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Papers
The Inviability of the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime in the Post-Cold War Era: Nuclear Proliferation in Northeast Asia and the Future of the Regime
³ÃÀüÀÌÈÄ ½Ã´ëÀÇ ÇÙÈ®»ê ±ÝÁöÁ¶¾à ·¹ÁüÀÇ Ãë¾à¼º: µ¿ºÏ¾Æ½Ã¾ÆÀÇ ÇÙÈ®»ê°ú ·¹ÁüÀÇ ¹Ì·¡
Á¦ ¼®»ç³í¹®ÀÔ´Ï´Ù.
ÇÙÈ®»ê ±ÝÁöÁ¶¾à ·¹ÁüÀÇ Ãë¾à¼º ¿¬±¸. Çѹݵµ¸¦ ºñ·ÔÇÑ µ¿ºÏ¾Æ½Ã¿¡¼ÀÇ ÇÙÈ®»ê ½Ã³ª¸®¿À¿Í ·¹Áü¿¡ ¹ÌÄ¡´Â ¿µÇâ. ÇÙÈ®»ê ±ÝÁöÁ¶¾à ·¹ÁüÀº ±× ÀÚü°¡ ¸ð¼øÀûÀÏ »Ó¾Æ´Ï¶ó, ±¸ ¼Òºñ¿¡Æ® ¿¬¹æÀÇ ºØ±«¿Í ´õºÒ¾î ´Ù°¡¿Â ³ÃÀüÀÌÈÄ ½Ã´ë¿¡ Áö¼ÓµÇ±â ¾î·Æ´Ù. Çѹݵµ¸¦ À§½ÃÇÑ µ¿ºÏ¾Æ½Ã¿¡¼ÀÇ ÇÙÈ®»ê ½Ã³ª¸®¿À¸¦ ¹è°æÀ¸·ÎÇÑ ·¹ÁüÀÇ Ãë¾à¼º ¿¬±¸¿Í ¹æÇâ Á¦½Ã.
"Nuclear-Weapon States are Terrorist States"(ÇÙ¹«±â¸¦ ¼ÒÁöÇÑ ¸ðµç ±¹°¡´Â Å×·¯¸®½ºÆ® ±¹°¡·Î ºÐ·ùµÇ¾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù)
±¹Á¦ Å×·¯¸®Áò¼ö¾÷À» À§Çؼ ÁغñÇÑ ±ÛÀÔ´Ï´Ù.
¼¹æ±¹°¡¸¦ Áß½ÉÀ¸·ÎÇÑ ±¹Á¦»çȸ´Â Å×·¯¸®ÁòÀ» ºÒ¹ýÈÇÏ°í, À̸¦ ±ÔÁ¤ÇϱâÀ§ÇØ ³ë·ÂÇÏÁö¸¸, ÇÙ¹«±âÀÇ »ç¿ëÀ̳ª ¾ïÁ¦ Àü·«, ±× ÀÚü°¡ ±¹Á¦»çȸ°¡ ±ÔÁ¤ÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Â Å×·¯¸®ÁòÀÇ ¹üÁÖ¿¡ ¼ÓÇÑ´Ù.¿¹ÄÁµ¥, ÇÙ¹«±â »ç¿ë¿¡ ±âÀÎÇÑ ´ë·® º¸º¹, ¹«Â÷º° Çлì, °ø°¥ Çù¹Ú¿¡ ÀÇÇÑ ¾ïÁ¦ µîÀº Å×·¯¸®ÁòÀÌ´Ù....
"To Be or Not To Be: Too Many Questions"
¿Ü±³ Á¤Ã¥°ú À±¸®¶ó´Â ¼ö¾÷½Ã°£¿¡ ¾´ ªÀº ±ÛÀÔ´Ï´Ù.
Çð¸´ÀÇ ºñ±ØÀÌ Çð¸´ÀÇ ÇൿÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Â Áö¼º¿¡¼ ºñ·ÔµÈ´Ù´Â ³í¸®ÀÇ ±Û.
"The Difficulties of Facing with Low-Intensity Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era ³ÃÀü ÀÌÈÄ ½Ã´ëÀÇ ±¹ÁöÀü(Low-Intensity Conflict) ´ëÀÀ¿¡ ÀÖ¾î¼ÀÇ ¹®Á¦Á¡"
±¹Áö ÀüÀï(Low-Intensity Conflict)¼ö¾÷ ±â¸» º¸°í¼.
³ÃÀü ÀÌÈÄ, °´ë±¹°£ÀÇ ´ë°á, ȤÀº Àü¸éÀüÀÇ °¡´É¼ºÀº ÁÙ¾úÁö¸¸, Áö¿ªÀûÀÎ °¥µîÀ̳ª ºñÁ¤±Ô±º°£ÀÇ ¹«·ÂÃæµ¹ °¡´É¼ºÀº ´õ¿í ³ô¾ÆÁ³´Ù. ¼±¸ °´ë±¹ Áß½ÉÀÇ ºÏ´ë¼¾ç Á¶¾à±â±¸(NATO)°¡ ³ª¸§µ¥·ÎÀÇ ÇعýÀ¸·Î ÄÚ¼Òº¸¹®Á¦¸¦ ÇØ°áÇÏ·Á°í ³ë·ÂÇÏÁö¸¸ ¿©·¯°¡Áö ¾î·Á¿ò¿¡ Á÷¸éÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù. ÀÌ ±Û¿¡¼ ÄÚ¼Òº¸ ¹®Á¦¸¦ ºñ·ÔÇÑ ±¹ÁöÀüÀïÀÇ ÇØ°áÃ¥À» ¸ð»öÇÔ.
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