THE ALAMEIN BUILD-UP
Since the fall of Tobruk and President Roosevelt's decision
to supply aid to the faltering British forces in Egypt, every
effort was made to get as many of the new M4 Sherman tanks as
possible to the 8th Army. The original plan was to send the complete
U.S. 2nd Armored Division to Egypt, but since this would take
until October or November to complete, it was decided to skim
off about 300 Shermans from training troops and send them off
to Egypt immediately, along with 100 of the new M7 "Priest"
self-propelled 105mm howitzers.
A special convoy if six ships was assembled and sailed on July
15th, accompanied by three U.S. destroyer. On the second day out
the Fairport, with a cargo of 8,000 tons was torpedoed by the
German sub U-161 and sunk five hundred miles north of the Virgin
Islands. Another fast ship with 52 more Shermans set sail to fill
the loss.
By September 11th a total of 318 Shermans had reached the Middle
East, most of which were M4A1s, with a few M4A2 models. These
were the first Shermans to arrive in quantity, but a single M4A1
had arrived earlier in August so that the ordnance and armored
troops could familiarize themselves with the vehicle. The Sherman
at this time was almost classified as a secret weapon, and its
arrival stirred many a tank crewman's heart. For the next few
months the Shermans would rule the battlefield, and the British
would finally have a tank with a turret mounted 75mm gun.
Immediately upon their arrival at Port Tewfik they began being
modified for desert conditions, plus the addition of sandshields
and stowage items. They were then repainted and passed on to the
training centers. When the battle of Alamein began on the night
of October 23rd there were 252 Shermans with the forward elements
of the 8th Army. However, the 36 Shermans of 9th Armoured Brigade
had only arrived that same day, and there was little time to check
them over before the great barrage began.
OPERATION LIGHTFOOT
Montgomery had put great effort into concealing his build-up
in the north, and at the same time had dummy tank parks and refuelling
depots set up in the south, in the hope that he could keep much
of Rommel's armor guarding the southern flank.
In the early hours of October 23, 1942 the British artillery illuminated
the night sky with one of the heaviest bombardments to date. The
main impact was felt from the coast to Ruweisat Ridge, but in
the south, XII Corps also joined in with diversionary fire. The
artillery barrage lasted 15 minutes and severely disrupted the
enemy's communication lines, plus the destruction of artillery
batteries and minefield emplacements. This was the beginning of
twelve days of battle which would see the Axis line falter and
then fall, under the enormous pressure applied by the 8th Army.
Sappers now moved forward using the first mine-detectors to see
service in WW2, followed by unique "Scorpion" mine clearing
tanks, lashing the sand with huge chain flails to clear paths
through the minefields. Two main corridors were to be opened up;
the upper corridor being given to the 9th Australian and 51st
(Highland) Divisions, and the lower one to the 2nd New Zealand
Division. Both attacks fell somewhat short of their objectives,
but the attrition on the enemy infantry positions had begun. The
Italian Trento Division had been very badly mauled and the German
164th Division had two battalions almost wiped out. A further
attempt to break through met even stiffer resistance with considerable
loss of men and machines.
On the 24th, after taking time to organize and assess the situation,
15th Panzer and Littorio Armored Divisions were ordered to regain
the lost positions. The IV Battalion and DLIV Group of Littorio,
reinforced with elements of 15th Panzer, attacked and drove the
British back until German infantry was able to take over the old
positions. In the south, detachments of 21st Panzer, V Semoventi
Group and some ardent Italian infantry using grenades, counterattacked
and stopped the attack here.
During these battles, General Stumme, commander of the DAK, suffered
a heart attack while moving across the battlefield and fell from
his vehicle without his driver noticing the mishap. It was then
several days before his body was found. To fill the vital position
until Rommel's return Lt-General Ritter von Thoma assumed command
on the evening of October 24.
On the 25th General Montgomery again ordered XIII and XXX Corps
to advance, but both met stiff resistance and failed to gain their
objectives. This was the situation on October 26th when Rommel
arrived back at his headquarters from Austria. Since the 15th
Panzer Division was now down to its last 39 tanks and Littorio
Armored Division had only 69, he was forced to bring northward
the 106 tanks of 21st Panzer.
These forces were ordered to counterattack and regain the old
positions, but the British were waiting with their new 6-pounder
anti-tank guns, and a heavy toll was taken. The RAF also pounded
the Axis armor from the air and by the end of the day the battlefield
was littered with wrecked vehicles.
The 9th Australian Division now struck northward and sliced into
the German 164th Division, trapping the greater part of it against
the sea. The 1st South African and 4th Indian Divisions joined
up to punch a hole in the Bologna Division positions, and now
Rommel ordered his last armor reserves, the Ariete Armored reserves,
the Ariete Armored Division, to move north.
WOODCOCK AND SNIPE
Kidney Ridge would prove to be a pivital point for the final
breakout at El Alamein, and to further expand its potential, two
rarely heard of missions were assigned to two infantry units and
their accompanying anti-tank guns. Their missions were to take
and occupy two positions on the Axis anti-tank screen, one code
named "Woodcock" north of Kidney Ridge, and the other
named "Snipe" to the south of the riidge.
On the evening of 26 October 1942 these two probes were launched
by 7th Motor Brigade, which had just been supplied with plenty
of the new 6-pounder anti-tank guns. They had a 30 gun half-hour
barrage layed down ahead of them. Due to a navigational error
60th Rifles stumbled into the German line way too soon, while
the infantry was still aboard their trucks, and recklessly made
a mad dash ahead to get out of the line of fire of the Axis anti-tank
guns. They captured about 100 stunned German soldiers plus six
anti-tank guns, and settled into their new positions at "Woodcock".
At "Snipe" a few miles to the south, the 2nd Bn.-Rifle
Brigade under Lt.Coil. Turner was also having navigational problems
caused by faulty maps. By 2. a.m. he had led his battalion about
2,000 yards from the start line to a small oval shaped depression
that he assumed was "Snipe". They set up a 19 gun defence
all around the perimeter and dug in where necessary with little
difficulty. The depression was fringed with tamarisk bushes and
camel thorn which helped conceal the guns and infantry firing
positions. They had captured a dozen German sappers as they took
the position and found a ten foot square roofed dug-out where
Turner was quick to set up his battalion HQ.
Meanwhile, several of the Bren gun carriers, feeling their way
through a minefield, raced off to attack a German/Italian refuelling
depot about a mile distant, setting several trucks and a fuel
tanker aflame. They lost one carrier and set the night sky ablaze.
Upon returning with a dozen prisoners they were told that about
twenty German tanks were now encircling their position.
Heading the attack was a Mark IV Special with the long 75mm gun.
It was followed by an Italian Semovente 75/18. Both sides now
opened up, but at 30 yards a 6-pdr atopped the Mark IV and several
more rounds set it on fire, which lit up the Semovente some 200
yards behind it. That was also swiftly destroyed, and at that
point the other tanks began to back off. Obviously there was something
deadly out there!
When dawn came the battalion began to realize from distant landmarks
that they had plunged themselves right into the gap between 15
Panzer to the north and the Littorio Division to the south. All
they could see for miles was Axis vehicles and tanks. They had
plowed through to the rear echelons, where softskins scurried
about making early morning deliveries.
The gunners decided that this was the time to find out if their
new 6-pdrs were as good as they were cracked up to be, and began
picking off tanks as fast as they could find them in their sights.
In this first exchange they destroyed fourteen tanks, several
SP guns, some trucks and an 88mm gun and staff car.
It wasn't long before they were under heavy shelling, which took
its toll among gunners trying to move their guns to better field
of fire positions, and infantry trying to hunker down. The battalion
was virtually cut off from the British lines to the east, but
somehow expected the 24th Armoured Brigade to show up at any moment.
Unfortunately when the Shermans of the 24th crested Kidney Ridge
all they could see was German vehicles and they had no idea that
the "Snipe" posirion was now buried in the Axis lines.
They began merrily bombarding the whole area.
Unable to warn off the tanks because they were on different radio
frequencies, Turner decided to send his intelligence officer off
in a Bren gun carrier to try and make contact with the 24th and
stop this "friendly fire". Eventually the firing on
Snipe ceased, and the Shermans moved forward. German tanks that
swung to face this new threat were now taken broadside by the
6-pdrs again. When the Shermans did reach Snipe their high silhouettes
brought in devastating fire from German anti-tank guns and soon
seven were ablaze. Soon after arrival the remaining Shermans withdrew
east behind Kidney Ridge again.
Turner's men were on their own again, and it was obvious that
the cavalry was not going to come and save them. A number of the
guns were hit and other broke down. Ammunition was getting desperately
low, and by midday there were only 13 guns left in action. The
infantry was picking off any enemy infantry that ventured too
close. Six of the Bren gun carriers were set ablaze by enemy fire,
sending up columns of black smoke.
At about one o'clock that afternoon nine Italian M14/41 tanks
from Littorio, supported by several Semoventes approached their
flank. Unfortunately only one gun could be brought to bear on
this group. Pulling together a full crew of volunteers they held
their fire until the tanks were within 600 yards and then dispatched
six of them in a row. They had three rounds left! The accompanying
Semoventes continued to lob 75mm rounds into their position, but
the shallow depression was a perfect spot for the low profile
6-pounder.
More 6-pdr rounds were found elsewhere and dragged to this lone
gun, which then took out three more M14s at about 300 yards and
under. This gave the Italians pause and the withdrew. However,
later that afternoon they again came under friendly fire, this
time from the 105mm guns of the brand new Priests of 2nd Armoured
Brigade who were in combat for the first time. This was devastating
to the men and they began to pray for darkness and escape from
this mess.
Then, at about 5 p.m. with maybe two hours of good light left
they saw about 70 enemy tanks, in two groups, assembling to attack
the British armour beyond Snipe. This was one of the attacks for
which 21st Panzer had been brought up from the south. For some
reason it seems that the newly arrived 21st Panzer had not been
informed of the nasty group of enemy anti-tank guns hidden at
Snipe. As the German attack moved foreward the nearest tanks were
well within 200 yards range of the four guns that had seen the
least action that day and were manned by Royal Artillery gunners
rather than infantry gunners.
Within minutes they took out nine panzers, and as others turned
head on to deal with these guns, the Shermans had broadside targets
in abundance. Gradually the German tanks drew back, but soon fifteen
Mark IIIs approached from the west. There was still two guns in
action that could take them on and four panzers were soon disabled.
Others swept around to a different approach and the available
guns were now down to about six. Two more Mark IIIs were knocked
out, the last for the day, and then darkness set in.
Their casualties included about seventy dead or wounded, including
ten officers. They buried their dead in the slit trenches they
had occupied and then withdrew from Snipe. Only one gun was retrieved,
as they had lost all their transport but for one truck.
It was only some days later, when battalion had a chance to visit
Snipe that the full impact of their 24 hour battle was revealed.
A conservative estimate concluded that they alone had destroyed
or disabled 33 tanks, 5 SP guns, several artillery pieces and
trucks and a staff car. They had possibly damaged another 20 tanks
which had been forced out of combat for repairs.
Snipe was obviously one of the turning points of the Second Battle
of El Alamein, and Rommel had lost irreplaceable armor to a small
group of British anti-tank guns that had accidentally embedded
themselves in the Axis lines.
OPERATION SUPERCHARGE
Although Churchill was totally disappointed with Monty's failure
to break through during the initial battles, the general stuck
to his plans for a decisive breakthrough. On November 2nd "Supercharge"
was unleashed and the most fierce fighting to date ensued. General
Freyberg's 9th Armored Brigade lost 70 of its 94 tanks, with Italian
anti-tank gunners engaging targets at ranges as short as 20 yards
in a swirling nightmare of dust and destruction. At the end of
the day the Axis front was a shambles and Rommel knew it was time
to withdraw to new positions 20km to their rear if he hoped to
save the Afrika Korps from a complete rout.
This movement had just begun on November 3rd when a message from
Hitler insisted that the Afrika Korps hold its ground to the last
man. Rommel hesitated, and then finally cancelled his orders to
withdraw. Fortunately for the DAK, Montgomery failed to exploit
this opportunity of indecision.
The Ariete moved in on the right flank of 15th Panzer on the morning
of Nov. 4 and soon found itself under heavy attack from the south
and rear by armored elements of the British X Corps. The Italian
armor was hopelessly outclassed and almost completely surrounded,
but fought on heroically until the following dawn. The Italian
XX Corps was almost completely destroyed, and the last message
from Ariete gave its position as 5km northwest of Bir el Abd.
By that afternoon the 8th Army had opened a 15 mile breech in
the Axis lines, but what remained of the mechanized units of Rommel's
Panzerarmee managed to escape to the west. However, the non-motorized
Italian Trento, Bologna, Brescia, Pavia and Folgore infantry divisions
were left stranded.

During this breakthrough, the commander of the DAK, General von
Thoma was also captured as he leapt from his burning vehicle.
The German Ramcke Parachute Brigade managed to withdraw on foot
into the desert wastes and were able to capture some British transport
with which to make their way west. On Nov. 7th they were spotted
by German reconnaissance vehicles north of Siwa, and General Ramcke
with 700 of his men were brought in.
The following 15th Panzer Division reports during the stages of
their withdrawal gives us a good insight into how it was carried
out. On November 4th they moved back into defensive positions
around Sidi Hamid, and waited as the remnants of 2nd Battalion
115th Panzer Grenadier Regiment continued to come in. Movement
westward had to be timed so that their transport, supply services,
and regular units could move smoothly through the various defiles
open to them.
On Nov. 5th the division moved off at 04:00 hours toward their
new positions in an area 50km south of Fuka. The rearguard was
formed of the remaining few tanks, as about 200 British tanks
and carriers followed up from the southwest. They reached the
specified area in the vicinity of Bir Abdalla around 09:00 hours
and organized for defense. Lack of fuel was always a problem at
this time. During the day enemy tanks and armored cars felt their
way forward, and attempted to outflank them to the south, but
were driven off by artillery and anti-tank fire. Their next objective
was the area south of Mersa Matruh, and the fuel required arrived
in the nick of time. During the night they withdrew to the eastern
limits of the Mersa Matruh minefields, arriving in the early hours
of Nov. 6th.
Kampfgruppe Menton (Sonderverband 288) under Col. Menton was already
located on the southeastern edge of the minefields. The lanes
through these extensive minefields were largely unknown now and
15th Panzer was forced to squeeze through the only known gap east
of the Siwa track. In this new position they were somehat protected
by the minefields, but had no freedom of movement. Both fuel and
water were in short supply.
On Nov. 7th a detachment from 33rd Panzer Engineer Bn. was sent
out to reconnoitre routes of withdrawal through the minefields
to the southwest and northwest. Both proved impassable and they
were finally ordered to move westward along the congested coastal
road by night to Sidi Barani, despite the risk of air attack.
Shortly after moving out, their armored spearhead was engaged
by gunners of Kampfgruppe Menton, which in the darkness mistook
them for the advancing British armor. Two tanks were knocked out
and the division was delayed for two hours.
On Nov. 8th, with the British continuing to follow cautiously,
15th Panzer managed to withdraw to Bug-Bug with only two minor
skirmishes. On Nov. 9th they passed through Halfaya Pass to the
Capuzzo area. During Nov. 11th they moved along the Trigh Capuzzo
to El Duda, on Nov. 12th they reached El Adem, and on the 13th
passed through the Gazala minefields on the Acroma track to reach
Bir Temrad. On Nov. 14th they moved along the Martuba route and
Via Balbia to Maraua. Nov. 15th saw them move from Barce to El
Abjar. Nov. 17th they passed through Benghazi, Ghemines and Magrun.
By Nov. 19th they were just north of Agedabia, and by the 25th
were in positions east of El Agheila. The long retreat from Alamein
was over.