, in February 1972, to
pay a Kennecott subsidiary $84 million and made a down payment of $5.7
million.[12]
Immediately after the 1973 coup, Manufacturers Hanover loaned $44
million to Chile, and ten other U.S. and two Canadian banks loaned
$150 million.[13] In 1975 a group of banks that included First
National City, Bank of America, Morgan Guaranty, and Chemical gave a
$70 million renewable credit to Chile.[14] Ford, GM, Chrysler, and six
other firms placed bids for a massive reorganization and expansion of
the Chilean auto assembly industry,[15] and ITT gave $25 million for a
planned science research center.[16] All 323 firms that were
nationalized constitutionally under Allende have been returned to
private ownership.[17] ITT, which asked for $95 million from Allende,
has recovered $235 million from the junta.[18]
In addition to multinationals and commercial banks, the U.S.
government also involved itself in the economic boycott. The
involvement of the government was partly a result of massive pressure
from ITT, which had access to Kissinger, William Rogers, the CIA, and
the U.S. Ambassador in Chile.[19] Geneen met with CIA Chief of
Clandestine Operations for the Western Hemisphere Division William V.
Broe on July 16, 1970,[20] and with Nixon's assistant for
international affairs Peter Peterson in September, 1971.[21] Merriam
visited the State Department 25 times and talked with Kissinger and
his aides for a year, according to his testimony,[22] and on October
1, 1971 wrote to Peterson suggesting that the administration halt
economic aid to Chile.[23]
Nixon's new economic policy, introduced in August, 1971, shifted
responsibility for the formulation of economic policy toward Chile
from the State Department to the Treasury Department. In addition to
Connally and his assistant John Hennessy (formerly general manager of
the First National City Bank in Lima and LaPaz), other Treasury
officials in on the anti-Chile action were: John R. Petty, formerly a
vice-president of Chase Manhattan Bank and now a partner of Lehman
Brothers; Paul A. Volcker, formerly an executive of Chase Manhattan;
Charls E. Walker, formerly special assistant to the president of the
Republic National Bank of Dallas and former executive vice-president
and chief lobbyist of the American Bankers Association.[24] By
October, 1971, the State Department also took the hard Treasury line.
In a closed meeting with representatives of ITT, Ford, Anaconda,
Ralston Purina, First National City bank, and Bank of America, William
Rogers stated that the U.S. would cut off aid unless Chile provided
prompt compensation.[25]
After 1970, the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, Agency
for International Development, and the Export-Import Bank either cut
programs in Chile or cancelled credits.[26] The Allende government
continued to pay off old loans from the IDB and the World Bank, but
neither made new loans to Chile. The only exceptions were IDB loans to
Catholic University and Austral University; both universities were
strongholds of anti-Allende activity.[27] A week before the coup the
U.S. refused credits for Chile's purchase of 300,000 tons of
wheat.[28] Chile had been importing half of the amount annually for
several years prior to 1970, but in 1971 and 1972 U.S. exports to
Chile declined to negligible amounts.[29] On October 5, 1973 the junta
was granted 120,000 tons of wheat credits.[30] AID, IDB, International
Monetary Fund, and the World Bank were all involved in extensive
refinancing and guarantees of the Chilean debt by early 1975.[31]
Chile's foreign-exchange reserves fell from $335 million in November,
1970 to $100 million by the end of 1971, and in August, 1972, Chile
became the first country in the International Monetary Fund to
completely exhaust its Special Drawing Rights.[32] By this time
Chile's imports had declined, and the percentage of total imports from
the U.S. dropped from 40 percent to about 15 percent.[33] In December,
1972, Allende spoke to the U.N. General Assembly and complained of
Chile's inability to purchase food, medicine, equipment, and spare
parts.[34] Almost one-third of the privately-owned microbuses, taxis,
and state-owned buses had been immobilized by early 1972 because of
the lack of spare parts. The scarcity of parts also fueled the
truckers' strike, which in turn provoked more economic chaos.[35]
The economic boycott did not include aid to the Chilean military. On
the contrary -- military aid to Chile, which has always been
substantial, doubled in the 1970-1974 period as compared to the
previous four years.[36] In addition to the direct sale of arms, over
4,000 Chilean military officers have received training in the U.S. and
the Canal Zone over the past twenty years.[37] General Pinochet,
Gustavo Leigh (Air Force), Admiral Toribio Merino (Navy), and General
Cesar Mendoza (Carabineros) have all spent time in the U.S.,[38] and
over the past decade U.S. military personnel in Chile averaged about
48.[39] Fred Landis, a researcher on Chile, describes some features of
the counter-insurgency training program offered by the U.S.:
While undergoing their training they were told that there is an
international communist conspiracy to take over the world. As a
regular part of their training program, foreign officers are
required to give an oral presentation on how the communist
conspiracy applies to their own country. They read instruction
manuals prepared jointly by the Pentagon and the USIA which included
the official U.S. version of what happened in Indonesia in 1965 as a
warning [i.e., a communist plot to take over the government].[40]
But the corporations and the U.S. government were not content with
mere economic pressure and support for the Chilean military. The
economic measures after 1970 must be seen against the background of a
more direct intervention in Chile's internal affairs since 1964.
II. U.S. Covert Activities in Chile
In the U.S., Project Camelot began in 1963 with a budget of $8 million
for the first year. It was initially sponsored by a Pentagon
department called the Advanced Research Projects Agency, but it soon
shifted to CIA control. As part of Project Camelot, researchers were
sent to Chile and other Latin American countries with questionnaires
that polled attitudes on politics. In the 1964 election of Allende
against Eduardo Frei, the CIA had computerized these and other
attitude studies for an intensive ad campaign. The known fears and
anxieties of the target group were connected with communism:
The themes and images were outlined by the CIA, but were actually
implemented by the ad agencies of McCann-Erickson and J. Walter
Thompson, which ran Frei's campaign. Women were told that if Allende
were elected, their children would be sent to Cuba, and their
husbands would be sent to concentration camps. On election day women
voted as expected.[41]
A U.S. firm under contract to Project Camelot, Abt Associates,
developed a simulation game called Politica, which was purchased by
the Pentagon in 1966. Politica is fed information from a computer that
links the files of the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the State
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Crisis situations
are simulated and used in the training of Third World police officials
at the army's Military Police Training School at Fort Gordon, Georgia.
Such a simulation may have eventually played a role in anti-Allende
strategy in Chile.[42] It is known that Rand Corporation sponsored
in-depth studies of Chilean women and farmers between 1970 and 1973,
which were identified by the CIA as the key anti-Allende factions.[43]
The CIA spent more than $2.6 million on Frei's successful campaign in
1964, and $175,000 in 1965 for the support of 22 congressional
candidates, according to the Senate Intelligence Committee.[44] Other
estimates place CIA expenditures in 1964 at $20 million.[45] Even $2.6
million becomes an outrageously high figure when compared to U.S.
campaigns on a per capita basis. Philip Agee reports that a CIA
colleague told him in 1964 that "we are spending money in the Chilean
election practically like we did in Brazil two years ago."[46]
Another form of direct intervention in Chile was sponsored by the
American Institute for Free Labor Development. Funded by AID and
controlled by the CIA, AIFLD trains potential labor leaders in the
techniques of anti-communist and pro-management labor organizing.
AIFLD trainees are given generous stipends for themselves and their
families, which continue for nine months after they return to Latin
America from the AIFLD school in Front Royal, Virginia.[47] From 1962
to 1972, 79 Chileans graduated from this school, and another 8,837
received training in seminars conducted in Chile. In a six-month span
following 1972, another 29 Chileans graduated from Front Royal, an
increase of almost 400 percent.[48] During the economic boycott, AID
continued to provide funds for AIFLD, while cutting most other forms
of aid to Chile.[49]
AIFLD cooperates with the Chilean Maritime Federation (COMACH), a
union with strong connections to the Chilean navy. Naval officers were
prominent in the coup leadership in Valparaiso, the first city to fall
in 1973.[50] The Confederation of Chilean Professionals (CUPROCH), a
union that was formed in May, 1971 with AIFLD assistance, was
instrumental in the right-wing strikes that precipitated the coup.[51]
After the junta took power, the AIFLD program in Chile doubled,[52]
and in January, 1974 the junta arranged for a meeting of 26 small
AIFLD-connected unions and called it the Chilean National Workers
Confederation. All other labor organizing is now illegal in Chile.[53]
U.S. planning for the 1970 election began in June, 1970, when the
Forty Committee met on Chile and Richard Helms promised John McCone
$400,000 of CIA funds to assist the anti-Allende news media.[54] The
CIA also contributed $1 million to Allende's opponents.[55] Allende's
election went to the Chilean congress sitting as an electoral college,
where an additional $350,000 was paid out by the CIA in an attempt to
buy votes.[56]
After Allende's victory, Nixon, Kissinger, Helms, and John Mitchell
met on September 15, 1970. Helms came from that meeting with the
impression that "Nixon wanted a plan for action that would include a
military coup and a broad-based destabilization effort that would
'make the economy scream.'" Helms' notes of the session read, "Not
concerned with risks involved. Full time job -- best men we have."[57]
An additional $6 million was spent over the next three years,[58]
including $1.5 million to rightist candidates in the March, 1973
congressional election.[59] The grand total of $8 to $11 million spend
by the CIA since 1970 may have been worth $40 to $50 million after
being funneled through the black market.[60]
On the day that Helms received his instructions from Nixon, the owner
of El Mercurio, wealthy Chilean businessman Agustin Edwards, conferred
with top officials of the Nixon administration.[61] The El Mercurio
network consists of newspapers, radio station, ad agencies, and a wire
service; it dominates the Chilean media in audience, size, and
prestige, and includes the three principal newspapers of Santiago and
seven provincial papers.[62] In the seven-month period from September
9, 1971 to April 11, 1972 the CIA spent $1.5 million on El
Mercurio,[63] but the funding also preceded and followed this period.
El Mercurio may have been the recipient of almost half of the total
CIA expenditures in Chile since 1970.[64] In addition to the sort of
ads that were used successfully in the 1964 campaign, CIA funding also
sponsored mailings before the election of forged Popular Unity
stationery to hundreds of thousands of voters. These mailings asked
voters to list household goods and indicate whether they would be
willing to share with the poor after the election.[65] The CIA even
purchased a radio station for the right-wing.[66] The El Mercurio
network was used by the CIA to "launder propaganda, disinformation,
fake themes and scare stories which were then circulated through 70
percent of the Chilean press and 90 percent of the Chilean radio. The
USIA and the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) in turn
circulated these stories all over the world."[67] CIA agents at El
Mercurio included Enno Hobbing, Alvaro Puga, and Juraj Domic.[68]
The CIA helped finance truckers' strikes in 1972 and June, 1973,
probably through the International Transport Workers Federation,[69]
and may have had a hand in funding, training, and arming the Patria y
Libertad, an extreme right-wing party in Chile.[70] Michael Townley, a
former Peace Corp volunteer in Chile recruited by the CIA, directed
groups of Patria y Libertad to paint "Djakarta is approaching" slogans
all over Santiago immediately before the coup.[71] CIA money also
subsidized a strike of middle-class shopkeepers and a taxi strike in
the summer of 1973.[72]
At 2 a.m. on October 22, 1970, some Chilean army officers picked up
three submachine guns and ammunition from the military attache at the
U.S. Embassy in Santiago with the intention of kidnapping General Rene
Schneider.[73] Schneider was the commander-in-chief of the Chilean
army, and "one of the few strict constitutionalists in the upper
ranks."[74] Six hours later the officers ambushed Schneider's car and
killed him, apparently when he drew his own gun.[75]
Fred Landis spent time in Chile after the coup collecting information,
and accuses the CIA of "blowing up bridges, railway lines, and killing
people" shortly before the coup.[76] The idea was to increase pressure
on the military to act. There were 40 terrorist attacks daily in
Santiago provinces alone,[77] which gave the military an excuse to
enforce the Weapons Act with massive searches for leftist arms in the
weeks before the coup (somehow the right-wing arms were ignored).
Women demonstrated at army barracks to get some action, and threw corn
and feathers at officers and called them chicken.[78] The army was
tense and exhausted by the time Plan Z was unveiled in August, 1973.
Plan Z was a leftist plan to liquidate the armed forces and their
families (6,000 in Valparaiso alone). "The document was personalized,
using a computer so that each officer found on the copy shown him his
name among the list of intended victims as well as the names of all
his children."[79] Landis and Philip Agee both feel that the CIA had
something to do with concocting Plan Z.[80]
CIA presence in Chile was substantial before the coup. Almost
one-third of the staff at the U.S. Embassy in Santiago were on the CIA
payroll.[81] The list so far includes Frederick Purdy;[82] John
Isaminger;[83] Raymond Alfred Warren;[84] Deane Roesch Hinton, Harry
W. Shlaudeman, Daniel N. Arzac, James E. Anderson, John B. Tipton,
Arnold M. Isaacs, Frederick W. Latrash, Joseph F. McManus, Keith W.
Wheelock, and Donald H. Winters.[85] A U.S. Foreign Service officer
told Richard Fagen in 1972 that the Embassy had succeeded in
infiltrating all parties of the Popular Unity coalition except MIR
(Movement of the Revolutionary Left);[86] this was confirmed by
Colby's secret testimony in October, 1973.[87] The Embassy also proved
less than helpful to endangered U.S. citizens after the coup.[88]
Finally, there is some evidence of U.S. complicity of a more
circumstantial nature. On May 20, 1973, a member of the U.S. Embassy
met at 1 a.m. on a navy cruiser in the port of Arica with "the high
command of the navy and various officers of high rank in the northern
army division," and in the months of June and July a U.S. Naval
Intelligence officer accompanied every ship of the Chilean fleet.[89]
U.S. warships stood by off the coast of Valparaiso to give symbolic
support for the military insurgents.[90] Three Chilean right-wing
leaders traveled to Washington prior to the abortive coup attempt in
June, 1973, and U.S. Ambassador Nathaniel Davis met with Kissinger
several days before the September coup.[91]
1. Daniel Brandt, "Leftist Christians in Chile and the Coup of 1973:
Lessons for Future Leftist Movements," December 1975. Berkeley,
Calif.: Graduate Theological Union. This paper was written for a
course taught by Robert McAfee Brown.
2. "U.S. Sabotage of the Chilean Economy," The Militant, 37 (28
September 1973), p. 4.
3. Dick Roberts, "U.S. Imperialism's Stake in Chile Coup,"
The Militant, 37 (19 October 1973), p. WO/3.
4. Alan Burfford, "'Struggle With Valor and Without Tears,'"
Berkeley Barb, No.534 (7-13 November 1975), p. 5.
5. "Ten Years of U.S. Intrigue in Chile," San Francisco Chronicle,
5 December 1975, p. 1.
6. "U.S. Sabotage of the Chilean Economy," p. 4.
7. Ibid.
8. Laurence Birns, "The Demise of a Constitutional Society." In The
End of Chilean Democracy: An IDOC Dossier on the Coup and its
Aftermath (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), p. 26.
9. Gary MacEoin, No Peaceful Way: Chile's Struggle for Dignity
(New York: Sheed and Ward, Inc., 1974), pp. 91-2.
10. Ibid., pp. 95-100.
11. John M. Swomley, Jr. "The Political Power of Multinational
Corporations," Christian Century, 91 (25 September 1974), p. 881.
12. "U.S. Sabotage of the Chilean Economy," p. 4.
13. Jonathan Kandell, "Private U.S. Loan in Chile Up Sharply,"
New York Times (12 November 1973); reprinted in Birns, p. 193.
14. "Chile: Missing Persons," Time (18 August 1975), p. 31.
15. Rod Larsen, "Big Auto Sets Up Shop in Chile; Layoffs in U.S.,"
New American Movement, 4 (June 1975), p. 11.
16. Signe Burke Goldstein, "Demonstrators Challenge ITT," New American
Movement, 4 (June 1975), p. 11.
17. "Junta Hands Back Firms; Refugees Stream From Chile," Guardian,
27 (25 June 1975), p. 10.
18. Mark Day, "Terror Increases in Chile as Opposition Movement Grows,"
Los Angeles Free Press, 12 (7 March 1975), p. 23.
19. MacEoin, p. 64.
20. Ibid., p. 67.
21. Swomley, p. 881.
22. MacEoin, p. 67.
23. Swomley, p. 881.
24. Joseph Collins, "Tightening the Financial Knot," in Birns, pp. 181-2.
25. Ibid., p. 182.
26. MacEoin, pp. 95-100.
27. Collins, p. 185-6.
28. Tad Szulc, "The View from Langley," Washington Post (21 October
1973); reprinted in Birns, p. 155-6.
29. Birns, p. 196.
30. Szulc, pp. 155-6.
31. Larsen, p. 1.
32. "U.S. Sabotage of the Chilean Economy," p. 4.
33. Collins, p. 185.
34. "U.S. Sabotage of the Chilean Economy," p. 4.
35. Collins, p. 185.
36. North American Congress on Latin America, "Chile: The Story Behind
the Coup," Latin America and Empire Report, 7 (October 1973), p. 8.
37. Ibid., p. 9.
38. Ibid.
39. MacEoin, p. 151.
40. Fred Landis, "Psychological Warfare in Chile: The CIA Makes
Headlines," Liberation, 19 (March-April 1975), p. 31.
41. Ibid., p. 22.
42. Sid Blumenthal, "Politica: The Secret Government Strategy to
Change the World," Oui, 4 (December 1975), pp. 56-8, 134.
43. Ibid., p. 58.
44. "Ten Years of U.S. Intrigue in Chile," p. 16.
45. "U.S. Sabotage of the Chilean Economy," p. 4; Blumenthal, p. 58.
46. Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary (Harmondsworth,
Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 382.
47. Fred Hirsch, An Analysis of our AFL-CIO Role in Latin America or
Under the Covers with the CIA (San Jose, Calif.: published by the
author and the Emergency Committee to Defend Democracy in Chile,
1974), p. 3.
48. Hirsch, p. 33; NACLA, "Chile: The Story Behind the Coup," p. 11.
49. Hirsch, p. 33.
50. Ibid., p. 35.
51. Ibid., pp. 36-42.
52. Tim Nesbitt, "Unionists Respond to AFL-CIO Links," New American
Movement, 4 (October 1974), p. 6.
53. Hirsch, p. 41-2.
54. MacEoin, p. 68; Szulc, p. 158.
55. "The CIA's New Bay of Bucks," Newsweek (23 September 1974), p. 51.
56. Ruth Needleman, "CIA Role in Chile Exposed," Guardian, 26 (18
September 1974), p. 15.
57. David M. Alpern, et.al., "The CIA's Hit List," Newsweek (1
December 1975), p. 30.
58. "The CIA's New Bay of Bucks," p. 51.
59. Needleman, p. 15.
60. Richard R. Fagen, "The Intrigues Before Allende Fell," Los Angeles
Times (6 October 1974), part 8, p. 1.
61. "Ten Years of U.S. Intrigue in Chile," p. 1.
62. Landis, p. 26.
63. "Ten Years of U.S. Intrigue in Chile," p. 1.
64. Landis, p. 25.
65. Ibid., p. 24.
66. Needleman, p. 15.
67. Landis, p. 26.
68. Ibid.
69. Agee, p. 583.
70. Needleman, p. 15.
71. Landis, p. 30.
72. "How CIA Millions Financed Right-Wing 'Strikes' in Chile," The
Militant, 38 (4 October 1974), p. 3.
73. Alpern, p. 30.
74. MacEoin, p. 167.
75. Alpern, p. 30; "CIA: Tantalizing Bits of Evidence," Time (4 August
1975), p. 8.
76. Landis, p. 26.
77. Ibid., p. 31.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid., pp. 30-2.
80. Ibid., p. 31; Agee, p. 584; Philip Agee, "Playboy Interview,"
Playboy (August 1975), p. 60.
81. Fagen, p. 1.
82. MacEoin, p. 187; Landis, p. 32.
83. Landis, p. 26.
84. NACLA, "Chile: The Story Behind the Coup," pp. 14-5; Agee, Inside
the Company: CIA Diary, p. 583.
85. NACLA, "Chile: The Story Behind the Coup," pp. 14-5.
86. Fagen, p. 1.
87. Szulc, p. 160.
88. "Swedish Ambassador Answers Chile Junta," The Militant, 38 (22
March 1974), p. 15.
89. Miguel Enriquez, "The MIR Analyzes the Coup"; reprinted in Birns,
p. 104.
90. Landis, p. 26; Hirsch, p. 35.
91. NACLA, "Chile: The Story Behind the Coup," p. 12.
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