In the first term of the Howard government, the notion of leadership, and its apparent lack, were discussed ad nauseum in the Australian media. The argument went that Howard lacks political leadership, demonstrated by his refusal to confront Pauline Hanson, his refusal to support a heroin trial in Canberra, and a slowdown in the reduction in car tariffs. Howard was compared to Keating, a Prime Minister who cultivated an image of tough political leadership. You didn't have to like Paul Keating but you had to respect him, so the argument went. John Howard, it seemed, was even harder to like, and infinitely harder to respect.

For political commentators in the nation's broadsheets it often seems that an uncompromising stance and a certain arrogance demonstrate political leadership: Jeff Kennett is regarded as a leader, while Richard Court is not. For these people political leadership consists of displays of arrogance in the pursuit of policies that they find agreeable. This approach to political leadership is to say the least both flawed and simplistic.

Political leadership is one of the most difficult concepts to define, quantify and qualify in political science. It is a phenomenon that can be named but sometimes little else. Attempts at explaining leadership have at various times revolved around psychological explanations. Freudian and Oedipus complexes are used to explain the behaviour of prime ministers and presidents; the personality of leaders becomes the focus of attention. An unhappy childhood was seen as a pre-requisite to leadership, with Winston Churchill being wheeled out as the exception that proves the rule. Undoubtedly psychological and personality explanations of leadership have their place, but the former is difficult to measure and the latter is open to a range of interpretations and seem to rest primarily on anecdotes and unreliable memoirs.

James MacGregor Burns, in his 1975 work Leadership, saw leadership as hinging on the results of what leaders actually did. Leadership was to be gauged by actual social change measured. Leadership must not be measured by press clippings, spin doctoring and words but by results, by what was done not by what was promised would be done. Too often it seems, the commentators who call for leadership fall victim to the lure of style over substance. Charm, wit and casual arrogance can hide and obscure policy detail, achievements and failures, and big pictures splashed with bright and bold images can all to often dominant the smaller canvass, with its finer detail and sense of serious purpose.

If we are to examine leadership we must pose two questions: what did the leader actually do and would another leader have done the same thing. Leadership has a transformational element. The leader takes a new direction in so doing leaves an imprint on both the office and the political, social and economic environment they left behind. However, if it could be reasonably argued that another leader would have taken the same steps then the extent to which it was leadership must be questioned.

Did Paul Keating set Australia on an unique path? Or would another leader have set a similar trajectory? In this article we will examine Keating's performance in two spheres: the economic and social. The former deals with the implementation of what can be broadly defined as New Right economics, while the latter refers to the 'big picture issues' the Republic and Australian 'independence', and the 'push' into Asia.

As Treasurer, in the Hawke Government, Keating embraced the economic policies of the New Right that was sweeping OECD countries, so much so that The Economist regarded him as a Thatcherite. Keating's record is impressive; the float of the Australian dollar, deregulation of the banking system, tariff reductions, reduction of the size of government to pre-Whitlam levels, increases in national savings, compulsory superannuation, and the introduction of privatisation. Not for nothing was Keating made International Treasurer of the Year in 1985. The ramifications of Keating's initiatives with the Industries Commission and the Hilmer Report into competition policy will be felt for years to come.

Did Keating display leadership in this field? The answer is yes, though there are some important qualifications. Firstly, during the 1980s Keating's policy options were constrained by the economic climate of the day, a fact of life that other left-of-centre leaders like Francois Mitterrand and David Lange had to face. Keating was following a global trend. Secondly, through a combination of world trends and misjudgement with interest rates, Keating was partly responsible for the worst recession since the 1930s. This surely must constitute a failure. In response to the second question we ask of leadership, would another leader have pursued a similar course, it is possible to argue that a Liberal Treasurer would have undoubtedly have introduced similar policies. Indeed, John Howard put New Right economic policies on the national agenda. But in Keating's defence, it is probably worth remembering Otto von Bismarck's observation of the English political system,

'If reactionary measures are to be carried, the Liberal party takes the rudder, from the correct assumption that it will not overstep the necessary limits; if liberal measures are to be carried, the Conservative party takes office in its turn for the same consideration.'

Perhaps the Australian public may have found it more reassuring to have a Labor Treasurer introduced New Right economic reform, then a Liberal one.

While Keating's achievements in the social sphere are harder to quantify than in the economic arena, paradoxically his leadership is easier to recognise. Take, for example, the Republic. On this issue Keating has had a lasting impact, regardless of the result of the November referendum. It would also be fair to say that no alternative leader at that time would have pursued this course of action. Keating placed the Republic on the national agenda, and contributed to the air of inevitability that surrounds it, although his preferred model may not be adopted and the Australian Republican Movement distances itself from Keating. This is a relatively unambiguous example of political leadership. Related to the Republic, was the notion of Australian 'independence', a revision of Australian history. Keating, influenced by a revision promoted and embraced by the likes of Don Watson, Manning Clark, Geoffrey Serle and Gregory Pemberton, seems to have changed, or expressed as no leader has done before, the way some Australians think about their history. The best example perhaps is Keating's view of the second world war.

It was during Keating's fourth year as prime minister that the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the second world war fell. Although it is difficult to measure, Keating seems to have influenced through well-publicised comments on the Pacific war, the way many Australians view the second world war. There seemed to be an increased emphasis on Australia's role in the Pacific, where Australians, it is said, fought battles for Australia, not for Britain. Part of this myth is the British incompetence in Singapore, British desertion of Australia and Menzies' complicity in this betrayal. The upshot of this myth is that Australia's vital role in the early years of the war when the British Commonwealth stood alone is forgotten. The role of Australians in the Battle of Britain, Tobruk, El Alamein, Greece and Crete -the Commonwealth's finest hour- are seen, by revisionists like Keating, as wasteful Imperial ventures diverting vital resources from the real battle looming over the horizon against Japan.

If we ignore for a moment the parochialism and flagrant disregard for the facts associated with the revisionist myth, it is possible to argue that its preponderance is, in part, testimony to both Keating's impact and leadership. A cynic might say this is also a reflection on Australia's ignorance of where it has been and what it has done. Insofar as this change in the way in which Australians view the second world war can be attributed to Keating, he has displayed leadership in expressing and articulating this position, one which no other leader of the time would be likely to hold or express.

Keating claims the 'push' to Asia as one of his major achievements. To hear Keating tell it one could be forgiven for thinking that Australia was completely unaware of the existence of Asia until he pointed it out. Nevertheless, Keating did place Asia on the national agenda. Or had it always been there?

Asia has been a major foreign policy concern for Australia since before Federation. Initially this concern had its basis in a fear of Asia, however after the second world war successive governments saw Australia's future in Asia. The Colombo Plan, trade agreements with Japan, military commitments to Malaysia and South Vietnam, foreign aid, loans and investment, the quiet dismantling of the White Australia policy are all evidence of the importance which successive Liberal governments attached to Asia. In the late 1970s former Liberal Minister Sir Paul Hasluck commented that the Menzies cabinets were the first in Australia's history to recognise that Australia's future lay in the Asia and that Australia had an important role to play in the region.

It was Liberal governments that began the shift to Asia, and they could do so partly because, unlike the Labor Party up until 1967, the White Australia policy and the corresponding isolationism from Asia, was not an object of reverence. (Most senior Liberals would have viewed comments like those made by Labor leader Arthur Calwell, 'two Wongs don't make a white,' with distaste and disdain.) Whitlam, Fraser and Hawke all continued this push into Asia, although many Asian countries, notably Malaysia and Singapore, viewed Whitlam's withdrawal of army advisors from South Vietnam, as a retreat from Asia.

Keating built upon their foundations. Leadership? Not quite. However, Keating, unlike previous leaders alerted Australians to the importance of Asia. Though this painting in Keating's 'big picture' series was not his alone. Others devised the frame and canvass. He added a few bright splashes of colour, moved the picture were more people would pass it by and claimed it as his own. This is leadership through press clippings and stirring speeches, transformational only to those who suspend scepticism. A lesser grade of leadership- but leadership none the less.

There can be little doubt that in some way Keating transformed Australia. For the most part he pursued policy options that other leaders had followed or would have followed, but on several key issues, the Republic, the revisionist interpretation of Australia's role in the second world war, and, to a certain extent, relations with Asia, Keating changed the way Australians view them. Keating placed these issues, hitherto ignored or underplayed, on the national agenda. He changed Australia's direction.

It may be by only a few degrees and may be based on poor navigation, but the direction changed. British Conservative Julian Critchley wrote 'Thatcherism is, in fact, riddled with contradictions. Mrs Thatcher, on the other hand is free of doubt, she is the label on the can of worms.' In many ways Keating is the same, he is the label on the can of worms. But the can of worms in this case isn't Thatcherism; it is Keating's 'big picture.' It is a can left unopened and unexplored, while the focus lies with the label. Perhaps it is easier that way. Easier to remain a true believer, because to open the can one might find that little is true and even less is believable.

If we find ourselves desiring a leader riding chariots of fire with arrows of burning gold, we might do well to remember Gallieo's rejoinder to the claim 'unhappy is the land that has no heroes.' 'No, unhappy is that land that have need of heroes.' By the same token unhappy is the land that needs leaders, because they may settle for anyone.

Stephen Barton is a Masters student in the Department of Political Science. He is currently working on a thesis comparing the political leadership of Richard Court and Jeff Kennett.