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Ladies and gentlemen, I believe that it may be proved that in all these fields only a community approach yields results. There are lots of examples to prove that a community approach pays off. In the WTO negotiations, for example, the impact of Brussels is evident. Competition, which is the competence of the Commission, and which is therefore a community matter, produces actual results. Surely, everyone remembers the merger between Boeing and McDonald Douglas, on the occasion of which Commissioner Van Miert prevented this merger company from entering into exclusivity contracts with the major American airline companies. Only recently, Vodaphone and KPN-Orange were compelled to split up in order not to distort the competition on the Dutch mobile telephony market. The internal market, as we know it today, is the example par excellence of the potential strength of a good community approach. This internal market was the result of a community approach on the basis of directives, transposition terms and jurisdiction, with an increasing impact of soft law with peer review, convergence pressure and benchmarking. All these measures did not lead to the predicted uniformity and to a levelling harmonisation imposed from above. On the contrary, they led to the creation of an integrated market that allowed considerable space and freedom. Does this imply that the intergovernmental approach should be avoided at all costs? Of course not. Intergovernmental co-operation can be an initial impetus, and sometimes an intermediate stage towards integration, but it can never be the actual objective. Whereas a community approach may be based on qualified majorities, an intergovernmental approach can only be based on a consensus and the strict unanimity rule. In many cases this boils down to a situation of impotence and indecisiveness. Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to seize
this opportunity to raise a point which relates to this issue and which
we will have in Nice, particularly the discussion about enhanced co-operation,
which, I am afraid, is slipping further and further towards an intergovernmental
approach. Indeed, enhanced co-operation should never become an intergovernmental
instrument that allows a number of member states to tear themselves loose
in a number of fields, with a secretariat that functions outside the community
institutions. It should not be an instrument to create a two-speed Europe.
I am in favour of enhanced co-operation. I believe that it can be a means
to speed up integration and to involve member states, which did not join
in during the first phase.
Ladies and gentlemen, Allow me to return to the weaknesses of the current operation of the European Union : inefficiency, lack of transparency, lack of democratic legitimacy. What would a new community approach, cured from these three illnesses, look like? And which profound modifications are required in order to achieve this? Efficiency is closely
linked to cohesion. Without cohesion there is no efficiency. Four radical
measures are needed : in the first place, a socio-economic basis for the
monetary union, a socio-economic policy platform which is completed each
year by means of directives or recommendations and which outlines the policy
to be pursued in these domains within the Union. This goes much further
than GOPE (the "grandes orientations de politiques économiques")
and the annual adjustments of the Luxembourg and Lissabon guide-lines.
Not only must this socio-economic basis combine these instruments. The
aim is also that it follows the example of the public finance policy we
pursued in the past and which led to the creation of an economic and monetary
union. Obviously, it should be less stringent yet comparable in a sense
that it is based on annually adjusted programmes which are comparable to
the stability programmes that have led to the creation of the economic
and monetary union. Such a socio-economic policy platform would be a basis
for our joint currency and would make it possible for Europe to respond
as a Union to exogenous factors such as the recent oil crisis. And this
in contrast with the disparate position of the member states which we are
currently experiencing, to say nothing of the complete absence of the Commission
and Council in this respect.
It seems to me that the second measure is the inevitable separation of the Council's general secretariat and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security policy. To my view, it would be better if this High Representative had a seat both on the Council and the Commission in order to avoid ambiguity in this respect. It is untenable that both the High Representative and the Commissioner are involved in the Union's joint foreign policy. A third measure which is necessary refers specifically to the Union's defence policy: in 2003 we will have a rapid reaction force, but we already have a Eurocorps, a reinforced co-operation agreement avant-la-lettre which unites five countries at present. Together, they may be the steppingstone to a truly European defence system. For the Eurocorps is an instrument for converting the rapid reaction force into the nucleus of what is to be the future European defence system. Because the rapid reaction force that was created in Helsinki is nothing more than a list of troops and means on which the High Representative can count. However, in the relatively short term we must go further than that and create an integrated European defence system with a collective military force, common equipment and materials and even a common defence industry which can provide all this. A last measure to increase efficiency intends to create treaty mechanisms, which make it possible to switch from a system of unanimity to qualified majority - provided that there is a consensus -, all this without the need to follow the rigid procedure of an intergovernmental conference and a ratification round. It would certainly be a tremendous step forward in areas such as justice and domestic affairs. Article 29 of the Treaty provides for such a "passerelle". We will have to examine if it would be appropriate to create more of these treaty articles or rather to extend or at least effectively apply the possibilities provided for in article 29. Two radical measures are necessary to achieve genuine transparency within the Union. Firstly, I refer to the Charter of the Fundamental Rights that in the long term should be included in the Treaties. I do not see the point of limiting ourselves to a mere declaration. We already have a European Declaration on Human Rights. The charter must go further and add something new. Furthermore it is also necessary to rewrite and simplify those Treaties. This should be the initial phase towards the creation of a Constitution of the European Union. Secondly, we must regulate the Kompetenzabgrenzung (delimitation of competences). In other words, each level - the Union, the member states, the regions and the federal states - should know its competences. There should be transparent and clear agreements regarding competences in order to remove the impression that the Union is surreptitiously shifting competences and is assuming competences which had better be exercised at a different level. It is not my intention to make a plea for a European superstate, quite the reverse. The European integration process is unique precisely because the Union does not subject or phases out or substitutes the existing states nor the regions and the federal states, but peacefully integrates them in a greater unity. The growing weight of the regions is already clearly noticeable in the demographic and economic field. In several members' states, cross-border co-operation between regions is already a fact. In a globalising world it is better to put competences where they can be exercised most efficiently. This is a common trend today in major member states of the Union which were centrally controlled until recently, such as France or the United Kingdom. Excellencies
A new community approach will only constitute a breach with the past if there is real democratic legitimacy. Indeed, a true democracy is founded on a system of checks and balances. And we must dare to admit that this has actually never been the case in the European Union. There is insufficient democratic legitimacy within the Union. That is partly due to the weakness of political party formation in Europe is concerned. And it is also related to the current structure and position of the European Parliament. The concept of a bicameral system proposed by minister Fischer is a step in the right direction. The first chamber would seat the directly elected members of parliament, on the basis of the respective populations, the second chamber would seat the representatives of the member states with a fixed and equal representation of those member states, exactly like the United States Senate. Therefore I opt for the second alternative that was presented by the German Minister of Foreign Affairs. Democratic legitimacy also implies the existence of an interinstitutional balance. Most European constitutions make it possible for government and Parliament to dissolve each other. Within the Union, however, a unilateral system is applied, according to which Parliament can dissolve the Commission, but cannot be dissolved itself. In a union of checks and balances this imbalance must be adjusted. Finally, democratic legitimacy implies the creation of a different Commission, a Commission which does not draw its power from its past, from the personality of one or more of its members, but from a renewed relationship with other institutions and more particularly from a democratically and directly elected chairman. Besides, I do not see how Europe could benefit from a weaker Commission. We need a strong Commission that can exercise its right of initiative to the full. Subsequently, the Council must outline its principal priorities and act as legislator, together with the Parliament. Excellencies,
What is the significance of all these proposals to the intergovernmental conference, which will hopefully come to a conclusion in Biarritz and Nice? How does all this relate to the Intergovernmental Conference? As I already stated, the debate on the ultimate goals must not be a pretext for postponing the important decisions, which we now have to take. The present Intergovernmental Conference must carry through the necessary reforms in the first place to ensure that a Union with 28 member states remains operational. The more we can do in that respect, the better. But the discussion should not be ended even if Nice turns out to be a success. That does not mean that I am hoping for new left overs. But I do think that after Nice and even before the start of enlargement we will have to outline the ultimate goal of our joint undertaking, namely the European Union. Making a first outline could be a task for the Belgian presidency, which could result in a declaration of the 15 member states, a declaration which does not give the exact content but which rather indicates the direction of the ultimate goal. A new modification of the treaty immediately after the Intergovernmental Conference is not realistic and I do not advocate it. But a declaration in which the start is given for a debate about the leap that the expanded Union will have to make ought to be possible. I do not know when this will lead to a new modification of the treaty, and for the time being I do not think that is relevant. But it will happen eventually. Ladies and Gentlemen, Allow me to quote the famous Hölderlin: "Man is a God when he dreams, but a beggar when he thinks". What we need to guide the European Union to its final destination are both gods and beggars, both dreamers and thinkers. The European Union was the result of a vision and of the every-day political reality. Let's continue along these lines and dream and set to work at the same time. Thank you.
Guy Verhofstadt
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