Increasingly, the Kosovo Liberation Army was transformed into a popular guerilla movement. The heavy handed tactics of the Yugoslav forces, targeting the UÇK through the population, created the base of support necessary for the movement to become a political factor impossible to ignore. While this happened, the Western Countries stood by silently, the protestes remained muffled, giving the Yugoslav president Slobodan Miloševic the impression that he can pursue this policy undisturbed. Only after a summer of pushing back the UÇK from its hasty territorial gains, the international community began to take interest in the events in Kosovo. The agreement between American special envoy Richard Holbrooke and the Yugoslav president reached in October 1998 was the result of belated foreign interest. The delay gave the Kosovo Liberation Army the power to sideline Ibrahim Rugova, the unofficially elected president of the Albanians of the province. It also created a state of crisis in the country need by Slobodan Miloševic to stabilize his power and suppress the opposition. The war in Kosovo coincided with the most suppressive laws yet against the media and the universities, the main sources of opposition in the country.

The agreement on Kosovo not only forsaw a cease-fire and a withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from the province, but also the creation of a 2,000 strong OSCE mission to verify the cease-fire. After 5 months still only 1,400 observers had been sent to the region. Instead of creating a strong, well-stocked mission, the Verification mission could not fulfill its goal. Instead of seeking to resolve the crisis, which was waiting to break out again, it took a predictable massacre in Raçak to move international negotiator to propose a peace plan. Instead of making the future of Kosovo open to direct and substantial negotiations, the Contact group presented a plan, which was many ways inadequate, offered only conjunction with the stationing of NATO troops in Kosovo, hardly an acceptable offer for the Yugoslav government. Not only did it offer an excuse for the Yugoslav government to opt out of the negotiations, it also offered no face saving measures, which could have been sold to the Serbian audience. By March, after having threatened air strikes for three times, NATO brought itself in the situation were it could no longer fail to follow up on its threat without loosing all credibility. The bombings were, however, not flanked by humanitarian support to refugees resulting from the escalation of the conflict.

The air strikes of NATO have eliminated differences between opposition and the government. No organization or party in Serbia can afford to welcome the air strikes. The already weak opposition is today in no position to offer an alternative to Miloševic, largely due to the absence of adequate support from the West. The support for independent media and an alternative civil network would have cost no more than a few Cruise Missiles, not to mention the human price and the physical damage the bombs are inflicting on Yugoslavia.

The overwhelming responsibility for the crimes committed in Kosovo and all the ensuing events lies with the Yugoslav leadership, that is Slobodan Miloševic, and many Serbian intellectuals which for a long time have demonstrated open racist and aggressive nationalist attitudes towards the Albanian population. The Western countries, however, which had the means to prevent the killing, once again failed to act at the right time and with appropriate policies.