The Battle of St. Vith: A Concept in Defensive Tactics
by: General Bruce C. Clarke, Ret.
Before we crossed the English Channel in 1944, a senior American general in addressing his commanders said: "Once you have reached a certain line or have taken a piece of ground you will not give it up without my personal permission."
At the time I felt that such a rule in tactics was rigid and probably dangerous. If my understanding is correct, the original rules of fisticuffs or boxing required each contestant to "Toe the Line" drawn across the center of the ring. He lost if he failed to keep this position. The Marquis of Queensberry established new rules, which are in effect today, which eliminated the "Toe the Line" requirement and put mobility into prize fighting. The tactics of boxing were thus changed.
After I was handed the command of the St. Vith area in the early afternoon of 17 December 1944, I hastily estimated the situation. I had been a Brigadier General just 10 days. My military future and that of my command was very important to me. It did not look very hopeful.
I tried to develop in my mind what was the German Commander required to accomplish In what appeared to me to be an all-out desperate operation. I felt that punching a hole through the Ardennes was not his mission. Neither was the capture of St. Vith or Vielsalm or establishing a bridgehead across the Salm River. These could well be steps in his operation but Hitler's gamble had to be for decisive stakes. Decisive objectives were far to my rear and towards the English Channel. With those ideas in mind and without any orders but to "go up to St. Vith, contact General Jones of the 106th Division and if he needs help give it to him," I felt that I must fight a flexible delaying action and not let my command be destroyed by what I sensed was a force vastly superior to my command and associated units.
I disposed my command as it arrived piecemeal to provide such a defense. established a base of fire of dug-in direct weapons using a T.D. company, which had recently been issued 90 MM gun T.D.'s.
I established a mobile' counterattack force, of a part of a battalion of tanks, concealed near and behind St. Vith. It was used to counterattack whenever the Germans established dangerous situation but then only to "sweep" the enemy and return to its rendezvous for further orders.
A rather weak defensive line resisted the Germans. The troops on this line were engineers, armored infantry and reconnaissance units. They took a terrific beating. Some of the most heroic fighting of the Battle of the Bulge took place In these units. Their deeds have never been adequately recorded nor awarded.
They are the unsung heroes of the US Army's greatest battle. Several company-size units were reduced to 1/3 of their original strength in four or five days of fighting. Still I had to order them to pull back on occasion to keep them from being cut off and destroyed. Once, during the battle, I was asked: "When you counterattack and restore your line why do you withdraw your counterattacking force instead of staying there and holding?" My response was something like this:
"This terrain is not worth a nickel an acre to me. In my tactics I am giving up about a kilometer a day under enormous pressure but my force is intact and. I am in control of it. A few kilometers advance cannot be of any substantial value to my German opponent. He must, I believe, advance many kilometers and very quickly If, he is to accomplish his mission. The Seventh Armored Division is preventing him from' doing that. We are winning, he is losing."
My Division Commander understood that concept perfectly. General Montgomery understood it. Fortunately, he supported this concept, even to the extent of overriding the orders of his subordinate.
In 1964 when Manteuffel and I spent several days together at St. Vith discussing the battle at length for the first time what the German concept of, the operation was. I repeat it from those discussions and other discussions with General Von Luttwitz who commanded the "secondary effort of the operation.
'"For the German Plan to be successful three things had to happen:
The Defensive and Delaying Concept used at St. Vith prevented the third requirement of the German operation from happening until the American troops in the rear area could be positioned to handle the situation later.
On 22 December 1964, at a press conference in Watertown, New York, 'General von Manteuffel stated "on the evening of 24 December 1944, I recommended to Hitler's Adjutant that the German Army give up the attack and return to the West Wall." He stated that the reason for this recommendation was due to the time lost by his Fifth Panzer Army in the St. Vith area.
In a question and answer period, after I had recently talked on the Battle at St. Vith, a college ROTC student said, "General, what is the principle job of a general in the conduct of such a battle as St. Vith?"
My answer was: "It is to prevent the confusion from becoming disorganized."
NOTE (Edited for currency, but General Clarke's advice is still applicable):
Years ago this battle was fought as the result of a massive surprise attack
on the Western Front. Now, several United States divisions and other NATO
troops are facing new threats in Europe, facing forces that could launch
another such surprise attack. The pattern, of the battle could well follow
this one...surprise, cut off units, bad weather, short supply, disrupted
communications, loss of contact and pervasive confusion. For these reasons
the study of this battle is of value today.