Recommendation for Presidential Unit Citation 
           by:  ROBERT W. HASBROUCK, Major General, USA 27 June 1947

There is included with this recommendation as Tab "E" a compilation of personal narratives of various unit commanders of the 7^th Armored Division in an effort to present a more personalized and vivid account of a unit's action than is usually found in the stereotyped form of official After Action Report. The requirement that After Action Reports be submitted by the tenth of the following month has resulted in all such reports submitted with this recommendation having been prepared while units were still hotly engaged in the Battle of the Ardennes by individuals who were under the stress and strain of prolonged combat and who had a multitude of other tasks to perform which, at that time, they considered of more importance. The Unit After Action Report of the 275^th Armored Field Artillery Battalion included in Tab D submitted herewith is an example of such a report as it utterly fails to convey to the reader any real conception of the heroism displayed by all members of this unit under most unusual and hazardous conditions. Yet this battalion performed outstandingly and is as deserving of a Distinguished Unit Citation as any unit which was present at ST. VITH.

The cutting of the Division's east route several miles below MALMEDY had caused all the Division Artillery to cross over to detour directly west from MALMEDY to STAVELOT (K7101), while others -- because of their position further to the rear in the column and forewarned of the congestion caused in STAVELOT by retiring units chose to detour by way of VERVIERS (K6823) and SPA (K6712). On the west route traffic had been greatly delayed since noon on the 17^th due to the number of troops withdrawing to new positions. By nightfall the congestion was so great that the entire column was bottled up and brought to a stand-still on the road, extending from POTEAU through VIELSALM, TROIS PONTS, and STAVELOT. Although the Division Artillery was still snarled in this traffic jam, one Armored Artillery Battalion was available to the 7^th Armored Division and constituted the sole artillery support of the Division until about noon of the 18^th, when the Division Artillery finally was able to close in the ST. VITH-VIELSALM area. This was the 275^th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (separate), assigned to VIII Corps and in position near OBER EMMELS (P8290). They had remained in place despite the fact that no friendly troops were between them and the enemy and had shifted for direct fire. When the 7^th Armored Division began to arrive at ST. VITH,  the Commanding Officer of the 275^th, Lieutenant Colonel Clay, offered his battalion's services to General Clarke.

During the day a force of approximately 300 German infantry infiltrated through the wooded area between RODT and POTEAU and gained the position area of the 275^th Armored Field Artillery Battalion. The 275^th held its ground, and diverted on battery to direct fire at point blank range while continuing to execute fire missions with the other two firing batteries. The situation became critical, and it looked as if the artillery battalion was to be overrun until light tanks from the 87^th Cavalry Squadron arrived. Opening fire with 37mm canister and machine guns the tanks drove into the German Infantry killing and wounding many of the enemy and putting the remainder in flight.

Pressure continued to increase along the entire front, and as the 7th Armored division shortened its lines and again regrouped, German Infantry and Tanks pressed strongly on all positions. Practically the entire Division area was now being engaged by long-range artillery fire, while in the north, the enemy in strength was along the east bank of SALM RIVER from east of TROIS-PONTS to  GRAND HALLEUX, and in the south, along the high ground south of the highway running west from SALMCHATEAU. This meant that CC-B of the 9^th Armored Division, the 112^th RCT, the 424^th RCT, three units of Corps troops (the 275^th  Armored Field Artillery Battalion, the 965^th Field Artillery Battalion and the battered remnants of the 168^th Combat Engineer Battalion), and the entire 7^th Armored Division (less trains)--low on supplies and nearing exhaustion from five days of continuous bitter fighting against overpowering odds and under the most severe conditions of weather--were east of the SALM RIVER  with only one certain supply route )a secondary road leading west from VIELSALM) and one probable route (road, SALMCHATEAU-JOUBIEVAL-LIERNEUX). At approximately 1800 hours verbal orders of the Commanding General XVIII Airborne Corps directed the withdrawal as soon as possible of all troops east of the SALM RIVER to assembly areas generally north of the position then occupied by the 82^nd Airborne Division at 1853 hours, the 106^th Division and its attached units were placed under command of the 7^th Armored Division.

CC-B, 7^th Armored Division planned to bring out all vehicles and troops in position near CROMBACH (P8185) and southwest of that town through BEHO (P7581) to VIELSALM (P7089). The one Infantry Company of the 424^th at BRUNFAUF (P8084) accompanied them. North of CROMBACK (P8185) all troops and vehicles were to come out through HINDERHAUSEN (P7987) to COMMANSTER (P7685), and thence to VIELSALM (P7089). TASK FORCE BOYLAN, with a Medium Tank Company and an Infantry Company was to hold HINDERHAUSEN until all other troops had left; and then fall back without delay. the 965^th and 275^th Field Artillery had displaced westward to new positions during the night, and the 434^th Field Artillery remained in position until TASK FORCE BOYLAN was frozen solid and even the heaviest vehicles were able to move over roads which normally would not have carried a 2½ ton truck. Due to the frigid weather the road between HINDERHAUSEN and COMMANSTER --up to this time a soft, muddy road which would not facilitated the withdrawal and practically all vehicles were evacuated. So far as is know no men were left behind. by 2300 CC-B had closed in its assembly area near XHORIS (K4807).