The complete text of the report:
''POLISARIO FRONT RESPONSE TO THE REPORT RELEASED BY FONDATION ‘France Libertés’ ON THE CONDITIONS OF DETENTION OF THE MOROCCAN PRISONERS OF WAR (POWs) HELD BY THE POLISARIO FRONT


SEPTEMBER 2003
Introduction:

1 -The Foundation ‘France Libertiés’ published, on 4th August 2003, a report on the conditions of detention of the Moroccan prisoners of war (POWs) captured by the POLISARIO Front in the war against the Kingdom of Morocco, which began in 1975.

2 - This report—the oeuvre of two delegates of the Foundation: Afifa Karmous and Pauline Dubuisson—was written following a visit conducted, from 11th to 25th April 2003, to some of those prisoners. The report charges that the prisoners have been ill-treated, starved, humiliated and submitted to ‘forced labour’, to say nothing of murders, summary executions, torture, physical mutilations and medical experiments…

3 - The report even puts forward an approximation of the number of deaths. As a consequence of torture alone, it alleges that «Right up to 1998, an average of 2 to 3 detainees died and had to be buried every night» (page 38). This compelling estimation makes one presume that between the end of 1975 (beginning of the conflict) and 1998, 17.000 to 25.000 persons would have been killed, despite the fact the total number of Moroccan POWs captured by the POLISARIO Front has never exceeded 2.300.

4 – It is an acknowledged fact that, in spite of the cruel war, endurances and hardships of exile imposed by Morocco on the Saharawi people for the past 28 years, the POLISARIO Front waged a clean struggle for national liberation within the framework of respect of the rules of international legality. Moreover, it co-operated fully with the United Nations for the implementation of the Settlement Plan and Houston Accords as the framework for the peaceful solution to the decolonisation conflict of Western Sahara. It has also recently expressed its support to the ‘Peace Plan for Self-determination of the people of Western Sahara’ proposed by the Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary General, Mr. James Baker, and which enjoys the unanimous support of the Security Council (res. 1495 of 31st July 2003).

5 – The United Nations Settlement Plan for Western Sahara, accepted by the two parties to the conflict, Morocco and the POLISARIO Front, and endorsed by the Security Council in 1991, provides for the release of all POWs in the beginning of the transition period in the end of which a referendum on self-determination would be held. The latest Baker plan entitled ‘Peace Plan for Self-determination of the People of Western Sahara’ stipulates in its paragraph 19: «Immediately after the effective date of this plan, all political prisoners and prisoners of war shall be released, and the obligation of each party in this regard its not dependent upon performance by the other».

6 – Of course, all these peace plans have not yet been implemented. But on whom to lay the blame? On the Saharawi refugees driven out of their land and compelled to live, for three decades so far, in canvas-tents and in deprivation at the mercy of harsh weather conditions and international charity? On hundreds of Saharawi disappeared, victims of Moroccan terror and whose families have been kept in the dark about their whereabouts during all these years? On tens of Saharawi prisoners of conscience, convicted unjustly for having demonstrated or expressed their points of view, and who languish currently in the jails of Rabat?

7 - The persistence of the drama in all its dimensions, including the fate of the Moroccan soldiers, who have on their hands—it must be recalled—the blood of innocents, is the exclusive responsibility of the Moroccan government. It is the responsibility, first and foremost, of having driven them into a war of genocide against the Saharawi people. Then, the responsibility for having ignored and denied them their rights (Morocco has never submitted to the ICRC a list of its POWs). It is equally the responsibility for having refused, during years, to receive those POWs who had been released. In short, it is the responsibility for frustrating all attempts of the international community with the aim of finding a peaceful and definitive solution to the conflict.

8 – The POLISARIO Front submitted to the UN General Secretariat, on the eve of the entering in effect of the cease-fire in September 1991, a list of Saharawi combatants held by Morocco. Nonetheless, no information has yet been provided by Morocco about most of those POWs. In contrast, the POLISARIO Front, from the outset, has always made it possible for the ICRC as well as numerous NGOs and journalists to conduct regular visits to Moroccan POWs who maintain constant correspondence with their families. Likewise, it has unilaterally released more than 1300 Moroccan POWs thus far.

9 – The POLISARIO Front extended full co-operation to the mission of inquiry conduced by ‘France Libertés’ that could meet, without any witnesses, more than half of the Moroccan POWs and to spend with them all the needed time in an unrestricted and fully free fashion. However, in no moment during their visit have the members of the mission consulted the Saharawi authorities regarding any verification or clarification of whatever facts.

10 – It goes without saying that ‘France Libertés’ is entitled to its own reading of the question regarding Moroccan POWs, to call for their total liberation and to declare itself against their partial liberation. Likewise, it is at liberty to contest the terms relevant to the exchange of POWs contained in the UN/OAU Settlement Plan, in the Houston Accords and more recently in the latest plan Baker. Nonetheless, to give an exclusive credit to allegations of which only source is the Moroccan POWs, who represent a group of soldiers who were captured fighting during combat, is in essence, a biased approach of which method is all the more questionable.

11 – What we have here is a case of the perfect prisoner of war witness-judge and party becoming a credible and incontestable source. However, the prisoner of war is still a soldier of the other party, and for this reason, he should not be expected to impart objective testimonies on the enemy’s conduct. And for a very good reason: his unit’s comrades are always ready to go on war in Western Sahara along the wall of shame that separates Saharawi families for more than twenty years. Equally, the headquarter of his regiment is always stationed illegally in El Aaiun, Smara or Dakhla and the recognition of his rights by his own country hinges on the zeal of some ‘nationalism’ that he is to exhibit to overcome the enemy.

12 – The mission did not include any doctor, psychiatrist or expert on armed conflicts and questions of POWs. Expertise in these fields is very essential in order to ensure a minimum of objectivity and seriousness, and to avoid any risky judgements or gratuitous allegations. Whilst basing their work solely on testimonies of a prisoner of war, the authors have thus presented some information that are largely imprecise, contradictory or simply false. In this way, for instance, the death due to illness or thirst during an attempt to escape in plain desert is systematically considered in the report as a violent death or a premeditated murder. There is good reason, therefore, to wonder about the aim sought here, and the persistence in seeking to «adapt testimonies» to preconceived judgements.

13 – In order to justify their conclusions and recommendations, the members of the mission have drawn on political considerations that are completely in line with a certain vision of the conflict, besides their attempt to implicate Algeria at whatever coast. They also exaggerated the importance they attach to the information gathered regarding the humanitarian aid.

14 - We analysed the content of the report and examined its details meticulously. Despite the impression of the data and the incompleteness of the information set out in the report, we have done our utmost, and in full transparency and good faith, to clarify all the questions raised therein.

I–VERIFICATION OF FACTS AND EVENTS MENTIONED IN THE REPORT


1- Allegations regarding the absence of information on the Moroccan POWs.

15 – In its introduction, the report claims that despite the length of their captivity «there has been very few detailed and concrete information on the treatment» (page 6). This affirmation is imprecise because since the start of the conflict, the Moroccan POWs held by the POLISARIO Front have been visited regularly by delegations from the ICRC, by journalists, NGOs, associations, parliamentarians and organisations of defence of human rights, and the like.

16 – Many reports and stories on their conditions of detention and on their daily life have been published in newspapers and magazines and have been aired on TV channels and radios, while being disseminated in reports of organisations of defence of human rights. Indeed, this fact is acknowledged in page 7 of the report: «many of them were convinced that what they testified on previously was already well known by everybody and the international public opinion».

17 - The ICRC, which is the international body responsible for the protection of POWs, has been allowed by the POLISARIO Front to conduct visits to the Moroccan POWs since 1976, and not since the eighties (page. 6)

18 – The POLISARIO Front has undertaken an intense diplomatic campaign to draw the attention of the international public opinion to the question of the POWs, at a time when the government of Morocco denied their existence, lest it would recognise the reality of the war and the intensity of combat between the Saharawi and Moroccan armies.

19 - The Government of Morocco has constantly exerted pressure so that the international public opinion would not take interest in the war in Western Sahara and particularly in the fate of the Moroccan POWs; likewise, it has refused, until very recently, to receive them after they had been released by the POLISARIO Front.


2 - Illnesses and work accidents
Concerning the allegations contained in the rapport,

20 - The name Azoga mentioned in the report (page 37), without other details, is Azougar Mohamed Ben Hadou, N? ICRC 625 regimental number 2281/76, who was captured in Haouza on 18th August 1988. The report attributes his death to a work accident. Azougar did not die. He is very well and alive, and «camp of El Oussate near Mahbès« never existed. The account of the report about his case is completely false. (Annex)

21 – Regarding some Bouzid mentioned, without any details on the page 37, he is Bouzit Lahcen regimental number 1807/77, who was captured in Guelta on 14th October 1981. He died following his falling from a truck on road on 23rd November 1989. Bouzit Lahcen’s death was a simple traffic accident that did not take place during any work whatsoever. Therefore, the information according to which 45 prisoners fell brutally of this same truck is imprecise. (Annex)

22 - Mohamed Marmouchi whose true name is Oudrar Mohamed No ICRC 3071, regimental number 14792/76, who was captured in Oued Smaira on 17th April 1981, died on 9th March 1998, and not in 1997 as indicated in the report. (Page 37).

23 - The story of the death of Mohamed El Mehdi that took place, according to the report (page 38), in a trench in 1998, and of Makhloufi Ahmed, buried during work time, in 1997, close to Rabouni is completely false. These two prisoners died on 26th March 1987 during a bombardment by Moroccan aircrafts in the 5th military region. Three Saharawi combatants who were with them fell martyrs in the act. Mohamed El Mehdi regimental number 4225/64was captured in Bir Lehlou on 25th October 1977, whereas Makhloufi Ahmed, regimental number 1282/73, was captured in Lengueb on 12th January 1979.

24 - As for the case of the two fishermen (page 38) claimed to have died because of exhaustion during work, it involves in fact only one person. Hassan Tarazoute is actually the same «a certain Lahcen». The death of Tarazoute Hassan was not due to exhaustion, as indicated in the report, but because of cancer. He died at Chahid Bel-la’s hospital on 13thJune 1999. (Annex)

25 – As for some Houcine, who «died … from a lung disease caused by long term exposure to coal fumes that he could not bear. He was working as a cook», according to the report (page 38), there is absolutely no such person.

26 – With regard to the four persons mentioned by their names and forenames as detained in the Errachid’s jail on page 38, we must first point out that Errachid is a centre for mechanical repair since 1989 and not a detention centre, and that two of these persons are not detained by the POLISARIO Front. It is the case of Khiary Mustapha and Lahcen Benali. The two others, Azaoui Hassan regimental number 32613/82 and Mustapha Ben Mohamed regimental number 31409/81, are two Moroccan soldiers who deserted the Moroccan army and are under the protection of the POLISARIO Front.

27 – Regarding Mriss El Kbir (page 38), who himself would have been detained, according to the report, in Errachid and who «refused to hand in to the Polisario Front the money he had», the account of his case bears no resemblance at all to reality. In fact, his true name is Khamrich El Kebir ICRC N? 3188, regimental N? 72224/85, who was captured in Tichla on 8th July 1987. Because of his involvement of paedophilic cases against Saharawi children, he was temporarily separated from his colleagues.


3 - Partial liberations

28 – The POLISARIO Front has proceeded on several occasions to the unilateral liberation of large groups of POWs as humanitarian gestures and signs of goodwill towards the POWs themselves and their families. This has also been done in view to creating an atmosphere of détente, which is conducive to dialogue as a prerequisite for boosting all chances for peace.

29 – It bears repetition here that this attitude on the part of the POLISARIO Front is at variance with the behaviour of the other party vis-à-vis the POWs and hundreds of Saharawi disappeared, and is fundamentally at odds with the ferocious and inhuman politics of repression pursued by Moroccan the occupied territories of Western Sahara.

30 – The paragraphs of the report related to partial liberations (Pages 16, 17, and 18) demonstrate a tendentious interpretation of some repeated humanitarian gestures that have the merit of having allowed the return thus far of more than half of the Moroccan POWs to their homes, that is 1346 persons.

31 - Every announcement of the liberation of a contingent of Moroccan POWs creates an atmosphere of joy and hope among all prisoners including those whose names do not appear on the list of the departing ones, even though evidently every prisoner of war would like very well to be among the released, which is quite normal. It also reminds the families and children of Saharawi POWs held by Morocco of the fate of their loved ones who have been languishing in Moroccan jails for more than 27 years.

32 – Brooding over some individual reactions of POWs prisoners as to the liberation of their former colleagues, set forth in the report (pages 14 and 15), can in no way be objective and serious. This also applies to the attempt to justify the refusal of Moroccan authority to welcome back its own soldiers, released by the POLISARIO Front in 1989 and in 1997. (Page20)

33 - That the Moroccan regime systematically places taboos in order to hide the reality of facts is one thing. When the authors of the report draw on the same arguments in their attempt to justify the arbitrary and deliberate posture of this regime towards its own soldiers is however another thing, which is completely incomprehensible.

34 - The report clearly opts for absolving Morocco of an objectionable conduct by all measures, while concluding that the problem of the POWs, including both those who remain detained and those who have already been released and are now amid their families in Morocco, depends exclusively on the Saharawis: «As along as the POWs are not released, particularly the officers, the Moroccan authorities will not respond to any moral or financial claims». In sum, if the 1346 POWs who have already been released by the POLISARIO Front—more than half of the Moroccan POWs—are not paid compensations by the Moroccan government, once again the only responsible will be the POLISARIO Front!

35 – Despite that the Saharawi party is not signatory to Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols, we have fully co-operated with the ICRC with regard to the Moroccan POWs. For more than 20 years, the international organisation visits the prisoners regularly and discharges appropriately its relevant mandate, without any restriction whatsoever.

36 – In contrast, Morocco continues to deny the existence of Saharawi POWs, who are being held by it under a complete regime of secrecy, just as it denied for about ten years the existence of the dungeons of Tazmamaret, Kalaat M’Gouna, Agdez and many other notorious centres.

37 – Regarding the insistence by the report on the need for the liberation of all POWs following the cease-fire and the cessation of active hostility, in accordance with Geneva Conventions, it is worth bearing in mind that since the beginning of the peace process in Western Sahara, Morocco has clearly demonstrated its will to renege on its commitments under the Settlement Plan.

38 – Entrenched in this posture, Morocco has reduced the cease-fire to a simple truce held unilaterally by the POLISARIO Front, and has made out of the cessation of active hostilities a big illusion. This precisely because no arrangements regulating the end of active hostilities have been implemented, particularly the cantonment of troops that remain, for all to see, facing each other on the ground in a position of war.

39 – The evocation in the report (page 16) of the provisions of article 118 of the III Geneva Convention relative to the Moroccan POWs is out of context. It is a simplistic and tendentious reading of texts with regard to the real situation of the conflict of Western Sahara.

40 – In effect, the evocation of the cease-fire and the cessation of active hostilities in this particular context is inadequate juridically and politically, since Morocco continues shunning its commitments and harbouring hostility on all military, political and legal planes.

41 - In a nutshell, humanitarian law can not be selective and applied according to conjunctures. When Hassan II refused to receive his soldiers, where were the champions of the «respect of humanitarian law?»


4 – Failed escape attempts:

42 – Attempts of escape carried out by POWs are a common thing in all wars. In the case of Western Sahara, the open space and conditions of detention of the Moroccan POWs, who enjoy a great deal of liberty with regard to other situations, further facilitate desertions.

43 – In fact, the Moroccan POWs live in the same conditions as the Saharawi combatants who keep an eye on them, and have a permanent contacts with the population, which is spelled out, for all to see, on page 7 of the report: «The POWs are not jailed in or confined to any closed space, as happens with most prisoners around the world». In the report (page26), it is acknowledged that «tens of POWs are said to have succeeded in their escapes».

44 – Regarding Nadir, Mauritanian of Bir Moghrein, Mahjoub of Kénitra (page 26), El Haressi Mohamed, Moulay Mokhtar and Zaïed (page 27), they have never been held by the POLISARIO Front, and therefore there is no information about them.

45 – Lahboub Mohamed , mentioned on page 27, as having died in 1982 after an escape attempt in Haouza, is very well and alive; his CIRC n? is 00141 and regimental n? is 8254/74. He was captured on 24th August 1979.He was among the 243 Moroccan POWs repatriated by the ICRC on 1st September2003. (Annex)

46 – In paragraph 3 on page 27, the report mentions that Souaki Lahcen and Omar Douali were executed in 1985 after an escape attempt. Then in the following paragraph, it talks of «Lahcen Ben Sidi also known as one Omar» who would have been disappeared since 1988 after an escape attempt. These persons were never captured by the Saharawi army.

47 – As for Kalfoul Abderazek, mentioned on page 27, he is Kalkoul Abderazak ICRC n 841, regimental n 4379/61, a corporal who was captured in Bir Zaran on 11th August 1989. He used to be member of the first Battalion of the third Regiment of infantry. He died because of a heart failure in1990, while he was waiting among the 200 Moroccan POWs, who had been released by the POLISARIO Front in 1989, but had to wait fir six years to be repatriated owing to the refusal of the Kingdom of Morocco to receive them back. Kalkoul Abderrazek was suffering from tuberculosis; his death occurred at the National hospital on 23rd August 1990. (Annex).

48 – Regarding Tamahmacht Housin, mentioned on page 27, regimental n 4056/73, he was a soldier of the first Battalion of infantry of the third Regiment. He was captured in Bir Zaran on 11th August 1979; he died on 15th April 1989, after having contracted hepatitis. (Annex)

49 – As for Maatoui, mentioned also on page 27, he is Maataoui Mahjoub El Arbi, pilot of Mirage F-1 with a rank of flight sergeant. He was captured in the region of Zak on 9th December 1979. His death took place following an escape attempt. To avoid being caught up, he hid himself in a container full of lentils in the warehouse of the Saharawi Red Crescent. It is presumed that he may have slipped provoking thus the falling of a heap of sacks over him. Two months after his disappearance, he was found dead. (Annex)

50- With regard to these three cases of death, which have just been addressed above, the report concocts and puts forth some causes that are completely contrary to reality.

51 - The death of El Harasse and Boujmah, mentioned on page 27, is false. El Harasse whose forename is Saïd ICRC n 00690, regimental n 10899/82 was a soldier of the third Regiment. He was captured in Oum Deguen on 16th September 1988. He is currently among the Moroccan POWs. As for Boujmah, he has never been held by the POLISARIO Front. (Annex).

52 – On page 27, the report mentions the case of a group of six persons who would have taken control over their Saharawi guards and took their arms before taking to flight from the military post El Ghezouani. The report indicates that the Algerian soldieries caught up the six escapees and «executed them all, including Ali Ould Zouali».

53 - This paragraph of the report confounded two different groups. The first group of six people, including Ali ould Souilem ould Zaoui mentioned in the report under the name of Ali ould Zaouli, left the refugee camps in August 1993. The six persons were:


1- Ali Fal Souilem Zaoui, named in the report as Ali Zouali,
2- Najem Lehbib Meaif
3- Ali Mouloud Jlala
4- Mahjoub Mohamed Sghir
5- Abdesselam Bougarfa
6- Boujemaa Breika El Ghazouani


54 - these members of the group were part of the soldiers of Saharawi origin who enlisted in the Moroccan army and were then captured as prisoners, or surrendered during the combat.

55 - Following their release, among others, the six persons rented a vehicle to go back to their families in the occupied territories of Western Sahara. After the driver dropped them shortly before reaching the Moroccan defence wall, the six persons should then have pursued their way on foot during the extreme heat of month of August in 1993.

56 - Three members of the group died of thirst on 16th August 1993 including: Ali Fal Souilem Zaoui regimental n 1533/88, who was captured in Farsia on 25th February 1987, Mahjoub Mohamed Sghir regimental n? 23211/71, who was captured in Smara on 6th October 1979 and Boujemaa Breika El Ghazouani, regimental n 24029/74, who was captured in Oum Dreiga on 18th November 1987. (Annex)

57 - The three others were rescued by a unit of the ALPS (Saharawi Popular Liberation Army) and were brought back to the camps where they remained several months before going back to the occupied territories. These included: Najem Lehbib Meaif, Ali Mahmoud Jlala and Abdessalam Bougarfa. (Annex)

58 - The second group, including four prisoners, effectively managed to seize arms from the military post of the fourth Military Region, and not Ghezouani centre as indicated on page 27 of the report. Then they took to flight on 8th February 1997, on the day of Aïd El Fitr.

59 – All members of this group were intercepted by a unit of the fifth Military Region in the vicinity of the Moroccan defence wall, except one who managed to escape. It is the case of Salim Moha ICRC n° 00163, regimental n? 17641/78, a soldier of the tenth Regiment who was captured in Ras El Khanfra on 22nd September 1980.

60 - The three others were stopped, and they are currently among the other prisoners. This is the case of: Sahmoudi Abdelaziz ICRC n 04010, regimental n 1066/74, who was captured in Amoti on 2nd March 1980, El Boulgheiti Rachid ICRC n° 00588, regimental n 34313/82, who was captured in Haouza on 18th August 1988 and El Khounati Abderrazak ICRC n° 00101, regimental number 18454/78, who was captured on 14th October 1981. (Annex)

61 – It is therefore a question of two different groups of prisoners whose escape attempts occurred in different places and at different times. Some among them could be rescued, and they are still alive. The involvement of Algerian militaries claimed by the report seems to stem from a premeditated attempt aiming at justifying the kind of conclusions to which the two authors want to arrive.

62 - The death of Hamou and Hamid Kabba mentioned in the report was the consequence of thirst and exhaustion, and not torture as indicated on page 24. In fact, Chabou Hamou ICRC n° 02090, regimental n 16642/80, who was captured in Oum Deguen on 18th November 1987 and Kabba Mohamed Moha, named Hamid, ICRC n° 00137, regimental n 1851/C, who was captured in El Bouirat on 24th August 1979, ran away on 5th August 1998 during a period of extreme heat typical of this month and was found dead.


5 - The civilians- prisoners

63 - The report evokes the situation of «civilian» prisoners who, according to terms of the report, were «kidnapped» by «men with hidden faces» (page 14) belonging to the POLISARIO Front. It is very easy to discern in this statement an exposed attempt that aims, without any proof, to discredit the image of our movement by portraying it as a group of kidnappers.

64 – Despite the scorched earth policy pursued by Morocco in Western Sahara, the POLISARIO Front spared no effort to avoid causing any casualties among the civil population throughout all years of the war. During many years, the POLISARIO Front, who sometimes fought big battles inside Moroccan territory and seized whole regions, was not associated at all with any acts involving slaughtering civilians, burning fields, destroying dams, wiping out livestock, poisoning wells, or detaining innocent civilians or kidnapping them.

65 - The fourteen Moroccan POWs that the report identifies as «civilians» (Page 14) have been captured fighting on the battlefield or in convoys escorted by the Moroccan army of occupation. In fact, twelve among them were captured with arms in their possession on a boat that was fishing illegally in the territorial waters of the SADR. The two others were captured, inside Moroccan territory, while they were driven in a military convoy. The report claims that so-called Belkadi Mohamed, released on 3rd December 2000, «was12 years old when he was kidnapped» (page 15), while his registration card with the ICRC shows however that he was born in Agadir in 1959.

66 – If the Saharawi army wanted to capture Moroccan civilians as prisoners, it always had the possibility to capture an infinitely number that would exceed the sum of all military prisoners. This was never an objective of the POLISARIO Front. All Moroccan POWs, claimed erroneously in the report as «civilians», have been released and the last ones were part of the group of the 243 Moroccan, repatriated to Morocco by the ICRC on 1stSeptember 2003.


6-Torture, interrogations, summary executions and «forced labour»

67 - The report underlines, on page 23, that «The mission gathered many testimonies on torture and summary executions. Most of the witnesses cannot remember which year exactly these serious exactions were committed». «What’s more, only a few among the POWs could give us the full names of the victims: during those terrible years, they were not allowed to speak to each other, otherwise they got beaten with thick electric cables».

68 – The flimsiness of the inquiry and its expeditious and imprecise character is very clear for all to see. When one sets out to deal with such a delicate and serious question, one should not put forward but verified and verifiable cases. The claim as to the «terrible years» during which the prisoners did not speak to each other for fear that they would be whipped by «electric cables» (page 23) is a sheer fabrication, because the Moroccan POWs have always lived in a community since the beginning of the conflict. The authors of the report maintain, on the same page 23, that they will only deal with «the gross violations on which we obtained precise information», yet they do not present, as will be immediately shown, nothing but some information that are largely incomplete and often contradictory.

68 - The report mentions three cases of torture (page 23) concerning the lieutenants Mozouns, Boukiris and Abderrahmen, and on the following (page 24), claims that the latter was set alight with kerosene and then killed. In this regard, we affirm emphatically that there was never, among the Moroccan POWs held by the POLISARIO Front, any lieutenant by this name or forename. Likewise, we express our categorical denunciation of such a horrible and inhuman act.

70 – Lieutenant Mozoun, who is mentioned on page 23 without any other details, is lieutenant Mozoun Larbi, who belonged to paratroops and was captured during the battle of Bir Zaran on 11th August 1979, and who died to due to a heart failure following an escape attempt. (Annex)

71 - As for Lieutenant Boukili Abdeslam, mentioned also on page 23 as lieutenant Boukiri, but without further details, he holds the ICRC n 3519. He was captured in Bir Zaran on 11th August 1979 and was recently released among the 243POWs repatriated by the ICRC on 1st September 2003. Lieutenant Boukili is not dead as claimed in the report. (Annex)

72 - Sergeant Zebda and Abdellatif Marrakchi, executed according to the report in 1981 (page 24), were never among the Moroccan POWs held by the POLISARIO Front, as exactly are the cases of Mohamed Kabrane and Abdel Kader mentioned on the same page.

73 - The report claims that Bouchib and Brahim as well as Youssef (page 24) died in 1988 and 2000 respectively. These are only forenames mentioned without any references that could help us to identify them with precision. In any case, they were never among the POWs held by the POLISARIO Front.

74 – The report mentions the case of «The captain, or corporal, in chief Youssef», a cook in the eighth Saharawi Military Region, according to the report (page 24), who allegedly «in 1997…had an argument with a Saharawi military who beat him to death«. The only captain with the forename Youssef is Captain Youssef Megzari, pilot of plane F5 from Marrakech’s airbase, who was captured on 25th August 1991. He is alive and is among the POWs who are still in detention (annex). Moreover, there was never a corporal by the name Youssef among the POWs held by the POLISARIO Front. (Annex)

75 - Talha Mohamed whose death in 1990 is described in the report as a result of being beaten with a shovel (Page 24) is actually Talha Abdellah Larbi and not Mohamed as indicated. He was a corporal and was captured in Amgalaon8th November 1989. He belonged to the fourth battalion of paratroops of the fourth Regiment of car-borne infantry (RIM). On the night of 20th March1990, prisoner Talha seized an arm and took to flight. He was pursued by guards and was caught up immediately. Refusing to drop his arm and surrender, he opened fire on the guards. After an intense exchange of fire, during which he wounded the combatant Ali Salem ould Abderrahman, prisoner Talha was shot by bullets and died in that instant. (Annex)

76 - As for the case of Finidi Omar (page 24), captured in Farsia on 25th February 1987, the report claims that he was 19 years old at the time of his detention, while he was actually born in Fès in 1960. His Moroccan identity card n J136131 and his ICRC n 501 do confirm this fact. He was then 27 years old when he was captured in 1987. This corporal who belonged to the third grouping of the royal artillery (GAR) died on 24th July 1994 following a fight with another Moroccan POW with whom he maintained a sexual relation. In this regard, we underscore that there is no «prison Saïd» between Rabouni and Tindouf airport, as claimed in the report. (Annex)

77 - Brahim Tebia (page 24), regimental n 3966/79, who belonged to the third Grouping of armed squadrons (GEB), was captured during the battle of Lebouirat on 24th August 1979. This soldier had mental troubles; he tried to escape on several times; he died during an escape attempt on 29th May 1989. He was never taken to «a post #5» which, moreover, never existed. The inquiry, which was conducted at the time by the authorities concerned, showed negligence on part of the guards of the jail. The two guards, who were on duty, during the night of his escape, were punished. (Appendix)

78 - Sabri M’Hamed ICRC n 0149, who was captured in Guelta Zemmouron 14th October 1981, died due to his illness; he had a nose cancer. He died at Hospital Bel-la on 21st September 1999, and not under torture as indicated on page 24 (annex).

79 - Aziz Mrakchi, mentioned on page 24, whose death was due, according to the report, to torture is named Kchaichi Aziz, regimental n 14642/75, ICRC n 3102. This soldier, who was captured during the battles of l’Ouarkzizes on 6th March 1980, died due to a heart failure on 21st September 2000, while he was sleeping in his room. He was 42 years old, and not 63 years, as claimed in the report. (Annex)

80 - Houcine and Mohamed are only forenames. Without any further details, it is impossible to clarify this case.

81 – As for the question of detention centres, it is mentioned in the report on page 38, that «Errachid is a prison where torture is systematically practiced on the detainees. Right up to 1998, an average of 2 to 3 detainees died and had to be buried every night». Therefore, during the period indicated, some 17.000 to 25.000 prisoners would have died according to the report. That means that the POWs, whose total number did not exceed 2300, all died at least 7 times each. Such an affirmation evidences the flimsiness of the authors, in too obvious a way to bear further comment.


7. Insults and public curiosity:

82 – It is claimed in the report that, on the one hand, little information was known on the situation of the prisoners and, on the other, that they were regularly visited and exhibited for particular purposes (page 25). Thus, if prisoners are shown to foreign delegations that ask to see them, their being exhibited, instead of not allowing them to be visited, becomes then a remonstrative act.

83 - Concerning the opinion of the Saharawi refugees on the Moroccan POWs, the report expresses in this sense one thing and then its opposite. On the one hand, it claims on page 18 that «Saharawi Refugees show compassion towards the Moroccan POWs» and, on the other, it maintains on page25 that «the POWs have also been exhibited to the Saharawi refugee population on certain occasions where they were literally exposed to public anger and got beaten, spat on, and insulted».

84 –The report therefore speaks of the ‘compassion’ of population towards the POWs apparently to advance the argumentation in favour of their full liberation, and simultaneously highlights the phrase «exposed to public anger and got beaten, spat on, and insulted«, so as to affirm that the prisoners’ rights are violated and that the conditions of their detention are bad.

85 – For many years, the national radio of the SADR was the only source of information for Moroccan families to obtain news about a family member who was sent out to the frontline in Western Sahara. It is true, as the report recalls (Page 20), that «the war was a taboo» which indicates thus the refusal of the Moroccan government to provide any information on the fate of the soldiers who were captured on the front.

86 – What also needs to be recalled is the important role played by Committees of Support to the Saharawi People in transmitting mail and carrying packets destined to the prisoners. Several people from the solidarity movement bought medicines, books and clothes for the prisoners.


8. Physical mutations and medical experiments

87 - Under the title «physical mutilations», the report points to the taking of shambles of blood of the POWs who, as indicated on page17, «are seriously ill and that the state of their heath was such that it would require a medical transfer due to lack of proper medical infrastructures. All the POWs suffer from several pathologies simultaneously, but they do not receive any appropriate medical attention or treatment». If there was recourse to taking of blood, that was intended to rescue those detainees who would need it.

88 - The report speaks of castration; however, it recognises on page 26,that «the persons did not testify directly on their mutilation»; no name was mentioned. The only proof presented would be that «the method was described». What credibility could be then given to such an allegation? Here is another example of twisting facts and distorting the truth.

89 – The «medical experiments» mentioned in the report (page 26) are an allegation not supported by any case. For what purpose, then, are these abominable practices evoked without any justification?


II. CONDITIONS OF DETENTION
1. Housing, food and clothing

90 - Before addressing the descriptions contained in the report, it is important to recall the following:
A- The situation of the Moroccan POWs held by the POLISARIO Front cannot be appreciated outside the context of the conflict during which they were captured, or far from the material and objective reality in which the Detaining Power finds itself.
B- The Moroccan POWs live in general conditions similar to those of the Saharawi refugee population. This also involves the question of food, medical care and housing. (Annex)
C- POWs are in the liberated territories along with units of the Saharawi army, sharing the same conditions of life.
D- There is not any foreign body that provides food, clothes or medicines to the POWs. That is to say that the Saharawis share with the prisoners what they receive as part of the aid.

91 – One can read in the report, on page 28, that during the first years of war, prisoners «had no shoes and no proper clothes—only a pair of trousers, no matter what the weather was».

92 – It is true that, during the first years of the Moroccan aggression and the exodus imposed on the Saharawi people, there was severe shortage in all areas for both the refugee population and the POWs. It was the period during which all Saharawi institutions were set up underground, where infants would die of hunger, when malnutrition and infectious diseases were the daily lot of a population that escaped the bombardments of napalm and white phosphorus by Moroccan aircrafts. The photographs and moving testimonies given by journalists, NGOs and other visitors are indisputable facts, which are still present in memories and archives alike.

93 – ‘France-Libertés’ that co-funded projects in the refugee camps knows very well that the population there and also in the liberated zones dress second-hand clothes that they receive as part of international donations. The members of the mission of ‘France Libertés’ should have observed that the Moroccan POWs had similar clothes.

94 - The report points out the idea that some prisoners sleep inside «containers or in trenches they had to dig: ten of them were put in the trenches which then were covered…» (page 28). It goes without saying that the living conditions of the refugees were precarious until the beginning of the nineties, and therefore it is little wonder that prisoners had to suffer shortages in this area. None the less, the claim that ten of the prisoners had to sleep in covered trenches, and that «if the POWs needed to do their necessities, they had to do it here» (page 28), can only be born out of an imagination that shows aggressiveness and resolve of the authors to draw a dark picture of the situation. It is impossible to prove, as claimed in the report, that today «tens of the POWs, to this day, still do not have any shelter and have to sleep in the outside» (page 28) unless, because of the heat, they choose to sleep at night under the beautiful stars, as the most part of the refugee population do.

95 – Generally, the Moroccan POWs have always lived in a community according to their regions of origin. They have their own information media (televisions, satellite antennas and radios) to keep abreast of what is happening in Morocco and around the world. They are not «dislocated in time and history» (page 23, paragraph 7). If there is any disarticulation, it should be sought rather between the picture of the POWs depicted by the report and the real conditions of their detention.

96 – The claim that «the POWs worked day and night, and were only allowed to sleep 2 hours» (page 28), has no resemblance whatsoever to reality. The POWs have exactly the same timetables as hard-working Saharawis. The ones among them, who are able to work, have a timetable of less than seven hours per day. At night, they stay in their camps.

97 - The report claims on page 29 that, «These inhuman conditions are not caused by any lack of means by the Detaining Power», and more seriously that, «since the beginning of the conflict, the Polisario Front has rationalised a treatment of these POWs that reduces them just to a mere labour force». These are reprehensible allegations that are unjustified and unjustifiable.

98 – What is highly absurd is the authors’ claim in the report, on page 25, that the POWs «were not allowed to pray» and that «if caught reciting the Koran, they were violently whipped with electric cables». Who would believe such pure fabrications? Tolerance is a well-known virtue of the Saharawi Moslem people, besides in all detention sites there are worship places and muezzins.


2 – health conditions of the Moroccan POWs

99 – Health situation of the Saharawi refugees is dependent on international aid. Hospitals and health centres constantly suffer from lack of medicines and specialised personnel. To compensate for this deficiency, the POLISARIO Front had to ask the Algerian authorities to extend medical care and surgical operations to some prisoners in Algerian hospitals. Algeria has always replied positively.

100 - The military regions have health infrastructures that are less equipped than those in the camps do. In every region, there is a doctor and several male nurses. To claim that the Saharawi doctors do not give the POWs, «the medical attention required by their profession» (page 29) is an unfounded allegation and an affirmation that is at odds with reality. More seriously, it can be manipulated to sow hatred between the two peoples.

101 – All types of pathologies including eye aliments and infections, mentioned in the report (page 30), are not suffered only by the POWs. It needs one only to consult the reports of both the Saharawi Ministry of Health and foreign medical missions that frequently visit the refugee camps to realise this fact. As for «the exposure of intense luminosity», which is cited as a cause of the aliments, the report seems to forget that the Moroccan POWs and the Saharawi population live under the same sun.

102 – As for the affirmation according to which «POWs [were] dying from lack of post-surgical treatments»(page 29), the foreign medical missions that operated Saharawis and Moroccan PWOs alike can testify in this regard. It would have been more convincing on the part of the mission to give names of victims as examples.


3. «Forced labour»

103 - The work of POWs, as indicated in the report, is not illegal. It is even recommended to aid them to bear their detention and improve their life conditions. Visits of delegations of the ICRC were always opportunities to discuss this question and the Detaining Power has always taken the ICRC’s recommendations into account.

104 – The POLISARIO Front has never hidden the fact of POWs’ work. The affirmation that they are subjected to a «forced labour»and even to slavery fits well in the same set of distortions of reality and stems from malicious intention. The Moroccan POWs, who are in contact with the population, gain a great deal out of their work. They obtain material goods and compensations in exchange of the services they render.

105 – The claim set out in pages 33 to 36 that all buildings existing in Rabouni, the military bases and in the refugee camps are the exclusive work of the POWs is an exaggeration.

106 – During the first years of exile, as evidenced by many visitors, the Saharawi State sought to build vital infrastructures especially hospitals and schools. All the refugee population and, above all, women participated in making sand bricks and the building of education centres, clinics, hospitals and administrative establishments. Today, almost the entire population possesses latrines and small houses.

107 - The report claims that the prisoners constructed roads and landing strips (page 33-4). Once again, this is an exaggeration, because neither in the liberated zones nor in the refugee camps are there any landing strips. The only road within the range of the camps is the one that links Tindouf, Rabouni and Smara, and is an Algerian road.


4- Work of a military character or for military purposes

108 - The report claims, on page 36, that «the POWs were also forced to take part in the «war effort», and that they «worked near combat zones, and some died under the bombs of Moroccan air force».

109 – The POWs have never been placed with the Saharawi combatants in combat zones for obvious grounds, above all, security. Of course, in every military region, there is a group of prisoners, detained in the rear-bases, and far from combat ground. That the Moroccan air force bombarded these bases, unfortunately this occurred several times during sixteen years of war.

110 - In conclusion, the report sets out to discover a nightmarish world with affirmations such as those heaped all on page 34: «the POWs were systematically kept hungry and thirsty»; «Those who were caught drinking the murky water of the brick-making pools were whipped»; «a bit of rice or some lentils that were served to them in a wheel-barrow»; and, «They could only relieve themselves once a day, when getting up». If such allegations regarding the conditions of housing, food, clothing and health as well as those related to subjection to «forced labour»were true, one cannot help wondering how these prisoners could have survivedduring28 years.

111 - Here is what the French journalist Jean-Pierre Tuquoi wrote in ‘’Le Monde’’ of 22nd February 2002 about the Moroccan POWs that he visited in El-Aaiun camp: «a hundred prisoners live in this camp […] among the refugees with whom they share their daily lives. Like them, they are taken care of by the international community that provides the basic food». Describing the life of Mehdi, a Moroccan prisoner, he adds:«he lives in a permanent building along with other Moroccans, watches the television of his country and moves around in the camps without any hindrance…»


5. Humanitarian aid and the political objectives of the report:

112 - The report deals with what it describes as «theft» of humanitarian aid (page 31). Once again, the only source of the mission is the prisoners themselves. A part from the fact that this is not the object of their inquiry, this slippage is revealing indeed of the state of mind of the members of the mission. Does it entail a serious responsibility and unforgivable flimsiness to bank on simple statements to undertake an international campaign of the type launched by ‘France Libertés’ in order to halt the aid destined to the Saharawi refugees?


III. THE GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE REPORT

113 – The title of the report ‘conditions of detention of Moroccan prisoners of war held in Tindouf (Algeria) leads to confusion. It is true that the mission met some prisoners in the region of Tindouf, but it also met others in the liberated territories of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Therefore, moral integrity entails that the title of the report be worded in consonance with this state of affairs.

114 – It is to be recalled that, since mid-sixties, Algeria has incessantly and strongly defended the principle of the right of the Saharawi people to self-determination. This position was the same Algeria took towards all questions of decolonisation all over the world. Whether in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean or the Pacific, the defence of the principle of self-determination has been a cornerstone of the foreign policy of Algeria who regained its independence after a victorious war of national liberation against French occupation, which sought to perpetuate the colonial fact.

115 – To distort Algeria’s position as to the conflict of Western Sahara, to implicate it unjustly in the war, and to accuse it of violations of the rights of Moroccan POWs is an exercise that has no legal, political or ethical basis. Quite the opposite, we have to underscore that the position of Algeria has remained unaltered regarding the respect of the status of POWs, under the responsibility of the Detaining Power, the POLISARIO Front.

116 –Furthermore, asked time and again by the ICRC and other friendly countries, Algeria has always favoured and contributed to the accomplishment of liberation operations.

117 – The affirmation based on testimonies of prisoners «to say that this conflict can be placed in the context of a long war of independence [of Algeria]» (page 21), or again to make «Algerian officers» say that «the conflict of Western Sahara will be the opportunity «to settle an account dating back from 1963» (page 21) is a complete distortion of reality. The international community insistently recalls that the problem of Western Sahara is an unfinished question of decolonisation between Morocco, the coloniser, and the Saharawi people who has an inalienable right to self-determination and independence.

118 – On the whole, it is hardly surprising to hear from the Moroccan prisoners «that the Algerian army was often present on the battle grounds, along with the Saharawi Popular Liberation Army» (pages 31); that «most of the POWs were captured by both Saharawi and Algerian soldiers» (page 31); that «Although the uniforms were the same, their dialects were different and easily recognisable» (pages 31); or, again, that the Moroccan civilians were «interrogated on military infrastructures, on the whereabouts of the troops in the region from where they were kidnapped by both Algerian and Saharawi militaries» (Page 15). The war was indeed a clean one, especially when one calls to mind the resounding defeats inflicted on the Moroccan army by the Saharawi combatants. However, when all this type of affirmations is used as a framework for some argumentation in order to accuse Algeria, it indeed betrays a great deal of amalgam and mystification that the Moroccan propaganda has never dared to orchestrate.

119 – It is common knowledge that the only military incident that occurred in Western Sahara between the Algerian and Moroccan military units was that of Amgala in January 1976. It can be readily recalled that the Moroccan army attacked an Algerian unit that was bringing aid including medicines and supplies to Saharawi civilians who were bombarded by Napalm by Moroccan aircrafts in Tifariti, Amgala and Oum Dreiga. Ever since, the Algerian army has never crossed the borders of Western Sahara, and Morocco has never been able to prove the opposite.

120 – In accordance with the provisions of the III Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of POWs, the POLISARIO Front, as the Detaining Power, transferred a part of the Moroccan POWs to Algeria.

121 – In effect, article 12 of the so-called Convention stipulates that: «Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a party to the Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the Convention».

122 – This relevant provision regulates the problem that POWs can cause to a contending party that does not possess all means to receive them. It was precisely the insufficiency of reception infrastructures at that time with regard to the number of Moroccan POWs that made the Saharawi authorities resort to this measure for highly humanitarian purposes, in compliance with the provisions of the aforesaid Convention.

123 - The Algerian government replied positively to the demand of the Saharawi government for the sake of the well being of those Moroccan POWs who were treated appropriately and humanely. History will remember for Algeria this great gesture of generosity and sense of responsibility.


Conclusion:
The POLISARIO Front considers that:
124 - The assessment of the conditions of detention of POWs, which does not take into account the reality of the Saharawi refugees and combatants, while repudiating the efforts undertaken by the Saharawi authorities for the improvement of this situation including the liberation of 1300 Moroccan soldiers and officers, is unfounded and unjust.

125 - The report did not relate the real conditions of the Moroccan POWs, and did not respect the required objectivity and impartiality. Its elaboration, on the exclusive basis of the testimonies of Moroccan POWs and without prior verifications that entails this kind of inquiries, made it swings to erroneous judgements and arbitrary conclusions.

126 – The reduction of the drama and the sufferings endured by the region for more than three decades to the only question of Moroccan POWs, and to consequently launch a broad campaign of blackmail and intimidation targeting associations of friendship, NGOs and, on the whole, donors of aid to the Saharawi refugees, including propagating unverifiable information on the handling of this help, is a close-minded, interested and unjust approach.

127 – At a time when peace prospects are enhanced with the adoption by Security Council of resolution 1495, and while the Saharawi party is pursuing gestures of goodwill aiming at the liberation of Moroccan POWs, Morocco is seen blocking all avenues leading to peace, jailing, repressing and refusing to provide any information on the fate of Saharawi POWs and disappeared. Instead of trying to contribute to the creation of an atmosphere of détente, which could be conducive to the solution of the conflict, and whilst seeking to unjustly implicate Algeria, the report appears to aim at reviving tensions and asserting its opposition to peace efforts undertaken by the international community".

(SPS)