3.1.2 International Transparency Regime.  An international transparency regime is a key means of strengthening transparency in small arms and light weapons.  Greater transparency is vital for combating illicit small arms trafficking.  By carefully documenting licit trade, it will improve the chances of detecting arms proliferation and sources of diversion into the black market.  It is a critical way to detect and prevent potentially destabilizing accumulations of small arms.  Another benefit would be an improvement in the ability to prevent violation of UN arms embargoes. Perhaps one of the most important consequences would be the ability to better analyze policy.  As more information is made available there will be more opportunities to learn and promote effective policy.  Gaps in policy will also be more apparent.  It is difficult to fight such a complex problem when there is so little substantive empirical data on which to base decisions.  Greater transparency will foster better choices and effective implementation of policy and encourage confidence-building between States. The Council of the European Union under joint action aims at building consensus in the relevant regional and international fora under subsection (d), Article 3, in order to ensure control of the establishment and maintenance of national inventories of legally-held weapons owned by the countries’ authorities and the establishment of restrictive national weapons legislation for small arms, including penal sanctions and effective administrative control. 
3.1.2.1 One logical component of a transparency regime would be the inclusion of small arms in the UN Register on Conventional Arms or the creation of a separate UN Register for Small Arms and Light Weapons.  Some possible categories of small arms to be included are mortars, machine guns, shoulder-launched missiles, and assault weapons.  An immediate step is the building up on the Internet of an internationally-based authoritative and independent register for small arms, similar to the UN Register for Conventional Arms, and to encourage member States to make voluntary submissions to the register.  EPG is in consultation with member States and NGOs to develop such a register which would include data provided by member States willing to contribute.  The information included would center on the number and types of small arms and light weapons possessed and produced by each member, the number of those exported and their recipients.  EPG’s aim is clear that, having mobilized support for an independent register, a new register administered by the United Nations could be introduced depending upon the voluntary provisions of data by each member State. Eventually, sales to States not party to the Register or found in repeat violation of the international code of conduct could be penalized by the Security Council.
3.1.2.2 The logistical problems of adding a new category to the UN Register on Conventional Arms would suggest a limited amount of information to be included.  For example, it might be possible to add one general category "small arms."  Additional, more detailed information could be collected on a voluntary basis or through regional initiatives.  The alternative is to create a separate UN Register on Small Arms.  There are a number of advantages to such an approach, including emphasizing that the small arms issue is a unique problem independent of larger conventional arms. The monitoring of small arms flows which is conducive to determining destabilizing accumulations could, in fostering transparency, enhance trust, confidence, security and, by extension, durable peace.  Any UN register will have limitations.  It is limited to only licit arms, as black market weapons, by definition, are not able to be quantified and reported by governments.  Additionally, the success of the Conventional Weapons Register cannot be expected to be repeated.  The weapons systems contained within that document are fewer in number and larger in size. Therefore, there are fewer weapon systems to count and report, and those systems are much more difficult to conceal than small arms.  And, it can be expected that some states will cheat and not report all their legal production, for whatever reason.  Despite these limitations, however, the increased transparency in production and destination remains useful.
3.1.2.2.1 General Processing of Data.  Under the Register, governments would be required to submit generalized reports, declaring production, stockpiling and transfer of small arms. Additionally, national lists of registered small arms manufacturers, importers, suppliers, and brokers should be included.  Figures would also be provided for illicit arms confiscated or seized.  Inclusion of information recording losses or theft from weapons stores, and the disposal and dismantlement of small arms stocks would also be pertinent.
3.1.2.2.2 Aggregation and Communication.  Another useful component would be a list of national legislation and regulation pertaining to small arms.  Such information is currently difficult to collect in a comparative manner.  A compilation would improve the ability to detect discrepancies between national policy and the small arms non-proliferation goals of interested Sates.
3.1.2.2.3 Transparency and Early Warning.  Initially NGO, eventually  UN early warning systems should be set up in order to enhance early detection of proliferation.  Points of transfer, such as harbors, airfields and supply roads, especially in regions of conflict, need monitoring. Such monitoring could be done by encouraging a "monitoring culture" within which, in countries concerned, illicit transfers are reported.  Regional organizations, such as the OAU, OAS, and OSCE, for example, will be pivotal to supporting any monitoring capacity.
3.1.2.2.4 Holdings.  In addition, the regime provides a benefit to member states, which have access to the Register's data.  States will be able to determine an element of another state's military power based upon the reported data.  This form of intelligence, available to regime members only, serves a member state's national security concerns and interests and provides an incentive for joining the regime.  Transparency of holdings information can serve as a substantial confidence building measure.
3.1.2.2.5 Relationship of transparency regime to illicit trafficking.  Information should be shared that would help expose small arms trafficking.  Verification and transparency are mutually enhancing.  Thus, information gathering and sharing are integral to an intrusive verification process and critical to prevention and enforcement, which is both a precondition for and function of transparency.  Consequently, cooperation, coordination, training and information sharing among police, intelligence and customs within and between countries must be enhanced.   Integration with organizations such as Interpol would be relevant because the small arms black market relates to the general levels of violence in societies rather than simply conventional national defense.  Documenting instances where end-use statements for export licenses have been forged or falsified or where arms traders have been convicted or de-registered would be invaluable for law enforcement authorities.

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