Armor in World War II

The French

At the onset of World War II, the French enjoyed a numerical superiority in armored vehicles of better than 3:1 over the Germans (mere numbers can be deceptive, see French Light Tank FT-17), yet for all practical purposes, French armor was a non-factor in 1940. This came about from a couple reasons.
       First, while their number one adversary was prevented from possessing tanks by the Treaty of Versailles, the French were somewhat lackadaisical about tank development. When the enemy lacked both tanks and anti-tank weaponry, any tank force, no matter how crude, would be enough to ensure victory. Thus the French armored forces were largely made up of outmoded light tanks, most of which still retained a machine gun for their main armament.
       At the end of 1936, the French had two mechanized divisions. Both were converted cavalry formations and equipped with light tanks only. These were intended for the reconnaissance role and lacked the shock strength necessary to take on an offensive role. These divisions also sported horse-mounted troops as well as tanks. When Germany re-armed, the French decided it was time to get serious about armor development and began to organize heavy tank divisions, Divisions de choc, but this proved to be too little too late.
       Secondly, French deployments mitigated against the effective use of armor. The French scattered the majority of their armored vehicles all along the line in small detachments. This lessened their attack potential and hampered the defense. The French were unable to assemble sufficiently massive armored forces to do anything other than annoy the Germans as they swept through Belgium and on to Paris.
       Finally, the French were the least mechanized of any of the combatants in 1940. This coupled with their reliance on the Maginot Line while leaving their flank exposed along the border with Belgium played a major role in the French defeat. The bulk of the French army was stationed behind the Maginot defenses ready to deal with a breakthrough, but unfortunately for the French, the Germans didn't cooperate, and instead drove around the non- mechanized French army which couldn't keep up with the Panzers.
       One French development of note was the armored half-track which the French deployed in their mechanized cavalry divisions. The Americans, and later the Germans copied this development for their mechanized forces⁵.

The British

Between the wars the British fully embraced the concept of a mechanized land force. By 1940 the entire British army was motorized, that is, each brigade contained sufficient organic transport in trucks and/or carriers to move its entire force on wheels. This should have led to an army that was extremely nimble and capable of astounding rapid movements. That this didn't happen is a subject for another day, but part of the reason may lie with British armored doctrine.
       Throughout the 20's and early 30's an argument raged back and forth in Britain. On the one hand were early tank proponents like J.F.C. Fuller and Liddell Hart who proposed combat formations of purely tanks. On the other side were those, who like the Germans, realized that infantry was a necessary adjunct to deal with battlefield problems that were unsolvable with tanks alone. Ultimately, the British settled on a schizophrenic scheme.
       British armor was split into two different types with two different combat missions. The first, or "Infantry Tank," was to be a heavily armored vehicle which would move with the infantry in order to smash through the enemy lines. Once a hole was opened, the second kind of tank, the "Cruiser Tank," would scurry forward to exploit the breakthrough. Cruiser tanks were lightly armored and lightly armed but fast and nimble.
       British Infantry tanks ranked among the heaviest armored of the fighting vehicles used in World War II. This largely due to their intended role of battering down a defensive position. They were also slow and lumbering beasts and easily out maneuvered.
       The British experience with their two tank system was mixed. When they were able to employ the Infantry tanks, they often were able to effect a breakthrough of sorts. At other times where the terrain was unsuitable for the heavy tanks, the assault fell to the cruiser tanks, a role they were ill-suited for. Even when the system worked as intended, the Cruiser tanks were still too thin-skinned to go toe-to-toe with German armor.

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5. Russian use of half-tracks was largely restricted to headquarters units.

Unless otherwise stated, images accompanying this article were taken from "Design and Development of Fighting Vehicles," R.M. Ogorkiewicz.