From: http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_archives/bookchin/CMMNL2.MCW.html
BOOKCHIN ON CONSENSUS:
II
Individualism, as conceived by classical liberalism, rested on a
fiction to
begin with. Its very presupposition of a social "lawfulness" maintained
by
marketplace competition was far removed from its myth of the totally
sovereign, "autonomous" individual. With even fewer presuppositions to
support itself, the woefully undertheorized work of Max Stirner shared
a
similar disjunction: the ideological disjunction between the ego and
society.
The pivotal issue that reveals this disjunction -- indeed, this
contradiction -- is the question of democracy. By democracy, of course,
I do
not mean "representative government" in any form, but rather
face-to-face
democracy. With regard to its origins in classical Athens, democracy as
I
use it is the idea of the direct management of the polis by its
citizenry in
popular assemblies -- which is not to downplay the fact that Athenian
democracy was scarred by patriarchy, slavery, class rule and the
restriction
of citizenship to males of putative Athenian birth. What I am referring
to
is an evolving tradition of institutional structures, not a social
"model."4
Democracy generically defined, then, is the direct management of
society in
face-to-face assemblies -- in which policy is formulated by the
resident
citizenry and administration is executed by mandated and delegated
councils.
Libertarians commonly consider democracy, even in this sense, as a form
of
"rule" -- since in making decisions, a majority view prevails and thus
"rules" over a minority. As such, democracy is said to be inconsistent
with
a truly libertarian ideal. Even so knowledgeable a historian of
anarchism as
Peter Marshall observes that, for anarchists, "the majority has no more
right to dictate to the minority, even a minority of one, than the
minority
to the majority."5 Scores of libertarians have echoed this idea time
and
again.
What is striking about assertions like Marshall's is their highly
pejorative
language. Majorities, it would seem, neither "decide" nor "debate":
rather,
they "rule," "dictate," "command," "coerce" and the like. In a free
society
that not only permitted, but fostered the fullest degree of dissent,
whose
podiums at assemblies and whose media were open to the fullest
expression of
all views, whose institutions were truly forums for discussion -- one
may
reasonably ask whether such a society would actually "dictate" to
anyone
when it had to arrive at a decision that concerned the public welfare.
How, then, would society make dynamic collective decisions about public
affairs, aside from mere individual contracts? The only collective
alternative to majority voting as a means of decision-making that is
commonly presented is the practice of consensus. Indeed, consensus has
even
been mystified by avowed "anarcho-primitivists," who consider Ice Age
and
contemporary "primitive" or "primal" peoples to constitute the apogee
of
human social and psychic attainment. I do not deny that consensus may
be an
appropriate form of decision-making in small groups of people who are
thoroughly familiar with one another. But to examine consensus in
practical
terms, my own experience has shown me that when larger groups try to
make
decisions by consensus, it usually obliges them to arrive at the lowest
common intellectual denominator in their decision-making: the least
controversial or even the most mediocre decision that a sizable
assembly of
people can attain is adopted -- precisely because everyone must agree
with
it or else withdraw from voting on that issue. More disturbingly, I
have
found that it permits an insidious authoritarianism and gross
manipulations -- even when used in the name of autonomy or freedom.
To take a very striking case in point: the largest consensus-based
movement
(involving thousands of participants) in recent memory in the United
States
was the Clamshell Alliance, which was formed to oppose the Seabrook
nuclear
reactor in the mid-1970s in New Hampshire. In her recent study of the
movement, Barbara Epstein has called the Clamshell the "first effort in
American history to base a mass movement on nonviolent direct action"
other
than the 1960s civil rights movement. As a result of its apparent
organizational success, many other regional alliances against nuclear
reactors were formed throughout the United States.
I can personally attest to the fact that within the Clamshell Alliance,
consensus was fostered by often cynical Quakers and by members of a
dubiously "anarchic" commune that was located in Montague,
Massachusetts.
This small, tightly knit faction, unified by its own hidden agendas,
was
able to manipulate many Clamshell members into subordinating their
goodwill
and idealistic commitments to those opportunistic agendas. The de facto
leaders of the Clamshell overrode the rights and ideals of the
innumerable
individuals who entered it and undermined their morale and will.
In order for that clique to create full consensus on a decision,
minority
dissenters were often subtly urged or psychologically coerced to
decline to
vote on a troubling issue, inasmuch as their dissent would essentially
amount to a one-person veto. This practice, called "standing aside" in
American consensus processes, all too often involved intimidation of
the
dissenters, to the point that they completely withdrew from the
decision-making process, rather than make an honorable and continuing
expression of their dissent by voting, even as a minority, in
accordance
with their views. Having withdrawn, they ceased to be political beings
-- so
that a "decision" could be made. More than one "decision" in the
Clamshell
Alliance was made by pressuring dissenters into silence and, through a
chain
of such intimidations, "consensus" was ultimately achieved only after
dissenting members nullified themselves as participants in the process.
On a more theoretical level, consensus silenced that most vital aspect
of
all dialogue, dissensus. The ongoing dissent, the passionate dialogue
that
still persists even after a minority accedes temporarily to a majority
decision, was replaced in the Clamshell by dull monologues -- and the
uncontroverted and deadening tone of consensus. In majority
decision-making,
the defeated minority can resolve to overturn a decision on which they
have
been defeated -- they are free to openly and persistently articulate
reasoned and potentially persuasive disagreements. Consensus, for its
part,
honors no minorities, but mutes them in favor of the metaphysical "one"
of
the "consensus" group.
The creative role of dissent, valuable as an ongoing democratic
phenomenon,
tends to fade away in the gray uniformity required by consensus. Any
libertarian body of ideas that seeks to dissolve hierarchy, classes,
domination and exploitation by allowing even Marshall's "minority of
one" to
block decision-making by the majority of a community, indeed, of
regional
and nationwide confederations, would essentially mutate into a
Rousseauean
"general will" with a nightmare world of intellectual and psychic
conformity. In more gripping times, it could easily "force people to be
free," as Rousseau put it -- and as the Jacobins practiced it in
1793-94.
The de facto leaders of the Clamshell were able to get away with their
behavior precisely because the Clamshell was not sufficiently organized
and
democratically structured, such that it could countervail the
manipulation
of a well-organized few. The de facto leaders were subject to few
structures
of accountability for their actions. The ease with which they cannily
used
consensus decision-making for their own ends has been only partly
told,6 but
consensus practices finally shipwrecked this large and exciting
organization
with its Rousseauean "republic of virtue." It was also ruined, I may
add, by
an organizational laxity that permitted mere passersby to participate
in
decision-making, thereby destructuring the organization to the point of
invertebracy. It was for good reason that I and many young anarchists
from
Vermont who had actively participated in the Alliance for some few
years
came to view consensus as anathema.
If consensus could be achieved without compulsion of dissenters, a
process
that is feasible in small groups, who could possibly oppose it as a
decision-making process? But to reduce a libertarian ideal to the
unconditional right of a minority -- let alone a "minority of one" --
to
abort a decision by a "collection of individuals" is to stifle the
dialectic
of ideas that thrives on opposition, confrontation and, yes, decisions
with
which everyone need not agree and should not agree, lest society become
an
ideological cemetery. Which is not to deny dissenters every opportunity
to
reverse majority decisions by unimpaired discussion and advocacy.
Footnotes:
4 I have never regarded the classical Athenian democracy as a "model" or an "ideal" to be restored in a rational society. I have long cited Athens with admiration for one reason: the polis around Periclean times provides us with striking evidence that certain structures can exist -- policy-making by an assembly, rotation and limitation of public offices and defense by a nonprofessional armed citizenry. The Mediterranean world of the fifth century B.C.E. was largely based on monarchical authority and repressive custom. That all Mediterranean societies of that time required or employed patriarchy, slavery and the State (usually in an absolutist form) makes the Athenian experience all the more remarkable for what it uniquely introduced into social life, including an unprecedented degree of free expression. It would be naive to suppose that Athens could have risen above the most basic attributes of ancient society in its day, which, from a distance of 2,400 years we now have the privilege of judging as ugly and inhuman. Regrettably, no small number of people today are willing to judge the past by the present.
5 Peter Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism (London: HarperCollins, 1992), p. 22.
6 Barbara Epstein, Political Protest and Cultural Revolution: Non-Violent Direct Action in the 1970s and 1980s (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), especially pp. 59, 78, 89, 94-95, 167-68, 177. Although I disagree with some of the facts and conclusions in Epstein's book -- based on my personal as well as general knowledge of the Clamshell Alliance -- she vividly portrays the failure of consensus in this movement.
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