In an armoured regiment equal priority is placed upon
the characteristics of firepower, protection, mobility and flexibility. In
an armoured reconnaissance battalion these priorities do not have equal
weight and their order of precedence may, in lay eyes, appear somewhat
unusual. The battalion's entire raison d'etre rests upon the gathering of
information for its parent formation, and for this task the abstract
quality of flexibility is the prime requirement,. especially during the
planning phase and in the field of radio communication; the radio is the
reconnaissance vehicle's most important weapon, and its use can cause
untold damage. Therefore mobility is equally essential to transport it
into its operation area. However, occasions may arise when the information
sought has to be fought for, and in this context some protection and
firepower is useful; on the other hand, it must be emphasised that the
best results are obtained through undetected observation, and that contact
with the enemy is avoided if at all possible.
These principles are, of course, common to all armies,
but in the years following the repudiation of the Versailles Treaty the
blitzkrieg technique was being forged, and in the Panzerwaffe the
requirement was for deep reconnaissance which could operate effectively up
to 30 miles ahead of the main body.
|
Rear details of an SdKfz 222
belonging to Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 4 in Russia, 1943. The
colour scheme appears to be yellow ochre with a serpentine
overspray in green. The crew seem to be wearing the green armoured
car denims, and have sand-painted helmets. The 4. Panzer Division
runes, in yellow, are visible on the right rear mudguard, balanced
by a white company symbol on the left. |
Unlike the British, who had employed armoured cars
continuously in a wide variety of roles, the German reconnaissance
battalions were heavily influenced from the outset by, their cavalry
background. Thus their order of battle contained all the elements which
were present in the cavalry screens of 1914, but reflected in the modern
idiom. Instead of horses there were armoured cars; in place of footsore
jaegers there was a motor-cycle machine-gun element; the horse artillery
had been replaced by vehicle-drawn howitzers and anti-tank guns; and the
assault pioneers, concerned mainly with bridging, were also mechanised.
The 1939 organisation of the Reconnaissance Battalion
(Aufklaerungs Abteilung or A-A) of a Panzer division consisted of:
- A headquarters staff
- Two armoured reconnaissance squadrons (Panzerspaehschwadronen)
- A motor-cycle machinegun squadron (Kradschuetzenschwadron)
- A heavy squadron (Schwere Schwadron)
- A mobile workshops, and supply and transport elements.
The battalion headquarters incorporated the
usual command and control apparatus, as well as an intelligence section
(Nachrichtenzug), which was responsible for correlating the information
received from the squadrons and transmitting it to divisional headquarters
via a troop from the divisional signals battalion.
|
Afrika Korps SdKfz 222 in desert
colours with anti grenade grilles closed. As reconaissance troops
operated in front of everyone else, it was natural that they
should be wary of "friendly fire", hence the prominent
national cross on the vehicles rear. |
Each armoured reconnaissance squadron consisted
of a squadron headquarters containing one radio command vehicle and four
armoured cars fitted with radio; one heavv troop of six six- or
eight-wheeled armoured cars; and two light troops, each of six
four-wheeled cars. The heavy troop could be further sub-divided into three
two-car sections, and the light troops into two three-car sections,
provided each section contained at least one car fitted with radio.
The. motor-cycle machine-gun squadron employed side-car
mounts and consisted of squadron headquarters, three rifle troops each of
three sections armed with two MG 34s and one light mortar as integral
support weapons, and one heavy troop equipped with four MG 34s.
The heavy squadron contained a number of diverse
elements including a light infantry gun troop, equipped with two towed
Model 18 75mm light infantry, guns; a Panzerjaeger troop with three (later
five) towed 37mm anti-tank guns and one MG 34; and an assault pioneer
troop of three sections, each armed with one MG 34.
This organisation has sometimes been described as a
battle-group, but such a description is misleading. The function of the
motor-cycle machine-gun squadron and the weapon troops of the heavy
squadron was that of shock troops, designed to case the passage of the
cars through the enemy's defended zone by suppressing the opposition with
a high volume of fire. Once through this zone the cars completed their
mission alone. If a water obstacle lay across the route of an armoured
reconnaissance squadron, part or all of the assault pioneer troop might be
attached; such an attachment was far from popular with the armoured car
crews, since the bridging vehicles were slow and their bulk rendered them
unsuitable for use along certain routes. The armoured reconnaissance
battalions of the motorised infantry divisions were similarly organised,
but had only one reconnaissance squadron and lacked a heavy squadron.
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SdKfz 231 (6-rad) heavy armoured
car in a battle damaged village in Poland, September 1939. The
large national cross on the radiator louvres, originally white,
seems to have been overpainted yellow; another cross on the hull
side has been completely masked. Ahead of it is a yellow W,
significance unknown. |
At the outbreak of war the Aufklaerungs-Abteilungen
were deployed as follows: A-A 1 with 1st Cavalry Brigade; A-A 3, 4, 5, 7
and 8 with the Panzer divisions; A-A 2, 13, 20 and 29 with motorised
infantry divisions; A-A 6 with the 1st Light Division. Somewhat larger
units, Aufklaerungs Regimenter 7, 8 and 9, served respectively with the
2nd, 3rd and 4th Light Divisions.
Subsequently, standardisation was achieved by adding
'armoured' to the title and by numbering or naming the
Aufklaerungs-Abteilungen after their parent Panzer divisions. Thus, Pz-A-A
1 served in 1. Panzer-Division, Pz-A-A 16 in 16. Panzer-Division, Pz-A-A
'GD' in the Panzer-Division 'Grossdeutschland', SS-Pz-A-A 'Totenkopf' in
3. SS-Panzer-Division 'Totenkopf', and so on. In the motorised infantry -
later Panzergrenadier - divisions the Aufklaerungs-Abteilungen added 100
to the number of their parent formation so that, for example, Pz-A-A 120
could readily be identified as belonging to the 20th Motorised Infantry
Division. Inevitably there were exceptions to this rule, the most notable
being Pz-A-A 140, which served in 22.Panzer-Division; Pz-A-A 87 of
25.Panzer-Division; and Pz-A-A 130 of the Panzer-Lehr-Division. In North
Africa the official title of 21.Panzer-Division's reconnaissance battalion
was Pz-A-A 200, and that of 15.Panzer-Division, Pz-A-A 15, but these units
are repeatedly referred to in German accounts as A-A 3 and A-A 33
respectively.
Hitler's decision to double the number of Panzer
divisions and expand the motorised infantry branch for the invasion of
Russia placed a severe strain on available resources; the reconnaissance
troops were no less affected than other areas of the Panzerwaffe, many
battalions entering the campaign some way short of their theoretical
establishment. This, as well as the serious losses incurred not merely
during the invasion itself but also in the dreadful winter that followed,
made some re-organisation inevitable. Some mention has already been made
of the difficulties encountered by the four-wheeled cars during this
period, the result being that their availability and importance steadily
declined. Losses among motor-cycle troops generally had also been high, so
serious in fact that the Panzer division's organic motor-cycle battalion
was disbanded and its personnel posted to the reconnaissance battalion.
This meant that the latter's organisation for a while lacked its previous
tactical balance, there being somewhat too few cars and rather too many
motor-cyclists.
|
SdKfz 231 (8-rad) with barrier
shield. The front and rear driving positions can be identified by
the visors in the hull side. |
In this interim form, the battalion's order of battle
was as follows, the term 'company' having been substituted for 'squadron':
- Battalion headquarters and intelligence section
- One armoured car company, usually equipped with eight-wheeled cars
- Three motor-cycle machine-gun companies
- One heavy company
- Mobile workshops, supply and transport
As more half-tracks became available the battalion's
motor-cycle element was steadily reduced. The arrival of the 75mm 233 and
later the 234/3 and various self-propelled anti-tank gun mountings, both
wheeled and half-tracked, also meant that the towed weapons troops of the
heavy company, always of dubious value, could be phased out.
It goes
almost without saying that during the lengthy period of this major
re-equipment no one armoured reconnaissance battalion precisely resembled
another. However, in the spring of 1944 the theoretical constitution of
the battalion had been tabulated as follows:
- Battalion Headquarters
- Staff Company (Stabskompanie)
- No. 1 Armoured Reconnaissance Company (Panzerspaehkompanie)
- No. 2 Reconnaissance Company (Aufklaerungskompanie)
- No. 3 Reconnaissance Company
- No. 4 Heavy Company
- Supply Company (Versorgungskompanie)
The majority of these titles are misleading. The
Staff Company, for example, logically incorporated the intelligence
section, but also included the battalion's six armoured car troops –
Radspaehtrupps - which each contained three vehicles. Those four-wheeled
cars still remaining were grouped into light troops, one vehicle at least
being fitted with radio, but most of the troops were equipped with
eightwheelers, among which radios were now fitted as standard. A troop of
three 75min. L/24 howitzer cars also formed part of the company, joined
later by a troop of Pumas or 75min L/48 234s. The vehicles of the more
heavily armed troops were allocated to other troops as their missions
dictated.
The principal equipment of No. 1 Armoured
Reconnaissance Company was the 250/9 reconnaissance half-track. The
company was subdivided into eight three-vehicle troops - Kettenspaetrupps
- and three 250/3 radio vehicles provided rear link facilities for the
company commander.
No. 2 and 3 Reconnaissance Companies were also
equipped with the 250 half-track series. Each consisted of a company
headquarters, three reconnaissance troops and a heavy weapons troop. The
headquarters section included two 250/3 rear-link radio vehicles, and each
reconnaissance troop contained seven 250/1 armoured personnel carriers,
subdivided into one troop headquarters vehicle and three sections of two
vehicles each. The heavy weapons troop consisted of one 250/1 in troop
headquarters; a close support section of two 250/8 self-propelled 75mm
L/24 howitzers and one 250/1 APC; and a mortar section of two 250/7 80mm
mortar carriers and one 250/1 APC.
|
Abandoned SdKfz 250/2 telephone
vehicle, North Africa. The marking below the Afrika Korps palm
indicates that it belonged to a towed howitzer battery. |
The conception of the half-tracked reconnaissance
company was not simply that of a replacement for the old motor-cycle
machine-gun squadron, although it did incorporate its role, which it was
able to perform with ease since its establishment provided for no less
than 48 machine-guns as well as the organic heavy weapons support
mentioned above. Fully equipped with radio, its primary task was
reconnaissance; ist provision of Panzergrenadier support for armoured car
or armoured reconnaissance company operations had now become a secondary
role, invoked at the battalion commander's discretion.
No. 4 Heavy Company consisted of an assault
pioneer troop, a close support troop and a mortar troop. The assault
pioneers, in addition to their bridge repair role, were also responsible
for demolition; this included the removal of barriers if the battalion was
leading an advance and the destruction of bridges if it was covering a
withdrawal. They were also specialists in certain combat techniques, and
their order of battle included a section of six man-pack flamethrowers.
The troop's theoretical establishment was seven SdKfz 251/5s, the assault
pioneer version of the medium half-track, but whether these were available
in sufficient numbers is doubtful, and suitably modified 250/1s would have
taken their place.
The close support troop nominally consisted of six
251/9 self-propelled 75min L/24 howitzers,.and the mortar troop of six
251/2 80min mortar carriers, but in practice the 250/8 and 250/7 were
frequently used.
This battalion organisation, like others of the period,
represents what was desirable rather than attainable. The majority of
reconnaissance battalions were below strength during the last year of the
war, and expedience and improvisation were the order of the day,
commanding officers using whatever equipment they could obtain to carry
out their missions.
|
SdKfz 232 Schwere
Panzerspähwagen (8-rad) (Fu) in mint condition. The photo clearly
illustrates the working of the swivel aerial mounting which
permitted the turret all round traverse. |
Something of the method adopted by German
reconnaissance units is described by Oberst a.D. Fabian von Bonin von
Ostau, who served in Panzer-Aufklaerungs-Abteilung 1:
Having been given a task by division, the commanding
officer would despatch several troops along the most important axes and
lead them personally. Behind him, the squadron thickened up the screen
with further troops. As an officer commanding a section of two
eight-wheeled cars, I carried out tasks given to me directly by the
commanding officer. I was given a distant objective, perhaps 20 to 40
kilometres into enemy territory, and, without consideration of
neighbouring recce sections, had to reach this using my own initiative.
Enemy forces had to be reported and if possible circumvented without
detection so that we could penetrate deep into their rear areas. Often we
had not reached our objective by nightfall and remained as stationary
observers, on suitable features, until daybreak. On reaching the objective
we were either ordered to return to our unit or were relieved by another
recce section that had followed us up. Occasionally we remained stationary
in enemy territory until such time as our own division caught up with us.
|
SdKfz 232 Schwerer Panzerspähwagen
(8-rad) (Fu)
|
At first one had to overcome and become used to a
feeling of loneliness, of being all alone in enemy territory without being
able to rely on outside help. With increasing experience, one's
self-confidence grew; apart from which, such independent missions were
particularly attractive to a young cavalry officer in that one was not
pressed into a restrictive framework with one's superiors and neighbours.
The initial penetration into unknown enemy territory
was difficult. For this purpose our own local attacks were taken advantage
of before the enemy could recover his balance. When one had achieved some
penetration, the advance became easier. A recce leader must be a good
observer and have a nose for knowing where he might run into the enemy.
Mostly the cars were well camouflaged and used all available natural
cover, following each other with the last car covering the rear. On
features where a good field of vision was offered, one halted and made a
thorough observation. If no enemy were seen then the first car went on to
the next observation point under surveillance, when it arrived safely the
next car was called forward.
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SdKfz 231 (6-rad) of
Panzer-Aufklärungs-abteilung 2 in France, June 1940. The most
obvious markings on the overall Panzer grey scheme are the white
outline national cross, and the "G" identifying
Guderian´s XIX Panzer Korps. Just ahead of the cross are the two
yellow dots used at that date by 2. Panzer Division as a formation
sign, and ahead of these the yellow painted name
"Salzburg" in plain capitals. The log and hessian
"carpets" stowed on the front mudguard are for use under
the rear wheels in bad going. This car seems to have shed its
front ground roller. The rack rigged at the top of the radiator
seems to hold smoke canisters, whith strings led back through the
driver´s visor - an improvisation entirely in keeping with the
reconnaissance role in a campaign involving deep penetration of
enemy lines. |
It was important to make a thorough observation of
villages as these were nearly always used by the enemy in one form or
another. If you see the enemy, then you know. If the enemy is not visible
and the civilian population is going about its normal business, then the
village is not enemy occupied. If no people are seen, this is highly
suspicious and the village should be by-passed by a wide margin.
The best patrols I had were those with clean guns. Even
worthwhile targets were only reported and not engaged; that is the
business of others. A troop leader with a tendency to bang away is useless
for reconnaissance purposes since he is soon located by the enemy and
chased like a rabbit. A report giving the location of an enemy tank
leaguer is of infinitely more value than five shot-tip lorries.
Reports were made in Morse and communications were
good.' The operators were well trained and could send reports quickly, but
it was up to the section commander to formulate the report. This soon
became a matter of routine. Voice transmissions were used only between
vehicles. Every report concerning the enemy's whereabouts, and even
negative information contained in periodic situation reports, helped build
up a picture of the overall enemy situation.
The essential ingredients of a successful
reconnaissance section were a well drilled team, mutual confidence and
strong nerves. Our main thought was always "There is always a way out
and all is not lost so long as one is alive."
|
Clearly marked SdKfz 232 (8-rad)
(Fu) of the 1st Armoured Reconnaissance Sqn.,
Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung "Grossdeutschland" in rail
transit near Kursk, June 1942. The turrets have been sheeted down,
and each bears the Reichsbahn shipping label. The leading car has
been fitted with a frontal shield with which to force its way
through barriers. The slight right hand lock illustrates perfectly
the effect of eight wheel steering. |
Once our invasion of Russia had been halted in December
1941, fresh Siberian formations were pitched against troops who had no
experience of winter warfare conditions. The Army had to fight a series of
delaying actions until a defence line could be established on the Upper
Volga. During this period the reconnaissance battalions performed vital
work as covering forces, concealing from the enemy the details of our own
movements and intentions. For this purpose the armoured reconnaissance
squadrons, with their good communications equipment. were deployed over a
wide area under their squadron leaders. In defence, the fighting element
of the battalion, that is the motor-cycle troops and the heavy company,
were deployed mainly in the front line, while the armoured car troops were
given specific missions by Division.
When covering a withdrawal the method employed by the
reconnaissance battalions was the reverse of that used in the advance. The
armoured reconnaissance squadrons remained in concealed observation
positions after their division had disengaged, while the remainder of the
battalion established temporary defensive fronts, usually based on
narrow-frontage features such as a bridge or causeway, through which the
cars would withdraw when they received the order to retire. In these
circumstances the two major tasks of the armoured reconnaissance squadrons
were to screen the divisional flanks and rearguard against observation by
the enemy's reconnaissance units, and to report on the enemy thrust lines
as they developed. From the flow of information provided by the cars, the
divisional commander was able to adjust his plans according to the needs
of the moment and so conclude the successful extraction of his command.
The cars were recalled when the division had consolidated its main defence
line and would retire through their own battalion's interim defence lines
while bridges were blown up, trees felled and roads mined behind them.
|
An SdKfz 232 (8-rad) (Fu) leads
the way through a ruined Greek village, spring 1941. Some attempt
seems to have been made to overpaint the original "Panzer
grey" scheme with light shade, but much of this has worn off,
and the barrier shield has not been repainted at all. The name
"Seydlitz" appears on the hull side in white gothic
script. The second vehicle is an SdKfz 221 light armoured car,
mounting a smaller turret than the 222. |
Notwithstanding the use of all possible means to
achieve its ends by stealth, deception and concealment, armoured
reconnaissance was -and remains - an extremely dangerous game, and the
average troop leader had an active, testing, but all too frequently short
career. Oberst von Bonin von Ostau was wounded on three separate
occasions, and of four of his fellow troop leaders who joined at the same
time, three were killed during the 1941-1942 fighting and the fourth the
following year.
Bibliography: