GUERILLA WARFARE
by Che Guevara
Chapter I: General Principles of Guerrilla Warfare
1. Essence of Guerrilla Warfare
The armed victory of the Cuban people over the Batista dictatorship was not only the triumph
of heroism as reported by the newspapers of the world; it also forced a change in the old
dogmas concerning the conduct of the popular masses of Latin America. It showed plainly the
capacity of the people to free themselves by means of guerrilla warfare from a government that
oppresses them.
We consider that the Cuban Revolution contributed three fundamental lessons to the conduct of
revolutionary movements in America. They are:
1. Popular forces can win a war against the army.
2. It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can
create them.
3. In underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting.
Of these three propositions the first two contradict the defeatist attitude of revolutionaries or
pseudo-revolutionaries who remain inactive and take refuge in the pretext that against a
professional army nothing can be done, who sit down to wait until in some mechanical way all
necessary objective and subjective conditions are given without working to accelerate them. As
these problems were formerly a subject of discussion in Cuba, until facts settled the question,
they are probably still much discussed in America.
Naturally, it is not to be thought that all conditions for revolution are going to be created through
the impulse given to them by guerrilla activity. It must always be kept in mind that there is a
necessary minimum without which the establishment and consolidation of the first center is not
practicable. People must see clearly the futility of maintaining the fight for social goals within the
framework of civil debate. When the forces of oppression come to maintain themselves in power
against established law, peace is considered already broken.
In these conditions popular discontent expresses itself in more active forms. An attitude of
resistance finally crystallizes in an outbreak of fighting, provoked initially by the conduct of the
authorities.
Where a government has come into power through some form of popular vote, fraudulent or
not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot
be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted.
The third proposition is a fundamental of strategy. It ought to be noted by those who maintain
dogmatically that the struggle of the masses is centered in city movements, entirely forgetting the
immense participation of the country people in the life of all the underdeveloped parts of
America. Of course, the struggles of the city masses of organized workers should not be
underrated; but their real possibilities of engaging in armed struggle must be carefully analyzed
where the guarantees which customarily adorn our constitutions are suspended or ignored. In
these conditions the illegal workers' movements face enormous dangers. They must function
secretly without arms. The situation in the open country is not so difficult. There, in places
beyond the reach of the repressive forces, the inhabitants can be supported by the armed
guerrillas.
We will later make a careful analysis of these three conclusions that stand out in the Cuban
revolutionary experience. We empha- size them now at the beginning of this work as our
fundamental contribution.
Guerrilla warfare, the basis of the struggle of a people to redeem itself, has diverse
characteristics, different facets, even though the essential will for liberation remains the same. It is
obvious-and writers on the theme have said it many times-that war responds to a certain series
of scientific laws; whoever ignores them will go down to defeat. Guerrilla warfare as a phase of
war must be ruled by all of these; but besides, because of its special aspects, a series of
corollary laws must also be recognized in order to carry it forward. Though geographical and
social conditions in each country determine the mode and particular forms that guerrilla warfare
will take, there are general laws that hold for all fighting of this type.
Our task at the moment is to find the basic principles of this kind of fighting and the rules to be
followed by peoples seeking liberation; to develop theory from facts; to generalize and give
structure to our experience for the profit of others.
Let us first consider the question: Who are the combatants in guerrilla warfare? On one side we
have a group composed of the oppressor and his agents, the professional army, well armed and
disciplined, in many cases receiving foreign help as well as the help of the bureaucracy in the
employ of the oppressor. On the other side are the people of the nation or region involved. It is
important to emphasize that guerrilla warfare is a war of the masses, a war of the people. The
guerrilla band is an armed nucleus, the fighting vanguard of the people. It draws its great force
from the mass of the people themselves. The guerrilla band is not to be considered inferior to the
army against which it fights simply because it is inferior in firepower. Guerrilla warfare is used by
the side which is supported by a majority but which possesses a much smaller number of arms
for use in defense against oppression.
The guerrilla fighter needs full help from the people of the area. This is an indispensable
condition. This is clearly seen by considering the case of bandit gangs that operate in a region.
They have all the characteristics of a guerrilla army: homogeneity, respect for the leader, valor,
knowledge of the ground, and, often, even good understanding of the tactics to be employed.
The only thing missing is support of the people; and, inevitably, these gangs are captured and
exterminated by the public force.
Analyzing the mode of operation of the guerrilla band, seeing its form of struggle, and
understanding its base in the masses, we can answer the question: Why does the guerrilla fighter
fight? We must come to the inevitable conclusion that the guerrilla fighter is a social reformer,
that he takes up arms responding to the angry protest of the people against their oppressors, and
that he fights in order to change the social system that keeps all his unarmed brothers in ignominy
and misery. He launches himself against the conditions of the reigning institutions at a particular
moment and dedicates himself with all the vigor that circumstances permit to breaking the mold
of these institutions.
When we analyze more fully the tactic of guerrilla warfare, we will see that the guerrilla fighter
needs to have a good knowledge of the surrounding countryside, the paths of entry and escape,
the possibilities of speedy maneuver, good hiding places; naturally, also, he must count on the
support of the people. All this indicates that the guerrilla fighter will carry out his action in wild
places of small population. Since in these places the struggle of the people for reforms is aimed
primarily and almost exclusively at changing the social form of land ownership, the guerrilla
fighter is above all an agrarian revolutionary. He interprets the desires of the great peasant mass
to be owners of land, owners of their means of production, of their animals, of all that which they
have long yearned to call their own, of that which constitutes their life and will also serve as their
cemetery.
It should be noted that in current interpretations there are two different types of guerrilla warfare,
one of which-a struggle complementing great regular armies such as was the case of the
Ukrainian fighters in the Soviet Union-does not enter into this analysis. We are interested in the
other type, the case of an armed group engaged in struggle against the constituted power,
whether colonial or not, which establishes itself as the only base and which builds itself up in rural
areas. In all such cases, whatever the ideological aims that may inspire the fight, the economic
aim is determined by the aspiration toward ownership of land.
The China of Mao begins as an outbreak of worker groups in the South, which is defeated and
almost annihilated. It succeeds in establishing itself and begins its advance only when, after the
long march from Yenan, it takes up its base in rural territories and makes agrarian reform its
fundamental goal. The struggle of Ho Chi Minh is based in the rice-growing peasants, who are
oppressed by the French colonial yoke; with this force it is going forward to the defeat of the
colonialists. In both cases there is a framework of patriotic war against the Japanese invader, but
the economic basis of a fight for the land has not disappeared. In the case of Algeria, the grand
idea of Arab nationalism has its economic counterpart in the fact that nearly all of the arable land
of Algeria is utilized by a million French settlers. In some countries, such as Puerto Rico, where
the special conditions of the island have not permitted a guerrilla outbreak, the nationalist spirit,
deeply wounded by the discrimination that is daily practiced, has as its basis the aspiration of the
peasants (even though many of them are already a proletariat) to recover the land that the
Yankee invader seized from them. This same central idea, though in different forms, inspired the
small farmers, peasants, and slaves of the eastern estates of Cuba to close ranks and defend
together the right to possess land during the thirty-year war of liberation.
Taking account of the possibilities of development of guerrilla warfare, which is transformed with
the increase in the operating potential of the guerrilla band into a war of positions, this type of
warfare, despite its special character, is to be considered as an embryo, a prelude, of the other.
The possibilities of growth of the guerrilla band and of changes in the mode of fight, until
conventional warfare is reached, are as great as the possibilities of defeating the enemy in each
of the different battles, combats, or skirmishes that take place. Therefore, the fundamental
principle is that no battle, combat, or skirmish is to be fought unless it will be won. There is a
malevolent definition that says: "The guerrilla fighter is the Jesuit of warfare." By this is indicated a
quality of secretiveness, of treachery, of surprise that is obviously an essential element of guerrilla
warfare. It is a special kind of Jesuitism, naturally prompted by circumstances, which
necessitates acting at certain moments in ways different from the romantic and sporting
conceptions with which we are taught to believe war is fought.
War is always a struggle in which each contender tries to annihilate the other. Besides using
force, they will have recourse to all possible tricks and stratagems in order to achieve the goal.
Military strategy and tactics are a representation by analysis of the objectives of the groups and
of the means of achieving these objectives. These means contemplate taking advantage of all the
weak points of the enemy. The fighting action of each individual platoon in a large army in a war
of positions will present the same characteristics as those of the guerrilla band. It uses
secretiveness, treachery, and surprise; and when these are not present, it is because vigilance on
the other side prevents surprise. But since the guerrilla band is a division unto itself, and since
there are large zones of territory not controlled by the enemy, it is always possible to carry out
guerrilla attacks in such a way as to assure surprise; and it is the duty of the guerrilla fighter to do
so.
"Hit and run," some call this scornfully, and this is accurate. Hit and run, wait, lie in ambush,
again hit and run, and thus repeatedly, without giving any rest to the enemy.
There is in all this, it would appear, a negative quality, an attitude of retreat, of avoiding frontal
fights. However, this is consequent upon the general strategy of guerrilla warfare, which is the
same in its ultimate end as is any warfare: to win, to annihilate the enemy. Thus, it is clear that
guerrilla warfare is a phase that does not afford in itself opportunities to arrive at complete
victory. It is one of the initial phases of warfare and will develop continuously until the guerrilla
army in its steady growth acquires the characteristics of a regular army.
At that moment it will be ready to deal final blows to the enemy and to achieve victory. Triumph
will always be the product of a regular army, even though its origins are in a guerrilla army. Just
as the general of a division in a modern war does not have to die in front of his soldiers, the
guerrilla fighter, who is general of himself, need not die in every battle. He is ready to give his life,
but the positive quality of this guerrilla warfare is precisely that each one of the guerrilla fighters is
ready to die, not to defend an ideal, but rather to convert it into reality. This is the basis, the
essence of guerrilla fighting. Miraculously, a small band of men, the armed vanguard of the great
popular force that supports them, goes beyond the immediate tactical objective, goes on
decisively to achieve an ideal, to establish a new society, to break the old molds of the outdated,
and to achieve, finally, the social justice for which they fight.
Considered thus, all these disparaged qualities acquire a true nobility, the nobility of the end at
which they aim; and it becomes clear that we are not speaking of distorted means of reaching an
end. This fighting attitude, this attitude of not being dismayed at any time, this inflexibility when
confronting the great problems in the final objective is also the nobility of the guerrilla fighter.
2. Guerrilla Strategy
In guerrilla terminology, strategy is understood as the analysis of the objectives to be achieved in
light of the total military situation and the overall ways of reaching these objectives.
To have a correct strategic appreciation from the point of view of the guerrilla band, it is
necessary to analyze fundamentally what will be the enemy's mode of action. If the final objective
is always the complete destruction of the opposite force, the enemy is confronted in the case of a
civil war of this kind with the standard task: he will have to achieve the total destruction of each
one of the components of the guerrilla band. The guerrilla fighter, on the other hand, must
analyze the resources which the enemy has for trying to achieve that outcome: the means in men,
in mobility, in popular support, in armaments, in capacity of leadership on which he can count.
We must make our own strategy adequate on the basis of these studies, keeping in mind always
the final objective of defeating the enemy army.
There are fundamental aspects to be studied: the armament, for example, and the manner of
using this armament. The value of a tank, of an airplane, in a fight of this type must be weighed.
The arms of the enemy, his ammunition, his habits must be considered; because the principal
source of provision for the guerrilla force is precisely in enemy armaments. If there is a possibility
of choice, we should prefer the same type as that used by the enemy, since the greatest problem
of the guerrilla band is the lack of ammunition, which the opponent must provide.
After the objectives have been fixed and analyzed, it is necessary to study the order of the steps
leading to the achievement of the final objective. This should be planned in advance, even though
it will be modified and adjusted as the fighting develops and unforeseen circumstances arise.
At the outset, the essential task of the guerrilla fighter is to keep himself from being destroyed.
Little by little it will be easier for the members of the guerrilla band or bands to adapt themselves
to their form of life and to make flight and escape from the forces that are on the offensive an
easy task, because it is performed daily. When this condition is reached, the guerrilla, having
taken up inaccessible positions out of reach of the enemy, or having assembled forces that deter
the enemy from attacking, ought to proceed to the gradual weakening of the enemy. This will be
carried out at first at those points nearest to the points of active warfare against the guerrilla band
and later will be taken deeper into enemy territory, attacking his communications, later attacking
or harassing his bases of operations and his central bases, tormenting him on all sides to the full
extent of the capabilities of the guerrilla forces.
The blows should be continuous. The enemy soldier in a zone of operations ought not to be
allowed to sleep; his outposts ought to be attacked and liquidated systematically. At every
moment the impression ought to be created that he is surrounded by a complete circle. In
wooded and broken areas this effort should be maintained both day and night; in open zones
that are easily penetrated by enemy patrols, at night only. In order to do all this the absolute
cooperation of the people and a perfect knowledge of the ground are necessary. These two
necessities affect every minute of the life of the guerrilla fighter. Therefore, along with centers for
study of present and future zones of operations, intensive popular work must be undertaken to
explain the motives of the revolution, its ends, and to spread the incontrovertible truth that
victory of the enemy against the people is finally impossible. Whoever does not feel this
undoubted truth cannot be a guerrilla fighter.
This popular work should at first be aimed at securing secrecy; that is, each peasant, each
member of the society in which action is taking place, will be asked not to mention what he sees
and hears; later, help will be sought from inhabitants whose loyalty to the revolution offers
greater guarantees; still later, use will be made of these persons in missions of contact, for
transporting goods or arms, as guides in the zones familiar to them; still later, it is possible to
arrive at organized mass action in the centers of work, of which the final result will be the general
strike.
The strike is a most important factor in civil war, but in order to reach it a series of
complementary conditions are necessary which do not always exist and which very rarely come
to exist spontaneously. It is necessary to create these essential conditions, basically by explaining
the purposes of the revolution and by demonstrating the forces of the people and their
possibilities.
It is also possible to have recourse to certain very homogeneous groups, which must have shown
their efficacy previously in less dangerous tasks, in order to make use of another of the terrible
arms of the guerrilla band, sabotage. It is possible to paralyze entire armies, to suspend the
industrial life of a zone, leaving the inhabitants of a city without factories, without light, without
water, without communications of any kind, without being able to risk travel by highway except
at certain hours. If all this is achieved, the morale of the enemy falls, the morale of his combatant
units weakens, and the fruit ripens for plucking at a precise moment.
All this presupposes an increase in the territory included within the guerrilla action, but an
excessive increase of this territory is to be avoided. It is essential always to preserve a strong
base of operations and to continue strengthening it during the course of the war. Within this
territory, measures of indoctrination of the inhabitants of the zone should be utilized; measures of
quarantine should be taken against the irreconcilable enemies of the revolution; all the purely
defensive measures, such as trenches, mines, and communications, should be perfected.
When the guerrilla band has reached a respectable power in arms and in number of combatants,
it ought to proceed to the formation of new columns. This is an act similar to that of the beehive
when at a given moment it releases a new queen, who goes to another region with a part of the
swarm. The mother hive with the most notable guerrilla chief will stay in the less dangerous
places, while the new columns will penetrate other enemy territories following the cycle already
described.
A moment will arrive in which the territory occupied by the columns is too small for them; and in
the advance toward regions solidly defended by the enemy, it will be necessary to confront
powerful forces. At that instant the columns join, they offer a compact fighting front, and a war
of positions is reached, a war carried on by regular armies. However, the former guerrilla army
cannot cut itself off from its base, and it should create new guerrilla bands behind the enemy
acting in the same way as the original bands operated earlier, proceeding thus to penetrate
enemy territory until it is dominated.
It is thus that guerrillas reach the stage of attack, of the encirclement of fortified bases, of the
defeat of reinforcements, of mass action, ever more ardent, in the whole national territory,
arriving finally at the objective of the war: victory.
3. Guerrilla Tactics
In military language, tactics are the practical methods of achieving the grand strategic objectives.
In one sense they complement strategy and in another they are more specific rules within it. As
means, tactics are much more variable, much more flexible than the final objectives, and they
should be adjusted continually during the struggle. There are tactical objectives that remain
constant throughout a war and others that vary. The first thing to be considered is the adjusting
of guerrilla action to the action of the enemy.
The fundamental characteristic of a guerrilla band is mobility. This permits it in a few minutes to
move far from a specific theatre and in a few hours far even from the region, if that becomes
necessary; permits it constantly to change front and avoid any type of encirclement. As the
circumstances of the war require, the guerrilla band can dedicate itself exclusively to fleeing from
an encirclement which is the enemy's only way of forcing the band into a decisive fight that could
be unfavorable; it can also change the battle into a counter- encirclement (small bands of men
are presumably surrounded by the enemy when suddenly the enemy is surrounded by stronger
contingents; or men located in a safe place serve as a lure, leading to the encirclement and
annihilation of the entire troops and supply of an attacking force). Characteristic of this war of
mobility is the so-called minuet, named from the analogy with the dance: the guerrilla bands
encircle an enemy position, an advancing column, for example; they encircle it completely from
the four points of the compass, with five or six men in each place, far enough away to avoid
being encircled themselves; the fight is started at any one of the points, and the army moves
toward it; the guerrilla band then retreats, always maintaining visual contact, and initiates its
attack from another point. The army will repeat its action and the guerrilla band, the same. Thus,
successively, it is possible to keep an enemy column immobilized, forcing it to expend large
quantities of ammunition and weakening the morale of its troops without incurring great dangers.
This same tactic can be applied at nighttime, closing in more and showing greater aggressiveness,
because in these conditions counter- encirclement is much more difficult. Movement by night is
another important characteristic of the guerrilla band, enabling it to advance into position for an
attack and, where the danger of betrayal exists, to mobilize in new territory. The numerical
inferiority of the guerrilla makes it necessary that attacks always be carried out by surprise; this
great advantage is what permits the guerrilla fighter to inflict losses on the enemy without
suffering losses. In a fight between a hundred men on one side and ten on the other, losses are
not equal where there is one casualty on each side. The enemy loss is always reparable; it
amounts to only one percent of his effectives. The loss of the guerrilla band requires more time to
be repaired because it involves a soldier of high specialization and is ten percent of the operating
forces.
A dead soldier of the guerrillas ought never to be left with his arms and his ammunition. The duty
of every guerrilla soldier whenever a companion falls is to recover immediately these extremely
precious elements of the fight. In fact, the care which must be taken of ammunition and the
method of using it are further characteristics of guerrilla warfare. In any combat between a
regular force and a guerrilla band it is always possible to know one from the other by their
different manner of fire: a great amount of firing on the part of the regular army, sporadic and
accurate shots on the part of the guerrillas.
Once one of our heroes, now dead, had to employ his machine guns for nearly five minutes,
burst after burst, in order to slow up the advance of enemy soldiers. This fact caused
considerable confusion in our forces, because they assumed from the rhythm of fire that that key
position must have been taken by the enemy, since this was one of the rare occasions where
departure from the rule of saving fire had been called for because of the importance of the point
being defended.
Another fundamental characteristic of the guerrilla soldier is his flexibility, his ability to adapt
himself to all circumstances, and to convert to his service all of the accidents of the action.
Against the rigidity of classical methods of fighting, the guerrilla fighter invents
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