By: David Grabiner
There has been a lot of debate on the importance of protection; does it help to bat in front of a great hitter? It is easy to cite individual examples of players who hit better or worse when their protection situation changed, but this doesn't prove anything, since there will always be hitters who improve or decline just by chance.
Protection has a clear effect on runs scored, since a good hitter is more likely than a bad hitter to drive runners in. It also has a clear effect on intentional walks. These will have small secondary effects on raw totals such as hits and home runs, since an intentional walk prevents the batter from getting them; there may also be a larger secondary effect on RBI, since intentional walks are given only with runners in scoring position.
I'm interested in finding out whether there is any actual effect on the hitter. When they do pitch to him, does he do better when protected than when unprotected? Thus I will primarily be comparing batting and slugging average.
The only previous clear data of this type was a study by Bill James in the 1985 Baseball Abstract, looking at Dale Murphy and Bob Horner. Murphy hit .265 with Horner in the lineup, and .281 with the same power with Horner out. (This is not a statistically significant difference.) It's a large sample, but it's just one player; the effect might not matter for Murphy, but it might affect other players.
Now, I have looked at the 1991 AL, and identified twenty-five players who might have benefited from protection. They did not hit any better when protected; therefore, I must conclude that protection is not a significant effect. Details follow.
I considered a hitter to be capable of providing protection if he was a regular who had both a slugging percentage of at least .450 and a good reputation. Mike Macfarlane, for example, slugged .506 in a half-season, but I don't think pitchers were frightened when he was on deck.
A player was eligible for the study if he had at least 100 AB protected by a big hitter, and 100 AB not protected. If protection helps a player, these players should hit better when protected than when unprotected. If it doesn't help, half should do better and half worse by chance. That's about what happened, with ten of twenty-five hitting better when protected, and fifteen worse.
Here is the list of big hitters I used. The criteria were necessarily somewhat subjective; reputation became less important as slugging percentage went up. In particular, hitters in the .450-.470 range had to have a clear reputation.
Player Team SLG Baines Oak .473 Belle Cle .540 Boggs Bos .460 Buhner Sea .498 Canseco Oak .556 Carter Tor .503 Clark Bos .466 Davis Min .507 Fielder Det .513 Franco Tex .474 Gonzalez Tex .479 Griffey Sea .527 Hrbek Min .461 Joyner Cal .488 Mack Min .529 Molitor Mil .489 Puckett Min .460 Ripken Bal .566 Sierra Tex .502 Tartabull KC .593 Tettleton Det .491 Thomas Chi .553 Whitaker Det .489 Winfield Cal .472
The non-qualifying regulars over .450 were Downing, Hall, Dave Henderson, Horn, Martinez, Pasqua, Reimer, Greg Vaughn, and White; of these, all but Horn and Reimer were below .470. Moving a few players from one list to the other wouldn't make a significant difference in the study.
Here are the twenty-five players, with comments. The "Protected" lines include all plate appearances with any of the big hitters on deck; for all but Downing, Pettis, and Sierra (all Texas players), one big hitter did almost all of the protecting.
Roberto Alomar, Toronto
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 637 188 41 11 9 57 4 5 .295 .354 .436
Protected 530 162 32 10 9 46 2 3 .312 .361 .455
Unprotected 107 26 9 1 0 9 2 2 .243 .314 .346
Does it help to bat in front of Joe Carter? Alomar started the season batting second in front of Kelly Gruber, with Carter third. When Gruber went out on May 1 with an injury, Carter moved up to third, and stayed there for almost all of the rest of the season. That looks like a protection situation.
Alomar's splits suggest it helps, but see Kelly Gruber below for the other side. Alomar hit for a much higher average with Carter on deck, but it was only 107 AB; he could easily have a one-month slump at the same level.
The two lines would match in batting and slugging average if four singles, a double, and a homer (and the six hits) were moved from the "Protected" to the "Unprotected" line. That's the difference between what Alomar hit when unprotected, and what he would be expected to hit if protection had no effect. We'll look at this for all of the players.
Brady Anderson, Baltimore
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 256 59 12 3 2 38 5 3 .230 .338 .324
Protected 117 23 7 0 2 22 1 0 .197 .329 .308
Unprotected 139 36 5 3 0 16 4 3 .249 .346 .338
Cal Ripken batted third for Baltimore, and was far better than anyone else in the lineup; this was his MVP season. Anderson batted second half the time he played. In other games, he usually came off the bench and batted in front of almost everyone else, with a short stretch as the leadoff hitter in front of an Orsulak/Milligan platoon.
That .197 average stands out because it is below the Mendoza line, but the actual split is small, particularly given the small sample size (the least reliable in the study). The lines would match if six singles were moved to the "Protected" line and two doubles moved back, a net shift of only two total bases.
Carlos Baerga, Cleveland
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 593 171 28 2 11 48 6 3 .288 .346 .398
Protected 271 75 12 0 4 22 4 1 .277 .339 .365
Unprotected 322 96 16 2 7 26 2 2 .298 .352 .425
Baerga is a particularly useful case, because we have reasonably large samples of both protected and unprotected play. Baerga usually batted third, in front of Albert Belle. However, Belle missed 39 games (mostly with injuries), and the Indians also juggled the lineup during the season, so Baerga often batted elsewhere. The other batters behind him were never close to Belle's quality; Belle hit 28 homers in 461 at-bats and slugged .540. This was Belle's first full season, but he was a highly regarded prospect, and hit far better than anyone else on the team.
Baerga hit somewhat better when he wasn't protected; the two lines above would be a perfect match if one double, one triple, and one homer were transferred to the "Protected" line.
George Brett, Kansas City
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 505 129 40 2 10 58 0 8 .255 .327 .402
Protected 395 96 30 0 8 48 0 6 .243 .321 .380
Unprotected 110 33 10 2 2 10 0 2 .300 .352 .482
The classic protection situation: Brett batted third and Danny Tartabull batted cleanup for the Royals all year, except when one of them was hurt. When Tartabull was out of the lineup, the Royals' cleanup hitter was usually someone like Jim Eisenreich.
The 102-point difference in slugging looks impressive, but it is just 110 AB; move five hits to the "Protected" line, including both triples, and the split disappears. Still, it's hard to argue that Tartabull's absence hurt Brett.
Jose Canseco, Oakland
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 572 152 32 1 44 78 9 6 .266 .359 .556
Protected 422 113 24 1 33 66 9 6 .268 .374 .564
Unprotected 150 39 8 0 11 12 0 0 .260 .315 .533
The protection situation isn't as clear here. Canseco was only considered "Protected" when he batted in front of Harold Baines and his .473 SLG. The "Unprotected" at-bats were split between Dave Henderson, Mark McGwire, and Terry Steinbach in the cleanup spot behind Canseco. Henderson hit almost as well as Baines, but didn't have the reputation. McGwire had the reputation, but had a poor season, hitting only .201 with a .383 SLG. Only Steinbach was your typical non-protecting cleanup hitter.
And the split that appears is not at all what you would expect from a lack of protection. The batting and slugging averages are very close; moving the triple to the "Unprotected" line would make them match. But when Canseco could supposedly have been pitched around, he drew 12 BB+HBP instead of the expected 21.
Milt Cuyler, Detroit
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 475 122 15 7 3 52 5 2 .257 .335 .337
Protected 109 25 5 0 0 10 1 0 .229 .300 .275
Unprotected 366 97 10 7 3 42 4 2 .265 .348 .355
This is an unusual protection situation, because of the spots in which Cuyler batted. He was protected when he batted leadoff in front of Whitaker. He usually batted ninth, with Phillips in the leadoff spot.
Cuyler hit worse when protected, even though you might expect him to be placed in the leadoff spot against pitchers he was expected to hit well. (Phillips was in the lineup in half of those games.) In 109 AB, it's probably mainly a chance split, and not a very large one; moving a single and two triples to the "Protected" line is enough to balance out the splits.
Alvin Davis, Seattle
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 462 102 15 1 12 56 0 10 .221 .299 .335
Protected 148 32 2 0 2 8 0 0 .216 .256 .270
Unprotected 314 70 13 1 10 48 0 10 .223 .317 .366
When Davis was protected, he batted in front of Jay Buhner. They were 6th and 7th early in the season, moving to 4th and 5th later. The bottom of Seattle's lineup wasn't stable; Davis never batted in front of the other good hitters (Griffey and Martinez), but batted in front of essentially everyone else other than Harold Reynolds.
The split in walks is large, and would be statistically significant in isolation, but Davis didn't show the other expected effects of protection, declining across the board. To balance out the slugging averages, you would need to move four doubles and two homers to the "Protected" line, and six singles back.
Brian Downing, Texas
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 407 113 17 2 17 58 8 2 .278 .377 .455
Protected 257 64 8 2 10 30 3 1 .249 .333 .412
Unprotected 150 49 9 0 7 28 5 1 .327 .451 .527
Downing usually batted leadoff for the Rangers. Early in the season, the big hitters batted in the 3-5 spots, with Huson, Petralli, and other weak hitters batting second. Later, Franco and Palmeiro moved to the second spot, both much more likely to drive Downing in if he got on base.
Downing walked more when unprotected, but the primary cause of his splits (the largest in AVG and OBP except for Pettis) was the increased average. The lines would match if five singles, one double, and one homer were moved to "Protected."
Cecil Fielder, Detroit
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 624 163 25 0 44 78 6 4 .261 .347 .513
Protected 515 136 21 0 39 63 4 4 .264 .346 .532
Unprotected 109 27 4 0 5 15 2 0 .248 .349 .422
Fielder batted cleanup in every Tiger game, usually in front of Mickey Tettleton. When Tettleton wasn't in the lineup, the fifth-place hitter was Incaviglia, Barnes, or sometimes Deer. This looks like a protection situation, although Tettleton's reputation in 1991 is debatable.
The splits are the classical argument for protection; Fielder drew fewer walks when protected, and hit for a higher average with more power. But it's not a big difference in 109 AB; a double and two homers moved to the "Unprotected" line with two singles coming back would be enough to eliminate it.
Julio Franco, Texas
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 589 201 27 3 15 65 3 2 .341 .408 .474
Protected 370 135 18 3 9 33 1 2 .365 .416 .503
Unprotected 219 66 9 0 6 32 2 0 .301 .392 .425
Franco started the season batting fifth, in front of Kevin Reimer. Later, he moved up, usually batting leadoff or second in front of Palmeiro, or third in front of Sierra. Reimer slugged .477 but didn't have a reputation as a big hitter, and Palmeiro and Sierra were even better.
If protection helped a high-average hitter, you would expect to see splits like Franco's. He walked more when unprotected; the walk split is just short of two standard deviations, and goes over if you count walks and HBP. But he gained about as much in hits as he lost in walks. To match the batting and slugging averages, you would need to move eight singles and one triple to the "Unprotected" line.
Kelly Gruber, Toronto
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 429 108 18 2 20 31 6 5 .252 .308 .443
Protected 103 25 2 1 3 9 2 1 .243 .310 .369
Unprotected 326 83 16 1 17 22 4 4 .255 .307 .466
Gruber batted third in April in front of Carter, went out on May 1, returned on June 12 in the third spot, and then dropped to lower spots (usually fourth through sixth) on June 20. When he wasn't batting third, he batted in front of a variety of players, including Myers, Mulliniks, Tabler, and Olerud, who was not a star then.
These splits are the reverse of what you would expect if protection were an effect. Gruber drew more walks with Carter behind him, and lost some power. It's not that big a split in 103 AB, though; the "Protected" line would be a reasonable slump for him. The lines would match if one double and two homers were moved to the "Protected" line, and two singles moved back.
In fact, a normal cause of slumps may have something to do with these splits; 27 of the 103 AB were the week Gruber came back from his injury. (He hit about the same that week as in the other unprotected AB, 6 for 27 with a double and a homer.)
Brian Harper, Minnesota
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 441 137 28 1 10 14 6 6 .311 .336 .447
Protected 204 60 5 1 4 6 2 3 .294 .316 .387
Unprotected 237 77 23 0 6 8 4 3 .325 .353 .498
Harper usually batted sixth, sometimes fifth, and sometimes came off the bench. Since the bottom of Minnesota's lineup wasn't stable early in the season, this put him in front of an assortment of weak hitters. Shane Mack started the season as a bench player, batting eighth when he started, but settled in to the seventh spot behind Harper on July 21.
Harper slumped late in the season, hitting only eight doubles after the All-Star break; hit protection splits reflect the fact that he was protected during this slump. The doubles split is more than two standard deviations, but it isn't large enough to put the slugging average split over two standard deviations. To balance the batting and slugging averages (but not the lines), we need to move four homers to the "Protected" line and the triple back; to balance the lines themselves would require more changes.
Dave Henderson, Oakland
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 572 158 33 0 25 58 4 2 .276 .346 .465
Protected 424 115 28 0 21 34 4 2 .274 .332 .488
Unprotected 148 42 5 0 4 24 0 0 .284 .384 .399
A near-classic situation; Henderson was protected when he batted second in front of Canseco, but not when he batted fifth behind Canseco and Baines, or cleanup behind Canseco with Baines out of the lineup. When Henderson wasn't protected, the hitter behind him was usually Steinbach or McGwire.
The splits are exactly what you would expect if protection were an effect; his OBP jumped when unprotected, mainly due to walks (only three intentional) while his power dropped. To get the lines to match, you would need to move three homers and three doubles to the "Unprotected" line, and seven singles back.
Wally Joyner, California
AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG
Total 551 166 34 3 21 52 1 5 .301 .360 .488
Protected 426 134 26 2 15 38 1 5 .315 .368 .491
Unprotected 125 32 8 1 6 14 0 0 .256 .331 .464
Another classic protection situation. Joyner usually batted third with Dave Winfield cleanup, and there were some games in which Joyner batted second with Winfield third. When Winfield wasn't in the lineup, the batter behind Joyner was usually Dave Parker or Gary Gaetti, neither one of whom struck fear in the hearts of opposing pitchers.
The batting average splits are similar to Alomar's, but Joyner compensated somewhat by hitting for more power. As with Alomar, the effect is likely to have come from the small sample size. The batting and slugging averages would match if seven singles were moved to the "Unprotected" line, and a homer moved the other way.