DAWN - Opinion; 07 February, 1998

India's bid for UNSC seat


By Brian Cloughley

THE present composition of the UN Security Council's permanent membership is, as almost everyone agrees, inappropriate. There should be an increase. Japan should be included. So should Germany. Brazil? Maybe; but certainly one of the South American nations. Perhaps, also, one from Africa, although that would be difficult, for all sorts of reasons. But what of the subcontinent? A billion people unrepresented, is this reasonable? Of course not.

Expansion of the permanent membership of the Security Council - probably doubling - should include representation from the subcontinent. The problems are: who? and, how?

It can't be Sri Lanka. Or Nepal. Or - let's face it - Pakistan. It has to be India. But Pakistan and its allies will not permit India's application to see the lights of UN HQ in a New York Heartbeat. Unless...

Unless there might be a quid pro quo between Pakistan and India. It is not unthinkable that an arrangement might be constructed whereby India's ardent and urgent desire for inclusion in the Big Ten could be accommodated by Pakistan. For, assuredly, New Delhi's ideas of Security Council permanent membership are doomed if Pakistan continues its campaign against it. The President of Greece and other comparative lightweights visiting New Delhi can make all the noises of support for India they wish; but if the second most important nation of the subcontinent does not wish India to be in the PSC, it will not be. But the solution, oddly, might lie in Kashmir.

Mind you, all bets are off if the BJP is ascendant in the Indian elections. Recent reports (in The Hindu on January 14, for example), that the BJP would emphasize and legitimize India's nuclear and missile programmes are only too credible and Pakistan could expect no cooperation whatever in seeking rapprochement about Kashmir or anything else were there to be a BJP-influenced government in New Delhi. But let us say sanity prevails and that there might be a moderate coalition constructed in March that is not viscerally anti-Pakistan. This could be an opportunity for Mr Nawaz Sharif to employ diplomatic skills for which he has not, so far, been notable, either at home or in foreign affairs.

There is no point in rehearsing the Kashmir saga in detail. The points of view are too disparate to be explained cogently. India has one decided point of view. Pakistan has another. And the people of Kashmir (which, outsiders tend to forget, is not just the troubled Valley but includes territory not controlled by India) have several points of view, few of which are taken into account by the major players. But it might be reasonable and productive for Pakistan to indicate that objections to India's proposal for inclusion in the UN Security Council's permanent membership could be more favourably regarded were New Delhi to ease off its resistance to dialogue over Kashmir that might actually lead to somewhere.

Some of us remember a moment of semi-euphoria in June 1989 when the Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries announced in the VIP lounge at Islamabad airport that agreement had been reached for withdrawal of both nations' troops from Siachen to positions occupied at the time of the Simla Accord - that is, well away from the region in which there was no conflict in 1971.

The drama was turned to farce next day by New Delhi's 'clarification' that "the Indian foreign secretary had endorsed the Pakistani foreign secretary's observations on their talks, whereas the report has made out as if he endorsed the Pakistan foreign secretary's remarks on the defence secretaries' talks", which, of course, was not a confusing statement although, as everyone knew, the defence secretaries had agreed that withdrawal made sense, even if the later Indian position did not.

But the really significant thing about the agreement destroyed by India was that it would not have cost New Delhi anything (it would have saved the lives of scores of soldiers who have since died in the wastes of Siachen, but that, unfortunately, is irrelevant to point-winning in politics). Not one smidgen of national pride would have been sacrificed on either side. Quite the reverse: accord would have shown that the countries were serious about negotiating; that they were mature in their approach to problem-solving and confidence-building; and that they could bring themselves to contribute to stability by involving themselves in bilateral dialogue - which would have been a winner for India in its stance concerning Kashmir.

But no, petty point-scoring was more important than bold decision-making. And so it has been ever since - just as it was before. But there must be a way out of this lunacy, not just in Siachen but in Kashmir where the people have suffered too much, too long.

It is not only in recent years that rulers of Kashmiris in the Valley have been indifferent to their welfare (to use Lord Birdwood's observations about the unlamented Maharaja Hari Singh). Their lot for centuries has been appalling, and their political treatment since 1947 nothing less than shameful. It is now recognized by independent and rational Indian commentators that vote-rigging by the Congress and the National Conference over the years was the straw that broke the back of the normally quiescent Kashmiri. But this is not to say that Pakistan is entirely blameless in the continuing conflict on the Indian side of the Line of Control. There are extremist groups, based in Pakistan who act almost with impunity in their violent support of the (quite genuine) uprising in the Valley and its environs.

It has been put to me by Pakistani politicians that the army cannot act to suppress these elements because of its own commitment to Islam and for reasons of deep, endemic support for the Kashmiris in their fight for freedom. There would be, it is said, grave political problems were action taken. And so on. This is all nonsense. The army is a well-disciplined force. It is more than capable of taking on and defeating - eliminating - terrorists bands whose proclivity for mayhem and bloodshed cannot be disguised by a thin cover of religious adherence.

These people are not good Muslims. They are crazed and crackpot zealots whose only trade is violence. They should be combated vigorously, and the government of Mr Nawaz Sharif, with its large majority, a long life ahead of it and a compelling requirement to regain the trust of the people, should act to prevent the madmen from their forays into Indian-administered Kashmir (IAK). It can be done; it should be done.

Not only would such action by the government be beneficial in the overall context of Kashmir, but it would be a significant and much needed confidence-building measure vis-a-vis India. (It might be going too far, as an attraction, to state that it would save lives).

India is conducting a well-constructed international propaganda operation concerning Pakistan 'support' for Kashmiri terrorists. And it is doing this, it has to be said, with some justification. After all, we have seen independent reports - not just Indian propaganda - that many terrorists killed by security forces were foreign nationals, not Indians, Pakistanis or Kashmiris. They didn't arrive by space-capsule in Indian-administered Kashmir. And they didn't drive up from Delhi. They went across the Line of Control. It is time they were stopped, and then, deported from Pakistan.

There would be an outcry from some of the 'religious' political parties. But hasn't anyone noticed that these parties do not, in fact, attract all that much support from the people of Pakistan? They can bring people out on the streets, certainly. And they can influence sectarian killers. But neither of these is evidence of a democratic approach to life. And if the religious parties don't want democracy then the government of Pakistan should know what to do about that.Certainly, there have been terrible atrocities committed by Indian security forces in IAK; it could hardly have been otherwise, given the nature of the insurrection. But the world yawns about them. "Just more atrocities; switch over to the cricket."

The benefits of robust action on Pakistan's part would be enormous. To begin with, there would be cessation of Indian shelling across the Line of Control. This always increases when word of an incursion by extremists is obtained by Indian intelligence (for 'The Afghans' as the terrorists are known, be they Libyan, Saudi, Egyptian or whatever, are hopelessly insecure in the intelligence sense) and it is difficult to blame Indian commanders for blasting away when they know that there is going to be cross-Line activity on a certain route in a certain time-frame. (The lives of innocent villagers would be saved, but perhaps, again, this would just be coincidental).

Second, the intensity of the campaign of violence in IAK would be reduced. This would only be beneficial. Even if it gave the Indian security forces a boost (and Indian senior commanders could be relied upon not to crow about 'winning the war', lest they confound the larger purpose; they, at least, with their counterparts in Pakistan, are sensible people), the atmosphere of relaxation would benefit the entire population. There will never be trust, ever again, no matter what happens, between the Kashmiris in the Valley and 'India' - as they call it - but at least there might be reduced suspicion and restoration of normality in the lives of ordinary, decent folk. Further benefits might be even more gradual, but no less significant for that. For there is the matter of India's UN ambitions.

Now, India regards the UN resolution concerning the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir as 'old' and, therefore, for some reason, less applicable than it might be were it new. To be sure, the Security Council resolution is old. But it has never been repealed, modified or even - in open forum - questioned by India. It exists and remains applicable. So how could India aspire for inclusion in a body that has decided upon, and retains its decision on, a major item of international importance which India discounts? The answer might be the hoary old one of 'Yes, but...' but that won't wash this time.

India might well say, Yes, But - the US does not enforce UNSC resolutions concerning Israel, therefore it is irrelevant to our proposed membership of the SC if we ignore a resolution, too. One hopes that India will not be tempted to take this stance, because if it does it will gain a mighty enemy and forever bid farewell to any bid for membership of the Security Council. The time for fervent pragmatism has come. Realpolitik should be adopted in the subcontinent - not that the moral or idealistic approach has been much in evidence for the past fifty years (or even before then, very much, come to think of it).

And both India and Pakistan would be better off for adoption of a more realistic attitude in their dispute over Kashmir. So would the world, for the imperative in the subcontinent to go further, faster and more expensively in developing nuclear weapons and systems for their delivery would diminish. It would not disappear, for India has a fear of China that will never be eradicated (although what India imagines it could do were China to be serious about waging all-out war against it is open to debate) and considers it must continue to develop the nuclear-tipped Agni missile.

But the main cause of disagreement, distrust, disruption and dislocation in the region is the Kashmir problem. Put it to rest; end it; and would there be a new era in the region? No, of course not. But at least there would be more on which to agree, less distrust, fewer disruptive influences, and smaller tendency to dislocate proposed and worthwhile advances in trade and other cooperation that would so benefit the SAARC nations.

In September 1965 I asked President Zia if the solution to the Kashmir problem might be to propose the Line of Control as a national border - with, maybe, a few alterations here and there. No, said Zia, it wouldn't. He had enough political problems on his hands without an uprising in Azad Kashmir, and anyway, the recent Indian foray into Siachen showed that they were intent on gaining control of territory by military means. What had happened, he asked, rhetorically, to the idea of 'peaceful negotiation'? If Pakistan didn't defend in the north what might the next Indian move be? - an advance to Skardu? No, he said: the answer lay in waiting. Well, perhaps we have now waited long enough for resolution of the Kashmir question.

The peoples of the region, certainly, have waited too long for resolution.