14-20 January 1999
Behind blown bridges
By: Eqbal Ahmad
Apart from Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his courtiers, few
citizens will attach much importance to the alleged attempt on the
Pakistani prime minister's life. Whether one views it in a historical or a
contemporary perspective, this was a non-event. It may, nevertheless,
serve to further inflate Sharif's ballooning power.
As a phenomenon, political assassinations are about as South Asian as
the monsoon. Even our founding fathers -- Mahatma Gandhi, Liaquat Ali
Khan, S W R Bandaranaike and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman -- were not spared the
assassin's bullet. Their successors suffered a full repertoire of murder
by bullet (Indira Gandhi), bomb (Rajiv Gandhi) and the hangman's noose
(Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto). Only the Americans can claim a roughly comparable
record of political homicide.
Viewed from the historical perspective, the bomb on the road to Raiwind
was a minor event. When it exploded under a bridge, Sharif was nowhere
near it. In fact, he had not even left his home in Model Town, which is
miles away from the site of the explosion. On being informed, he and his
family flew to Raiwind by helicopter which was obviously standing by to
transport the prime minister. The bomb, which damaged a small bridge, was
not ignited by remote control -- a fact that suggests a lack of
professionalism rare for real terrorists in Pakistan.
"He is unshaken," the minister of information told reporters, "Our prime
minister is a brave man." Just the right words to convey to the world a
sense of the sycophancy that surrounds Sharif.
However, there is a real danger that this insignificant event shall
serve as an excuse to extend the government's powers, undermine the rule
of law and further undercut Pakistan's fragile system of checks and
balances. The country has already been greatly enfeebled by a series of
developments. Among them were the forced resignation of a chief justice
who was asserting the judiciary's authority, constitutional amendments
which augment the powers of the prime minister and render him immune to
presidential authority, the passage of anti-terrorism legislation which
reduces judicial authority to ensure the rights of the accused and the
creation of military courts in Sind to entirely bypass the judiciary.
A 15th constitutional amendment has already been voted by the National
Assembly where Sharif holds a comfortable two-thirds majority. It now
awaits a hopefully negative vote in the Senate where Sharif does not
command the required numbers. This amendment, rhetorically an attempt to
make the Islamic Republic more Islamic, will confer as much power as those
exercised in the seventh century by Caliph Omar Ibn Al-Khattab upon men
totally lacking the virtues of Omar.
It is generally believed that Sharif has cracked down on the Muttahida
Qaumi Mahaz (MQM) because the Karachi-based ethnic party did not support
his proposed 15th amendment. Until two months ago, Sharif's Muslim League
and the MQM were allies. The alliance ended when Sharif accused MQM
members of murdering Hakim Saeed, a respected philanthropist. Then came
the institution of governors' rule in Sind (where the Muslim League
government could not survive the break with MQM) and a crackdown on MQM
leaders and cadres.
Karachi was returned to the state of war between the government and the
MQM which prevailed during Benazir Bhutto's term. Four MQM members were
arrested in Karachi after the explosion, an alacrity of investigation
unexpected from Pakistan's police and intelligence departments. It is
feared that the government will use the explosion to persecute its
opposition.
Sharif is prey to a familiar ailment. He retells, in effect, the story
of Pakistan's crisis of leadership. More than once, people have entrusted
a leader with power who, for greed of power or money or both, did not
convert this power into authority. Z A Bhutto was elected by a majority in
West Pakistan on promises he was unable to fulfill. He kept amassing
power, amendment after constitutional amendment, until he was overwhelmed
by the excess of it.
At the climax of his power, Sharif had appeared invulnerable. He
appointed himself commander-in-chief, fired the army chief, hand-picked
his chief of army staff, jailed his opponents, tamed the judiciary,
adulterated the bureaucracy and used religion for his purposes. When he
finally needed it, the judiciary was too compromised and enfeebled to save
him, the bureaucracy was too weak and demoralised to help civilianise
military rule and the mullahs he had courted jumped ship to join Mohammed
Ziaul-Haq's bandwagon.
Z A Bhutto's daughter had double luck. Between 1988 and 1997, she had
two stints as prime minister. In her first term, she distinguished herself
for incompetence while husband Asif Zardari worked the banks and
contractors. In the second term she became the Bonnie to her Clyde, and
now faces myriad corruption charges by an adversary in power who would
neither prosecute seriously nor let her be. As a result, Pakistan's
parliamentary system is effectively deprived of an opposition. Only the
feisty press and a lively, though small, civil sector enliven a weak
democratic environment. Sharif's government looks on these with disfavour.
Sharif is following in Z A Bhutto's footsteps. His greed for power
appears to be obsessive. If he does not stop now, he will bring grief to
the country and to himself. He should know, as Bhutto should have known,
that notwithstanding his own background of collaboration with a military
usurper, he is a beneficiary of people's preference for a democratic
order. His political future is linked to a parliamentary system whose
health is better assured by institutions than by individuals.
The bomb that exploded in Lahore on 3 January could do Pakistan much
good if Sharif draws the right lessons from it. One lesson is that when
power is personalised, the person in power becomes the focus of all
discontent. A second is that short-circuiting the rule of law is a
temporary and, in the long run, harmful expedient. Only a reformed,
competent and independent judiciary is the ultimate guarantee of justice,
an attribute without which a system and a government shall lack
legitimacy. A last lesson is that governments and leaders who drag
religion into politics distort politics, society and religion itself, but
fail to draw political gains from doing so.