By: David Grabiner
In previous articles, I looked at 1989-1990 data on hitting in LIP situations and with runners in scoring position, and concluded that the players who had "established" an ability to hit well in either situations gained less than one extra hit a year in these situations, and even this conclusion was not statistically significant.
The USA Today Baseball Weekly has data for hitting with runners in scoring position (which I will abbreviate RISP), so I can now update the RISP data to cover 1991. I'll have to wait for the 1992 Elias Analyst before I can update the LIP data.
The 1989 Elias Analyst lists those players who gained or lost the most with RISP over the ten-year period 1979-1988; the 1990 Elias Analyst lists those players who gained or lost the most with RISP over the five-year period 1985-1989. If there is an ability to perform in the clutch, these are the players who should have the ability.
Now, take a look at the data. (I have provided it at the end of the article). I looked at every player in the years after he had established himself as good or bad with RISP, provided that he was listed in the Elias Analyst and had at least 200 AB. In the averages, I counted seasons of 200-400 AB at half weight (marked with asterisks in the data below), and seasons of over 400 AB at full weight.
First, some background data: 1/4 of all at-bats are with runners in scoring position, and overall batting average in these situations does not change.
Clutch Terrors (gained .041 in 1979-1988, or .049 in 1985-1989):
Full Seasons: 24
Half Seasons: 10
BA Change with RISP: +.012
Chokers (lost .036 in 1979-1988, or .037 in 1985-1989):
Full Seasons: 31
Half Seasons: 8
BA Change with RISP: -.001
Neither number above is statistically significant; a quick estimate puts the standard error at .008 for the clutch terrors.
But assume that there is a real effect, splitting the difference and saying that the difference between an average player and a terror is .006 (rounding down because of extra non-significant digits). Since a regular has about 140 RISP at-bats per season, that's a difference of less than one hit. If a hit with runners in scoring position is twice as important in winning the game as an average hit, which may be an overvaluation, having this .8 of a hit with RISP rather than in a random spot is worth as much as an extra .8 of a hit per season. That's a whopping .001 on your season batting average, or .003 when you compare a clutch terror to a choker. If clutch hitting is an ability, that is about how important it is. This gives a good justification for essentially ignoring it when comparing players.
Also, there is no guarantee that the whole difference, or any part of it, comes from bearing down harder in the clutch. I actually expected to find a larger difference, just for such reasons as sacrifice flies (which ground-ball hitters don't get to discard in their batting averages), and disciplined hitters who get walked when they get ahead in the count with a base open (see Tettleton and McGriff, but then see McGwire).
There are only three players who made the lists in both this article and my previous one on LIP hitting. All three, Rickey Henderson, Benito Santiago, and Don Slaught, are on the choke list here but were on the clutch list in the other study. If there is an ability to bear down in the clutch, you would expect the same players to show up as terrors on both lists.
Barry Bonds's batting average with runners in scoring position was cited in support of his MVP candidacy last year, and may be again this year. But he was on the '79-'88 choke list for his career, and is still below average, so this doesn't look like an ability at all.
For those who want to check, here are the stats. (A + change means that the player improved in the clutch; * marks a season of 200-400 AB.)
Player's Change Change Change Change
name '79-'88 1989 1990 1991
Leach +.067 -.081* N/A N/A
McGwire +.066 +.038 +.013 +.037
Tabler +.064 -.026* +.027* +.018
Gruber +.058 -.011 +.041 -.014
Stilwell +.056 +.031 -.005 +.032*
Fletcher +.053 -.017 +.028 +.048*
Guillen +.046 +.018 +.052 -.025
Canseco +.044 +.090* -.012 =
LaValliere +.041 N/A +.045 -.026*
Santiago -.077 +.003 -.028 +.009
C. James -.063 +.016 +.025 N/A
Bonds -.063 -.021 +.076 +.053
Slaught -.052 +.030* +.047* -.011*
Pasqua -.042 +.070* +.006* -.016
Snyder -.040 +.012 -.006 N/A
Bradley -.036 -.033 +.007 N/A
Change Change Change
'85-'89 1990 1991
Valle +.081 +.019* -.033*
Manrique +.074 +.004* N/A
Worthington +.060 -.028 N/A
Jay Bell +.059 +.027 +.016
Winfield +.058 -.019 +.011
Molitor +.050 +.028 +.042
Tettleton -.058 -.068 +.020
Orsulak -.054 +.031 -.039
R. Henderson -.053 -.054 -.037
McGriff -.053 -.036 -.005
Williams -.052 +.056 -.025
Hassey -.048 +.009* N/A
Benzinger -.045 -.003* +.070*
Palmeiro -.040 +.005 -.091
Hrbek -.040 -.011 +.026
Jacoby -.039 = +.026
Rivera -.037 +.023 -.054