INTRODUCTION

U.S. Military Refuses to Adapt to the situation if it means cleaning up their snobbery

"I’m not going to destroy the traditions and doctrine of the United States Army just to win this lousy war."

Sound familiar?

"any good Soldier can defeat a guerrilla."

Insert "marine" for Soldier if you like.

Now consider how the brass lacked a fraction of the balls (moral courage) of 1LT Watada during the Vietnam war to reform themselves and stand up to corrupt President Johnson to conduct the non-linear war correctly:

www.leaderu.com/ftissues/ft0012/articles/garfinkle.html

But is it too much to expect that General Westmoreland, General Earl Wheeler, and their staffs might have better understood their professional obligations in the face of a novel challenge? No, that is not too much to expect. It is not too much to expect a professional Soldier to put his country’s interests above those of his service or his personal reputation, and that was precisely the problem. Thanks to Nikita Khrushchev’s famous speech about "wars of national liberation" as the new face of the anti-imperialist struggle, and to President Kennedy’s conclusion that the United States needed to invest more resources into our capabilities to fight counterinsurgencies, a furious argument broke out in the early 1960s within the middle ranks of the U.S. Army. While some major figures, such as General James Gavin, supported Kennedy’s view, most senior Army brass resisted it firmly. General George H. Decker, Army Chief of Staff from 1960 to 1962, summarized this view with the comment that "any good Soldier can defeat a guerrilla."

The conventionalists won the bureaucratic wars, and, as is the way of the world in such matters, their views hardened from having been subject to criticism. The conventionalists got promoted and, with those hardened views firmly implanted in their heads, rose to their places just in time to mismanage the war in Vietnam. Lind quotes an anonymous Army officer in Vietnam as saying, "I’m not going to destroy the traditions and doctrine of the United States Army just to win this lousy war." Such sentiment not only reflects Westmoreland’s misguided devotion to conventional tactics in the face of an unconventional situation, but also the primacy the Army accorded doctrinal orthodoxy (and the professional egos attached to the doctrines) above all else. The American people had a right to expect better, and certainly deserved better. Which brings us back to Robert McNamara.

Is it too much to have expected McNamara to have bucked the tide within the Johnson Administration as a whole and opposed the 1965 escalation? Yes, it is too much, and we would all be better off if McNamara ceased his self-flagellation over the point. But is it too much to have expected McNamara to put a stop to Westmoreland’s disastrous direction of the war before the end of 1966? No, it is not too much, because that was his job. McNamara himself was one of those who dressed down General Gavin for wanting to develop anti-guerrilla tactics, and he gave Westmoreland the leeway to wreak maximum havoc. It was also McNamara the systems analyst, along with the senior Army brass, who became fixated with body counts and other conventional indicators of military success that mislead in unconventional contexts. If McNamara insists on contrition, fine; he has much for which to repent. Just let him get the reasons right.

"Surge" Face-Saving Measure is not new, Abrams was wonder-boy with his "Surge" in second half of our Vietnam War Debacle

Look familiar?

Change "Abrams" to "Petreaus".

Change "Maximum pressure" to "Surge".

Change "Vietnam" to "Iraq".