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http://www.satp.org/idr/Jan-Mar%2001/BRamanIII.htm

Ceasefire in J&K
B Raman

Questions & Answers

WAS THE CEASEFIRE DECISION WISE?

Yes, it was and still is, but as a prelude to inducing the genuinely Kashmiri organisations to enter into a dialogue with the Government of India, but unfortunately, its subsequent public projection has made it appear as a gesture to Pakistan and as a prelude to the resumption of a dialogue with Pakistan. The military leadership in Pakistan does not appreciate such gestures. Instead, it views them as signs that India is blinking and that Pakistan’s policy has started paying dividends.

WHAT IS THE GROUND REALITY IN J&K?

The ground reality in J&K is that the Army of the State of Pakistan has been using the Army of Islam of the Afghan war vintage, consisting of Pakistani groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) formed by Maulana Masood Azhar, formerly of the HuM, and of the former East Pakistan vintage such as the Al Badr, to make India bleed and achieve its objectives. These are not pro-Pakistan Kashmiri organisations. These are, pure and simple, Pakistani organisations, consisting of and led by Pakistani nationals, many of whose office-bearers are Punjabis or Pakhtuns and not even Kashmiris of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), based in and operating from Pakistani territory and funded and armed by the Army of the State through Islamic organisations such as the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), the Jamaat-ul-Ulema Pakistan, etc and through retired heads of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) such as Lt General Hamid Gul and Lt General Javed Nasir. These organisations’ target is not just J&K, but the whole of India. Their objective is not just acquisition of J&K, but the Pakistanisation of India, by fighting for two more so-called homelands for the Muslims of North and South India. The Army of Islam provides the Army of the State with an alibi to deny its non-involvement to global opinion. What we are facing in J&K and other parts of India is not just militancy and/or terrorism, but a covert war waged by the Army of the State of Pakistan against the Indian State through this Army of Islam. By describing these organisations as pro-Pakistan organisations and not Pakistani organisations, we are playing into the hands of the Army of Islam and Pakistan by giving this foreign Army a locus standii in J&K, which it neither has nor should have.

WHAT IS THE POSITION REGARDING THE KASHMIRI MILITANT ORGANISATIONS?

The genuinely indigenous Kashmiri militant organisations form into two groups - the pro-independence group consisting of organisations such as the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and the pro-Pakistan group, consisting of organisations such as the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), the militant wing of the JeI, J&K. Since the middle 1990s, the pro-Independence group has been active mainly politically and not so much on the ground. The HM too has been marginalised by the Pakistani Army of Islam. Whereas, the LeT claims responsibility for its operations, the HUM does not. Instead, the HUM lets the HM claim the responsibility, in order to make it appear to the outside world that the fighting is being done by indigenous Kashmiri organisations, and not by Pakistani ones and to project the HM as the leader of the jihad in J&K. This was clearly brought out by Mr Kamran Khan, the Pakistani investigative journalist, in a report on the HUM based on interviews with HUM activists in 1995. We should not let ourselves be manipulated by Pakistan into according to the HM, in our public projections, an importance it does not have or deserve, as the most important indigenous Kashmiri organisation.

WHAT IS THE POSITION OF GEN PERVEZ MUSHARRAF VIS-À-VIS THE ARMY OF ISLAM AND ITS PATRON OSAMA BIN LADEN

Deliberately ambivalent.

He has not taken any action against the HUM, despite it being declared by the US as an international terrorist organisation in October, 1997.

He has resisted US pressure to cooperate in tracing and arresting the hijackers of the IAC aircraft to Kandahar in December, 1999.

He reportedly promised to President Clinton in March last year that he would himself meet the Amir of the Taliban, Mulla Mohammed Omar, in Kandahar and persuade him to moderate the Taliban’s policies and cooperate with the US on the bin Laden issue, but has not done so.

He launched with fanfare last year a programme for the de-weaponisation of Pakistani society, but, subsequently, slowed down its implementation under pressure from the Army of Islam.

His Interior Minister, Lt General (retd) Moinuddin Haider, announced a plan for the documentation of the madrasas and for greater government control over their curriculum, but the implementation of this too has been slowed down under similar pressure.

Under US pressure, he initially imposed restrictions on the movements of Maulana Masood Azhar, but subsequently relaxed them and allowed the Jaish-e-Mohammed to operate freely from Pakistani territory.

Previous Pakistani rulers covertly supported the jihad of the Army of Islam against India, but he is the first Pakistani ruler to have openly justified the jihad.

He initially imposed restrictions on public displays by the constituents of the Army of Islam, but has subsequently relaxed them.

He has consciously refrained from criticising the activities of the Army of Islam. After every act of terrorism, the LeT has been holding a press conference in Pakistani territory or issuing a press statement in Pakistani territory to claim responsibility for the attack. He has never tried to condemn the LeT.

A statement issued by the Pakistan Foreign Office on 15 January 2000, after the meeting of Shri Vijay Nambiar, the Indian High Commissioner, with General Musharraf said, "The commencement of the dialogue would bring about improvement in the prevailing environment." In other words, any Pakistani instructions to the Army of Islam to desist from acts of terrorism would be conditional on the beginning of the dialogue and its making progress to the satisfaction of Pakistan and the Army of Islam.

WHY IS GEN MUSHARRAF UNWILLING TO REIN IN THE ARMY OF ISLAM?

General Musharraf, Maj General (retd) Mahmud Durrani, Lt General (retd) Hamid Gul and Lt General (retd) Javed Nasir were amongst those who godfathered this Army of Islam, initially for use against the erstwhile USSR at US instance and now against India. In their perception, this Army of Islam seems to be producing results against India as it did against the USSR and the Najibullah Government of Afghanistan. Why should they rein it in when Pakistan has not been made to pay dearly for its actions? Moreover, he has given clear evidence of being amenable to pressure from the Islamic extremist organisations and their supporters in the Army.

IS THE PAKISTAN ARMY IN A POSITION TO REIN IT IN, IF IT WANTS TO? WHAT IS IT’S DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER IT?

He is cleverly trying to create an impression that it has limited control over it. This is not so. The tapes of the conversations of Lt General Mohammed Aziz, the then Chief of the General Staff (CGS), with General Musharraf, then on a visit to Beijing, in May 1999, provide ample proof of this. During the conversation, Lt General Aziz told General Musharraf: "The scruff of their neck (the Army of Islam’s) is in our hands; whenever you want, we could regulate it."

POINTS TO BE KEPT IN VIEW

To project the ceasefire as a gesture to the people of J&K in order to pave the way for a political process and not as a gesture to Pakistan to pave the way for a bilateral dialogue.
If the ceasefire is further extended, to make it clear that it only applies to the indigenous Kashmiri organisations, consisting of Indian citizens, which have taken to arms against the Government of India and not to the Pakistani Army of Islam, which has been waging a war against the Indian State on behalf of the Pakistan State Army.
To make a clear distinction between the dialogue with the Kashmiri organisations on the future political dispensation of the State and with Pakistan on its claims to Indian territory in J&K.
To make it equally clear that Pakistan has no locus standii in the dialogue between the Government of India and the Kashmiri organisations and that, similarly, the Kashmiri organisations have no locus standii in any dialogue of the Indian State with the State of Pakistan.
To emphasise that while the Government of India is willing to have talks with the Government of Pakistan on the nuclear confidence-building issues at any time at the appropriate level, any talks on the Kashmir issue would continue to be dependent on Pakistan pulling back its Army of Islam from Indian territory.
To avoid inviting General Musharraf to New Delhi since the invitation could be exploited by him to further strengthen his position by projecting to the Army and the people that his policy is succeeding.
To ensure consistency in our policies and public projections. If we project Pakistan one day as a State Sponsor of International Terrorism and the next day as a State positively responding to India, the world will stop taking seriously our strong case against Pakistan. Re-opening the dialogue process with Pakistan does not mean facilitating Pakistan coming out of the dog-house into which it has been consigned by international opinion.
To avoid giving a certificate of good conduct to Pakistan through unwise public statements.
To ensure that we do not let ourselves be manipulated by Pakistan and its Army of Islam to undermine the position of Dr Farooq Abdullah, the Chief Minister of J&K, and other mainstream Kashmiri leaders to the benefit of the HM and other pro-Pakistan leaders.
To avoid too many public statements and to keep Pakistan and its Army of Islam guessing as to our next move. Proper public projection of our policies and actions is as important, if not more important, than the actions themselves.
Never to forget the fact that like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and General Zia-ul-Haq and many other Pakistani leaders, civilian and military, General Musharraf is a master practitioner of the art of dissimulation, which comes naturally to him.