Eric Swanson
International Relations can be described as different governments interacting with each other. Each nation state’s government is made up of a conglomerate of different organizations interacting with each other and other nation states. These organizations bring to international relations its own boundaries, standards, and influences. The Organizational Behavior Model (OBM) can explain the decisions, events, and relations made between nation states. The OBM can be applied to the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Middle East Crisis in Israel. Through the OBM international relations is able to be understood.
Nation States interact with one another by the use of organizations called governments. The government’s behavior is not of a national leader’s rational decision but as an “output” of the organizations within the government guided by Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). (143) This “output” is the product of the actual organizations striving for efficiency that bounds leaders making decisions.
Since the dawn of the first community, humans formed organizations so that efficiency can be maximized. Adam Smith noted this phenomenon by calling it the division of labor. (145) Individuals with a comparative advantage will specialize in that skill for the good of himself and the whole community. In governments, the division of labor theory is used and is very extensive. Every major and minor problem that arises domestically or internationally is solved by forming an organization within the government to maximize the capabilities of that group. With the amount of demands put upon the government the bureaucracy of the government can grow to exponential levels.
These organizations are the actual instruments of the government that interact with other nation states. (164) When America wants to fight with terrorists, President Bush does not fight Osama Bin Laden. The organization of the Department of Defense takes on the Taliban and Al Queda organizations. Once again, it is the organization and its behavior that actually performs the interaction between the nation states.
Organizations are the best and most efficient way to handle international relations. (164) The amount of nation states and its many organizations that are in the world makes it impossible for President Bush to negotiate with all of them to ensure America’s interest are upheld. Therefore, it is only logical that organizations are formed to ensure that the maximum amount of diplomacy and negotiations can be done to other nation states.
An organization binds leaders to a certain number of possibilities when it comes to international relations. Since President Bush can not go out from the White House and accumulate all information pertinent to a subject, he must rely on his organizations to gain the information and present it to him. In this way, this inherently limits the leader on the amount and the extent of his decisions. This “bounded rationality” of the leader only comes from the organizational behavior that dictates international relations. (154)
For organizations to accomplish these three objectives of being the actual, most efficient, binding instruments of international relations, it must rely on standard procedures to guarantee constant returns. SOPs, standard rules, and routines dictate how an organization will accomplish its mission and react to new situations. (143) Most new rules for new situations are not entirely new ways of doing things, but are adaptations from past standard rules or procedures. (152) This refusal to new changes limits its flexibility to new situations and causes the organization to allow only incremental changes. (176) Therefore, due to the stubbornness of organizations to change, it allows organizational behavior to manufacture reproducible quality results based upon its mission in international relations.
The organization, therefore, creates an enormous amount of influence in international relations. Since it is the actual instruments of interaction and it binds the leader’s rationality, it influences the government’s choice in a matter of international relations. (176) In addition, with the organizational priorities shaping organizational implementation, organizations can indirectly tell leaders what it can and will do in matters of international relations. (176) This proves the power and influence those organizations have in international relations. This is also why the OBM is such an important part of understanding international relations, because of the influence organizations play.
Of course, like any model, there are drawbacks. The OBM does not take into account the national leader’s influence and decisions on international relations. Nor does it take into account the power and voice of the people within a nation state, and how that will influence leaders and organizations alike. But for a model, it does help understand two aspects of international relations: the Cuban missile Crisis and the Middle East Crisis in Israel.
What happened in Cuba during October of the late 1950’s was the result of American and Soviet organizations. The routines, influences, and priorities of these two nation states’ organizations helped shape the decisions their figureheads made. Organizations were the instrument that created and handled this Crisis.
In America, the discovery of the Soviet missiles was an organizational success that influenced the decisions made during the Crisis. Not only was it a success, but the discovery of the missiles was only possibly through organizational behavior. (219) The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) had three ways of gaining intelligence on Cuba as a standard routine. The ONI would investigate the shipments from the Soviets by sea, called “cratology”, question refugees in Florida, and had operatives in Cuba relaying information on the activity of the Cubans. (220) When this intelligence was dissected the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as procedure made a “target card” for further investigation. (221) Then the CIA asked the Air Force to have one of its U-2 spy planes to make a pass over the San Cristobal area of Cuba taking pictures of the land. (221) The film that was taken from the U-2 was then processed by the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), which correctly identified the SAM sites, Soviet troop movements, and missile silos all arranged as if they were all in the Soviet Union. (222) With all this information, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) met and decided to let the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other top officials know that it had sufficient evidence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. (223) All of these events and decisions made were done within standard procedures within organizations of the government. In this case, the organizational behavior of gaining intelligence worked smoothly to the benefit of the Americans and their interests.
However, why was it so easy for the American government to find the Soviet missiles? Wouldn’t a rational Soviet leader of a country try to hide the nuclear missiles from these American government entities? The answer to these questions is easy. The reason for the Soviet’s failure for loose intelligence was because of their organizational behavior. On Sept 8th, the first Soviet missile secretly arrived in Cuba. This successful operation of stealth was handled by a sub-unit of the Soviet General Staff. (203) From then on, the missiles were under operational control of the Group of Soviet Forces (GSF) in Cuba. (211) The missile regiments came from Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF). (212) This is the unit that set up all the missiles for storing and firing. Due to SOPs, the SRF laid out the plans according to Soviet blue prints. Because the SRF arranged the missile silos and bunkers exactly as they were in the Soviet Union, it was easy for the NPIC to decipher the pictures from the U-2 spy plane and find the identifiable elements of nuclear missiles. In addition, the Soviets did not use camouflage and did not try to work during the night so that the missiles were not discovered. Due to an infantry unit in charge and pressures from the mother country to be ready by a certain date, the GSF decided mission accomplishment was more important than stealth. (213) Once again, due to routines and organizational habits by the Soviets the missiles were allowed to be discovered. On another occasion, it was noted that the Russian forces, specifically the SAM sites, did view the U-2 spy plane over their air space, but did nothing to stop the plane.(214) The reason for this was the order was given to only shoot hostile targets and not to engage any others, so that the Soviets was not arouse attention. (214) By the Soviet organization following its orders, it allowed the discovery of the missile.
The discovery of the missiles was entirely the workings of organizational behavior. This behavior was characterized by American organizations successfully doing its routines for its benefits, while the Soviet organizations successfully doing its routines for its failure. This proves the organizational power in international relations.
This OBM can be also used in today’s Middle East Crisis in Israel. Many nation states try to impress on Israel to come to peace with Palestine and its leader Yasser Arafat. However, if one looks at this situation through the model of the ORB, they will find that Israel is not dealing with Arafat, but with an organization bent on Israel’s destruction. Israel is dealing with an organization that has procedures and routines to send suicide bombers to destroy Israel. Of course, these organizations that Israel is dealing with are the terrorist organizations within Palestine that Yasser Arafat is failing to control. Why is he failing to control? Because according to the OBM, he is not in control, but is a pawn of the organization he is apart of. This terrorist organization has all the characteristics of an organization because it can influence government choices, shape government priorities, has limited flexibility, and changes slowly. So for Israel to deal with Arafat is a mistake according to OBM.
Organizational Behavior Model is a powerful tool to understand international relations. Through this model one can see how decisions and events are made from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the Middle East Crisis in Israel. This model shows that the organization of nation states dictates what actions the nation will take according to a preset procedures.
Bibliography
Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision. New York: Longman,
1999.
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Date this page was last updated: 12/06/2002