THE ALAMEIN BUILD-UP

Since the fall of Tobruk and President Roosevelt's decision to supply aid to the faltering British forces in Egypt, every effort was made to get as many of the new M4 Sherman tanks as possible to the 8th Army. The original plan was to send the complete U.S. 2nd Armored Division to Egypt, but since this would take until October or November to complete, it was decided to skim off about 300 Shermans from training troops and send them off to Egypt immediately, along with 100 of the new M7 "Priest" self-propelled 105mm howitzers.



A special convoy if six ships was assembled and sailed on July 15th, accompanied by three U.S. destroyer. On the second day out the Fairport, with a cargo of 8,000 tons was torpedoed by the German sub U-161 and sunk five hundred miles north of the Virgin Islands. Another fast ship with 52 more Shermans set sail to fill the loss.
By September 11th a total of 318 Shermans had reached the Middle East, most of which were M4A1s, with a few M4A2 models. These were the first Shermans to arrive in quantity, but a single M4A1 had arrived earlier in August so that the ordnance and armored troops could familiarize themselves with the vehicle. The Sherman at this time was almost classified as a secret weapon, and its arrival stirred many a tank crewman's heart. For the next few months the Shermans would rule the battlefield, and the British would finally have a tank with a turret mounted 75mm gun.

Immediately upon their arrival at Port Tewfik they began being modified for desert conditions, plus the addition of sandshields and stowage items. They were then repainted and passed on to the training centers. When the battle of Alamein began on the night of October 23rd there were 252 Shermans with the forward elements of the 8th Army. However, the 36 Shermans of 9th Armoured Brigade had only arrived that same day, and there was little time to check them over before the great barrage began.

OPERATION LIGHTFOOT

Montgomery had put great effort into concealing his build-up in the north, and at the same time had dummy tank parks and refuelling depots set up in the south, in the hope that he could keep much of Rommel's armor guarding the southern flank.
In the early hours of October 23, 1942 the British artillery illuminated the night sky with one of the heaviest bombardments to date. The main impact was felt from the coast to Ruweisat Ridge, but in the south, XII Corps also joined in with diversionary fire. The artillery barrage lasted 15 minutes and severely disrupted the enemy's communication lines, plus the destruction of artillery batteries and minefield emplacements. This was the beginning of twelve days of battle which would see the Axis line falter and then fall, under the enormous pressure applied by the 8th Army.



Sappers now moved forward using the first mine-detectors to see service in WW2, followed by unique "Scorpion" mine clearing tanks, lashing the sand with huge chain flails to clear paths through the minefields. Two main corridors were to be opened up; the upper corridor being given to the 9th Australian and 51st (Highland) Divisions, and the lower one to the 2nd New Zealand Division. Both attacks fell somewhat short of their objectives, but the attrition on the enemy infantry positions had begun. The Italian Trento Division had been very badly mauled and the German 164th Division had two battalions almost wiped out. A further attempt to break through met even stiffer resistance with considerable loss of men and machines.
On the 24th, after taking time to organize and assess the situation, 15th Panzer and Littorio Armored Divisions were ordered to regain the lost positions. The IV Battalion and DLIV Group of Littorio, reinforced with elements of 15th Panzer, attacked and drove the British back until German infantry was able to take over the old positions. In the south, detachments of 21st Panzer, V Semoventi Group and some ardent Italian infantry using grenades, counterattacked and stopped the attack here.
During these battles, General Stumme, commander of the DAK, suffered a heart attack while moving across the battlefield and fell from his vehicle without his driver noticing the mishap. It was then several days before his body was found. To fill the vital position until Rommel's return Lt-General Ritter von Thoma assumed command on the evening of October 24.

On the 25th General Montgomery again ordered XIII and XXX Corps to advance, but both met stiff resistance and failed to gain their objectives. This was the situation on October 26th when Rommel arrived back at his headquarters from Austria. Since the 15th Panzer Division was now down to its last 39 tanks and Littorio Armored Division had only 69, he was forced to bring northward the 106 tanks of 21st Panzer.
These forces were ordered to counterattack and regain the old positions, but the British were waiting with their new 6-pounder anti-tank guns, and a heavy toll was taken. The RAF also pounded the Axis armor from the air and by the end of the day the battlefield was littered with wrecked vehicles.
The 9th Australian Division now struck northward and sliced into the German 164th Division, trapping the greater part of it against the sea. The 1st South African and 4th Indian Divisions joined up to punch a hole in the Bologna Division positions, and now Rommel ordered his last armor reserves, the Ariete Armored reserves, the Ariete Armored Division, to move north.

WOODCOCK AND SNIPE

Kidney Ridge would prove to be a pivital point for the final breakout at El Alamein, and to further expand its potential, two rarely heard of missions were assigned to two infantry units and their accompanying anti-tank guns. Their missions were to take and occupy two positions on the Axis anti-tank screen, one code named "Woodcock" north of Kidney Ridge, and the other named "Snipe" to the south of the riidge.
On the evening of 26 October 1942 these two probes were launched by 7th Motor Brigade, which had just been supplied with plenty of the new 6-pounder anti-tank guns. They had a 30 gun half-hour barrage layed down ahead of them. Due to a navigational error 60th Rifles stumbled into the German line way too soon, while the infantry was still aboard their trucks, and recklessly made a mad dash ahead to get out of the line of fire of the Axis anti-tank guns. They captured about 100 stunned German soldiers plus six anti-tank guns, and settled into their new positions at "Woodcock".



At "Snipe" a few miles to the south, the 2nd Bn.-Rifle Brigade under Lt.Coil. Turner was also having navigational problems caused by faulty maps. By 2. a.m. he had led his battalion about 2,000 yards from the start line to a small oval shaped depression that he assumed was "Snipe". They set up a 19 gun defence all around the perimeter and dug in where necessary with little difficulty. The depression was fringed with tamarisk bushes and camel thorn which helped conceal the guns and infantry firing positions. They had captured a dozen German sappers as they took the position and found a ten foot square roofed dug-out where Turner was quick to set up his battalion HQ.
Meanwhile, several of the Bren gun carriers, feeling their way through a minefield, raced off to attack a German/Italian refuelling depot about a mile distant, setting several trucks and a fuel tanker aflame. They lost one carrier and set the night sky ablaze. Upon returning with a dozen prisoners they were told that about twenty German tanks were now encircling their position.
Heading the attack was a Mark IV Special with the long 75mm gun. It was followed by an Italian Semovente 75/18. Both sides now opened up, but at 30 yards a 6-pdr atopped the Mark IV and several more rounds set it on fire, which lit up the Semovente some 200 yards behind it. That was also swiftly destroyed, and at that point the other tanks began to back off. Obviously there was something deadly out there!

When dawn came the battalion began to realize from distant landmarks that they had plunged themselves right into the gap between 15 Panzer to the north and the Littorio Division to the south. All they could see for miles was Axis vehicles and tanks. They had plowed through to the rear echelons, where softskins scurried about making early morning deliveries.
The gunners decided that this was the time to find out if their new 6-pdrs were as good as they were cracked up to be, and began picking off tanks as fast as they could find them in their sights. In this first exchange they destroyed fourteen tanks, several SP guns, some trucks and an 88mm gun and staff car.
It wasn't long before they were under heavy shelling, which took its toll among gunners trying to move their guns to better field of fire positions, and infantry trying to hunker down. The battalion was virtually cut off from the British lines to the east, but somehow expected the 24th Armoured Brigade to show up at any moment. Unfortunately when the Shermans of the 24th crested Kidney Ridge all they could see was German vehicles and they had no idea that the "Snipe" posirion was now buried in the Axis lines. They began merrily bombarding the whole area.

Unable to warn off the tanks because they were on different radio frequencies, Turner decided to send his intelligence officer off in a Bren gun carrier to try and make contact with the 24th and stop this "friendly fire". Eventually the firing on Snipe ceased, and the Shermans moved forward. German tanks that swung to face this new threat were now taken broadside by the 6-pdrs again. When the Shermans did reach Snipe their high silhouettes brought in devastating fire from German anti-tank guns and soon seven were ablaze. Soon after arrival the remaining Shermans withdrew east behind Kidney Ridge again.
Turner's men were on their own again, and it was obvious that the cavalry was not going to come and save them. A number of the guns were hit and other broke down. Ammunition was getting desperately low, and by midday there were only 13 guns left in action. The infantry was picking off any enemy infantry that ventured too close. Six of the Bren gun carriers were set ablaze by enemy fire, sending up columns of black smoke.

At about one o'clock that afternoon nine Italian M14/41 tanks from Littorio, supported by several Semoventes approached their flank. Unfortunately only one gun could be brought to bear on this group. Pulling together a full crew of volunteers they held their fire until the tanks were within 600 yards and then dispatched six of them in a row. They had three rounds left! The accompanying Semoventes continued to lob 75mm rounds into their position, but the shallow depression was a perfect spot for the low profile 6-pounder.
More 6-pdr rounds were found elsewhere and dragged to this lone gun, which then took out three more M14s at about 300 yards and under. This gave the Italians pause and the withdrew. However, later that afternoon they again came under friendly fire, this time from the 105mm guns of the brand new Priests of 2nd Armoured Brigade who were in combat for the first time. This was devastating to the men and they began to pray for darkness and escape from this mess.

Then, at about 5 p.m. with maybe two hours of good light left they saw about 70 enemy tanks, in two groups, assembling to attack the British armour beyond Snipe. This was one of the attacks for which 21st Panzer had been brought up from the south. For some reason it seems that the newly arrived 21st Panzer had not been informed of the nasty group of enemy anti-tank guns hidden at Snipe. As the German attack moved foreward the nearest tanks were well within 200 yards range of the four guns that had seen the least action that day and were manned by Royal Artillery gunners rather than infantry gunners.

Within minutes they took out nine panzers, and as others turned head on to deal with these guns, the Shermans had broadside targets in abundance. Gradually the German tanks drew back, but soon fifteen Mark IIIs approached from the west. There was still two guns in action that could take them on and four panzers were soon disabled. Others swept around to a different approach and the available guns were now down to about six. Two more Mark IIIs were knocked out, the last for the day, and then darkness set in.
Their casualties included about seventy dead or wounded, including ten officers. They buried their dead in the slit trenches they had occupied and then withdrew from Snipe. Only one gun was retrieved, as they had lost all their transport but for one truck.
It was only some days later, when battalion had a chance to visit Snipe that the full impact of their 24 hour battle was revealed. A conservative estimate concluded that they alone had destroyed or disabled 33 tanks, 5 SP guns, several artillery pieces and trucks and a staff car. They had possibly damaged another 20 tanks which had been forced out of combat for repairs.
Snipe was obviously one of the turning points of the Second Battle of El Alamein, and Rommel had lost irreplaceable armor to a small group of British anti-tank guns that had accidentally embedded themselves in the Axis lines.

OPERATION SUPERCHARGE

Although Churchill was totally disappointed with Monty's failure to break through during the initial battles, the general stuck to his plans for a decisive breakthrough. On November 2nd "Supercharge" was unleashed and the most fierce fighting to date ensued. General Freyberg's 9th Armored Brigade lost 70 of its 94 tanks, with Italian anti-tank gunners engaging targets at ranges as short as 20 yards in a swirling nightmare of dust and destruction. At the end of the day the Axis front was a shambles and Rommel knew it was time to withdraw to new positions 20km to their rear if he hoped to save the Afrika Korps from a complete rout.
This movement had just begun on November 3rd when a message from Hitler insisted that the Afrika Korps hold its ground to the last man. Rommel hesitated, and then finally cancelled his orders to withdraw. Fortunately for the DAK, Montgomery failed to exploit this opportunity of indecision.



The Ariete moved in on the right flank of 15th Panzer on the morning of Nov. 4 and soon found itself under heavy attack from the south and rear by armored elements of the British X Corps. The Italian armor was hopelessly outclassed and almost completely surrounded, but fought on heroically until the following dawn. The Italian XX Corps was almost completely destroyed, and the last message from Ariete gave its position as 5km northwest of Bir el Abd.
By that afternoon the 8th Army had opened a 15 mile breech in the Axis lines, but what remained of the mechanized units of Rommel's Panzerarmee managed to escape to the west. However, the non-motorized Italian Trento, Bologna, Brescia, Pavia and Folgore infantry divisions were left stranded.



During this breakthrough, the commander of the DAK, General von Thoma was also captured as he leapt from his burning vehicle. The German Ramcke Parachute Brigade managed to withdraw on foot into the desert wastes and were able to capture some British transport with which to make their way west. On Nov. 7th they were spotted by German reconnaissance vehicles north of Siwa, and General Ramcke with 700 of his men were brought in.
The following 15th Panzer Division reports during the stages of their withdrawal gives us a good insight into how it was carried out. On November 4th they moved back into defensive positions around Sidi Hamid, and waited as the remnants of 2nd Battalion 115th Panzer Grenadier Regiment continued to come in. Movement westward had to be timed so that their transport, supply services, and regular units could move smoothly through the various defiles open to them.

On Nov. 5th the division moved off at 04:00 hours toward their new positions in an area 50km south of Fuka. The rearguard was formed of the remaining few tanks, as about 200 British tanks and carriers followed up from the southwest. They reached the specified area in the vicinity of Bir Abdalla around 09:00 hours and organized for defense. Lack of fuel was always a problem at this time. During the day enemy tanks and armored cars felt their way forward, and attempted to outflank them to the south, but were driven off by artillery and anti-tank fire. Their next objective was the area south of Mersa Matruh, and the fuel required arrived in the nick of time. During the night they withdrew to the eastern limits of the Mersa Matruh minefields, arriving in the early hours of Nov. 6th.
Kampfgruppe Menton (Sonderverband 288) under Col. Menton was already located on the southeastern edge of the minefields. The lanes through these extensive minefields were largely unknown now and 15th Panzer was forced to squeeze through the only known gap east of the Siwa track. In this new position they were somehat protected by the minefields, but had no freedom of movement. Both fuel and water were in short supply.

On Nov. 7th a detachment from 33rd Panzer Engineer Bn. was sent out to reconnoitre routes of withdrawal through the minefields to the southwest and northwest. Both proved impassable and they were finally ordered to move westward along the congested coastal road by night to Sidi Barani, despite the risk of air attack. Shortly after moving out, their armored spearhead was engaged by gunners of Kampfgruppe Menton, which in the darkness mistook them for the advancing British armor. Two tanks were knocked out and the division was delayed for two hours.

On Nov. 8th, with the British continuing to follow cautiously, 15th Panzer managed to withdraw to Bug-Bug with only two minor skirmishes. On Nov. 9th they passed through Halfaya Pass to the Capuzzo area. During Nov. 11th they moved along the Trigh Capuzzo to El Duda, on Nov. 12th they reached El Adem, and on the 13th passed through the Gazala minefields on the Acroma track to reach Bir Temrad. On Nov. 14th they moved along the Martuba route and Via Balbia to Maraua. Nov. 15th saw them move from Barce to El Abjar. Nov. 17th they passed through Benghazi, Ghemines and Magrun. By Nov. 19th they were just north of Agedabia, and by the 25th were in positions east of El Agheila. The long retreat from Alamein was over.