un#6

NYU-A#7-

Jeffrey Garofalo

October 27, 2000

International Organizations

UNEF I & The Suez Canal

Background

On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, the principle artery for navigation, commerce and the transhipment of oil for Asia, the Far East, Africa and Western Europe. By assuming control over the canal company and its property, Nasser sought to expel England and France from the region, while uniting the Arab world in their struggle against Israel. This bold action precipitated an intriguing course of events culminating in a military confrontation which forever changed the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East.

The Participants in the Suez Crisis

England: After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after WW I, England became the dominant force in the Middle East. At one time stationing over 80,000 troops to protect this vital outlet to the British Empire, England viewed Nasser's gamble as a direct challenge to English hegemony in the region.
France: France was concerned that Egypt's policy would threaten their interests in Morocco and Algeria, both of whom sought their independence from "Metropolitan France".
Israel: Having gained their independence in 1948, Israel viewed Nasser's action as a direct threat to both their security and economic viability.
Soviet Union: Krushchev sold arms to Egypt through Czechoslovakia, thereby introducing the Soviet Union to the Middle East for the first time.
United States: President Eisenhower sought to contain Soviet influence in the region, while seeking to curry favor with the Arab World. The U.S. would play a prominent role in the diplomatic arena during the conflict.

III. The Confrontation

The battle on the ground and in the skies overhead followed the adoption of a plan reminiscent of a Hollywood script. As Dr. Kissenger explains in Diplomacy "Concocted by France, the plan involved an Israeli invasion of Egypt and an advance towards the Suez Canal. As Israeli forces marched towards the Canal, England and France would demand a withdrawal by both Egypt and Israel to a distance of ten miles from the canal. When Egypt refused, as was expected, England and France would introduce ground and air forces to capture the Canal Zone".

IV. The Role of the United Nations in the Conflict

Disappointed with the unilateral actions taken by England, France and Israel against Egypt, the U.S. brought the case to the UN for a resolution of hostilities. The UN would take several measures to resolve the conflict. These included:

On October 30, the U.S. introduced a Security Council resolution calling for a cessation of hostilities and Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territories. England and France vetoed the resolution;
On November 1, under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, an emergency session of the General Assembly was called;
On November 2, in a vote of 64-5, a resolution was passed calling for a cease fire, a withdrawal of forces and a prompt action toward opening up the Canal. The British and French agreed, pending the creation of a UN force to monitor the armistice and reopening of the canal for navigation;
On November 3 and 4, Canadian Lester Pearson introduces resolution calling on Secretary General Hammarskjold to create necessary UN force;
On November 5, the resolution was adopted and by November 15, the first UN contingents began arriving in Egypt.

UNEF I

With a force of 6,073 military personnel, representing 10 countries, the UNEF was stationed along the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula. At a cost of $214,249,000, the UNEF remained until the outbreak of the six days war in June of 1967. The principle objectives of UNEF were threefold:

To secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities;

To monitor the withdrawal of the armed forces of Israel, France and England from Egyptian soil;

To serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces.

VI. Successes of UNEF I

Successfully monitored Anglo/French troop withdrawals by December 22, 1956;

Successfully monitored Israeli troop withdrawal by March of 1957;

Forces at Sharm al-Shaykh permitted Israeli navigation of the Red Sea;

Served as an "instrument for relative peace for 10 years";

Mission went far beyond any previous peacekeeping operation in size and budget;

Established the principle that the force should be politically neutral;

Established the principle that the force should be administratively linked to the Secretary General.

VII. Failures of UNEF I

The force could not ease tensions within the area;

The force could not prevent armed clashes;

107 UNEF lives lost;

Ultimately, the force was unable to prevent the next major confrontation in the region.

VIII. Conclusion

In May of 1967, Egypt presses Secretary General U-Thant for the removal of UNEF from Sharm al-Shaykh. On June 5, 1967, war breaks out between Israel and her neighbors. Israel occupies the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. For UNEF, 10 years of relative peace had erupted in war. For England and France, their great power status evanesced in their plans of 10 years prior. Over the next 25 years, their void would be filled by the Soviet Union and the U.S.