Dominant Logistics
The Future Army - Revisited
A few months ago, I wrote an article outlining some suggestions for the future structure of the U.S. Army. As more feedback has become available from Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as other locations, I believe it is time to revisit this topic and address it more completely. This article will also include suggested divisions between Active and Selected Reserve components in a Total Force structure.
As mentioned in other articles, I support a rotational system for Army manning and readiness based upon a four-year cycle. This will apply to both the Active and Reserves components. Active units will complete two readiness cycles in the four year period as well as an OOTW cycle while the ARNG units will be pre-scheduled for a single potential eight-month period of Active service during the four-year cycle.
Most of the redundant command formations above division level should be eliminated. The joint nature of modern warfare along with the increased lethality and capability of modern forces and communications seems to make the Corps and Army levels of command obsolete. This belief is based upon the reality that is the XVIII Airborne Corps. This Corps command is currently responsible for four Active divisions, four Reserve/National Guard divisions, six additional NG combat brigades, as well as a full complement of Corps support assets, including an Armored Cavalry Regiment.
Where things get a little weird is when we climb the ladder to find that the next step in the command chain is the 3rd Army - which is responsible for the XVIII Airborne Corps and a handful of minor supporting units. Then we reach Army Central Command - which is responsible for 3rd Army and a handful of minor supporting units. This takes us to the next layer - 11 major bureaucratic commands, all to ensure that Army Central Command and the other combat commands have enough help. When you run all of the numbers, you end up with four Corps level commands, four Army level commands, and 11 major commands (19 commands higher than division) all to "lead" a combat force of only ten active divisions and 18 ARNG divisions (and associated smaller units). Higher commands outnumber active combat divisions by nearly two to one - this is patently insane. And this doesn't even include the nine additional unified commands at the DOD level. All told, the DOD has 28 commands higher than division level with responsibility over a total of 28 Active and ARNG divisions. When all commands are factored in, higher commands outnumber active divisions by nearly three to one. And then we wonder why we struggle to meet the personnel requirements for a handful of military taskings.
In virtually every modern tasking, and in every forseeable future tasking, all operations are joint to some degree. The Corps and Army levels of command are relics for wars long past. All higher level commands throughout the respective branches should be consolidated into the DOD joint commands to eliminate the legacy redundancies.
Divisional and Regimental Formations
In total, I would recommend a force structure based upon a total of 14 divisions along with 38 supporting regiments of various types and 32 National Guard separate brigades of varying types. The basic divisional construct would consist of two active duty brigades while the third brigade would be an ARNG "plugger" brigade or a supporting regiment. All divisions would consist solely of various types of infantry - specialization would come from the plugger unit. Basic divisions would be as follows:
Light Infantry Divisions
An infantry formation that emphasizes strategic deployability along with maximum capability in heavy and urban terrains. These would not be greatly different than existing LID units although some types of light armor should be included. These units are designed to use terrain and mobility advantages in lieu of other physical protective means. Four divisions should be fielded.Mechanized Infantry Divisions
While lighter than existing mechanized systems, the proposed mechanized infantry units would have greater survivability than the LIDs, particularly in more open terrains. These units are also designed for greater survivability against more capable foes using the proposed mechanized infantry systems. Four divisions should be fielded.Peacekeeping Divisions
The peacekeeping formations are specially designed for the humanitarian, nation-building, and post-war missions that the military must engage in. These are very light units that are specifically designed for low-impact and high cost-effectiveness. Six divisions should be fielded.
As mentioned, these divisions would normally consist of only two combat brigades. It should also be noted that these units are designed around a force-type; the third "plugger" brigade will be of a mission or task type. This allows for the use of two general purpose combat infantry brigades along with a third brigade that is tailored to the mission at hand:
Mountain Brigades - Infantry brigades specifically trained and stationed in high altitude and cold-weather regions.
Urban Brigades - Infantry brigades trained and equipped solely for urban warfare.
Peacekeeping Brigades - Similar in construct to the units of the peacekeeping divisions
Special Operations Brigades - Not necessarily Special Forces units but units that are specifically trained and equipped for guerilla warfare, airborne operations, and rear guard operations.
Each of these brigade types should consist of eight brigades for a total of 32 National Guard plugger brigades. Because we are scheduling an active rotation once every four years for each NG brigade, in every year, there will be two NG brigades of each type pre-scheduled for augmenting active duty divisions (although they will only be called up if needed). Given the proposed rotation lengths, this allows us to "round-out" a total of four divisions in forward operations for the full year without any unexpected or unusual call-ups.
Further augmentation of the divisions is available from the proposed cavalry regiments:
Armored Cavalry Regiments - units designed to retain our existing tank warfare capabilities. These units are also ideal for desert warfare. Four regiments should be on Active Duty while another twelve should be available in ARNG.
Airborne Cavalry Regiments - an Air-Mech-Strike force combining survivability with tremendous mobility. Two regiments should remain on active duty while another six should be ARNG.
Artillery Cavalry Regiments - all major forms of artillery (divisional general support and higher), including air defense, should be removed from the normal units and assembled in artillery regiments. This will make even the biggest of guns readily available to the lightest of units if the need exists - conversely units are not weighed down by the logistical burden of heavy artillery when it isn't needed. Two Active regiments as well as six ARNG formations should be fielded.
Aviation Cavalry Regiments - units of various aviation assets ranging from non-divisional transports to dedicated combat aircraft. Some aviation regiments may even be dedicated combat units as have been proposed by some. Two Active regiments and four ARNG regiments should be sufficient.
With this mix of unit formations, we get the ability to address a wide variety of scenarios with tailored forces but we do so without giving up the strength of a substantial combat force. While some propose going with independent strengthened brigades, the logistics necessary to support these efforts will be greater than the logistics supporting the current divisions. We may gain some advantage in the combat elements themselves but that advantage would be countered by a larger logistics footprint as each brigade or group will need supporting elements that are otherwise not needed for a formation of that size that is not an independent element. But this doesn't mean that smaller formations shouldn't be used as there are situations where the tactical benefits of the smaller unit outweigh the logistical penalties.
This structure is also consistent with the concept of Active Capacity, where we emphasize those elements we need most often while keeping the other units in reserve until they are needed. The only thing the Army is always in need of is leg infantry - all other units are pretty much optional so the bulk of these should be in reserve. Many have complained of retention problems with mechanized and armored units in the ARNG and these problems should not be ignored. But a failure to make a given area of ARNG service worthwhile to servicemembers cannot justify wasting billions of dollars. It's a lot cheaper to increase ARNG pay and benefits than it is to retain massive quantities of armor and attack helicopters on active duty.
Moreover, the cavalry regiments can serve as a sort of combat laboratory with units of varying structure, design, and equipment. For example, some have suggested developing smaller unit formations to allow for more manuever groups within a given division. On the other hand, some have suggested using a group structure, somewhat resembling an enhanced brigade. With the given approach, we can test these unit models in operational units without disrupting our primary combat capabilities. We can also use these units as a testing ground for new weapons and tactics. As technology brings a new capability into the fold, the initial versions of the technology can go to units within the cavalry regiments where lessons will be learned and improvements made. If the technology is appropriate, it can then be passed on to the larger force in a superior, second generation form - otherwise, the technology can be used as OPFOR systems within the various training centers.
With this approach, transformation is no longer a task - it is a perpetual state of being for the Army. Instead of remaining within a given state for an extended duration, a significant portion of the force remains in a constant state of evolution while the bulk of the force maintains an emphasis on infantry capabilities and technologies that have been proven and developed over time.
Deployment Capabilities
A new effort to revitalize the Army's deployment capabilities is underway but needs to be stopped. The last thing the Army needs to be purchasing is slow transport ships when alternatives like the SkyCat 1000 are available and offer far greater capability. Even a modest quantity of SkyCats would give us the ability to deploy multiple divisions of virtually any type within a single month. In the case of lighter units, an entire brigade would require only five SkyCats and these can land virtually anywhere as they require no airstrip, only an open space of sufficient size.
Unlike any current aircraft flying in the United States inventories, the SkyCat can carry multiple Abrams tanks in a single load as well as other vehicles and gear. In theory, the SkyCat 1000 can handle a payload of up to 1000 tons, or 13 Abrams tanks with some payload to spare in a single load. According to available estimates, an entire light infantry battalion, personnel and all, should be possible in a single SkyCat load, even the heavier light infantry units that I have proposed. The Army does not need to be purchasing ships unless they are the kind that fly.
The Skycat also offers a more effective means for the deployment of helicopter assets. Currently, helicopters are very difficult and expensive to deploy over long distances because they must either travel in very limited quantities in large aircraft, or in larger quantities on slow ships. If the Army were to purchase navalized helicopters (ie. folding rotors), it could carry large quantities of helicopters by Skycat airships to anywhere in the world in relatively short periods of time. Given the Skycat's massive proposed size, it may even be possible to develop specialized Skycat's that could serve as flying helicopter carriers. This would likely involve using a lift to move helicopters to the upper portion of the airship to allow for take-off and landing. By using the MH-60 variant of the Blackhawk, up to twelve helicopters or more could easily be supported by this system. Larger quantities of smaller aircraft, such as autogyros, could also be sustained. In theory, some types of fixed wing aircraft, including UAVs, could operate from the airship without the need for a landing strip as the airship has an operational cruising speed of 100knots. Given the Skycat's payload and range estimates, this arrangement could remain operational on-station for about two and half days without the need for refueling or reloading. And obviously, this helicopter carrier could also serve as an aerial refueling and rearming point for helicopters as well.
The Skycat also can serve in amphibious roles. The airship uses an air cushion landing system allowing it to land on virtually any surface, including water. Whereas a traditional amphibious assault would require months of positioning of men and materials, a large-scale amphibious assault could be launched anywhere in the world within a matter of days using Skycats. And this capability would be available on inland seas as well so the force would not be locked into the predictable patterns that limit the flexibility of today's amphibious operations. This also brings greater flexibility to the missions of logistics support. With Skycat's, logistics forces can use rivers and lakes in lieu of roads for executing support missions or the load can be delivered on land as well. With the Skycat, we get a variety of options that heretofore have not existed.
At a minimum, the Army needs to assemble the funding necessary to purchase 40 Skycat 1000 airships for logistics and mobility purposes while an additional 10 should be procured specifically for helicopter operations. This would allow for a division-sized package of light forces or a brigade-sized package of medium/heavy forces to be available for very rapid deployment in a true combined arms arrangement. This allows for an additional 10-20 Skycats to be available for movement of materials in support of that force or for other taskings.
Future Combat Systems
The entire FCS program needs to be brought to a screaming halt until such time as an independent third party can come in and evaluate the program. This includes the Interim programs like the Stryker. I am a proponent of maintaining strong relationships between the military and defense contractors but these relationships cannot come at the expense of the troops. Already in Iraq, American soldiers have died not because of terrorists, insurgents, roadside bombs, or irate locals - they are dead because they were riding in a Stryker and it's excessive ground pressure caused the embankment they were driving on to collapse.
Most of the FCS concepts don't even make sense, particularly the Mule program. Whoever dreamed up the notion that having mindless robots scampering around the battlefield would be a good idea needs their head examined to be blunt. In theory, this may work someday but we don't have the money and the technology has shown no indication of being ready for prime time at this point.
Along with the FCS, the Smart Distribution program must also be halted. Conceptually, it isn't a bad idea until you reach some of the more ridiculous aspects like self-tensioning cargo nets. It is also insane to believe we can magically create two platforms that will meet every and all logistics needs of the military to perfection. Already, this search for perfection has resulted in per unit estimated costs of around $600,000-$800,000 per vehicle in the Future Tactical Truck System. For that amount of money, we would be substantially better off to develop a Tracked Support Vehicle to replace the heavier of the FTTS vehicles, retain most of the existing HMMWVs, field an amphibious hybrid-powered HEMTT, and develop a new multirole Jeep for a smaller vehicle option.
Existing Bradley and M113 vehicle systems can be modernized and upgraded at a fraction of the costs of Stryker and FCS. We don't need to, nor can we afford to, reinvent the wheel every time some power-crazed general gets a wild hair up his butt. Tracked vehicles are a far better option for the FCS program anyways as their design is inherently more combat resistant and lower in weight than any traditional wheeled armored vehicle can dream of being.
And while we're correcting the FCS mistake, kill the Comanche helicopter program. We're short on Blackhawks and we can't find the funding to replace the Chinooks but we're still wasting billions on a Comanche that is less survivable than the Apaches that currently are not survivable enough to use effectively? Our aviation doctrine is in the process of being rewritten specifically to eliminate the missions that Comanche is expected to perform because helicopters cannot survive in the mission environment - this makes the Comanche a waste of needed resources, no matter how it is performing in tests.
Soldier Firepower
Once again, reports are coming in that the Army has rediscovered that maybe those crazy World War II folks actually DID do some things well. The recoilless rifle, banished from U.S. forces for years, is reportedly on the verge of making a comeback in the form of the Gustav 84mm MAAWS. This system has been in use with the Rangers since 1990 and the Navy SEALs sometime after that. The grunts have been calling for fielding either a recoilless rifle or an RPG-type system for years - now that bodybags are filling up, somebody actually cares and word is that the M3 MAAWS may finally enter service with the conventional infantry. It's about time.
But what about the rest of the individual and crew-served weapons that the troops have been compaining about for years? The M-16 has been a complete piece of crap from the day it originally appeared in the force and yet it has now been the standard issue weapon of the U.S. Army for well over 30 years. The M203 still looks great on paper and never as good anywhere else due to lack of training with it's overpriced rounds. The M240 and SAW are still ungodly heavy for the missions they are intended to perform. Our handguns continue to suck while we still rarely have shotguns available. And now we have news reports about a shortage of ammunition for training. But hey, we've got the biggest SUVs in the world, now don't we?
At what point did we lose sight of the actual purpose of the Army? I have no idea when that occured but at some point, we need to regain a respect for what this profession is actually about because while we may hold a high tech advantage over most potential opponents, we are officially on the wrong side of the equation when it comes to combat technology. Where high-tech consists primarily of computerized hardware, combat tech involves those systems that actually support and sustain our combat capabilities, and in this area, the U.S. Army ranks among the worst in the world in the hardware it hands out to the troops. The gear is too heavy, ineffectual, unreliable, and too expensive on an almost universal basis (aside from Special Forces).
The top spending priorities of the U.S. Army must be to correct this massive gap to include: