<This dialogue
sets forth the difference between the physical and metaphysical worlds in
the context of Greek natural philosophy. Some of the language is fairly
technical: the "errant spheres" of sections 6 and 7 are the celestial
spheres carrying the planets, while the "inerrant sphere" is that of the
fixed stars. It's useful to keep in mind, also, that "air" and "spirit" are
interchangeable concepts in Greek thought, and that the concept of the Good
has a range of implications which don't come across in the English word: one
is that the good of any being, in Greek thought, was also that being's
necessary goal.
<The criticism
of childlessness in section 17 should probably be read as a response to the
Christian ideal of celibacy, which horrified many people in the ancient
world. - JMG>
1. Hermes: All
that is moved, Asclepius, is it not moved in something and by something?
Asclepius:
Assuredly.
H: And must not
that in which it's moved be greater than the moved?
A: It must.
H: Mover, again,
has greater power than moved?
A: It has, of
course.
H: The nature,
furthermore, of that in which it's moved must be quite other from the nature
of the moved?
A: It must
completely.
2. H: Is not,
again, this cosmos vast, [so vast] that than it there exists no body
greater?
A: Assuredly.
H: And massive,
too, for it is crammed with multitudes of other mighty frames, nay, rather
all the other bodies that there are?
A: It is.
H: And yet the
cosmos is a body?
A: It is a body.
H: And one
that's moved?
3. A: Assuredly.
H: Of what size,
then, must be the space in which it's moved, and of what kind [must be] the
nature [of that space]? Must it not be far vaster [than the cosmos], in
order that it may be able to find room for its continued course, so that the
moved may not be cramped for want of room and lose its motion?
A: Something,
Thrice-greatest one, it needs must be, immensely vast.
4. H: And of
what nature? Must it not be, Asclepius, of just the contrary? And is not
contrary to body bodiless?
A: Agreed.
H: Space, then,
is bodiless. But bodiless must either be some godlike thing or God
[Himself]. And by "some godlike thing" I mean no more the generable [i.e.,
that which is generated] but the ingenerable.
5. If, then,
space be some godlike thing, it is substantial; but if 'tis God [Himself],
it transcends substance. But it is to be thought of otherwise [than God],
and in this way.
God is first
"thinkable" <or "intelligible"> for us, not for Himself, for that the thing
that's thought doth fall beneath the thinker's sense. God then cannot be
"thinkable" unto Himself, in that He's thought of by Himself as being
nothing else but what He thinks. But he is "something else" for us, and so
He's thought of by us.
6. If space is,
therefore, to be thought, [it should] not, [then, be thought as] God, but
space. If God is also to be thought, [He should] not [be conceived] as
space, but as energy that can contain [all space].
Further, all
that is moved is moved not in the moved but in the stable. And that which
moves [another] is of course stationary, for 'tis impossible that it should
move with it.
A: How is it,
then, that things down here, Thrice-greatest one, are moved with those that
are [already] moved? For thou hast said the errant spheres were moved by the
inerrant one.
H: This is not,
O Asclepius, a moving with, but one against; they are not moved with one
another, but one against the other. It is this contrariety which turneth the
resistance of their motion into rest. For that resistance is the rest of
motion.
7. Hence, too,
the errant spheres, being moved contrarily to the inerrant one, are moved by
one another by mutual contrariety, [and also] by the spable one through
contrariety itself. And this can otherwise not be.
The Bears up
there <i.e., Ursa Major and Minor>, which neither set nor rise, think'st
thou they rest or move?
A: They move,
Thrice-greatest one.
H: And what
their motion, my Asclepius?
A: Motion that
turns for ever round the same.
H: But
revolution - motion around same - is fixed by rest. For "round-the-same"
doth stop "beyond-same". "Beyond-same" then, being stopped, if it be
steadied in "round-same" - the contrary stands firm, being rendered ever
stable by its contrariety.
8. Of this I'll
give thee here on earth an instance, which the eye can see. Regard the
animals down here - a man, for instance, swimming! The water moves, yet the
resistance of his hands and feet give him stability, so that he is not borne
along with it, nor sunk thereby.
A: Thou hast,
Thrice-greatest one, adduced a most clear instance.
H: All motion,
then, is caused in station and by station.
The motion,
therefore, of the cosmos (and of every other hylic <i.e., material> animal)
will not be caused by things exterior to the cosmos, but by things interior
[outward] to the exterior - such [things] as soul, or spirit, or some such
other thing incorporeal.
'Tis not the
body that doth move the living thing in it; nay, not even the whole [body of
the universe a lesser] body e'en though there be no life in it.
9. A: What
meanest thou by this, Thrice-greatest one? Is it not bodies, then, that move
the stock and stone and all the other things inanimate?
H: By no means,
O Asclepius. The something-in-the-body, the that-which-moves the thing
inanimate, this surely's not a body, for that it moves the two of them -
both body of the lifter and the lifted? So that a thing that's lifeless will
not move a lifeless thing. That which doth move [another thing] is animate,
in that it is the mover.
Thou seest,
then, how heavy laden is the soul, for it alone doth lift two bodies. That
things, moreover, moved are moved in something as well as moved by something
is clear.
10. A: Yea, O
Thrice-greatest one, things moved must needs be moved in something void.
H: Thou sayest
well, O [my] Asclepius! For naught of things that are is void. Alone the
"is-not" is void [and] stranger to subsistence. For that which is subsistent
can never change to void.
A: Are there,
then, O Thrice-greatest one, no such things as an empty cask, for instance,
and an empty jar, a cup and vat, and other things like unto them?
H: Alack,
Asclepius, for thy far-wandering from the truth! Think'st thou that things
most full and most replete are void?
11. A: How
meanest thou, Thrice-greatest one?
H: Is not air
body?
A: It is.
H: And doth this
body not pervade all things, and so, pervading, fill them? And "body"; doth
body not consist from blending of the "four" <elements>? Full, then, of air
are all thou callest void; and if of air, then of the "four".
Further, of this
the converse follows, that all thou callest full are void - of air; for that
they have their space filled out with other bodies, and, therefore, are not
able to receive the air therein. These, then, which thou dost say are void,
they should be hollow named, not void; for they not only are, but they are
full of air and spirit.
12. A: Thy
argument (logos), Thrice-greatest one, is not to be gainsaid; air is a body.
Further, it is this body which doth pervade all things, and so, pervading,
fill them. What are we, then, to call that space in which the all doth move?
H: The bodiless,
Asclepius.
A: What, then,
is Bodiless?
H: 'Tis Mind and
Reason (logos), whole out of whole, all self-embracing, free from all body,
from all error free, unsensible to body and untouchable, self stayed in
self, containing all, preserving those that are, whose rays, to use a
likeness, are Good, Truth, Light beyond light, the Archetype of soul.
A: What, then,
is God?
13. H: Not any
one of these is He; for He it is that causeth them to be, both all and each
and every thing of all that are. Nor hath He left a thing beside that
is-not; but they are all from things-that-are and not from
things-that-are-not. For that the things-that-are-not have naturally no
power of being anything, but naturally have the power of the
inability-to-be. And, conversely, the things-that-are have not the nature of
some time not-being.
14. A: What
say'st thou ever, then, God is?
H: God,
therefore, is not Mind, but Cause that the Mind is; God is not Spirit, but
Cause that Spirit is; God is not Light, but Cause that the Light is. Hence
one should honor God with these two names [the Good and Father] - names
which pertain to Him alone and no one else.
For no one of
the other so-called gods, no one of men, or daimones, can be in any measure
Good, but God alone; and He is Good alone and nothing else. The rest of
things are separable all from the Good's nature; for [all the rest] are soul
and body, which have no place that can contain the Good.
15. For that as
mighty is the Greatness of the Good as is the Being of all things that are -
both bodies and things bodiless, things sensible and intelligible things.
Call thou not, therefore, aught else Good, for thou would'st imious be; nor
anything at all at any time call God but Good alone, for so thou would'st
again be impious.
16. Though,
then, the Good is spoken of by all, it is not understood by all, what thing
it is. Not only, then, is God not understood by all, but both unto the gods
and some of the men they out of ignorance do give the name of Good, though
they can never either be or become Good. For they are very different from
God, while Good can never be distinguished from Him, for that God is the
same as Good.
The rest of the
immortal ones are nonetheless honored with the name of God, and spoken of as
gods; but God is Good not out of courtesy but out of nature. For that God's
nature and the Good is one; one os the kind of both, from which all other
kinds [proceed].
The Good is he
who gives all things and naught receives. God, then, doth give all things
and receive naught. God, then, is Good, and Good is God.
17. The other
name of God is Father, again because He is the that-which-maketh-all. The
part of father is to make.
Wherefore
child-making is a very great and a most pious thing in life for them who
think aright, and to leave life on earth without a child a very great
misfortune and impiety; and he who hath no child is punished by the daimones
after death.
And this is the
punishment: that that man's soul who hath no child, shall be condemned unto
a body with neither man's nor woman's nature, a thing accursed beneath the
sun.
Wherefore,
Asclepius, let not your sympathies be with the man who hath no child, but
rather pity his mishap, knowing what punishment abides for him.
Let all that has
been said then, be to thee, Asclepius, an introduction to the gnosis of the
nature of all things.
