In the book, The Poverty of Progress, E. Bradford Burns lays out the trials and triumphs of Latin America in the Nineteenth Century, by focusing on the sociopolitical and economic issues of the times, and how they affected the majority of Latin Americans. Burns structures his essays, in such a way, to explain what the social elite deemed as “progress” through liberalism, and then presented the alternatives of liberalism, through reigns of successful caudillos. According to Burns, the caudillos created governments “of the people for the people” (98) while the liberals were of the ideal “’for’ the people but not ‘by’ the people” (22). Through the examples of capitalism, monoculture, and Europeanization, all under the generalization of “progress,” Burns lays out the comparisons and contrasts between the popular “folk caudillos” and the liberals, ultimately showing his favoritism towards the caudillos. This essay will try to compare and contrast the policies and the “progress” of the liberals of the nineteenth century and of two “folk caudillos,” Carrera of Guatemala and Belzu of Bolivia.

According to Burns, “liberalism meant placing individual freedom and material gain over public interest” in the name of “progress.” The elite stressed “individualism, competition, and the unfettered pursuit of profit” which ended up causing rifts between the people of Latin America, not necessarily through class lines, but cultural preferences (8). The ideas of “progress” came from the “elites’ fears of their own provinciality or inferiority” compared to their European cousins (18). To alleviate these fears the elites and the middle class forced and imposed upon Latin American people all aspects of European culture creating facades of European cities all across Latin America. Progress was measured by how well a city emulated it’s European counterpart, not by how independent and economically wealthy they were. In their pursuit of Europeanization the elites created a greater dependency to Europe and America than when they were a colony of Spain and Portugal. In the name of capitalism communal lands of the Indians were plotted and sold to Haciendas, forcing the Indians to work on these cattle ranches and plantations to earn money for food rather than grow it themselves. Burns says, the elites also excluded the Indians from the government, showing great racism towards the “inferior” Indians, and in attempt to create greater wealth for themselves, using the hands of the Indians to cultivate that wealth. Free trade became the major money maker for the middle class and elites causing more capitalization, hacienda expansion, loss of folk land, and resulting in a monoculture agrarian society. Burns stresses many times how the elites and the middle class took advantage of the docile Indians in order to create greater wealth for themselves and reputations for being Europeanized, for the good of “progress,” rather than acting for the good of the country as a whole.

When the stresses and impositions put upon the Indians became too much they revolted against their upper class. During one such revolt in Guatemala, Rafael Carrera, took leadership and then became president of Guatemala. The Indians under his reign were tired of their “exploitation and destruction through Europeanization” and just wanted to “live unmolested according to the dicta of their own culture” rather than be oppressed by Anglo-Saxon culture (97). Carrera understood and sympathized with the Indians, having lived among them for many years. Under Carrera’s rule, from 1838-1865, the country as a whole became more stable, independent, and self sufficient. Unlike the liberals, who excluded the Indians from any type of government, Carrera is said to have “Indianized” the government, giving high ranking positions in both government and military to the Indians. He had government documents and decrees translated into the Indian language and opened his ears and arms to the Indian voice. Burns also explains how Carrera turned the country from a monoculture society to a more self-sufficient society. Lands that were confiscated from the Indian people in pursuit of capitalization were returned to the Indians, and if lands were not available, lands were made available for anyone who wished to relocate. Enabling the Indians to go back to their subsistence farming, as well as getting rid of free trade, made the country look inward for food and goods rather than to Europe which lowered the price of food and created a more stable economy saving the country money but, leaving the elites’ and middle class’ pockets a little less lined. By the end of Carrera’s reign, in Guatemala, the “progress” of the people was probably more evident than if the liberals had forced it. Carrera continued with the modernization of the lands, stressing education, technology, and western thought, not through force, but subtle suggestion at a pace at which the Indians could adapt Europeanization to their culture rather than adopt it. According to Burns, this policy of modernization and Europeanization is much more efficient and humanitarian than the liberals’ attempts, creating a stable and economically independent nation.

Around the same time Carrera was in office, Manuel Belzu became president of Bolivia becoming one of the most “highly controversial figure[s]” of the times. Like Carrera, Belzu became the voice of the Indian people, looking towards their interests rather than to the interests of the wealthy. He was a great advocator of “’protectionism’ as a means to promote local industry and thereby to benefit the working class” (107). Unlike Carrera, he was a ruler who turned a blind eye to many of the things the Indians did, especially when they revolted or pillaged against the wealthy. He also turned a blind eye to their attempts to gain back their land, driving the middle class hacienda owners into the cities, rather than having the government decree the land back to the Indians. Belzu believed that all Indians should have their own lands and that the “basic problems bedeviling Bolivia” was “foreign penetration and manipulation of the economy and the alienation of the Indians’ land” (107). Burns also says that Belzu believed that Bolivia was not ready to embrace the theories of free trade, so he restricted it and looked more toward “import commerce,” but because of lack of funds, it could not be done. Belzu also made other changes within the nation to the favor of the Indians; he created “modest labor unions” and “abolished slavery,” he even “valorized the Indian past” in efforts supporting the poor majority rather than the rich minority. The major difference between Carrera and Belzu, according to Burns, is that Belzu was too Europeanized himself to maintain power and to fully take control of the country, rather he turned a blind eye to many of the occurrences within the nation. Through Burn’s interpretation of history, Belzu seemed to be the middleman between a true “folk caudillo” and a liberal, even though the Indians of Bolivia thought as him as a father-figure. Belzu’s impact on Bolivia was insubstantial due to the fact the moment he retired office the liberals returned everything to the way it was before Belzu took office.

E. Bradford Burns uses these essays within The Poverty of Progress to stress the ideas and impacts of liberal and caudillo policies and practices. The liberals who believed “progress” meant to become a European nation in the Americas through capitalism and greed; Rafel Carrera who believed “progress” meant to help the Indian people adapt European cultures to their own and create a stable internal economy; and Manuel Belzu who helped the Indians become more independent and meet out their own justice while he turned a blind eye. These three examples of practices and policies within nineteenth century Latin America show the diverse beliefs between liberals and caudillos and that Burns believes that support of the Indian people is superior to that of their distruction and extinction.