DAWN - Opinion; 20 January, 1998

China's emerging world role


By Dr Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty

THE year 1997 closed on a sombre economic note for the globe as a whole, with the "tiger economies" of South Korea and South East Asia in crisis, mighty Japan shaken by the collapse of some major business corporations, and even Europe experiencing high unemployment. The two bright spots were the US, whose credentials as the unique superpower were reinforced by its economic resilience, and China, which maintained its record of steady growth since economic reforms were introduced in the late 1970s.

The visit of a delegation of the Islamabad Council of World Affairs (ICWA) to China in early December, 1997, led by its President, former Foreign Minister Agha Shahi, enabled discussions with leading think-tanks and government ministers, which served to put China's world-view, as well as prospects for Pakistan-China relations in a contemporary perspective. This latest appraisal of the perceptions of a power whose emerging world role and attitude towards South Asia are of critical importance to Pakistan deserves to be appreciated, and taken into account as Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif prepares to visit China next month.

The last part of 1997 had witnessed unprecedented diplomatic activity by China after the 15th Party Congress held in September had identified the country's broad goals, and endorsed the leadership that was to succeed Deng Xiaoping. The confirmation of President Jiang Zemin as the successor to the architect of modern China, as well as of the continuation of the policies of the late leader was a fit starting point for China to project its goals and perceptions to the whole world. The weeks following the Congress saw President Jiang Zemin visit the US, while Premier Li Peng went to Japan, with Russian President Yeltsin coming to China. These visits covered China's most important relationships, which are with the US, Russia and Japan.

We found a very clear concept of China's goals, as well as of the principles and policies underlying Chinese interaction with the world. The main priority of Chinese national policies at home and abroad remains that of pursuing the goal of economic modernization and development, with the specific aim of raising this nation of 1.2 billion relatively poor people to the level of medium level advanced countries. This is a task of monumental proportions and is being implemented with a mixture of pragmatism and uncompromising adherence to basic principles.

The established goals of the Dengist period, that relate to the modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology and defence, are predicated on "opening to the outside world", which is contrary to the historical Chinese tradition of self-sufficiency. Side by side with the unrelenting pursuit of economic progress, which compels close cooperation with the developed world led by the US, China is committed to resisting hegemony, and to protecting its perceived national interests. Therefore while stressing economic cooperation with the western world, China resolutely seeks to promote a multipolar world order, in which the interests of the developing countries, with which it identifies itself, can be safeguarded.

China's relationship with the US illustrates the basic Chinese approach of "combining flexibility with principles." The unique superpower is pursuing a policy of retaining its global pre-eminence by skillfully exploiting its unchallenged military force, and economic clout. Washington follows a policy towards China that combines elements of "engagement" as well as "containment."

The Sino-US relations in the economic and technical field are flourishing, with Chinese exports surging in a two-way trade of $45 billion, with the balance heavily in China's favour. This surplus provides significant support to China's growth. The transfer of advanced technology from the US also remains critical for modernization. As such the visit of President Jiang Zemin last November was used to advance the "engagement" mode, with China signing an agreement on nuclear non-proliferation that would meet US goals of restricting the spread of sophisticated technology to developing countries.

This agreement, in which Iran found specific mention, cleared the way for the sale of state of the art nuclear technology to China, that could add $30-40 billion to US exports to China over the next few years, thus narrowing the trade gap. China also responded to US interest in promoting stability in the West Pacific region, through what was described as strategic consensus on such issues as peace in the Korean Peninsula. However, though China attaches importance to its responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security Council, such commonalities cannot be construed as constituting a strategic military relationship.

This brings up the "containment' mode of US policy towards China, which is perceived as the only power capable of challenging Washington's global hegemony. The Chinese describe this approach as reflected in the three T's: Taiwan, Tibet and territorial claims of China on islands in the South China Sea. Though China manifests patience over the American policy of maintaining pressure by strengthening Taiwan, supporting Tibetan dissidents and tilting towards other claimants to disputed islands, it has no intention of compromising its vital national interests in response to such pressures. Beijing uses both diplomacy and military deterrence in response to "containment" by the US. For instance, China is orchestrating moves to promote multilateralism at the global level, as evident from the agreements concluded with Russia and France to promote multipolarity.

The Jiang visit was also used to put pressure on China to conform to western notions in the field of human rights, which are oriented towards granting greater leeway to political dissidents. Recalling the experience of the former Soviet Union, where the needed economic reforms were subverted by a political free for all, China regards such prescriptions as a recipe for disorder that would not serve the real interests of the Chinese people. Jiang therefore politely stood his ground, maintaining that China had its own cultural traditions that safeguarded the legitimate rights of its people, and therefore China was not prepared to yield on how it ran its domestic affairs, in which its preoccupation with the progress and well-being of its people was at the heart of its entire agenda. China's other major relationships, namely with Russia and Japan, are evolving in the context of the equation with Washington. While persisting in the pursuit of close cooperation, and good-neighbourly relations with its largest trading partner, Japan, Beijing does not conceal its unease at the type of security relationship emerging between Tokyo and Washington. With Moscow, an identity of perceptions on US hegemonic goals has resulted in a strategic alliance, that is to be shored up by all- round economic and political cooperation.

So far as South Asia is concerned, it may not loom large for China in terms of the totality of trade, but remains a region of primary interest on account of the geographical imperative. An improvement of relations with India has been accompanied by substantial increase in trade and other exchanges. China urges a peaceful settlement of disputes in the region, through dialogue, including that over Kashmir. However, it has not changed its basic stance, that there is a dispute which has to be ultimately settled on the basis of UN resolutions and the Simla Agreement. The primacy of China's economic agenda over the coming half century precludes the surfacing of conflicts of interest and perceptions that exist between Beijing and New Delhi. However, an analysis of China's principled position on many fundamentals reveal that the Sino-Indian relationship is going to be competitive rather than cooperative. Incidentally, this is also the impression that New Delhi wishes to foster to qualify for preferential treatment by the West which remains obsessed with the spectre of the threat from a resurgent China.

Putting together the broad Chinese evaluation of India's ambitions and goals in the coming years, one comes to the following conclusions:

i) India considers itself to be the heir to the role the British played in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. This runs counter to China's principled opposition to hegemony of any kind, whether regional or global. China certainly will not accept any limitation of its sovereign right to develop bilateral relations with various countries of South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.

ii) Though the Sino-Indian boundary dispute has been put on the back-burner, it is not likely to be resolved without a major shift in India's rigid stand.

iii) India's stance on Tibet continues to be ambivalent, since the Dalai Lama who is enjoying Indian sanctuary has stepped up his activities with western support as a means of pressure on China.

iv) China has taken note of the increased interest being taken in South Asian affairs by major powers, notably by the US and Russia. However, the policies of these powers are manifestly biased in India's favour, and both far more liberal in transferring dual use technology (and advanced weapons in the case of Russia) to India, which is perceived as being unhelpful to promoting stability and confidence in the region.

Coming specifically to relations with Pakistan, the basic fact is that our friendship has acquired deep roots, and is time- tested. Unlike other major powers, whose attitude to South Asia is manifestly coloured by "real-politik," China follows a balanced and principled policy, and has proved itself to be genuinely interested in our legitimate economic and security interests.

In line with its policy of fostering a stable and peaceful global environment that would be conducive to the attainment of its economic goals, China favours the settlement of all international disputes through peaceful means. It is therefore appreciative of the initiative taken by the present government in Islamabad to start a dialogue with India to resolve all outstanding issues, including Kashmir. While Beijing takes cognizance of the obstacles to this process, it urges perseverance and patience, without compromising principles.

Incidentally, any impression that China has downgraded its relations with Pakistan over recent years is totally unjustified. China recalls the close friendship with Pakistan during the years it was relatively isolated, when we took risks to consolidate our ties with our northern neighbour. The only point over which Beijing manifested its unhappiness in the recent past was when incidents of unrest among some elements in Xinjiang, following the accession of the Central Asian republics to independence drew a response from some religious groups in Pakistan that violated the principle of non-interference into each other's internal affairs that is a cornerstone of Sino-Pakistan friendship. Happily, that is past and forgotten, and perhaps the most durable and dependable aspect of our foreign policy, which has the support of all segments of our public opinion is that of maintaining and strengthening our friendship with China.

Very soon, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif will be paying an official visit to China. This may well be the most crucial foreign policy move by him around the time he completes one year as the head of government with an unprecedented mandate. All the leading personalities we met, whether official or academic, attach great importance to this visit. When we look at the political scene in our region, as well as at the global level, there will be a great many issues of critical importance to discuss. The post-cold war ferment in international diplomacy is at its height, with great power rivalries spreading to Central Asia, on account of its vast energy reserves. There is violence in Kashmir, instability in Afghanistan, and tensions in the Persian Gulf. Pakistani and Chinese interests and perceptions coincide on many issues and need to be coordinated through dialogue.

No less important is the economic ferment in Asia and the world. China now has a strong economy which has not only grown steadily at a record pace for two decades but is also capable of influencing the future course of events in its vicinity in a significant way. The Prime minister will have the opportunity to give renewed vitality to economic and technical cooperation with a trusted friend which has always sought to promote prosperity and economic self-reliance in Pakistan without attaching political strings. He will have the challenge of defining and strengthening this model friendship for the coming century.