Communicating and Controlling Strategy: A Study on the Effectiveness of the Balanced Scorecard

By Mary A. Malina and Frank H. Selto

Part 4 of 4

OVERVIEW OF DATA-SUPPORTED MODEL

Empirically associated quotations in the interview data, which are reflected by linkages in figure 4, support the research questions in interesting ways. (Numbers on the links in figure 4 are counts of the verified, paired and linked quotations). Further analysis of all the paired codes displayed in figure 4 reveals answers to the study's research questions and leads to recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the DBSC.

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Figure 4 - Data-Supported Model of Distributors' BSC Perceptions

It is interesting to note the empirical trimming of the model in figure 3 and the possible implications for management control and communication and the BSC. On the "effective" side of this model of DBSC perceptions (figure 4), Effective management control causes Aligned with strategy and Effective motivation, which in turn cause Positive outcomes (e.g., perception of Improvement. These are consistent, strong associations between specific factors that tell a coherent story, which we interpret as evidence of causality. There is, however, no consistent evidence of a direct link between Effective management control and Positive outcomes. In this model, Effective management control affects Positive outcomes through Aligned with strategy and Effective motivation. These data provide support for the "effective" form of research question 1.

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Figure 3 - Expected Model of Employees' DBSC Perceptions

Surprisingly, there are no consistent links between perceptions of Effective communication and any other DBSC model factor, which provides no support for the "effective" form of research question 2.

On the "ineffective" side of the model, Ineffective management control, Ineffective communication, and Ineffective motivation are associated or causally related. Furthermore, they cause Conflict/Tension, which provides support for "ineffective" forms of research questions 1 and 2. Ineffective motivation also is causally linked to Positive outcomes, which was not expected but is explainable given the specific factors involved ...“ Inappropriate benchmarks cause recommendations to Modify measures or BSC. Perhaps surprisingly, Aligned with strategy is associated with Ineffective management control, Ineffective communication, and Ineffective motivation, but these, too, are explainable given company circumstances. In this situation, aligning managers' goals with the company's strategy using the DBSC causes Conflict/Tension when alignment is forced by ineffective implementation. We now address each of the causal and associative links in the context of the research questions, beginning at the upper-left corner of figure 4.

QUESTION 1: 

DOES THE EVIDENCE SUPPORT CAUSAL PATHS FROM (IN)EFFECTIVE BSC MANAGEMENT CONTROL TO STRATEGIC (NON)ALIGNMENT, (IN)EFFECTIVE MOTIVATION, AND (POOR) GOOD PERFORMANCE?

Effective Management Control > Strategy Alignment > Positive outcomes. As expected, BSC characteristics of Effective management control (Effective measurement, Comprehensive performance, and Weight) are causally linked with Strategy alignment (9 causal links with Key factors, 5 with BSC important for business, and 9 with Traditional market share, respectively). Distributors perceive that availability of reliable data leads to the ability to take strategically important actions (e.g., 17 causal links with Measure causes change), which might not have been feasible before the DBSC. For example, as in the use of customer satisfaction measures:

"We [now] give the work to an outside service. They call a couple of customers every day. We get input on a list of questions. If the customer ends up not having a good experience, (now) we can get that info that day and call the customer ourselves" [8: 119-122].

Because the DBSC measures Comprehensive performance, including the key financial and non-financial measures, it is a reflection of overall success of managing critical factors (BSC important for business). Thus, managers have a better feel for how they are managing the overall business for both current and future results.

"The BSC is trying to give us a broader business set of measures of success than the more traditional financial and market share. It wraps a set of things together that make sense for managing the business" [3: 5-7].

One of the company's key strategic goals is to increase its traditional market share. The relatively heavy Weight placed on this DBSC measure forces distributors (sometimes reluctantly) to align their goals with improving the traditional market segment. They value their relationship with the company, and the DBSC tells them what they must do to be a successful distributor, though they interpret this to mean they should pursue improvements in traditional market share to the exclusion of other growth opportunities.

"If they care only about one-third of their business, then that's good. It's worth 28 points on the BSC. I'm red and yellow there so there's no hope to be green from all the other measures... . They are measuring only (traditional) market penetration... . Balanced scorecard is certainly a misnomer" [2: 122-126].

By including Key factors, the DBSC causes distributors to change their processes and actions (Measure causes change) in significant ways and leads to numerous recommendations to Modify measures or BSC (11 causal links). Measuring the percentage of customers' problems diagnosed within one hour, for example, caused most distributors to refocus their parts and service resources.

"This (measure) differentiates our businesses from our competition. It requires a complete change of 'culture' within the shop. Now we have to manage the service event instead of just scheduling work" [1:102-104].

In the past, distributors had favored large, complex service jobs that were relatively easy to schedule and that could be counted on to occupy technicians and service space for blocks of time. Customers who had simple service requirements were placed in the service queue in order of arrival, with no preferential treatment, with the result that many began to take their simple jobs elsewhere and with the risk that they would be lost as permanent customers. Distributors observed that:

"(One-hour diagnosis) requires a change in measurement and is creating a new mindset within the service organization... We can't schedule it; we have to provide the capacity and the process [1: 233-239]. [One-hour diagnosis] tends to make us triage like a hospital and do the quick jobs first [2: 58-59]. I wasn't an advocate at the start, but now I am. It tells us how quickly we figure out what's wrong so we can make an intelligent statement to the customer, and so they can say 'go ahead' or not. We have been able to flow more jobs through our shop by getting the quick, easy stuff through the shop. It lets us turn jobs quicker and avoids embarrassing situations... It's helping us, though it's not easy to change the mentality, but it's good" [6: 56-63].

Though there is no evidence of a direct link from Effective management control to Positive outcomes, the data otherwise provide extensive support for the "effective" form of research question 1. Effective management control using the DBSC appears to cause Strategic alignment and indirectly to cause Positive outcomes.

Effective Management Control > Effective motivation > Positive outcomes. The DBSC's motivational impacts were obvious overall and with respect to specific factors. Incentives included both improved distributor business performance and successful contract renewals. The design of the DBSC reflects the Causality of the business, which causes Meaningful rewards (8 causal links). Distributors believe that improving non-financial DBSC measures will result in significant financial rewards.

"(Service utilization is) the most important number in the whole business [5: 102]. I gave the formula to our guys that, if we bill our technicians out (on average) one more hour a day, we would put over $X million to our (annual) bottom line. That's the kind of magnitude were talking about" [4: 79-82].

The DBSC is successful as a motivational tool when it reflects relations between Strategic alignment and distributor performance. For example, setting Appropriate benchmark targets for motivation goes hand-in-hand with management control of Key factors (14 association links). Distributors do not object to tough, but attainable goals.

"Good measurement. Don't have a problem with that hurdle. Huge issue and can't stress it enough. We have about (xxx) hours. I can have one per year to be green. That's a tight hurdle. It's probably a little tight right now" [4: 88-91].

Furthermore, setting attainable but tough DBSC goals (Appropriate benchmarks) motivates distributors to change their decisions and processes (Measure causes change).

"80% of work is in 4-hour range in our service shop. Great number because the mentality in our shops had been that we want that big overhaul, the long, lengthy jobs. But then, service efficiency suffers. We didn't turn many jobs and lost a lot of hours because there is a good chance of losing hours [on a large job]... Give the company credit for the four-hour target. They thought about it; it's probably the industry norm. Focusing on this number has changed some of the culture or at least the thought process in the shop. We changed to the little jobs and we can get the big jobs later. So our management has awakened to the fact that they can manage their shops better using the one-hour diagnostic time and four-hour jobs to make their shops more efficient" [4:47-59].

Relative performance evaluation allows each distributor to know his relative standing and what others are doing, and thereby motivates distributors and gives them a tool for Improvement (7 causal links).

"(Gathering) the information and sharing it back to us, saying other distributors are X. I can look at it and see how I am doing. Why am I different? I can use it as a lever to try to improve" [7: 123-125].

The data provide consistent evidence of causation and support the contention that perceptions of this BSC's effective management control characteristics lead to effective motivation, strategic alignment, and positive outcomes, in support of the first research question.

Ineffective Management Control > Ineffective motivation > Conflict/tension. Note that this study found no consistent or frequent links between any of the elements of Strategy non-alignment and other DBSC-model factors. However, Key factors that are poorly represented in the DBSC are associated with numerous examples of other shortcomings. Notably, Inaccurate/subjective measures of Key factors (24 associations) contribute to perceptions of Inappropriate benchmarks (8 causal links), which cause widespread Conflict/tension (9 causal links). This nexus of factors appears to be responsible for much of the Conflict/tension caused by the use of the DBSC (17 out of 33 causal links). For example:

"(The measure is) a bunch of 'hooey' as far as keeping score, but for us running our business it's an important measure. What we do internally is what's important, not if we get a "star" on our shoe. This is one area if the company wants to improve, we need to be a lot more consistent and define that criterion much more closely. We routinely measured ourselves before the company did this. We gauge ourselves monthly on this one. We ignore the BSC measure for our purposes, and use our own." [1: 128-135]

"(Safety is a) hot button. The BSC uses a totally ludicrous measure, but the concept is great. I have written four memos on this subject. I ran two plants before this. I have 100 technicians, and if those 100 have more than one accident in a year, I'm in the red. Ridiculous." [6: 109-111]

The data provide consistent evidence of causal paths connecting Ineffective management control, Ineffective motivation, and Conflict/tension, which support the "ineffective" form of research question 1.

QUESTION 2: 

DOES THE EVIDENCE SUPPORT CAUSAL PATHS FROM (IN)EFFECTIVE BSC COMMUNICATION CHARACTERISTICS TO STRATEGIC (NON)ALIGNMENT, (IN)EFFECTIVE MOTIVATION, AND (POOR) GOOD PERFORMANCE?

Effective Communication > Strategy alignment or Effective motivation > Positive Outcomes. Unexpectedly, the study found no consistent evidence of specific relations between the attributes of Effective communication and other DBSC-model factors. Perhaps perceptions of effective communication are redundant to perceptions of effective management control, but distributors' use of language related to effective communication could not be associated with other DBSC factors. Occasionally, a distributor praised the design and availability of the DBSC on the company's intranet, but the associations of these comments with Strategic alignment, Effective motivation, or Positive outcomes were rare. Nonetheless, nearly all distributors talked naturally about performance in terms of color ratings and rankings. For example,

"I would be really reluctant to post this on the bulletin board. I don't want customers or technicians to see red" [1: 154-156]. "If you're red you're an idiot" [3: 172]. "By seeing it all, you can just call someone up and say, -˜How did you get green in service utilization?'" [4: 188]. "We were yellow, now we're bright red" [9: 59]. "We are competitive, so it matters what rank you are- I want to be number one" [5: 18].

The study's data and method of analysis do not obviously link Effective communication with other DBSC-model factors. It nevertheless seems likely that making the numerical DBSC scores clear and understandable to all via color ratings and rankings does greatly reinforce the DBSC message and does contribute in a general way to changes and improvements. If nothing else, both color ratings and rankings from this DBSC have changed the company's language and reinforce its already competitive culture. Overall, however, this study does not find that Effective communication is either associated with or causes Strategic alignment, Effective motivation, or Positive outcomes. This does not support the "effective" form of research question 2.

Ineffective Communication > Strategy non-alignment or Ineffective motivation > Conflict/tension. Ineffective communication appeared to be largely independent of other "ineffective" DBSC factors. However, though the study found little evidence of the impact of Effective communication, there was abundant evidence that the DBSC administrators' frequent use of One-way reporting is a direct cause of Conflict/tension (16 causal links).

Unfortunately, the Conflict/tension appeared to be unproductive (i.e., no consistent links to Positive outcomes). This may contribute to a climate of distrust and alienation that reduces the company's and its distributors' effectiveness. When the company imposes DBSC measures and benchmarks without seeking input and then uses the DBSC as an evaluation tool, distributors feel ignored and trivialized, but they have little recourse because of the frequency of One-way reporting, which was a common complaint.

"No response (to my complaints), so we stand by our measure. I've gotten no response to my concerns, and I'm -˜PO'd' at them on this subject. Any distributor who is green is a liar. No realistic way in hell that that can happen. The nature of the work we do, we just can't do this-. Do they have any idea what the distributor environment is? They don't care enough to reconcile issues, but the factor itself is important" [6: 116-123].

Partly as anticipated, the data provide support for the "ineffective" form of research question 2: Ineffective communication, specifically One-way reporting, has largely negative consequences for perceptions and reported uses of the DBSC.

ADDITIONAL PATHS

Strategy Alignment -“ Ineffective management control or Ineffective communication or Ineffective motivation -“ Positive outcomes. The study found numerous associations that at first glance appear to be anomalous. Upon reflection, however, it is not surprising that complaints about Inappropriate benchmarks are causes of recommendations to Modify measures or BSC. Clearly, distributors want goals for DBSC Key factors that will lead to business success. For example,

"Is the x% (benchmark percentage of technician hours used for training) appropriate? Hard to say. Probably now, that would be a low number given (that)-the company will completely obsolete its own product line soon. The need for training is much greater today than it has been in the past. Some companies will use training dollars (rather than percentage of training hours). They are at like 5% (of revenues), which is much higher than us. This raises a question in our minds. Do we do enough? We are concerned if we are reinvesting enough in our employees." [1: 183-190]

Additionally, the most numerous, consistent evidence (62 associations shown in dotted lines on the right side of figure 4) shows that Key factors are associated with Inaccurate/subjective measures, Not understandable messages, Inappropriate benchmarks, and Costly to measure. Distributors are frustrated when they perceive ineffective implementation of DBSC factors that they believe are key to their business success and contract renewal. Typical comments, for example involving the DBSC measure of training for salaried employees, include:

"(Training of salaried employees is) as critical (as for technicians) but harder to measure. We have to use some guessing, because they are not paid hourly. Also, what's training? Clearly going to a class during the workday, but what about going after work? What percent of the total salaried hours is that?" [5: 155-160]

"For salaried people, it's harder. We have to look at expense reports, and it's a horrendous process. When you bring this data collection problem to the company, they say we can't do that either. They don't even do it, and they aren't sure of the credibility of their number. From feedback from other distributors, they are just taking a stab at it. We actually compile the numbers, but others are getting green scores for just a guess. We're yellow or red, and it's a real number. The cost of the time isn't worth it. But, it's the right idea and the right thing to do." [1: 175-183]

Distributors' frustrations were obvious when they realized that the DBSC was attempting to measure and communicate important success factors, but that it was doing so ineffectively.

"We don't grow much, so we need to find ways to expand. That's all they pushed here (in contract renewal). At another distributor, all they pushed on was customer satisfaction. Some areas if know we're doing a bad job and were red, they don't seem to care-. Great tool but I'm not sure we are using it the way it should be used" [8: 175-181]. "This is something we all should pay more attention to. We haven't done as well as we should have, but the goal means nothing to me because I'm so far away from it" [5: 122-125].

While the study did not anticipate these (and other similar) associations, their discovery provides ample additional evidence of opportunities to improve the control and communication of strategy with the DBSC.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

The BSC is an innovative strategy communication and management control development. However, as with all innovations, establishing its validity takes time, objective evidence, and careful analysis. There is always the danger that promotional "hype" will promise more than a technique can deliver, which could lead to disappointment, skepticism, and failure to recognize significant benefits, even if they are not as grand as advertised. Kaplan and Norton [1996] bill the BSC as a complete, reliable strategic guide. It perhaps may prove to be just that. However, there has been almost no objective evidence presented in support of this proposition. Most of the BSC literature is either normative prescription or uncritical reports of BSC "successes." To our knowledge, this paper reports the first objective evidence about the BSC "in the real world." We believe this study provides a significant contribution to the literature, of interest to academics and managers alike.

Our findings are that, in at least one corporate setting, the BSC does present significant opportunities to develop, communicate, and implement strategy -“ just as Kaplan and Norton aver. We find evidence that managers respond positively to BSC measures by reorganizing their resources and activities, in some cases dramatically, to improve their performance on those measures. More significantly, they believe that improving their BSC performance is improving their business efficiency and profitability. Managers react favorably to the BSC and heed its messages when:

However, problems of designing and implementing the BSC may be no different from those associated with any major change in performance-measurement systems. The following factors were found to negatively affect perceptions of the BSC and cause significant conflict and tension between the company and its distributors.

Though some of these adverse findings are associated with recommendations for improvement, most are found to be causes of unproductive conflict and tension or a general atmosphere of ineffectiveness. For example, the study found many perceptions of key factors that were ineffectively implemented in the company's BSC. Left uncorrected, these negatives could result in deteriorated relations and failure to realize the potential benefits of the BSC. On the brighter side, these lists represent value-added and non-value-added BSC activities. To successfully design, implement and use the BSC, organizations should enhance the former, positive factors and eliminate or correct the latter, negative factors. It may be worth noting that the total number of consistent linkages on the "ineffective" side of the model in figure 4 far outweighs those on the "effective" side (154 to 59). Thus, the predominance of negative perceptions reflects many opportunities to improve both communication and control of strategy. It seems likely that this ineffectiveness could be resolved and the negative outcomes of unnecessary conflict and tension could be avoided at relatively low cost (though it may require significant changes in attitudes). Possible solutions could be as simple as improved dialogue between the company and its distributors regarding important but ineffectively measured or poorly understood DBSC factors [e.g., Lindquist, 1995].

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Even though many of this company's administrators and distributors apparently use the DBSC as a valid representation of their business, we recognize that their reported perceptions may not be valid representations of their actions. To our knowledge, however, there has been no rigorous, statistical test of the claim that the BSC is, in fact, a causal model, which should be the focus of future research.

We can say very little about the statistical properties of the host company's DBSC at this time, particularly since time lags between changes in investments in people, marketing, and internal processes may not result in tangible financial improvements for six months or several years.

"You will see very little change from quarter to quarter. Last quarter only one measure changed" [9: 121-124]. "I expect a three to five-year lag to see a significant impact of market penetration investments. I'm spending a gazillion dollars on it, but returns will be in about five years. We'll see some short-term returns soon, but the big returns are five years down the road" [2: 148-151]. "My gut feeling is that it took two to three years to reorganize and retrain, and four or five years later it started to pay off. I expect a quicker response now from improving the fill rate and one-hour diagnosis" [6: 205-207]. . I would think about half a year to a year for the parts fill rate. Do well, and your reputation becomes known and you'll see some effect in the financials. It's a matter of customer awareness that we're doing something different here that will bring repeat business" [3:130-133].

"People are very sensitive. They let us know if we are not living up to expectations. Some of our customers are looking elsewhere to get parts because of stocking problems. Customers will react in a six-month window" [1: 217-223]

Practical difficulties that will be encountered in any statistical test of a BSC include:

Making progress on controlling these factors offers opportunities for significant contributions to our understanding of complex performance measurement systems such as the BSC.

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This ends Part 4 of 4