Unions in Central and Eastern Europe played a key role in the changes during the period 1986 to 2000. These changes were called "the collapse of the Soviet Union" to some, and to others "the processes of democratisation". Perspectives on these changes vary greatly. To the people who experienced these changes first hand, however, the reality of what has happened has been very different from expectations. People in Ukraine and Russia have had to cope with the uncharted waters of new nationhood, transforming to a market economy, new constitutions, accelerated European integration, more direct exposure to global neo-liberalism; pressure from the International Monetary Fund, and serious threats to the rule of law and justice. The major challenges have been and continue to be:
Part two examines the contemporary situation of unions in Ukraine, in particular teachers' unions. There are challenges which all unions face, and there are those which are specific to teachers' unions. The economic and legislative context, problems of curruption, issues of union democracy, and financial problems are all addressed. There is also a focus on the internal dynamic of the union and relations between members and the union leadership. These are crucial considerations in understanding the potential of any union-coordinated projects.
The main purpose of part three is to analyse the role and to suggest a potential future role of unions in the larger context of the changes that are occuring and the goals which Ukainian workers might adopt.
Part four outlines the specific conclusions which follow from this analysis and translates these into practical project ideas.
This study should be seen in the context of other comparable studies done by myself in advance of international solidarity projects in Poland and Russia. These can be read here:
Table of Contents
Introduction
PART ONE:
BACKGROUND and GENERAL CONTEXTS in UKRAINE
PART TWO: UKRAINE'S REGIONS
Map of Ukraine
PART THREE:
UNIONS in GENERAL and SPECIFICALLY TEACHERS' UNIONS
PART FOUR: The ROLE of UNIONS
PART FIVE: WHAT IS TO BE DONE
Conclusions
INTRODUCTION
International solidarity is or should be a key component of the work of every union's political action committee. Some of us in the Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation feel that our Political Action Committee should be more active in the field of international solidarity work in Eastern Europe. This is especially needed now as teachers in particular are going through an extremely difficult period. This study is preparatory to variety of projects which may be developed by Western unions such as the OSSTF.
All have had to face the challenge of promoting fundamental reforms in society as well as in their own structures against a
background of psychological barriers and workers' apathy, corruption, and escalating anti-union policies and practices. This makes international solidarity projects very difficult. This study aims to address these challenges and propose practical projects to help Ukrainian workers, especially teachers, improve their lives through union-coordinated actions.
This study was written over the period August 2000 to December 2000 based on my personal discussions with workers, especially teachers, in several cities in Ukraine -particularly Kiev, Donetsk, Yalta, and Lugansk. This research was not intented to have the scope of a representative nationwide study, but rather an informal sampling of both large and small urban areas.
The main purpose of part one of the research is to study the socio-political attitudes
of the Ukrainian population as well as the socio-economic situation in
Ukrainian society. Other issues related to social and economic processes
were also studied including: the prestige of the President of Ukraine,
Leonid Kuchma, the Supreme Soviet, the Cabinet of Ministers, local
authorities and various political parties and public organizations,
people's attitudes toward the "left-right" problem in politics and social
life, attitudes about different periods of Soviet and Ukrainian history,
and the adoption of a new constitution.
I addressed such questions to those over 40 years old. With respect to "good things", opinions varied according to socio-linguistic background. Most, especially Russian-speakers, felt that there were more "good things" during the Brezhnev period. Recognition of problems but nevertheless an optimism about the current period was highest amonst Ukrainian-speakers. This split of attitudes seems to be the most common response to current everyday problems. Very few in this age group, and these were almost all Ukrainian-speakers, considered the period of national independence (since 1991) as having brought more "good things". This can also be explained by nostalgia for the past "zastoi" times. This nostalgia was especially true for Russian-speakers. Due to the obvious and considerable decline in the standard of living, Ukrainians of both groups seem to have lost much of their initial hope, if they had any, that independence would bring rapid social and economic benefits. Russian-speakers had little such hope to begin with.
Having said this, there is also a minority which assessed the Khrushchev period in a positive light. This was a period when Stalinism was being purged and attempts were made to develop a more democratic system and reform the economy. Many people spoke highly of Khrushchev's personality and his political actions. Such attitudes are more common amongst Russian-speakers.
With respect to "bad things" as well, opinions also varied according to socio-linguistic background. Russian-speakers tend to view the recent independence period as having more "bad things" introduced. Optimism about the current period was higher amonst Ukrainian-speakers.
There were even some older people who expressed a positive attitude towards the Stalin era. These people considered themselves "Communists" and stressed the context of Soviet losses during the war and competition from Western capitalism. These people tended to support the idea that only unpopular repressive command-administrative methods can change the situation in Ukraine for the better. But these people are few in number and only, in my experience, in the Russian-speaking population.
At the other end of the political spectrum, there are also a small number of people who sympathize with totalitarianism. The relatively small numbers of supporters of totalitarianism of the right or revolutionary dictatorship of the left indicates that Ukrainian society is managing to achieve a balance between conflicting political forces that are on the fringes of socio-political life. That most Ukrainians have a positive opinion towards the "thaw" of the Khrushchev period and the Gorbachev period of perestroika indicates a certain level of democratic consciousness as well as the inclination towards democratic change and a society based on democratic principles.
Most Ukrainians associate the past with a strong single-party system, the main body of which was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). While many Russian-speaking Ukrainians see this in a possitive light, most Ukrainian-speakers see this history in a negative light. Nevertheless, it is logical that, in addition to other factors, all Ukrainians' attitudes towards the political parties of today depend on what elements of historical consciousness and memory are reflected in the parties' program and its political orientation.
With the new political multi-party system, the citizens of Ukraine found themselves faced with a difficult problem, the problem of choice. This political system requires that every citizen define his or her own attitudes toward the ongoing changes. It demands a strong sense of individualitya, the ability to make resolute decisions, and to translate all of this into support for particular political movements. For many Ukrainians this was new, as this type of personality could not develop under the earlier one-party system.
Although there is no apparent "generation conflict" in Ukraine, it should be taken noted that there are a substantial number of older people in society who were brought up under the one-party political system. Through hard work, these people were assured certain social guarantees. They have their own vision of the country as an economically developed world power, which accounts for their extreme dissatisfaction with the current situation in Ukraine.
to the beginning
Briefly, the political situation in Ukraine can be characterized as
being in transition from the Soviet planned economy (refered to by me as "State Capitalism") to a modern Western-style state based on a market
economy. Like most CIS countries, Ukraine is
experiencing a slow and painful process of launching a market economy
while searching for the most effective administrative mechanism to
minimize transition "losses" to society. The development of such
mechanisms is no less important than market reforms, especially during
the formation of the Ukrainian state. The problem is aggravated by the
previous practice of governing during the Soviet period wherein political
institutions sought to control people's private lives entirely. Although
the desire to do so is strong at times, the experience of other
CIS societies shows that it is impossible to change the
long standing administrative system all at once.
Although much time has passed since Ukraine proclaimed (so-called) "democratic
reforms", many people do not feel than any radical changes have taken
place. It is understandable that after all of the "storms and shocks of
perestroika" and the dramatic events associated with independence, most of the
population of Ukraine rejects the idea of rapid revolutionary change. While everyone I spoke to felt that there was a need for change, few people I spoke to supported radical change by revolutionary means.
The majority believe that Ukrainian society should be improved by
gradual reformation, i.e. evolutionary change. Unions present organizational opportunities for such changes.
This century has shown that to a large extent, the success of "democratic" reforms depends on the level of people's
support. "Democracy" as an abstract ideal or concept is very attractive to
Ukrainians. Adherence to democratic principles
both in every day life and at the social level seems to be a key aspect of
Ukrainian public mentality.
This can probably explain the fact that despite all of the difficulties
of the transition period and the economic decline often associated with
political change, most citizens of Ukraine prefer to live in a
democratic, civil state. Most of them imagine this type of state as one
in which there are free elections to the most important bodies of power,
all citizens having equal rights, political and civil rights being
guaranteed, citizens being respected, and citizens' human dignity being
protected.
Most seemed to consider respect for citizens as
an important sign of democracy. This may be a response to the way wars, famines, and Stalinism affected life in Ukraine. The long history of suffering and totalitarianism in Ukraine
has produced the desire for the protection of social rights and respect
for citizens. Thus, such democratic characteristics as equal rights, protection of society and its citizens from illegal actions,
and bringing up people in the spirit of human dignity were
mentioned most often as being important. These characteristics are
regarded as the first and most important signs of democracy and were
considered either "very important" or "important" for most of the
people I spoke with.
At this same time, such classical indicators as free elections and
political rights (which are perceived as very important in the West) appeared to be less important for many people. This distribution of priorities can probably be explained by
disappointment in the efficacy of free elections as a means of forming
political bodies which are accountable to society.
Political rights without economic or administrative support are often
perceived as something abstract. In fact, political rights have been negated by the abuse of economic and administrative mechanisms to manipulate political choice rather than support it.
This seems to be a result of the gross political and electoral corruption seen in Ukraine recently. Few people I spoke with have any trust in political parties or politicians. As a result, few now have any respect for the political process itself, and some even consider free elections as unimportant for the development of real democracy. There may be more opportunities to build on workers trust in their unions than in trust in any political party.
The current political regime in Ukraine, led by President L. Kuchma, can be described as a
transitional one, combining the main components of the old Soviet planned and
the new "free market" political systems. Any evolution towards social health and real democracy
will depend on the degree to which economic and political reforms meet
people's expectations of life in a democratic society.
The problem of global political choices persists even though there
is still a clear preference expressed in Ukraine for the democratic model. The
idea of democracy in the context of equal civil rights, providing legal
protection for minorities and effective measures against state tyranny,
is widely accepted. Most Ukrainians would prefer to
live in a society where civil rights are not violated and the state
guarantees that they are upheld. Most that I spoke with
feel that the state must respect the
rights of ethnic and religious minorities that reside in Ukraine.
At the same time, attitudes towards the economic and political basis and strategies for
change toward democracy and social health differ considerably. For example, I often asked about the need for state
intervention into various spheres of social life, particularly the
economy. Is Ukrainian society ready to live under conditions whereby the
economy is regulated by the market? Most felt that
it is not. Many said they preferred to
live in a country where there is regulation of the economy and the establishment of stable
prices and salaries. Few expressed a preferece for a model where the economy is
regulated by the market and the state does not interfere.
But Ukrainians mistrust the government to provide this regulation.
This attitude, might suggest an important role for unions as a foil to the power of governments. And so, of course, I also often asked about possibilities of changes through union action.
Unfortunately, there seems to be the same lack of confidence amongst Ukrainians' in changes accomplished through union action.
Of course, economic difficulties and a rapid decrease in material
status is in part responsible for Ukrainians' disillusionment with the
possibility of improving their situation through market reform, government regulations, or union action. This is
why there is a feeling amongst many that they would like to simply return to the times when economic relations were
regulated by those in power and the population had minimal but stable
social guarantees and confidence in the future. It is also an
explanation for why many Ukrainians accept democratic political values,
but do not support the material basis for free market capitalism.
This is also revealed in Ukrainians' attitudes towards the state's
role in providing social protection. Although most stated
that they were ready to live in a society in which one's material status
depends on personal ability and work, they are not opposed to the state
being responsible for a "normal life." Most prefer to live in a country where the state provides
absolutely everyone with a certain standard of living.
Thus there is still a strong desire for the state, rather than unions, to interfere with the
economy by fixing prices and salaries and for the state to provide a
certain standard of living. While those of us on the left see this as a legitimate socio-political choice, those on the right see this choice as a hang-over from the old system or even a symptom of a socialist
consciousness. From both perspectives, these attitudes can be a considerable obstacle to further
radical reform either towards free market capitalism or a strengthening of unions since the population is not sufficiently ready to speed up
reforms in either of these directions. The attitudes include a fear of risk, a lack of personal
initiative, and a lack of responsibility for one's own material status and
family well being. This can be seen in the low participation rate in entrepreneurial businesses and unions.
This situation makes it difficult to predict how the present political
regime will evolve. The evolution will be conditioned first of all by
internal factors such as the current authority's ability to:
In the absence of such improvements, it seems that the idea of the
civil market model will not be accepted by Ukrainians. If this were to become apparant, then certainly the alternative of abandoning the current path would be increasingly considered. What this would mean, and how this would be labelled, depends on one's political perspective. Some would call it a return to socialims, others would call it a return to totalitarianism. In both scenarios, continued reforms toward market capitalism or a return to a planned economy, the role of strong and democratic unions is extremely important.
How likely is a change in direction? Even now, a signifant part of the population thinks that abandoning reforms and returning to earlier conditions is desirable, although some of these expressed an opinion that it is impossible considering the current hegemony of market capitalism.
In the West, we tend to believe that the clear division of executive, legislative and judicial power is one of
the most important indications of democracy.
Ukrainians seem to accept the idea of such a division and
would like to live in a state in which the functions and responsibilities
of each branch of power are legally defined. Unfortunately there is a significant confrontation among
the different branches of power, a rapidly declining prestige of local
legal bodies, and an obvious weakness of the public prosecutor system,
police and other power structures. The recent Gondadeze case is illustrative. There is a strong possibility that if
the confrontation between the executive and legislative branches
continues, the willingness to accept some kind of totalitarian regime
will grow.
Many feel that Kutchma is already assuming this role. The recent changes in the constitution, brought about by a highly questionable referendum, seem to support this view that the office of the President is increasingly powerful.
to the beginning
Therefore, individual political self-identification may provide
interesting perspectives in addtion to considerations of election results and party membership information. In my experience, most of the people I spoke with were either apolitical or centrist. However, there was a significant minority, especially in Donetsk, which seemed to me be on the left. However, I was mostly in the Russian-speaking East. The same is not true in the Ukrainian-speaking West of Ukraine, which is more political, more anti-union, and there is even a significant rightist minority.
It seems that the proportion of adherents to leftist political ideas in the central,
southern or northeastern regions is about equal to the proportion of those with
rightist views in Western Ukraine. But this is only in terms of proportion, because the West has a much smaller population than these other leftist regions of Ukraine.
Older people especially seemed to be disproportionaltely more on the left. Younger people tend to reject both the left and unionism.
These older and Russian-speaking people in the East, who tend to be on the political left, tend to be more concerned than other Ukrainians when it comes to social issues. They oppose Ukrainian society's widening gaps between rich
and poor, general price increases and declines in wages.
They also advocate close ties with Russia.
Younger and Ukrainian-speaking people in the West, who tend to be on the political right, are most worried about a possible communist revival and state interferance in the economy. They
oppose Ukrainian membership in the CIS and advocate for closer ties with Europe and the West rather than with Russia.
Comparing the politcial attitudes of Ukrainian men and women, it is the men who seem to be
more interested in political life and are more willing to share their
opinions. However, this difference seemed to be reversed with respect to unionism. It was the women who seemed to be more interested in unions as a socio-economic force in society.
Perhaps the most common characteristic shared by the majority of both East and West, Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking, young and old, male and female, is a difficulty in identifying their political self-definition in terms of "left" or "right". Some, especially in Kiev, Yalta, and Lugansk had difficulty identifying their political views. Most who could define themselves, considered themselves "centrists". There is also a general sense of disillusionment with contemporary politics, including such self-identification.
By analyzing the left, right, and centre political attitudes it can be
concluded that the best opportunity for a more progressive regime in government, therefore, may be a centrist - Left coalition. However this failed to be developed in the 1999 election, which saw a re-election of Kuchma.
to the beginning
Surveys of confidence ratings reflect that neither political parties, rich people, the police, the army, the national government, regional governments, local governments, unions, businesses (such as banks and private enterprises), nor other institutions enjoy much public trust.
Only religious organizations, where there seems to be little self-interested corruption, enjoy much public trust.
Ukrainians, in the vast majority, use the various forms of mass media (TV, radio, newspapers) yet tend not to place much trust in what they are told. In fact, there seemed to be amongst many, more faith in foreign media than Ukrainian media sources. A distinction here should be drawn between foreign media sources which are Western and those which are Russian. While in the West of Ukraine there is a general acceptance of the Westernization of Ukrainian mass media, in the other regions of Ukraine there is a preference for Russian media only.
to the beginning
It is, therefore, important to examine the peculiarities of the current
political situation and the genesis of political attitudes which form the
core of Ukrainian mass political consciousness. Here it is important to
remember that the fact that key elements of the old Soviet bureaucratic
system remain untouched considerably hampers both economic reform and
political transformation. These elements include an abnormally large
state sector within the economy and the continued functioning of the
Communist Party within politics. A common aspect of the historical
consciousness of some citizens is that they still think that
communist-socialist forces can solve their problems. This can be seen in
such statements as, "it was no worse then than it is now", "at least you
could get a free education", or "we didn't have this much crime", etc.
Those who sympathize with right radical organizations such as the SNPU,
UNA-UNSO, OUN, KUN, VPO or DSU believe that only this type of
organization (assuming they come to power) can provide prosperity and rid
society of the remnants of (what they would call) "Communist totalitarianism".
It is questionable, though, whether those in power actually regard their political parties
and blocs as links between the state and the people --considering that so few Ukrainians actually support or even express trust in these organizations.
It seems that the attitute developing is that Ukrainians' interest in political parties, movements, and specific political
events depends more and more on how these things affect everyday life.
There is an increasing tendency for people to stop thinking that social
and political structures, especially political parties, can improve their
lives.
This has caused a rift in the mass political consciousness. Although the
majority of people believe that political organizations should exist,
they refuse to personally participate in the political process. They do not see the political as personal, as most do in the West.
One reason for this political indifference is the inability of political
parties and movements to move beyond the old propaganda approaches. It is commonly believed that politicians say one thing and then do another. It is important, for the future that
political organizations express solutions to problems
based on a new set of public priorities, and then act on these solutions according to these priorities.
Of the small proportion of Ukrainians who do express support and connect thier hopes with a political party, these parties predominantly are the
communists and socialists --than with
any other political group. This raises the question as to whether the
lack of new political parties and the lack of social influence of the old
parties explains the waning support for political parties in general in
addition to the increasing indifference toward political life.
Interestingly, in explaining why they support a given party, the majority
of Ukrainians I spoke to could not say anything about the other political
parties or blocs.
to the beginning
In any country, the president appears as the legitimate policy maker
reflecting national and state unity and protecting state interests. It
is therefore important to explore attitudes towards the "First Person" of
the state and determine people's regard for this office and their expectations of this person.
Confidence in the president has declined significantly during the last few years --especially after the release of tapes which appeared to link L. Kuchma to the death of journalist Gondadeze. Kuchma now enjoys only a very low level of public trust, amonst the Ukrainians I spoke with.
Of the leaders of the different branches of power (L. Kuchma, O. Moroz
and Prime Minister E. Marchuk), Kuchma's actions elicited the strongest opinions.
Ukrainians seem willing to accept further economic reforms but not those instituted by Kuchma's team. At the same time, there are strong expressions that the president's
ordinances do not really have any effect as they are simply not
fulfilled. Such views were especially strong in Lugansk, Yalta, and Donetsk.
Most people I spoke with expressed a lack of confidence not only in the Office of the President, but also in the Cabinet of Ministers, regional authorities
and local authorities as well. This indicates that Ukrainians
should be more concerned with the effectiveness of the various levels of
the executive body, and less concerned with the distribution of power.
There also seemed to be support for the strengthening of the executive system at the
local level. Many expressed a belief that the situation in Ukraine will be improved only when the
local Soviets have more executive and legislative power in the
country.
Of course, support for President Kuchma varies from
region to region, with more support in the West and less in the other regions.
Attitudes towards the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine are also worth
examining. Few that I spoke with expressed trust for the Supreme Soviet, and most expressed significant distrust.
There seems to be little hope that the newly elected Supreme Soviet (elections were in November 1999) can improve the situation. Most seem to think that
a new parliament will work the same way as did the old one.
The level of confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers is also quite low and many expressed a belief that the cabinet should be reformed.
to the beginning
The communists had proposed submitting the following issues for a national
referendum:
The issues that did get on to the referendum, however, were very different. These were:
Of the ....% of Ukrainians who voted in the refernedum, ... % supported the new constitutional proposals and ... % rejected them. This gave Kuchma the mandate to introduce these changes, and this was done in ...... 1999.
In coming to an opinion on the new structure included in the new constitution, it is useful to compare the
experience of other states. For example, thirty five of the thirty eight members
of the European Union have double chamber parliaments, and so this seems like a good idea.
to the beginning
There are also questions of citizenship and ethnic background. The vast majority of Ukrainians want these to be solved in a peaceful
civilized way. There is a general acceptance that individuals with Ukrainian citizenship should
all be equal regardless of their nationality, religion, or political
views. The feeling is that a Ukrainian is first and foremost a citizen of Ukraine, not a
person of a certain nationality.
The most important point, however, is that the idea of Ukrainian self
rule can not be confined to state symbols including the constitution, but
must include the appropriate socio-economic base. M. Grushevskiy stated
that the Ukrainian national idea was not destroyed by Bolshevik bayonets,
but by the inability of the state Duma to institute socio-economic
policies that would satisfy the masses.
Today, the future of the idea of Ukrainian self-determination, and in fact the state itself,
depends primarily on economic reforms, people's attitudes towards them,
and people's material well-being. Ukraine is following a peculiar but
civilized path from the administrative model to a bureaucratic society.
This path differs in many respects from the path chosen by neighboring
countries.
to the beginning
I was particularly interested in whether Ukrainians were concerned about possible dependence on Western
credits. This seems not to be of great concern.
to the beginning
This is
also an issue which worries older people more than the youth.
It seems that perceptions about Russian TV correlate to how people
perceive this issue. Russian TV seems to be trusted and relied upon (more than Ukrainian TV) by those advocating for close ties with Russia.
Such contradictions in views can be explained by people's
understanding of the market economy and how it is formed.
Most Ukrainians feel that market reforms should be accompanied
by various social protection measures. They are not as clear on what these measures should be and how they fit into a market economic model.
Most Ukrainians seem to want the government to have at least some
control over prices and establish minimum salaries.
Many express this by saying they want the state to guarantee
a "normal life" to everyone through such means.
Ukrainian society seems to continue to have strong
paternalistic attitudes towards the state despite mistrust of the government and support for a market
economy and reforms in principle.
These attitudes are also expressed when discussing Ukrainians' attitudes towards social justice.
Most Ukrainians believe that the division
between rich and poor is unjust while very few express the belief that it is natural
for society.
People's attitudes towards social justice issues seems to be correlated with their
material level. The Ukrainians of higher income, tend to be
the less likely to support equality.
to the beginning
After the declines of the period 1988 to 1995, Ukraine achieved a certain leverl of macroeconomic stabilization between 1995 and 1998. This had a
positive influence on living standards. Since the crash of August 1998, however, living standards have declined significantly.
Material self-perception largely seems to depend on such factors as gender, age,
education, and social status.
Women are usually more critical of
their social status than are men.
The youth are less critical than the old concerning their social status, but the material
situation of young people seems to depend largely on their parents' well-being.
Pensioners, especially those who are 60 years and older, are in the most
difficult situation.
Employment does not appear to affect perceptions of poverty. Most of the
employed, especially teachers, perceived their material level as low or lower than average.
This included workers and technical specialists with university
education.
Impressions of the poor are difficult to interpret.
The unemployed should not be seen as members of unprotected social groups. A
large number of the unemployed are highly qualified workers who in most
industrial countries comprise the working class. The Ukrainian poor are
mainly people who had average incomes up until the end of the 1980s.
In Ukraine, poverty is accompanied by a general decline is social
conditions. This has led to increasing concern about acute social
problems, in addition to one's own standard of living. Most of the people I spoke to were worried about problems associated with
getting an education, and most expressed concern about the problematic drinking of a member of
their family.
The most acute problems seem to be:
It seems that all socio-demographic groups are characterized by a general
dissatisfaction with their lives.
Many people cited several factors that worried them, including:
The current state of society is characterized by the prevalence of
pessimistic attitudes towards life's prospects. Many
stated that they expected life to get worse in the future while the
others either did not have any opinion or did not expect
any changes at all.
Some rhetorical questions were commonly heard --such as, "How can
I raise my grandchildren in the spirit of respect for honest work if my
35 years of service does not give me a normal pension?" or "How can you
bring your kids up in the spirit of human dignity if only drug pushers
and prostitutes live well?"1.1 ELECTORAL TOTALITARIANISM or UNION DEMOCRACY?
Polical action work by any group in any region will only be as succesful as that group's understanding of the social health and character of the region.
Social health should be analyzed according to economic, social and, no
less importantly, political criteria. Politically, social health is the
estimation of the stability of power and the ability of those in power to
control the processes of society as well as the population's satisfaction
with its ability to participate in and control the political system.
1.3 THE LEFT OR THE RIGHT
The terms "left" and "right" are often used when analyzing individual
political views, party programs or the overall situation in a country.
The results of nationwide and local elections or referendums on certain
political issues can serve as indicators of political preferences along
the left-right scale. However, given the character of political
culture in which social and political structures are sometimes less important than
individual personalities, it is difficult to conclude that the distribution of
political forces is representative of the views held by the public.1.4 PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN STATE, UNION, AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL
INSTITUTIONS
Post-Soviet political psychology in Ukraine is characterized by increasing
negativism. Most of the people I spoke with have negative perceptions of most political and economic
institutions. Interestingly, this negativism is reflected in voting
procedures wherein people are asked to cross out the name of the person
they are voting against, rather than indicating the candidate they want
to vote for (as is the practice in the West).1.5 The POLITICAL is not PERSONAL
It is logical that attitudes towards a given political party, bloc or
organization depends significantly on which elements of historical
consciousness are reflected in it's platform.1.6 The PERSONAL is not POLITICAL
As well as politics not being internalized, most of the Ukrainians I met seem not to view their personal choices in a political context. They seem not to extend their individual choices out towards their larger implications in society.
to the beginning
1.7 ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE DIFFERENT BRANCHES OF POWER
The structure of Ukraine's political organization combines elements of parliamentary, presidential and
old Soviet rule. This raises the question of which of these has the most influence in defining the course of
politics and political policy in Ukraine?1.8 THE NEW (1999) CONSTITUTION
There were some reasons why Ukraine needed a new constitution, including the
need to formalize the state model and to determine the civil rights and
duties of Ukrainian citizens. But the Kuchma regime seems to have gone far beyond this, and used the process of revising the constitution as a way to increase the power of the Office of the President.
1.9 CONTRADICTIONS in POLITICAL VIEWS
Certain contradictions can be observed when discussing the question of what should be done in Ukraine, and this came to a head around both the referendum for the new constitution and the election campaign of 1999. Understanding these
contradictions goes a long way to explaining the way Ukrainians today think about their future.
First of all, many more Ukrainians believe that the state should
control prices and salaries than believe that the state should not
interfere with the economy. This reflects people's desire to have the state help to
improve their material status.
At the same time, however, most Ukrainians seem to think that their
material status depends solely on their work and abilities.1.10 THE BIGGEST THREATS
Most Ukrainians I spoke with feel certain that increasing corruption at all levels is the greatest threat to Ukraine. The connection between this corruption and the failure of real economic
reforms is generally made.
Social disconnection is also a great threat -- people don't feel like
they are really citizens. 1.11 UKRAINE AND THE CIS
The whole issue of relations with Russia and membership in the CIS varies from region to region and varies with ethnicity.
Most supporters of close ties with Russia, including CIS membership, were found in the
eastern (especially Lugansk, Donetsk, and Harkiv), south (especially Odessa and Crimea, including most notably Sevastopol), and central regions and amongst Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Although I had limitied experience with Western Ukrainians, I understand that such support is much lower, and that closer ties with the West are favoured over ties with Russia.
to the beginning
1.12 PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT THE CURRENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC
SITUATION IN UKRAINE
The main questions concerning public opinion about the current
socio-economic situation are:
My experience indicated that people actively support the idea that current
reform should be directed towards creating a market economy --but with some limits or government role. Areas of disagreement surround the quesion of this limited role of government.
Few advocate a return to the old Soviet-style economy. At
the same time, there are somewhat more of those who prefer methods of
socialist planning as instruments of economic improvement, within a market context.
Most that I spoke to generally support the idea of further reform. As to specific
methods, support is not as strong.
The majority believes that the government needs to do more to help raise their material standard of living.
A minority believes that the way to do this is to establish the most favorable conditions for private
business.
Very few support the rapid privatization of
state enterprises. 1.13 MATERIAL LEVEL AND PEOPLE'S PERCEPTIONS
During the short period during which the Soviet Union collapsed and Ukraine declared independence, material standards declined significantly. The years of transition, are associated not only with society simply dividing up
into rich and poor. There has been pauperization on a large scale. Clearly the social price for the change to a market economy has been higher than was expected.
Most people I met stated that they do not see any way out of their situation. It is
important to keep in mind that the perception of a problem often depends
on age, education, social status and material status. However, the
problem of low income worries not only the poor but also those who
perceive that their material level should be average or high. Even those that
perceived their material status as "average" or "high" worry about their
income. Such professions as doctors, teachers, professors, and nurses, generally express such opinions.
PART TWO: UKRAINE'S REGIONS
Map of Ukraine (click on the map for a larger version)
2.1 The Ukrainian West
2.1.1 Lvov
2.1.2 Other Parts of the Western Region
2.2 Central Ukraine
2.2.1 Kiev
Kiev's Teachers' House
2.2.2 Other Parts of the Central Region
2.4 The East
2.4.1 Donetsk
2.4.2 Lugansk
2.5 Conclusions Relevant to the Issue of Advancing the Teaching Profession
2.5.1
2.5.2
to the beginning
PART THREE:
UNIONS in GENERAL and SPECIFICALLY TEACHERS' UNIONS3.1 Unions in General
3.2 Legislative Context
3.3 Economic Context
3.4 Corruption
3.5 Union Democracy
3.6 Financial Problems
3.7 Teachers' Unions
3.8 Lack of International Ties
3.9 Conclusions Relevant to the Issue of Advancing the Teaching Profession
to the beginning
PART FOUR: The ROLE of UNIONS
4.1 Unions in the Soviet System
4.2 The Role of Unions in the Transition
4.3 The Role of Unions: the Potential and the Reality
4.4
4.5
4.6 Conclusions Relevant to the Issue of Advancing the Teaching Profession
PART FIVE: WHAT IS TO BE DONE
5.1 General Recomendations
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6 Summary of Recommendations
Conclusions