Gettysburg and the Center of Gravity

Eric Swanson

    Clausewitz introduced the concept of center of gravity in his book On War.  He recognized that total annihilation of the enemy was not necessary to gain the desired effect of war.  He introduced the idea of center of gravity to give military commanders the understanding of finding the source of the strength of the enemy and then attacking it.  This idea would give military commanders the most efficient means by which to win an engagement.  The center of gravity theory can be applied to the Battle of Gettysburg.  By evaluating the Battle of Gettysburg through the analysis of Clausewitz’s ideas of center of gravity, one can realize why the battle ended the way it did.  General Robert E. Lee did not correctly determine the North’s center of gravity and therefore misallocated his resources on the wrong objective.  During the beginning engagements of the battle, the Battle of Little Round Top, and the planning of Pickett’s Charge should have alerted Lee he was focusing on the wrong objective, but he never observed his mistake.  Due to his misallocation of resources, he could not amass enough force to win the battle, and in the end, Lee had to retreat due to the depletion in manpower and supplies.

            Clausewitz explored the ideas of concentrating efforts on an enemy’s source of strength.  Clausewitz recommended that the commander “identify and exploit the ‘decisive factors’ and ‘dominant characteristics’ of his enemy while understanding his own.”[1]  Therefore, “out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.”[2]  All “energies should be directed” against this point, so that military objectives can be most efficiently attained.[3]  So, he directs “the first task, then, in planning for war is to identify the enemy’s centers of gravity, and if possible trace them back to a single one. The second task is to ensure that the forces to be used against that point are concentrated for a main offensive.”[4]  General Lee had the right idea of concentrating his forces onto a point he felt was the most vulnerable, but he choose incorrectly.

            General Lee felt the center of gravity (COG) of the Army of the Potomac (AoP) was the army itself.  He felt that if he could draw out the North's Army and destroy it than he could march into Washington or Baltimore and force a peace between the North and South.[5]  There were some flaws to this plan.  General Lee and his Army of North Virginia (AoNV) had less manpower than the AoP.[6]  Also, because of the aggressiveness of Lee’s plans, he was extending his Army far into enemy territory, which created the necessity for long supply lines.[7]  This would force him to have firm control over the units, so no unit became too far from the base of supply and reinforcements.[8]  For these reasons, it was imperative that Lee win the ensuing battle.  If he did not, he would be surrounded in enemy territory without strong lines of communication or supplies to aid in a retreat, defense, or counterattack.[9]  The start of Lee’s battle plans should have clued him into the fact that the center of gravity for this battle was not the enemy itself but the land that would support the enemy.

            The Battle of Gettysburg started on July 1, 1863 with Brigadier General John Buford fighting a delaying battle against Henry Heth’s Confederate Division until Union infantry could be called up.[10]  Eventually the Union reinforcements arrived under command of Major General John Reynolds, commanding the 1^st Corps and the Advanced Guard.[11]  Reynolds commended Buford for his excellence in disposition and his choice in ground.[12]  Buford’s choice of land became the crucial factor in the Union’s COG.  Since the Union had the higher ground guarded by steep hills and boulder defenses, the Union could use those defense to stop any attack on their position from the Confederates.

            One of Lee’s most reliable Corps commanders, Lieutenant General James Longstreet, noticed the Union's possession of a better position than theirs and suggested a different method of attack.[13]  Lee, convinced that the COG was the enemy itself, wanted to aggressively attack the enemy where they were located.  However, Longstreet suggested the COG was not the enemy but their position and the land they occupied.  He also warned against attacking but fighting defensively instead.  Longstreet understood the North's natural advantages and the South's lack of reconnaissance to determine the number of Union troops that where in the hills.[14]  Longstreet suggested a broad sweeping movement to the right, thereby putting the AoNV in between the AoP and Washington and forcing the AoP to move out of their secure positions to attack and to regain communications with Washington.[15]  This plan would cripple the COG that the North attained and would put the battle on the South’s terms.  However, Lee refused this idea due to the uncertainty of the movement and his stubbornness of believing the AoP needed to be destroyed immediately without any fancy movements.[16]  Herein lies the first mistake that Lee made.  Lee had the opportunity to recognize that the COG was not the enemy.  Instead, it was their position that gave them their “hub of all power”.[17]  Unfortunately, he did not recognize his mistake in focus and called for the escalation of the battle on his terms.

            Later, during the Battle of Little Round Top, Lee was given another clue regarding the true COG in control of the battle.  Early on the 2^nd of July, the North's chief topographical engineer, Brigadier General Gouverneur Warren, noticed that if the Confederates controlled Little Round Top, they would have a clear line of artillery fire for the whole Union line.[18]  Immediately, the general ordered the 5^th Corps on the hill.  No sooner had the Union troops gained the top of the hill did the 4^th and 5^th Texas and 15^th Alabama start scaling the hill.[19]  Brigadier General Stephen and Colonel Chamberlain were instrumental in defending the hill from the Confederates.[20]  However, much of the success for the hill cannot be attributed to the valiant fighting of the Union, but to the lay of the land.  The land that the Confederates had to march up was “rocky and very rough, divided by numerous stone fences and other obstructions” that made it “impossible to maintain very good order in the advancing line.”[21]  Once again, Lee could have realized that the source of the Unions strength was not within themselves, but was the land that empowered the Union.

            Near the end of the battle on July 3^rd, 1863, Lee envisioned a last charge to break the lines of the North right in the middle and destroy the North.  This later became famously titled Pickett’s Charge.  Once again, Longstreet was very discouraged about this aggressive move and suggested once again a flanking movement that would force the North off the hills.[22]  Longstreet could foresee that his men would have to march a mile in open fields with Union artillery fire coming down from all directions.  He also saw that the Union infantry was bunkered in behind stonewalls, and when they started firing their rifles, it was nearly impossible to get any sizeable force through the barrage of fire to attack the Union.[23]  Lee’s final moment to recognize his mistake and reallocate resources to the true COG went unobserved.  Lee ordered the charge.  Almost as soon as the Confederate infantry emerged from the forest, Union artillery rained shells upon them.[24]  At about 300 yards, Union artillery switched to canister fire (bullets packed into casings) while the Union infantry opened fire, unleashing wave after wave of steel down range toward the oncoming Confederates.[25]  Before the smoke cleared, Lee realized he was finished for this battle.  When Lee asked Major General Pickett to form his division behind the Corps, Pickett’s famous line was “General Lee, I have no division.”[26]  This concluded Lee’s final push to break the Union at Gettysburg.

            Lee did not recognize Clausewitz’s true intention of the center of gravity.  Lee had many chances to recognize the true “hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends” for the Union, but he did not.[27]  His stubbornness clouded his judgment to adapt to the new information and left him and the Army of North Virginia in shambles.

Bibliography

Clausewitz, Carl Von, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1976.

McPherson , James M..  Gettysburg. Atlanta: Turner Publishing Inc., 1993.

Nofi , Albert A..  The Gettysburg Campaign. June  - July 1863. New York: Combined Books,

1986.

Norton , Oliver Willcox.  The Attack and Defense of Little Round Top, Gettysburg July 2, 1863.

Gettysburg: Stan Clark Military Books, 1913.

Piston, William Garrett.  “Cross Purposes: Longstreet, Lee, and Confederate Attack Plans for

July 3 at Gettysburg.” In The Third Day at Gettysburg and Beyond,  Ed. Gary W.

Gallagher, 31-55.  Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994.

Schalch, Margaret E. Planning for Peace Operations: The Relevancy of Center of Gravity.

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/Schalch.htm>  11 Nov 2002

Time Life Editors.  Voices of the Civil War: Gettysburg. Alexandria: Time Life Books, 1995.

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Date this page was last updated: 12/06/2002